Historiography of Islam generally portraits Islamic modernism in Indonesia influenced by purification movement of Wahabism in theology, reformism of Abduh and Rashid Ridha in thoughts, Islamic state of al-Mawdudi in politics, and Pan-Islamism of al-Afghani in international relation. Those movements brought in new characteristics of Islam in Indonesia; back to the pure of Islam, avoiding Sufism and fiqh-oriented Islam, rejecting local traditions, reform Muslim’s thought, engaging social activities, developing educational institutes, promoting nationalism against colonialism, and creating political parties to ensure Indonesian state for being Islamic and holding Islamic Shari’ah. However, modern Islam has no one monolithic thought and movement in Indonesia. Obviously, it has developed and changed in response to internal factors of socio-political conditions in Indonesia rather than to the outside of the country.
Despite its successful movement in building educational institutions and health care services, modern Islam failed to organize and mobilize Muslims to establish Islamic state, even to keep ‘seven words’ of Djakarta Charter –obligating Muslims to follow the Shari’ah- in the Constitution. Sukarno was very strict to limit the influence of political Islam, while the whole period of Suharto was full of simultaneous efforts to demolish all powers of political Islam. However, the later period of Suharto was in favor to non-political thoughts of Islam pioneered by youth wings of modernists such as Usep Fathuddin, Utomo Danandjaja, Ahmad Wahib and Nurcholis Madjid. Their movement later called Islamic neo-modernism was basically to declare the failure of Islamic politics, and instead to bring Muslims a new awareness of cultural Islam empowering Muslims in the level of individuals and communities.
In contrast to movement of Islamic modernism, the most important feature of neo-modernism is its interpretation of Islam as tolerant and inclusive religion, in favor of religious pluralism, and that Pancasila is not only Islamic but rather the most appropriate and final model for Indonesian Muslims living in pluralistic society. Those issues, although were very controversial among Muslims from a theological point of view, has had the possibility to develop and spread around the nation all the time during the authoritarian era of Suharto. This makes many people the opponents especially, suspicious and accusing neo-modernism as a product of the New Order in the one hand. While on the other hand, its proponents are also pessimistic with the future of inclusive Islam in the absent of the support from Post-Suharto regime. Moreover, progressive Muslims who promote inclusive Islam are standing up directly against civil-military groups of radical Muslims. The state in many cases, especially SBY regime, is very weak to counter hardlines of Muslim organizations.
Although the vast majority of Indonesian Muslims remain tolerant and inclusive, however the small size of radical Muslim has ‘social cultural chances’ and poses a danger as it may co-opt moderate majority in the absence of effective counter measures. The chances are that the ideology of Islamic state still remain in the head of many Muslims lay people as well as those who seat in the Parliament, the absence of national identity, the abrupt decline of central government, the demoralization of police, the cases of corruptions and poverty, and the weakness of national leadership. The situation will be worse if the effort of civil society remain outside of and are not linked with the government’s actions. Media, I think, also should not overemphasize to blow up the news of radical Muslims because it will give them free publicity they seek. The most important is the institutional commitment of the biggest ‘modern’ organization ‘Muhammadiyah’ and the biggest ‘traditionalist’ organization ‘Nahdlatul Ulama’ to ensure all of their missions are in favor of inclusive Islam.
Readings:
1. Robert Hefner, “The Modernist Travail” in Civil Islam, pp. 94-127.
2. Nurcholish Madjid, “In Search of Islamic Roots for Modern Pluralism, The Indonesian Experience” in Mark Woodward, ed., Toward a New Paradigm: Recent Developments in Indonesian Islamic Though, pp. 89-116.
Minggu, 28 Maret 2010
Modernization and purification of Islam: DII and Islamicist separatist movements, muhammadiyah, syari’ah;
Tri Harmaji
History of Religions in Indonesia Part II: from c. 1900 to the Present
Modernization and purification of Islam: DII and Islamicist separatist movements, muhammadiyah, syari’ah; Andi F Bakti, collective memories of the Qahhar movement, Robert Hefner, the modernist travail, John Bowen, Islam, law and equality in Indonesia.
Indonesia is a country comprise of so many diverse. There are many different ethnicity, customs, language, and religion. It looks that there is nothing same or similar among the people live in the area we call Indonesia now. The only cause of the similarity is history, but still not very long history; only about half and three centuries as the same people colonized by the Dutch. Usually and commonly a state is founded based on ethnicity or language. These two matters are the strongest tie to bind up people to live together as one nation in a state. Even religion is actually not strong enough to bind up people, because if so it is likely that in Europe will exist only one Christian state like Roman Empire at that time.
This problem is apparently has become so clearly interrupted Indonesian history. When independence from Dutch colonialism was finally achieved another colonialism, Javanese colonialism, was perceived by people in outer island of java. This feeling was generated by the centralized government in the Sukarno era. Like was expressed by people in south Sulawesi in accordance with DII/ Qahar rebellion, they were mostly perceived what they called as the ‘javanization program’ launched by Jakarta. This program was of course threatening their traditional custom and culture. What they could clearly perceived at that time was the displacement of their traditional governing system with Javanese governing system. This problem was and is emerging in the places in Indonesia. It is why we can witness that the rebellion emerged in many places and in different religions.
Another typical problem widely discussed in accordance with this problem is Islamic ideal of religious state based on syaria. The aspiration of Islamic people about the Islamic state even emerged before the Independence Day with the founding of Islamic party to strive for Islamic state after independence was gained. This aspiration apparently faced so many obstacles and the ideal has never been reached. Under Sukarno’s guided democracy where communist party got a lot of space in public as well as in political affair, Islamic people were continually disappointed. This situation is also the main cause of many Islamic rebellions at that time. It was then getting clearer for many Muslim that rebellion was not a fit way of challenging Javanese-nationalist governance although in a place like Aceh this was not ended until recently. The other ways of legal political party also faced very hard hindrance under Sukarno but more under Suharto. This made modernist to think of another way to pursue the goal; by dakwah.
What we can from the Islamic movement for syaria and also from many rebellions in the history of Indonesia is actually showing the fundamental problem in the founding of Indonesia as a state. From that things it is clear that among Indonesian there is no really a common ground where people can be tied together. Transmigration as a government program that is perceived by outer islander as javanesezation is may not totally wrong. It has become a way to bind scattered islands.
History of Religions in Indonesia Part II: from c. 1900 to the Present
Modernization and purification of Islam: DII and Islamicist separatist movements, muhammadiyah, syari’ah; Andi F Bakti, collective memories of the Qahhar movement, Robert Hefner, the modernist travail, John Bowen, Islam, law and equality in Indonesia.
Indonesia is a country comprise of so many diverse. There are many different ethnicity, customs, language, and religion. It looks that there is nothing same or similar among the people live in the area we call Indonesia now. The only cause of the similarity is history, but still not very long history; only about half and three centuries as the same people colonized by the Dutch. Usually and commonly a state is founded based on ethnicity or language. These two matters are the strongest tie to bind up people to live together as one nation in a state. Even religion is actually not strong enough to bind up people, because if so it is likely that in Europe will exist only one Christian state like Roman Empire at that time.
This problem is apparently has become so clearly interrupted Indonesian history. When independence from Dutch colonialism was finally achieved another colonialism, Javanese colonialism, was perceived by people in outer island of java. This feeling was generated by the centralized government in the Sukarno era. Like was expressed by people in south Sulawesi in accordance with DII/ Qahar rebellion, they were mostly perceived what they called as the ‘javanization program’ launched by Jakarta. This program was of course threatening their traditional custom and culture. What they could clearly perceived at that time was the displacement of their traditional governing system with Javanese governing system. This problem was and is emerging in the places in Indonesia. It is why we can witness that the rebellion emerged in many places and in different religions.
Another typical problem widely discussed in accordance with this problem is Islamic ideal of religious state based on syaria. The aspiration of Islamic people about the Islamic state even emerged before the Independence Day with the founding of Islamic party to strive for Islamic state after independence was gained. This aspiration apparently faced so many obstacles and the ideal has never been reached. Under Sukarno’s guided democracy where communist party got a lot of space in public as well as in political affair, Islamic people were continually disappointed. This situation is also the main cause of many Islamic rebellions at that time. It was then getting clearer for many Muslim that rebellion was not a fit way of challenging Javanese-nationalist governance although in a place like Aceh this was not ended until recently. The other ways of legal political party also faced very hard hindrance under Sukarno but more under Suharto. This made modernist to think of another way to pursue the goal; by dakwah.
What we can from the Islamic movement for syaria and also from many rebellions in the history of Indonesia is actually showing the fundamental problem in the founding of Indonesia as a state. From that things it is clear that among Indonesian there is no really a common ground where people can be tied together. Transmigration as a government program that is perceived by outer islander as javanesezation is may not totally wrong. It has become a way to bind scattered islands.
"Islamic Ideology in Modern Indonesia" by Nina Mariani Noor
Talking about Indonesia, we can not neglect the influence of Islam. Since the independence in 1945 the role of Islam is so apparent in political development. Through its ideologies and adherents, Islam has given color to the shape of Indonesian state even till today. In the case of Qahhar Mudzakkir, in my opinion, it is an example how a Muslim could take influential role in opposing central government. It seems to me that Qahhar Movement purposed to deal with the domination of Javanese culture in Indonesia. As a Javanese, I do admit that Javanese culture has significant influence in almost all Indonesia area, and its spreading to some extent was imposed by the central government in which dominated by Javanese people. Besides that, Javanese tend to have control over all areas in Indonesia and they ignore the interest of local people. Movement or rebellion like Qahhar, in my view, actually do not need to happen if central government consider the uniqueness of every area in Indonesia by paying attention to their needs and accommodating their interests.
Furthermore, “the ideology” of Qahhar movement is still exist in South Sulawesi till nowadays. people still remember Qahhar as a charismatic leader who struggled for their interest and even thsy still believe that Qahhar is still alive. Similarly to Qahhar’s ideology, Masyumi in which the New Order era was so afraid with the ideological growth of Islamic party of Masyumi. As a result, finally this party was successfully repressed and politically diminished. However, I am sure that the ideology such as Masyumi and Qahhar are still there, and any time it can appear again if the circumstances are injustice for” those “Muslims. For example is the appearance of NII in West Java.
In response to Nurcholish Madjid, I absolutely agree with him on Pancasila “as the only ideology to guide the Indonesian people in their activities at the national, political, and societal level” and in personal level people profess their religion. In my opinion, Pancasila can protect all Indonesia people regardless their ethnicitie, religions, and beliefs. If Pancasila is diminished and replaced by Islamic ideology, I worry that there would be no more” this” Indonesia.
Furthermore, “the ideology” of Qahhar movement is still exist in South Sulawesi till nowadays. people still remember Qahhar as a charismatic leader who struggled for their interest and even thsy still believe that Qahhar is still alive. Similarly to Qahhar’s ideology, Masyumi in which the New Order era was so afraid with the ideological growth of Islamic party of Masyumi. As a result, finally this party was successfully repressed and politically diminished. However, I am sure that the ideology such as Masyumi and Qahhar are still there, and any time it can appear again if the circumstances are injustice for” those “Muslims. For example is the appearance of NII in West Java.
In response to Nurcholish Madjid, I absolutely agree with him on Pancasila “as the only ideology to guide the Indonesian people in their activities at the national, political, and societal level” and in personal level people profess their religion. In my opinion, Pancasila can protect all Indonesia people regardless their ethnicitie, religions, and beliefs. If Pancasila is diminished and replaced by Islamic ideology, I worry that there would be no more” this” Indonesia.
Descecularized Nationalism and Minorities:
South Sulawesi and the Minority Politics of Qahhar Mudzakkar
MUCHA Q ARQUIZA
A respite from the Java-centered rendition of Indonesian history, Andi F. Bakti’s piece[1] brings us to the northeastern islands of Indonesia and the less talked about narratives of minor ethnic communities from Sulawesi. The nascent separatist sentiment among the Sulawesi group of ethnic communities is a Damocles sword looming distant from Jakarta but one that the Javanese dominant majority must not take for granted. The Qahhar movement as well as those localized forms of resistance in Southeast and North Sulawesi, Aceh, South Kalimantan, the South Moluccas, West Papua and elsewhere are what is referred to as minority politics and the politics of minority has its own dynamics. Qahhar movement of South Sulawesi is yet another instance of politics and nationalism that is familiar among Southeast Asians - as in the Bangsamoro of southern Philippines and the Pattani in southern Thailand – a desecularized kind of nationalism that mobilizes resistance by appealing to the religious and communal/clan loyalties. Here, the Indonesians’ example is highlighted in Qahhar’s ideology of Islamist separatism and the strong motivation to establish the Sulawesi Islamic Federal State. This is, of course, without side-lining the interesting detail of a distinct flavor of mysticism in Qahhar’s charismatic leadership, whose memory has embedded in his followers a certain deference and loyalty that borders between superstition and dogmatism.
In southern Philippines, we, too, have our own version of these tuan manurong (in Moro language: earth-bound demigods), heaven-sent nationalist heroes who are regarded as ‘just rulers’ with peculiar attributes of transfiguration, invulnerability and capability of being in different places at the same time, who had become a constant bewilderment to the State authorities. To cite a few, in 1800’s, General Vicente Alvarez, a young Spanish mestizo guardia civil was a central figure in the Katipunan movement in Zamboanga, Basilan and Lanao del Norte. Gen Alvarez was involved with the clandestine Philippine anti-Spanish colonialist and nationalist movement and was later adopted by the Sulu’s sultan where he successfully arbitered a royal dispute between the two claimants of the throne in Sulu; he then married to a Lumad princess from northern Mindanao where he was given the title ‘datu’, making Gen. Vicente Alvarez as the epitome of a genuine nationalist and a tri-people Mindanawon (i.e. perhaps the reason why Zamboanga City local government is reluctant to honor him as its local hero). In more recent campaigns, we have the Moro revolutionary personalities like MNLF Kumander Maas Bawang (1970s) the MILF Kumander Ustadz Kiddih (1990s), and many others. Like Qahhar, their mythologized person and political campaigns were transmitted through oral tradition and became effective medium in not only preserving and transmitting the ideology, but also expanding recruitment among the young generation, while consolidating the loyalty of the old membership.
One important lesson in the study of Qahhar movement highlights the fact of how minority history and politics are often sidelined and obscured by dominant discourses of majority-centeredness. This is the same pattern as how the glory of Kalimantan Kutai empire has been obliterated by the grandeur of dominant Madjapahit, for instance; or of Indonesian’s short memory in mooting B.J. Habibie’s contributions as statesman and national intellectual (i.e. present-day ‘SDM’ – semua dari makasar – anak muda of Sulawesi and mahasiswa from UGM told me that Habibie is considered the number one smartest Indonesian where Abdurahman Wahid only placed 5th; Habibie is allegedly 3rd in the world); or in the failure of former Vice President Yusuf Kalla to bring the votes home in the recent elections.
This lesson therefore stresses the significance of reading history as a discontinuity and of rhizomatic multi-rootedness. I would like to linger on this briefly by back-tracking to pick up on the train of thoughts of Kartodirjo (1966)[2] in characterizing the Banten peasant revolt of 1888 as both religion-inspired and nationalistic. The mass insurrection in Banten was a nascent form of Islamic nationalism, he contends, ‘albeit paradoxical’, the modernist in him stutters.
And once again, let me post my previous question, ‘is history of religion necessarily a political account or a cultural history’? My answer to that is of ‘both’ and perhaps even of more - in terms of multiple perspectives and levels.
History of religion to be truly human history is not to be viewed as simply of single-view journal entry or devoted record of singular silsilah or tarsila (i.e. kinship chain or ethno-clan genealogic account) of a particular clan or progeny of great men or account arising out of one particular vertical strand or stream of movement (i.e. social or religious). History is a colloquium of narratives developed from infinitely many origins or genealogic parents and branching out into rhizomatic roots and, at some points, intersecting, at others freely proliferating, defining its own course. History, if it is to be a story of humanity in a particular time and space, must be a multifaceted multi-voiced account of many perspectives consciously accounting the natural folding and unfolding; the discontinuities in time; and the uneven progress of social change in a web of narratives of a ‘thousand different paces’. Fernand Braudel (1976)[3] evoked the notion of a ‘longue duree’ (long span) of history that can be organized into at least three levels of time: the first level is that of the environment (probably the longest most imperceptible change observable as effects of space, climate and technology). The second level is that of social and cultural history, and the third level of time is that of events or the history of individual men, this third category may be the most deceptive as it is prone to manipulation and agenda-setting of vested interest such as what happened in the ‘making’ of Indonesia’s history in Soeharto’s New Order and the ‘unmaking’, by deletion from collective memory, in contemporary Indonesian account of Sukarno-Soharto juncture that unfortunately commenced in the 1965 massacre, a particularly traumatic event rendering this country into its saddest case of historical amnesia.
Indonesia’s history of religion and nationalism is to be studied then as conjunctures and plurality of vantage-points not only of chronological and geographical orientation but also of socio-relational centeredness or peripherality with respect to power structures and ideologies. History is only fully understood if the networks of the various narratives across culture and ethnicities; of majority and minority voices; of stories of the privileged and marginal are all equally accessed and valued. And never has this assertion rung more truth than in this study of supposed ‘coming into fore’ or resurgence of a national consciousness. But Islamic national consciousness? Kartodirjo insisted that the tarekat movement in Banten was some sort of an ‘Islamic nationalism’ and that could have not been farther than the truth. And so is the claim of the Sarekat Islam that their’s had been a form of ‘Islamic Communism’ (again, an anathema, to follow the logic of progressive-is-modernist-therefore-secularist), and now here we read of Qahhar Mudzakkar and his Islamic separatism. Whether one is for secularism or religion, the truth is, religion-based nationalism is not resurgent, it has always been there, but its story has never been fully told in a single-authored, hegemonic and totalitarian historical narrative of the modern elite where the modern state is founded. What is claimed to be purely secular form of nationalism is in fact a parallel stream of the same river with religion-inspired nationalism, only that its story is disrupted and discontinued because of the monopoly of Enlightened and western-oriented political discourses obsessed with the belief that modernity is necessarily secularizing (see Peter Berger’s ‘The Desecularization of the World’) and that any national liberation movement to be progressive is to be necessarily secular and non-religious. [29 March 2010]
----
[1] Andi F. Bakti “Collective Memories of the Qahhar Movement” in Mary Zurbuchen, Beginning to Remember, pp.123-149.
[2] Sartono Kartodirjo, The Peasant Revolt of Banten in 1888, VKI Vol.50, (s-Gravenage:Martinus Nijhoff, 1966).
[3] Fernand Braudel (1976) The Mediterranean and the mediterranean world in the Age of Philip II; trans. by Sian Reynolds. Fontana, Collins.
MUCHA Q ARQUIZA
A respite from the Java-centered rendition of Indonesian history, Andi F. Bakti’s piece[1] brings us to the northeastern islands of Indonesia and the less talked about narratives of minor ethnic communities from Sulawesi. The nascent separatist sentiment among the Sulawesi group of ethnic communities is a Damocles sword looming distant from Jakarta but one that the Javanese dominant majority must not take for granted. The Qahhar movement as well as those localized forms of resistance in Southeast and North Sulawesi, Aceh, South Kalimantan, the South Moluccas, West Papua and elsewhere are what is referred to as minority politics and the politics of minority has its own dynamics. Qahhar movement of South Sulawesi is yet another instance of politics and nationalism that is familiar among Southeast Asians - as in the Bangsamoro of southern Philippines and the Pattani in southern Thailand – a desecularized kind of nationalism that mobilizes resistance by appealing to the religious and communal/clan loyalties. Here, the Indonesians’ example is highlighted in Qahhar’s ideology of Islamist separatism and the strong motivation to establish the Sulawesi Islamic Federal State. This is, of course, without side-lining the interesting detail of a distinct flavor of mysticism in Qahhar’s charismatic leadership, whose memory has embedded in his followers a certain deference and loyalty that borders between superstition and dogmatism.
In southern Philippines, we, too, have our own version of these tuan manurong (in Moro language: earth-bound demigods), heaven-sent nationalist heroes who are regarded as ‘just rulers’ with peculiar attributes of transfiguration, invulnerability and capability of being in different places at the same time, who had become a constant bewilderment to the State authorities. To cite a few, in 1800’s, General Vicente Alvarez, a young Spanish mestizo guardia civil was a central figure in the Katipunan movement in Zamboanga, Basilan and Lanao del Norte. Gen Alvarez was involved with the clandestine Philippine anti-Spanish colonialist and nationalist movement and was later adopted by the Sulu’s sultan where he successfully arbitered a royal dispute between the two claimants of the throne in Sulu; he then married to a Lumad princess from northern Mindanao where he was given the title ‘datu’, making Gen. Vicente Alvarez as the epitome of a genuine nationalist and a tri-people Mindanawon (i.e. perhaps the reason why Zamboanga City local government is reluctant to honor him as its local hero). In more recent campaigns, we have the Moro revolutionary personalities like MNLF Kumander Maas Bawang (1970s) the MILF Kumander Ustadz Kiddih (1990s), and many others. Like Qahhar, their mythologized person and political campaigns were transmitted through oral tradition and became effective medium in not only preserving and transmitting the ideology, but also expanding recruitment among the young generation, while consolidating the loyalty of the old membership.
One important lesson in the study of Qahhar movement highlights the fact of how minority history and politics are often sidelined and obscured by dominant discourses of majority-centeredness. This is the same pattern as how the glory of Kalimantan Kutai empire has been obliterated by the grandeur of dominant Madjapahit, for instance; or of Indonesian’s short memory in mooting B.J. Habibie’s contributions as statesman and national intellectual (i.e. present-day ‘SDM’ – semua dari makasar – anak muda of Sulawesi and mahasiswa from UGM told me that Habibie is considered the number one smartest Indonesian where Abdurahman Wahid only placed 5th; Habibie is allegedly 3rd in the world); or in the failure of former Vice President Yusuf Kalla to bring the votes home in the recent elections.
This lesson therefore stresses the significance of reading history as a discontinuity and of rhizomatic multi-rootedness. I would like to linger on this briefly by back-tracking to pick up on the train of thoughts of Kartodirjo (1966)[2] in characterizing the Banten peasant revolt of 1888 as both religion-inspired and nationalistic. The mass insurrection in Banten was a nascent form of Islamic nationalism, he contends, ‘albeit paradoxical’, the modernist in him stutters.
And once again, let me post my previous question, ‘is history of religion necessarily a political account or a cultural history’? My answer to that is of ‘both’ and perhaps even of more - in terms of multiple perspectives and levels.
History of religion to be truly human history is not to be viewed as simply of single-view journal entry or devoted record of singular silsilah or tarsila (i.e. kinship chain or ethno-clan genealogic account) of a particular clan or progeny of great men or account arising out of one particular vertical strand or stream of movement (i.e. social or religious). History is a colloquium of narratives developed from infinitely many origins or genealogic parents and branching out into rhizomatic roots and, at some points, intersecting, at others freely proliferating, defining its own course. History, if it is to be a story of humanity in a particular time and space, must be a multifaceted multi-voiced account of many perspectives consciously accounting the natural folding and unfolding; the discontinuities in time; and the uneven progress of social change in a web of narratives of a ‘thousand different paces’. Fernand Braudel (1976)[3] evoked the notion of a ‘longue duree’ (long span) of history that can be organized into at least three levels of time: the first level is that of the environment (probably the longest most imperceptible change observable as effects of space, climate and technology). The second level is that of social and cultural history, and the third level of time is that of events or the history of individual men, this third category may be the most deceptive as it is prone to manipulation and agenda-setting of vested interest such as what happened in the ‘making’ of Indonesia’s history in Soeharto’s New Order and the ‘unmaking’, by deletion from collective memory, in contemporary Indonesian account of Sukarno-Soharto juncture that unfortunately commenced in the 1965 massacre, a particularly traumatic event rendering this country into its saddest case of historical amnesia.
Indonesia’s history of religion and nationalism is to be studied then as conjunctures and plurality of vantage-points not only of chronological and geographical orientation but also of socio-relational centeredness or peripherality with respect to power structures and ideologies. History is only fully understood if the networks of the various narratives across culture and ethnicities; of majority and minority voices; of stories of the privileged and marginal are all equally accessed and valued. And never has this assertion rung more truth than in this study of supposed ‘coming into fore’ or resurgence of a national consciousness. But Islamic national consciousness? Kartodirjo insisted that the tarekat movement in Banten was some sort of an ‘Islamic nationalism’ and that could have not been farther than the truth. And so is the claim of the Sarekat Islam that their’s had been a form of ‘Islamic Communism’ (again, an anathema, to follow the logic of progressive-is-modernist-therefore-secularist), and now here we read of Qahhar Mudzakkar and his Islamic separatism. Whether one is for secularism or religion, the truth is, religion-based nationalism is not resurgent, it has always been there, but its story has never been fully told in a single-authored, hegemonic and totalitarian historical narrative of the modern elite where the modern state is founded. What is claimed to be purely secular form of nationalism is in fact a parallel stream of the same river with religion-inspired nationalism, only that its story is disrupted and discontinued because of the monopoly of Enlightened and western-oriented political discourses obsessed with the belief that modernity is necessarily secularizing (see Peter Berger’s ‘The Desecularization of the World’) and that any national liberation movement to be progressive is to be necessarily secular and non-religious. [29 March 2010]
----
[1] Andi F. Bakti “Collective Memories of the Qahhar Movement” in Mary Zurbuchen, Beginning to Remember, pp.123-149.
[2] Sartono Kartodirjo, The Peasant Revolt of Banten in 1888, VKI Vol.50, (s-Gravenage:Martinus Nijhoff, 1966).
[3] Fernand Braudel (1976) The Mediterranean and the mediterranean world in the Age of Philip II; trans. by Sian Reynolds. Fontana, Collins.
The Pathways of Learning: Indonesia, Islam, and Civil Society by Roma Ulinnuha
In Indonesia milieu, Islam is, as Nurcholis Madjid states, a significant basis in relation to the state and politics, therefore Madjid called Indonesia a Muslim country. In the rainbow of modern democracy realm, I think, this does not mean ignoring the pluralistic stance needed to be promoted. I agree with Madjid that—as a neomodernist type of Intellectual—Islam should consider its vivid relation with civilization and state in particular. Robert Hefner accentuates the state and Islam encounter emphasized on the negotiation among Islam elite and the state. Both Madjid and Hefner actually deliver the quest of civil type of Islam in Indonesia.
The neo-modernist type of Islam is one of median ways in contrast to the desire of some Indonesian entities inserted the Islamic law to deeper inclusion in state. In this regard, I think there are advantages of the frameworks. First, it will flow in a flexibility negotiation toward state. The old and the new order experiences have shown the unrelenting negotiation between the segment of Islam and the state interests. The reformation era until now, serves as a larger negotiation of Islamic facets. While the neo-modernist tends to cope its close relation to the state, some related more on the alternative stance of the Islamic khilafah. This fact, as Fazlurrahman argues, the Islamic thoughts posits as a process of inter-related, interconnected to the real problem of society.
Furthermore Madjid’s notion that promote pluralistic mode of Islam in Indonesia—realizing that not all ulama have access to positivistic discussions about other religion and other adherents—is not without obstacle (p.483). Some may criticize the notion, but the more beneficial aspect is that the stance of moderation neglecting extremity. It goes on the second framework, I think, that the non-violence type of act is in advance. Of course, there is no development without tension and conflict, however it is more likely that the peaceful stance is significant in accordance with what suits best the space and time. The neo-modernism—as Fazlurahman introduces, combines the constructive modernism with the appreciation of classical Islam. This prototype is not directed to a question whether one fully follows it or not, but it should be revisited to the pathways of constructive learning in Indonesia color.
The neo-modernist type of Islam is one of median ways in contrast to the desire of some Indonesian entities inserted the Islamic law to deeper inclusion in state. In this regard, I think there are advantages of the frameworks. First, it will flow in a flexibility negotiation toward state. The old and the new order experiences have shown the unrelenting negotiation between the segment of Islam and the state interests. The reformation era until now, serves as a larger negotiation of Islamic facets. While the neo-modernist tends to cope its close relation to the state, some related more on the alternative stance of the Islamic khilafah. This fact, as Fazlurrahman argues, the Islamic thoughts posits as a process of inter-related, interconnected to the real problem of society.
Furthermore Madjid’s notion that promote pluralistic mode of Islam in Indonesia—realizing that not all ulama have access to positivistic discussions about other religion and other adherents—is not without obstacle (p.483). Some may criticize the notion, but the more beneficial aspect is that the stance of moderation neglecting extremity. It goes on the second framework, I think, that the non-violence type of act is in advance. Of course, there is no development without tension and conflict, however it is more likely that the peaceful stance is significant in accordance with what suits best the space and time. The neo-modernism—as Fazlurahman introduces, combines the constructive modernism with the appreciation of classical Islam. This prototype is not directed to a question whether one fully follows it or not, but it should be revisited to the pathways of constructive learning in Indonesia color.
Modernization and Purification of Islam: DII and Islamicist Separatist Movements, Muhammadiyah, Syari’ah By Joko Wicoyo
Toward a New Paradigm explores the range of voices in contemporary Indonesian Islamic discourse concerning religion, the state and society and highlights the theological foundations of Indonesian social and political discourse. The papers in this volume suggest not only that there is a new paradigm emerging within Indonesian Islam, but that the classical paradigms which have guided the study of Islam in Southeast Asia are in need of revision.
“Indonesia experience may not be an example to be copied by other Muslim nations. Being the largest among Muslim nations, Indonesia could offer itself as the laboratory for developing modern religious tolerance and pluralism. With about 90% of its more than 180 million population Muslims, Indonesia is striving to bring Islam into a positive and constructive dialogue with the demands of the age. This in itself is a good thing top observe” (pp.112-113).
It has been said that, in accordance with Bernard Lewis’ account, tolerance and its corollary pluralism are new to all religions. These are modern values, and they are a part of the challenges of modernity. Therefore it seems that one of the strategic questions is whether Islam permits some changes in some of its religious and cultural orientations as necessited by its response to the challenge of time and place, and its adaptation to different temporal and spatial milieu. In relation to this, what the reform movement promulgated by the Muhammadiyah is interesting.
In my understanding, the Muhammadiyah, has already designed to restore the teaching of Islam in their pure and original forms as manifested in the Qur’an and Sunnah, free of any element of heresy or superstition, and as true reflection of the principal characteristic of Islam. The Muhammadiyah looks at its reform as a means to reconstruct religious life in the form of pristine Islam. In this way the Muhammadiyah becomes the vindicator of Islamic precepts and all forms of rational practice against deviant and heretical tendencier. I think reform of this type is accordingly called “purification”. On the other hand, since Islam encompasses at the same time universal value, the reform of Muhammadiyah should also refer to the implementation of Islamic teaching in accordance with the demands of the developments of modern age.
Nevertheless, deviation might occur in implementing the true doctrines of the faith, due to the influence of local culture or a lack of understanding on the part of Muslim of true belief. One of the examples is the wave of Islamic militancy, demonstrated by the rise of the various radical Islamists groups which have become the hallmark of the political landscape of Indonesia since the collapse of the New Order Regime. They have been extremely active in bringing the radical Islamic discourse into the public sphere.
Surely, in Islam, purifying religious belief and practice has been an essential tenet of the reformist group, but how the purification of religious practice must be done, I think, it should be in line of the Qur’an which indicates that Islamic messages are adaptable to any cultural environment, as it has been adapted to the imperatives of the Arabian Peninsula cultural environment. Therefore it must also be adaptable to the environment of any culture of its adherents, anywhere and any time.
“Indonesia experience may not be an example to be copied by other Muslim nations. Being the largest among Muslim nations, Indonesia could offer itself as the laboratory for developing modern religious tolerance and pluralism. With about 90% of its more than 180 million population Muslims, Indonesia is striving to bring Islam into a positive and constructive dialogue with the demands of the age. This in itself is a good thing top observe” (pp.112-113).
It has been said that, in accordance with Bernard Lewis’ account, tolerance and its corollary pluralism are new to all religions. These are modern values, and they are a part of the challenges of modernity. Therefore it seems that one of the strategic questions is whether Islam permits some changes in some of its religious and cultural orientations as necessited by its response to the challenge of time and place, and its adaptation to different temporal and spatial milieu. In relation to this, what the reform movement promulgated by the Muhammadiyah is interesting.
In my understanding, the Muhammadiyah, has already designed to restore the teaching of Islam in their pure and original forms as manifested in the Qur’an and Sunnah, free of any element of heresy or superstition, and as true reflection of the principal characteristic of Islam. The Muhammadiyah looks at its reform as a means to reconstruct religious life in the form of pristine Islam. In this way the Muhammadiyah becomes the vindicator of Islamic precepts and all forms of rational practice against deviant and heretical tendencier. I think reform of this type is accordingly called “purification”. On the other hand, since Islam encompasses at the same time universal value, the reform of Muhammadiyah should also refer to the implementation of Islamic teaching in accordance with the demands of the developments of modern age.
Nevertheless, deviation might occur in implementing the true doctrines of the faith, due to the influence of local culture or a lack of understanding on the part of Muslim of true belief. One of the examples is the wave of Islamic militancy, demonstrated by the rise of the various radical Islamists groups which have become the hallmark of the political landscape of Indonesia since the collapse of the New Order Regime. They have been extremely active in bringing the radical Islamic discourse into the public sphere.
Surely, in Islam, purifying religious belief and practice has been an essential tenet of the reformist group, but how the purification of religious practice must be done, I think, it should be in line of the Qur’an which indicates that Islamic messages are adaptable to any cultural environment, as it has been adapted to the imperatives of the Arabian Peninsula cultural environment. Therefore it must also be adaptable to the environment of any culture of its adherents, anywhere and any time.
Is Qohhar's Movement still needed ? by Nihayatul Wafiroh
Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar was born in Lapia, Luwu regent on March 24, 1921, and he was recognized death by government on February 3, 1965. I say that his death was “recognized” since some of his followers believe that he is still alive. Qahhar was a charismatic figure at Luwu. He was a soldier of Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI). However, he disagreed with the Soekarno’s policy, so he withdrew from TNI. Finally, he established Tentara Islam Indonesia and joined to Darul Islam (DI). Latterly, this group was known with DI/TII in South and Southeast Sulawesi.
Basically, the idea that DI promoted was the establish Indonesian Islamic county. It was related to the slogan of Qohhar movement which were “Javanese colonialism,” “Majapahitism,” and “Javanese syncretism and communism.” Qohhar saw that Java colonized other islands. Soekarno, the president at the time, used Javanese rules to run the government’s policy. As a result, Javanization influenced in many spheres in Indonesia, including in Sulawesi. I remember that one of my friends from Kalimantan told me. She said that in her community people who born in around 60-80s their name were mostly using Javanese names such as Kartini, Soekarwo, Soehato, Soekarno etc. With using Javanese names, it would make them easier to find jobs. It was because the important positions in Kalimantan or other parts in Indonesia were held by Javanese people. Qohhar also saw that Java speared out communism. In fact, communist idea came from Java, so that Qohhar wanted to bring Indonesia particularly Sulawesi to be Islamic country.
Indeed, right now, the condition already changes. Although Javanese still has the power, it is not as strong as before. We can see that many people from outside Java island are visible in government. They become the leaders in some important department in government, so is Qohhar’s movement needed right now?
Basically, the idea that DI promoted was the establish Indonesian Islamic county. It was related to the slogan of Qohhar movement which were “Javanese colonialism,” “Majapahitism,” and “Javanese syncretism and communism.” Qohhar saw that Java colonized other islands. Soekarno, the president at the time, used Javanese rules to run the government’s policy. As a result, Javanization influenced in many spheres in Indonesia, including in Sulawesi. I remember that one of my friends from Kalimantan told me. She said that in her community people who born in around 60-80s their name were mostly using Javanese names such as Kartini, Soekarwo, Soehato, Soekarno etc. With using Javanese names, it would make them easier to find jobs. It was because the important positions in Kalimantan or other parts in Indonesia were held by Javanese people. Qohhar also saw that Java speared out communism. In fact, communist idea came from Java, so that Qohhar wanted to bring Indonesia particularly Sulawesi to be Islamic country.
Indeed, right now, the condition already changes. Although Javanese still has the power, it is not as strong as before. We can see that many people from outside Java island are visible in government. They become the leaders in some important department in government, so is Qohhar’s movement needed right now?
Modernization and Purification of Islam
LEYAKET ALI MOHAMED OMAR
History of Religion Part 2- Prof Bernard Adeney- Risakotta and Prof Margana
Readings are from : Andi F. Bakti- “Collective Memories of the Qahhar Movement”
Nurkholish Madjid, In Search of Islamic Roots for Modern Pluralism, The Indonesian Experiances.
Robert Hefner- “The Modernist Travail” in Civil Islam
In the 1960s, the struggle of ideology among Muslims, communists and nationalists was so intense that Soekarno attempted to combine nationalism, religion, and communism which however came to a failure due to lack of support. Soekarno’s statement that religion is a basic element of the nation and character-building failed to convince the religious groups to collaborate with the communists.
Communists, nationalists, Christians, and Muslims were so divided in ideological and political lines that none emphasized the urgency of development. During this period (1945-1966) indeed it was a new insight for to learn about the conflicts between the Javanese and the separatist movements in south and north Kalimantan, north and west Sumatra and so forth. Details of Qahhar Mudzakkar militant movements to create a Darul Islam somehow bring the question of the early Muslims that Islamised the majority Hindu-Buddhist society to me. As Nurkholish Madjid puts it ‘ Islam did not supplant the existing religion by military conquest; the method of Islamization of the nation is known as ‘peaceful penetration’. In contradiction to the example taken from the early Muslim, Qahhar took a so call the other ways to realised his dream of Darul Islam. It also interesting to see the inspiring issue on Qahhar’s death by the fanatics to keep the ideology alive by having versions of his where being.
The data given for the perspective of people on Qahhar’s identity and movements, (p.134) I think the distribution of data was not even. Perhaps, it should include those who are still with his ideology as that would bring to a balance understanding of its movements and the ideology astutely.
Robert Hefner work however suggested that Soeharto’s consistent attempt to introduce development ideology was generally well received by the Muslims because many of the Muslim organizations and leaders had understood that Islam is not an impediment to economic development. Both national and local Islamic institutions carried out their own economic activities according to their circumstances, or sought cooperation with other communities, or obtained the government’s support. It suggests that the collaboration between the Muslims and the Soeharto’s government during the New Order era seemed to have been motivated by both religious and pragmatic considerations, as the Muslims seemed to see no contradiction between material and spiritual needs.
History of Religion Part 2- Prof Bernard Adeney- Risakotta and Prof Margana
Readings are from : Andi F. Bakti- “Collective Memories of the Qahhar Movement”
Nurkholish Madjid, In Search of Islamic Roots for Modern Pluralism, The Indonesian Experiances.
Robert Hefner- “The Modernist Travail” in Civil Islam
In the 1960s, the struggle of ideology among Muslims, communists and nationalists was so intense that Soekarno attempted to combine nationalism, religion, and communism which however came to a failure due to lack of support. Soekarno’s statement that religion is a basic element of the nation and character-building failed to convince the religious groups to collaborate with the communists.
Communists, nationalists, Christians, and Muslims were so divided in ideological and political lines that none emphasized the urgency of development. During this period (1945-1966) indeed it was a new insight for to learn about the conflicts between the Javanese and the separatist movements in south and north Kalimantan, north and west Sumatra and so forth. Details of Qahhar Mudzakkar militant movements to create a Darul Islam somehow bring the question of the early Muslims that Islamised the majority Hindu-Buddhist society to me. As Nurkholish Madjid puts it ‘ Islam did not supplant the existing religion by military conquest; the method of Islamization of the nation is known as ‘peaceful penetration’. In contradiction to the example taken from the early Muslim, Qahhar took a so call the other ways to realised his dream of Darul Islam. It also interesting to see the inspiring issue on Qahhar’s death by the fanatics to keep the ideology alive by having versions of his where being.
The data given for the perspective of people on Qahhar’s identity and movements, (p.134) I think the distribution of data was not even. Perhaps, it should include those who are still with his ideology as that would bring to a balance understanding of its movements and the ideology astutely.
Robert Hefner work however suggested that Soeharto’s consistent attempt to introduce development ideology was generally well received by the Muslims because many of the Muslim organizations and leaders had understood that Islam is not an impediment to economic development. Both national and local Islamic institutions carried out their own economic activities according to their circumstances, or sought cooperation with other communities, or obtained the government’s support. It suggests that the collaboration between the Muslims and the Soeharto’s government during the New Order era seemed to have been motivated by both religious and pragmatic considerations, as the Muslims seemed to see no contradiction between material and spiritual needs.
Sabtu, 27 Maret 2010
Islamic Movements and Modern Indonesia: A Quest for Identities by Timotius Wibowo
Reading Andi F. Bakti’s article, “Collective Memories of the Qahhar Movement,” I am surprised to know that the movement does not just raise a religio-political issue (that they want to built an Islamic nation), but also a regional-ethnical problem (that the Sulawesi people is colonized by Javanese people). The fact that the slogans as “Javanese colonialism”, “Majapahitism”, and Javanese syncretism and communism” is still used by the successor groups (p. 13) imply that the regional-ethnical issue is no less important than the religio-political one, and that the issue is still alive now. We could also see the issue comes to the surface in some cases surrounding the last presidential election. It means that any issues that can be interpreted as Javanese colonialism can also be easily related to Qahhar’s movements. Although the myths about Qahhar are widely varied and each of them are not supported by sufficient historical data, but they have been a dry woods that keep the spirit of Sulawesi people flaming when they face Javanese domination. Unfortunately, such a regional-ethnical problem emerges not only among Sulawesi people. The people of some regions in Indonesia also find themselves dominated by Javanese culture, Javanese language, Javanese leadership, Javanese capital, Javanese workers, and even Javanese food. Such phenomenon indicates that the identity of Indonesia is still problematic.
The quest for identity is also the problem of modern Indonesian Muslims. In relation to pluralism, Nurcholis Madjid (1996, In Search of Islamic Roots for Modern Pluralism: The Indonesian Experiences) observed, “The problem of Islam vis-avis pluralism is, therefore, the problem of how the Muslims adapt themselves to the modern age. And this, in its turn, it involves the problem of how they see and asses the history of Islam, and how they see and asses change and the necessity of bringing the universal and normative Islam into a dialogue with the temporal and spatial realities.” (p. 100). Such problem of identity, in my opinion, emerges not only in the context of pluralism, but also in political spheres. As Indonesia has many cultures, Islam in Indonesia, in fact, has also many faces. To reduce the future conflicts, both the religio-political and the regional-ethnical ones, Indonesian identity needs redefining, as well as Indonesian Islam.
The quest for identity is also the problem of modern Indonesian Muslims. In relation to pluralism, Nurcholis Madjid (1996, In Search of Islamic Roots for Modern Pluralism: The Indonesian Experiences) observed, “The problem of Islam vis-avis pluralism is, therefore, the problem of how the Muslims adapt themselves to the modern age. And this, in its turn, it involves the problem of how they see and asses the history of Islam, and how they see and asses change and the necessity of bringing the universal and normative Islam into a dialogue with the temporal and spatial realities.” (p. 100). Such problem of identity, in my opinion, emerges not only in the context of pluralism, but also in political spheres. As Indonesia has many cultures, Islam in Indonesia, in fact, has also many faces. To reduce the future conflicts, both the religio-political and the regional-ethnical ones, Indonesian identity needs redefining, as well as Indonesian Islam.
Bridges Go Both Ways - Roy AB Tolentino
"The problem of Islam vis-a-vis pluralism is, therefore, the problem of how Muslims adapt themselves to the modern age. And this, in its turn, involves the problems of how they see and assess the history of Islam, and how they see and assess change and the necessity of bringing the universal and normative Islam into a dialogue with the temporal and spatial realities." (Madjid 1996:473)
Nurcholish Madjid’s diagnosis of the position of Islam in the contemporary world is as relevant today as it was more than a decade ago. Certainly, in the years following 9/11, much focus has been given to the manner in which Islam conducts itself in relation to the rest of the world. Unfortunately, more attention has been given to the radical elements of Islam than to those who seek a way to reconcile modernity with the Islamic tradition. It does not help that the Muslim world is also divided in its understanding of its relationship with modernity, such that openness on one hand can be construed as betrayal on the other.
Madjid provides an alternative framework, grounded in Islamic theology. The ineffable oneness of God allows for an interpretation that differentiates between the sacred and the profane. As Robert Hefner notes:
"This commitment to tauhid requires a never-ending effort to distinguish the divine from the merely human in Islamic tradition. In so doing, Madjid argued, tauhid also implies a commitment to reason, knowledge, and science, all of which can be understood as acts of devotion to a creator whose majesty is immanent in the natural laws of the world." (Hefner 2000:117)
Madjid called this process of differentiation (one could call it purification), secularization. “[T]hey consistently distinguished secularization, understood as the desacralization of domains wrongly valorized as sacred, from secularism, a Western ideology advocating a total separation of religion from politics and social life.” (Hefner 2000:118) However, almost predictably, his position was also assailed for its reliance on Western sources. This is where I think the dynamic Muslim intelligentsia often stumbles. There is much (certainly often valid) suspicion of Western ideas and principles, but this suspicion rarely results in critical understanding; too often, it remains merely suspicion, and at worst becomes radical rejection or paranoia. The intelligentsia have an enormous responsibility in utilizing this suspicion properly, but it is a responsibility sadly shirked. As Seyyed Hossein Nasr remarks:
"During the last two centuries the Islamic world has been witness to the appearance of a whole army of Western scholars, some outstanding scholars without predetermined prejudices and some even sympathetic to the Islamic cause... Yet, there have not been many studies of the other religions seriously from an Islamic point of view in a contemporary language in the same way that our ancestors studied other religions a thousand years ago." (Nasr 1993:239)
It is unfortunate since there is much knowledge to be shared, but it seems that some bridges have been built as one-way streets. It would be good to remember that bridges go both ways, after all.
Madjid, Nurcholish. “In Search of Islamic Roots for Modern Pluralism: The Indonesian Experiences,” in Toward a New Paradigm: Recent Developments in Indonesian Islamic Thought. Ed. Mark R. Woodward. Tempe: Arizona State University Press, 1996.
Hefner, Robert. Civil Islam. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.
Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. A Young Muslim’s Guide to the Modern World. Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust, 1993.
Nurcholish Madjid’s diagnosis of the position of Islam in the contemporary world is as relevant today as it was more than a decade ago. Certainly, in the years following 9/11, much focus has been given to the manner in which Islam conducts itself in relation to the rest of the world. Unfortunately, more attention has been given to the radical elements of Islam than to those who seek a way to reconcile modernity with the Islamic tradition. It does not help that the Muslim world is also divided in its understanding of its relationship with modernity, such that openness on one hand can be construed as betrayal on the other.
Madjid provides an alternative framework, grounded in Islamic theology. The ineffable oneness of God allows for an interpretation that differentiates between the sacred and the profane. As Robert Hefner notes:
"This commitment to tauhid requires a never-ending effort to distinguish the divine from the merely human in Islamic tradition. In so doing, Madjid argued, tauhid also implies a commitment to reason, knowledge, and science, all of which can be understood as acts of devotion to a creator whose majesty is immanent in the natural laws of the world." (Hefner 2000:117)
Madjid called this process of differentiation (one could call it purification), secularization. “[T]hey consistently distinguished secularization, understood as the desacralization of domains wrongly valorized as sacred, from secularism, a Western ideology advocating a total separation of religion from politics and social life.” (Hefner 2000:118) However, almost predictably, his position was also assailed for its reliance on Western sources. This is where I think the dynamic Muslim intelligentsia often stumbles. There is much (certainly often valid) suspicion of Western ideas and principles, but this suspicion rarely results in critical understanding; too often, it remains merely suspicion, and at worst becomes radical rejection or paranoia. The intelligentsia have an enormous responsibility in utilizing this suspicion properly, but it is a responsibility sadly shirked. As Seyyed Hossein Nasr remarks:
"During the last two centuries the Islamic world has been witness to the appearance of a whole army of Western scholars, some outstanding scholars without predetermined prejudices and some even sympathetic to the Islamic cause... Yet, there have not been many studies of the other religions seriously from an Islamic point of view in a contemporary language in the same way that our ancestors studied other religions a thousand years ago." (Nasr 1993:239)
It is unfortunate since there is much knowledge to be shared, but it seems that some bridges have been built as one-way streets. It would be good to remember that bridges go both ways, after all.
Madjid, Nurcholish. “In Search of Islamic Roots for Modern Pluralism: The Indonesian Experiences,” in Toward a New Paradigm: Recent Developments in Indonesian Islamic Thought. Ed. Mark R. Woodward. Tempe: Arizona State University Press, 1996.
Hefner, Robert. Civil Islam. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.
Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. A Young Muslim’s Guide to the Modern World. Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust, 1993.
Minggu, 21 Maret 2010
Javanese Sufism: When Experience is Superior than Doctrines by Timotius Wibowo
As M. C. Ricklefs (2007, Polarising Javanese Society) points out, the Javanese’s understanding of Sufism was found in their practice of mystic synthesis, which was characterized by three prominent features (p. 5-6). The fist one was a strong sense of Islamic identity. This identity was related to their leading figures, especially the first Sultan of Yogyakarta, Sultan Hamengkubuwana I. He was known as an ascetic since his youth and as being victorious against attacking spirits by reciting the memorized passages of the Qur’an. The second one was the fulfillment of the five pillars of Islamic ritual life: reciting the confession of faith, five-time daily prayers, the giving of alms, fasting in the month of Ramadhan, and the pilgrimage to Mecca. In other words, the practice of Sufism should be done alongside with the practice of Islamic obligations. The third character was acceptance of an array of local spiritual forces. Besides practicing Islamic rituals, they also had many rituals for local spiritual forces. In some cases, these two kinds of rituals were mixed to each other.
It is interesting to observe that such a mixture of scriptural and traditional believes are also found in Christianity, even in our modern era. Many Christians who hold a strong identity of Christianity and being committed to biblical obligations are also believes in the strength of local spirits. It is true that those Christians do no direct rituals for such spirits. However, they have some rituals to deals with these spirits (for examples, burning the goods that suspected as the domains of these spirits, using the Bible or the cross symbol as spiritual protection, or reciting short prayers to protect themselves). They will also give more respect to their Christian leaders who are victorious against these spirits, since they regard them as having a stronger spiritual power. These rituals are certainly unbiblical. Even, they are against biblical teaching, which forbids Christian using of amulets. Although have no grounds of Biblical teaching, these practices are still popular among Christians until nowadays.
Some may reject such syncretic religious practices. However, in Javanese context (and other Eastern people contexts, also), such practices are never die. This phenomenon, in my opinion, proves that personal experience is an important element of religious belief. In many cases, this element is even more influencing to one’s religious behaviour, compared to a systematic religious doctrine
It is interesting to observe that such a mixture of scriptural and traditional believes are also found in Christianity, even in our modern era. Many Christians who hold a strong identity of Christianity and being committed to biblical obligations are also believes in the strength of local spirits. It is true that those Christians do no direct rituals for such spirits. However, they have some rituals to deals with these spirits (for examples, burning the goods that suspected as the domains of these spirits, using the Bible or the cross symbol as spiritual protection, or reciting short prayers to protect themselves). They will also give more respect to their Christian leaders who are victorious against these spirits, since they regard them as having a stronger spiritual power. These rituals are certainly unbiblical. Even, they are against biblical teaching, which forbids Christian using of amulets. Although have no grounds of Biblical teaching, these practices are still popular among Christians until nowadays.
Some may reject such syncretic religious practices. However, in Javanese context (and other Eastern people contexts, also), such practices are never die. This phenomenon, in my opinion, proves that personal experience is an important element of religious belief. In many cases, this element is even more influencing to one’s religious behaviour, compared to a systematic religious doctrine
Sufism in Modern Indonesia by Faqihuddin Abdul Kodir
The existing of Sufism in Javanese religion, according to Mark Woodward in his book “Islam in Java; Normative Piety and Mysticism in the Sultanate Yogyakarta”, is the evidence that Javanese Islam is not the deviant Islam or the synthetic religion of Hinduism-Buddhism-Islam. Woodward inclines not to put Islam in a diametrical position in contradiction with Javanese culture or its mysticism. To him, Islam of Javanese people is one of variants of Islam of the world practiced in the land of Java. It is rather the dynamic of religious beliefs and practices in balancing the legalistic and mystical dimension of Islam. (p. 3). The concern of Kejawen much more to the isi (content) rather than wadah (container) is similar to the focus of Sufism to the bathin more than to zahir. Although the relationship of the inner and the outer is controversial in Islamic discourse, but it exists in the whole of Islamic world not excluded Javanese people. Manunggaling Kawula Gusti, the union of the servant and the Lord, also derives from the concept of wahdat al-wujud of the Persian-mystical al-Hallaj (922 AD). (p. 71-75).
Indonesian Muslims, in this case Javanese people, are not separated from global narrative of Islam, although the development of their religion has been influenced much more by dynamics of local and national factors rather than global ones. Sufism as well as modernism, in Indonesian context, is not static or monolithic. The Banten revolt 1888, which was organized by the leaders of Sufi organization, is obviously evidence that Sufism is not separated from practical lives due the dynamics of politics and economics in the region. Islamic modernism, which was against Sufism in the first development, has adopted New-Sufism based of the Qur’an and Hadith and some traditions of Islam. In the later part of Suharto era, Sufism was introduced profoundly around the country by New-modernism movement of Nurcholis Madjid as the important element of modern Islam.
Recently in this decade, the well-known spiritual training of ESQ is the metamorphosis of Sufism in the context of the socio dynamics of urban people. Ary Ginanjar, the founder of ESQ, promotes spiritual Islam through several days of trainings as the power for people to gain success in all level of their lives; business, politics, education, and family. He links the rituals of Islam to its spiritual messages which in many cases suit to the habits of being success in this modern life. Of course, this is only one face of what so called as New-Sufism. What we need, I think, in the context of social injustice is Sufism that advocates lower and marginalized people to gain their rights.
Resources:
1. Mark Woodward, Clifford Geertz, Islam in Java; Normative Piety and Mysticism in the Sultanate Yogyakarta, pp. 1-140.
Indonesian Muslims, in this case Javanese people, are not separated from global narrative of Islam, although the development of their religion has been influenced much more by dynamics of local and national factors rather than global ones. Sufism as well as modernism, in Indonesian context, is not static or monolithic. The Banten revolt 1888, which was organized by the leaders of Sufi organization, is obviously evidence that Sufism is not separated from practical lives due the dynamics of politics and economics in the region. Islamic modernism, which was against Sufism in the first development, has adopted New-Sufism based of the Qur’an and Hadith and some traditions of Islam. In the later part of Suharto era, Sufism was introduced profoundly around the country by New-modernism movement of Nurcholis Madjid as the important element of modern Islam.
Recently in this decade, the well-known spiritual training of ESQ is the metamorphosis of Sufism in the context of the socio dynamics of urban people. Ary Ginanjar, the founder of ESQ, promotes spiritual Islam through several days of trainings as the power for people to gain success in all level of their lives; business, politics, education, and family. He links the rituals of Islam to its spiritual messages which in many cases suit to the habits of being success in this modern life. Of course, this is only one face of what so called as New-Sufism. What we need, I think, in the context of social injustice is Sufism that advocates lower and marginalized people to gain their rights.
Resources:
1. Mark Woodward, Clifford Geertz, Islam in Java; Normative Piety and Mysticism in the Sultanate Yogyakarta, pp. 1-140.
Sufism, Mysticism and Tradition in Indonesia Islam: Nahdatul Ulama
Sufism, Mysticism and Tradition in Indonesia Islam: Nahdatul Ulama
Kristanto Budiprabowo (Tatok)
Thinking about recent history of traditionalist Islam in Indonesia makes me come to the question: How traditionalist Islam understands the meaning of religious organization? Understanding the meaning of religious organization became necessary because even though traditionalist Islam Indonesia practiced Islam in very various ways, they commonly based on the same sufistic teaching that focus on the combination between the five pillars of Islam and the local belief. In this combination of religious teaching, kyais have a significant role not in term of an organization’s organ but as local leader individually who create his own type of organization. The function of the kyais is not as an organization status but rather as local community leader who has an authoritative to offer rituals based on the local belief context. From this point I aware that religious organization somehow not based on the need of community but rather from the religious idea about community (ummat).
In the case of non-centralistic organization, traditionalist Islam in Indonesia mostly correlated with NU and the pesantren. In my opinion, perhaps, pesantren cannot see only as an independent religious organization. Pesantren is more like an educational institution that just broadening the community patriarchal system. If we see pesantren as the organ of the big organization that imaged as religious organization, so the meaning of religious organization not only can find as a dream of Islamic society but also the community effort to transform their social and cultural need to the more active.
The combination between religious idea about community and the socio-cultural need in the specific context, I think is the dominant caused how traditionalists Islam survive. The idea about community can understand in various meaning such as nationality, ethnicity and religiosity but the most important is the real ummat that united people in particular form of society. For me, Nahdathul Ullama is the perennial witness how traditionalist Islam can keep their Identity in the meantime transformed their form in the process of social change.
Kristanto Budiprabowo (Tatok)
Thinking about recent history of traditionalist Islam in Indonesia makes me come to the question: How traditionalist Islam understands the meaning of religious organization? Understanding the meaning of religious organization became necessary because even though traditionalist Islam Indonesia practiced Islam in very various ways, they commonly based on the same sufistic teaching that focus on the combination between the five pillars of Islam and the local belief. In this combination of religious teaching, kyais have a significant role not in term of an organization’s organ but as local leader individually who create his own type of organization. The function of the kyais is not as an organization status but rather as local community leader who has an authoritative to offer rituals based on the local belief context. From this point I aware that religious organization somehow not based on the need of community but rather from the religious idea about community (ummat).
In the case of non-centralistic organization, traditionalist Islam in Indonesia mostly correlated with NU and the pesantren. In my opinion, perhaps, pesantren cannot see only as an independent religious organization. Pesantren is more like an educational institution that just broadening the community patriarchal system. If we see pesantren as the organ of the big organization that imaged as religious organization, so the meaning of religious organization not only can find as a dream of Islamic society but also the community effort to transform their social and cultural need to the more active.
The combination between religious idea about community and the socio-cultural need in the specific context, I think is the dominant caused how traditionalists Islam survive. The idea about community can understand in various meaning such as nationality, ethnicity and religiosity but the most important is the real ummat that united people in particular form of society. For me, Nahdathul Ullama is the perennial witness how traditionalist Islam can keep their Identity in the meantime transformed their form in the process of social change.
History of Religions in Indonesia Part II: from c. 1900 to the Present Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism revivals: the Meaning of “Religion”; Fredri
Tri Harmaji
History of Religions in Indonesia Part II: from c. 1900 to the Present
Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism revivals: the Meaning of “Religion”; Fredrik Bart, Balinese World, Robert W. Hefner, Hindu Javanese: Tengger Tradition and Islam, Lien Shen Siddhi Hu, Sejarah Agama Buddha di Indinesia.
Especially Hinduism and Buddhism used to be the biggest religion in society now called as Indonesia where recently these religions are the most minorities. Reading the articles above I can imagine how it so painful for some hindu-buddhist leaders for witnessing the decline of their religion so drastically after the penetration of Islam and then Christianity. I can feel the pain because I also felt the same thing when my small congregation within aggressive Islamic majority in there my father is the priest because of one other problems began to lose its members. To experience the extinction of our community or religion is a painful feeling for the leaders as well as most devoted people in the community.
Hindu and Buddhist communities in Bali and Tengger regions described in the articles are the generation of this unfortunate time. In these two areas I can see how the people inside deal with the issue. In Bali where Hinduism is the majority the tension is not as strong as in Tengger where they are just minority that in fact faced continual threat from other religion especially Islam. In Bali the people are more confident of their position and their high long tradition in encountering Indonesian state development. Like what is ague by Fredrik Barth the people of Bali are very diverse their custom and religious detail of belief and practice. Although Islam as well as Christianity is presence there they are more secure because of their strong position as majority with long and strong tradition. It is different from the people in Tengger or on other Indonesian areas in general. In Tengger the Hindus as well as the Buddhists such in Basuki villages are in the position of minority within aggressive majority of mission. Like Hefner tell us, communities such Buddhism in Basuki area was completely ruined finally. They all were converted to Islam and rationally just looked at their previous religion as their past.
But, like also was described in the three readings, these religions are never giving up to struggle for their existence. In the independent time of Indonesia they begun to strive to make their religion recognized as Indonesian official religions. It was a long struggle but finally successful. Now, the time of one particular religion domination is over and the time of pluralism is emerging. This new era Indonesia was importantly marked by the recognition of Confucianism/ kong hu cu as official religion during Gusdur’s era. This new environment is totally important for the minority to free from religious majority’s mission. In this time the minority are highly honor as precious unique entities within the extravagance of the majority.
Revivalism is then become a chief issue for long ‘oppressed’ religion such as these three religions. But, it is also the fact that in this pluralism era in Indonesia we also find the revivalism of some radical/ fundamentalist among the major religion. These fundamentalist groups have an agenda that actually very different from pluralism values. In this context we can see that actually the situation is not so different from the long previous one. The hope for this minor religions is then on hand of the government. The role of the government is very important to give and insure more space for these religions at least to live for themselves.
History of Religions in Indonesia Part II: from c. 1900 to the Present
Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism revivals: the Meaning of “Religion”; Fredrik Bart, Balinese World, Robert W. Hefner, Hindu Javanese: Tengger Tradition and Islam, Lien Shen Siddhi Hu, Sejarah Agama Buddha di Indinesia.
Especially Hinduism and Buddhism used to be the biggest religion in society now called as Indonesia where recently these religions are the most minorities. Reading the articles above I can imagine how it so painful for some hindu-buddhist leaders for witnessing the decline of their religion so drastically after the penetration of Islam and then Christianity. I can feel the pain because I also felt the same thing when my small congregation within aggressive Islamic majority in there my father is the priest because of one other problems began to lose its members. To experience the extinction of our community or religion is a painful feeling for the leaders as well as most devoted people in the community.
Hindu and Buddhist communities in Bali and Tengger regions described in the articles are the generation of this unfortunate time. In these two areas I can see how the people inside deal with the issue. In Bali where Hinduism is the majority the tension is not as strong as in Tengger where they are just minority that in fact faced continual threat from other religion especially Islam. In Bali the people are more confident of their position and their high long tradition in encountering Indonesian state development. Like what is ague by Fredrik Barth the people of Bali are very diverse their custom and religious detail of belief and practice. Although Islam as well as Christianity is presence there they are more secure because of their strong position as majority with long and strong tradition. It is different from the people in Tengger or on other Indonesian areas in general. In Tengger the Hindus as well as the Buddhists such in Basuki villages are in the position of minority within aggressive majority of mission. Like Hefner tell us, communities such Buddhism in Basuki area was completely ruined finally. They all were converted to Islam and rationally just looked at their previous religion as their past.
But, like also was described in the three readings, these religions are never giving up to struggle for their existence. In the independent time of Indonesia they begun to strive to make their religion recognized as Indonesian official religions. It was a long struggle but finally successful. Now, the time of one particular religion domination is over and the time of pluralism is emerging. This new era Indonesia was importantly marked by the recognition of Confucianism/ kong hu cu as official religion during Gusdur’s era. This new environment is totally important for the minority to free from religious majority’s mission. In this time the minority are highly honor as precious unique entities within the extravagance of the majority.
Revivalism is then become a chief issue for long ‘oppressed’ religion such as these three religions. But, it is also the fact that in this pluralism era in Indonesia we also find the revivalism of some radical/ fundamentalist among the major religion. These fundamentalist groups have an agenda that actually very different from pluralism values. In this context we can see that actually the situation is not so different from the long previous one. The hope for this minor religions is then on hand of the government. The role of the government is very important to give and insure more space for these religions at least to live for themselves.
Sufism, Mysticism and Tradition in Indonesia Islam. Nahdatul Ulama; M.C. Ricklefs, Polarizing Javanese Society: Islamic and Other Visions C. 1830-1930
Tri Harmaji
History of Religions in Indonesia Part II: from c. 1900 to the Present
Sufism, Mysticism and Tradition in Indonesia Islam. Nahdatul Ulama; M.C. Ricklefs, Polarizing Javanese Society: Islamic and Other Visions C. 1830-1930.
In recent Indonesia Islam is divided into several groups that have more or less different theology and political agenda. NU and Muhamadiyah are the two biggest Islamic organization or actually groups that now actively engages in political realm, but outside these groups there are other several groups that also politically very active like HTI for example. The groups in Islamic religion are varying from the most fundamental until the most modern and liberal like JIL for instance. How can Islam become so varied? This question beside can bring us to the understanding of Islamic history but also can bring us to the understanding of the ‘meaning’ of Islam as a religion.
From the reading, Polarizing Javanese society by Ricklefs, I can see the process of Islamic groups’ emerging. And it is interesting that the most discuss group, the mystic or Sufi group, is no longer important now. It is acknowledged that the first Islam came to Indonesia was actually Islamic Sufism. This kind of Islam was very suitable for Indonesian Hindu-Buddhist and so, although it is unclear enough how the process, this kind of Islam won many Indonesian to convert. Sufism was widely accepted until the second wave of Islam, the more fundamental one, came together with the advance contact with Islamic heartland of Mecca. Sufism and mysticism that Ricklefs widely argues as mystic synthesis which people acknowledge themselves as purely Muslim but in other hand they also still believed in local spirits, was been the most widely accepted. But then when many hajj emerged then the more fundamental Islam, santri, was becoming more and more dominant in Java. When this stage was going on resistant from the former was also emerging. This resistant well represented in the three literatures produced at that time that is babad Kediri, serat Gotholoco, and serat darmogandul. This struggle finally result in the three groups of people in java like was perceived by Clifford Geertz that is priyayi, santri, and abangan.
What I described above show us the fact that Islam is a religion that is actually also shaped by the culture. From the first time of spreading in the in the Middle East Islam has been shaped by the cultures of the areas. Sufism that was known as the first Islam came to Indonesia is actually Islam that had been reshaped by Persian culture. In Indonesia and mostly in java where the people has already had high culture of Hindu-Buddhist Islam could not be accepted without receiving the host culture into. Mystic synthesis widely argues by Ricklefs is the proof of this phenomenon. Here Islam being reshaped by Javanese culture in order to be widely accepted by the Javanese. When the santri cried that Javanese was kafir and all kind of Javanese ritual was musrik, serat gatholoco bravely responded that santri was actually the real kafir because they have left their original religion and prefer to foreign religion, the arab religion which their land of origin was so drought like the land cursed by God.
History of Religions in Indonesia Part II: from c. 1900 to the Present
Sufism, Mysticism and Tradition in Indonesia Islam. Nahdatul Ulama; M.C. Ricklefs, Polarizing Javanese Society: Islamic and Other Visions C. 1830-1930.
In recent Indonesia Islam is divided into several groups that have more or less different theology and political agenda. NU and Muhamadiyah are the two biggest Islamic organization or actually groups that now actively engages in political realm, but outside these groups there are other several groups that also politically very active like HTI for example. The groups in Islamic religion are varying from the most fundamental until the most modern and liberal like JIL for instance. How can Islam become so varied? This question beside can bring us to the understanding of Islamic history but also can bring us to the understanding of the ‘meaning’ of Islam as a religion.
From the reading, Polarizing Javanese society by Ricklefs, I can see the process of Islamic groups’ emerging. And it is interesting that the most discuss group, the mystic or Sufi group, is no longer important now. It is acknowledged that the first Islam came to Indonesia was actually Islamic Sufism. This kind of Islam was very suitable for Indonesian Hindu-Buddhist and so, although it is unclear enough how the process, this kind of Islam won many Indonesian to convert. Sufism was widely accepted until the second wave of Islam, the more fundamental one, came together with the advance contact with Islamic heartland of Mecca. Sufism and mysticism that Ricklefs widely argues as mystic synthesis which people acknowledge themselves as purely Muslim but in other hand they also still believed in local spirits, was been the most widely accepted. But then when many hajj emerged then the more fundamental Islam, santri, was becoming more and more dominant in Java. When this stage was going on resistant from the former was also emerging. This resistant well represented in the three literatures produced at that time that is babad Kediri, serat Gotholoco, and serat darmogandul. This struggle finally result in the three groups of people in java like was perceived by Clifford Geertz that is priyayi, santri, and abangan.
What I described above show us the fact that Islam is a religion that is actually also shaped by the culture. From the first time of spreading in the in the Middle East Islam has been shaped by the cultures of the areas. Sufism that was known as the first Islam came to Indonesia is actually Islam that had been reshaped by Persian culture. In Indonesia and mostly in java where the people has already had high culture of Hindu-Buddhist Islam could not be accepted without receiving the host culture into. Mystic synthesis widely argues by Ricklefs is the proof of this phenomenon. Here Islam being reshaped by Javanese culture in order to be widely accepted by the Javanese. When the santri cried that Javanese was kafir and all kind of Javanese ritual was musrik, serat gatholoco bravely responded that santri was actually the real kafir because they have left their original religion and prefer to foreign religion, the arab religion which their land of origin was so drought like the land cursed by God.
Sufism, Mysticism and Tradition in Indonesian Islam. Nahdatul Ulama by Joko wicoyo
Durga’s Mosque: Cosmology, Conversion and Community in Central Javanese Islam written by Stephen C. Headley tells us about what the “umma” is. It is the exploration of the Islamization of the Krendawahana-Kaliasa area of Central Java. It explores the sociology of village life, the founding of communities, the cult of female divinities, including the rice goddess, the goddess of the Indian Ocean and, Durga (Chapter 1-4). Headley enriches the readers by describing the reconstruction of the religious history of the Kaliasa area by looking at two kinds of lineages, the Javanese trah and the Islamic lineages that have their own particular ties with Kaliasa. The weakening of the royal apanage system brought about by land reform allowed a restructuring of the religious landscape of the area by both Islamic and aristocratic lineages (Chapter 5-6). The author looks at how Muslim lineages encompass the area through a network of mosques and Islamic schools, the rituals and prayers offered at Durga’s shrine in Krendawahana and in the mosque at Kaliasa, and an analysis of the integration of Muslim and Javanese village cults. (Chapter 6-7)
The book is becoming more interesting when Headley offers the reader with the discussion of the sacrifice of a buffalo in Durga’s forest which explores the links between the Mahabarata, the tale of Durga’s defeat of the demon buffalo, and Durga’s son, Kala. What makes me surprise is he examines the Islamic and Javanese mantras that are part of the sacrifice and which used to address local deities, the formula of the prayers isn’t so different from the Islamic prayers. He also explores Islamic cosmographies and Javanese cosmogonies. By looking at the development of salat, the prayers said in the mosque. Salat is seen as a marker that distinguishes the Muslim from the unbeliever, and the sameness of these public prayers is a way for the local mosque community (jemaah) to create the illusion of being at one with the Muslim world (Chapter 8-11).
In the following chapters, the author illustrates the development of an Islamic space, the five daily prayers structure time, the effect of the recent economic and political crisis on the religious landscape of Central Java, how jihad (struggle) has permitted a reinterpretation of Islam in Java as an image of society, and the social healing rituals in and for the city of Solo after the chaos following the fall of ex-president Soeharto. Headley sees these rituals as an application of rural values in an urban setting. He asks how Islam has appropriated modernity through an accommodation with an individualism that would previously have been impossible in holistic rural Java, but was promoted by changes that came with colonial policy and post-independence development. Even so, this individualism continues to be limited by Javanese custom (adat) as the emphasis is once more on the values that allow the coexistence of different ethnic and religious groups.
I think what Stephen C. Headley has already explored in this book is one of the most original and systematic ethnography of Javanese religion and cultural history which is full of the varieties of Javanese traditions and bears the contemporary religious change in the Surakarta region of Central Java. In his analysis of the Durga ritual complex, Headley sheds light on one of the most unusual court traditions which have to survive in an era of deepening Islamization. His analysis of this ritual complex, and its implications for understanding of popular Javanese religion, deserves to be read by all serious students who are interested in Sufism, mysticism and traditions in Indonesian Islam in Java, as well as anyone who is interested in studying religions and indigenous beliefs in Indonesia.
The book is becoming more interesting when Headley offers the reader with the discussion of the sacrifice of a buffalo in Durga’s forest which explores the links between the Mahabarata, the tale of Durga’s defeat of the demon buffalo, and Durga’s son, Kala. What makes me surprise is he examines the Islamic and Javanese mantras that are part of the sacrifice and which used to address local deities, the formula of the prayers isn’t so different from the Islamic prayers. He also explores Islamic cosmographies and Javanese cosmogonies. By looking at the development of salat, the prayers said in the mosque. Salat is seen as a marker that distinguishes the Muslim from the unbeliever, and the sameness of these public prayers is a way for the local mosque community (jemaah) to create the illusion of being at one with the Muslim world (Chapter 8-11).
In the following chapters, the author illustrates the development of an Islamic space, the five daily prayers structure time, the effect of the recent economic and political crisis on the religious landscape of Central Java, how jihad (struggle) has permitted a reinterpretation of Islam in Java as an image of society, and the social healing rituals in and for the city of Solo after the chaos following the fall of ex-president Soeharto. Headley sees these rituals as an application of rural values in an urban setting. He asks how Islam has appropriated modernity through an accommodation with an individualism that would previously have been impossible in holistic rural Java, but was promoted by changes that came with colonial policy and post-independence development. Even so, this individualism continues to be limited by Javanese custom (adat) as the emphasis is once more on the values that allow the coexistence of different ethnic and religious groups.
I think what Stephen C. Headley has already explored in this book is one of the most original and systematic ethnography of Javanese religion and cultural history which is full of the varieties of Javanese traditions and bears the contemporary religious change in the Surakarta region of Central Java. In his analysis of the Durga ritual complex, Headley sheds light on one of the most unusual court traditions which have to survive in an era of deepening Islamization. His analysis of this ritual complex, and its implications for understanding of popular Javanese religion, deserves to be read by all serious students who are interested in Sufism, mysticism and traditions in Indonesian Islam in Java, as well as anyone who is interested in studying religions and indigenous beliefs in Indonesia.
Sufism, Islamization and Politic in Indonesia by Nihayatul Wafiroh
We cannot argue that Islamization in Indonesia connected to Sufism or Tasawuf. Historians believe that Indonesian was known in Indonesia since 7th and 8th century, however Islam just developed in 13th century. The groups of people who took rules in the developing of Islam were Sufi organizations. According to Alwi Shihab in his book, “Islam Pertama” dan Pengaruhnya Hingga Kini di Indonesia, Sufism influenced for the spread of Islam widely in Southeast Asia areas although after that there is differences of opinion on the arrival orders, whether in conjunction with the arrival of Islam or came later (p. 36).
Sufism is not only a religious movement but also it involves in a political sphere. Indeed, Sufism takes an important role to strengthen the position of Islam in the country and community, and the development of the wider society. Sastono Kartodirdjo in his book, Pemberontakan Petani Banten 1888, said that in 19th century, Sufi groups became an effective tool to organize a religious movement and the ideal of resurrection (p. 173). There are many groups of Sufism in Indonesia. Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) through Jam’iyah Tariqat al-Mu’tabaroh claims that there are 46 groups of Sufism which are recognized its validity (mu’tabaroh).
How are the functions of Sufi groups in politic areas in recent centuries? Indeed, during colonialist era, the roles of Sufi groups in the promoting independency could not be declared. Right now some of Sufi groups still take places in the politic. However I would like to ask : Do Sufi groups still keep the idealism of Islamic perspectives or the basic ideals of Sufism when they play in politic right now?
Sufism is not only a religious movement but also it involves in a political sphere. Indeed, Sufism takes an important role to strengthen the position of Islam in the country and community, and the development of the wider society. Sastono Kartodirdjo in his book, Pemberontakan Petani Banten 1888, said that in 19th century, Sufi groups became an effective tool to organize a religious movement and the ideal of resurrection (p. 173). There are many groups of Sufism in Indonesia. Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) through Jam’iyah Tariqat al-Mu’tabaroh claims that there are 46 groups of Sufism which are recognized its validity (mu’tabaroh).
How are the functions of Sufi groups in politic areas in recent centuries? Indeed, during colonialist era, the roles of Sufi groups in the promoting independency could not be declared. Right now some of Sufi groups still take places in the politic. However I would like to ask : Do Sufi groups still keep the idealism of Islamic perspectives or the basic ideals of Sufism when they play in politic right now?
LEYAKET ALI MOHAMED OMAR
History of Religion Part 2- Prof Bernard Adeney- Risakotta and Prof Margana
Readings are from : Stephen C. Headley- Durga Mosque;
Mark Woodward, Islam in Java- Normative Piety and Mysticism in the Sultanate of Yogyakarta.
Julia Day Howell- Sufism and the Indonesian Islamic Revival
Let me start from a point that I’m clinging on to; which is derived from a well known scholar on this subject in general. Abu Hamid, Muhammad bin Muhammad Al-Ghazali (450-505 H/1058-1111) he said “ He who learns Islamic jurisprudence and neglects Sufism becomes a good-for-nothing he who learns Sufism and neglects Islamic Jurisprudence becomes an apostate and he who combines both attains realization of the truth”
Reading Headley’s work on ‘Sacred Wells and Shopping Malls’; glimpses of the reconstruction of social confidence in Solo after the fall of Soeharto. The reading reveals the performance of rituals and purification of a blended multi-religions mysticism practices. Mixture of Javanese indigenous practice, Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam. The ritual starts from the wayang, but not as the usual wayang, the content dialogues from the dhalang was transformed to another senario. He related its dilemma to the ‘Broom of the world’ to seek help from the current situation of mishaps that happened and on the same ritual, for the well, offerings are classified by the number nine that signifies and symbolise in Javanese and Islamic perspectives. On top of that many other elaborated offerings were also done. These are actually part of the rituals that are believed to be sacred to ‘ward off’ or so to speak ‘clean’ the ‘unwanted evil’ that dwells around the places of interest obstructing or being the cause of hindrance to their prosperity and ironically with a grand finale of invoking Allah as the One who will grant the fulfilment of prayers (p. 459, 465).
It is obvious to highlight that Islam is based on the basic understanding of Tauhid (unity of Allah) as Schimmels, 1975:146 puts it “In its most basic sense it means monotheism”. On the other hand here in this practice it is the interpretation and intention that played a larger role. Those who are interested in spirituality practices as mentioned above, mysticism will always bring excitement for most human kind. Well understood as a ‘something’ from the other world that not many has ‘seen’ from their naked eyes but certainly it would be safe to seek refuge from. Much as the drama can tell, personally I felt this is a result of cultural and religious diversity in Java. It takes a person with wisdom to separate every single practice into its own box. Therefore, there is no need for a call to say this is an Islamic practice or it is not a practice in Islam; as far as it is understood it is neither. For me it belongs to a unique set on its own.
Mark R. Woodward in his interesting research, Islam in Java provides a profound understanding in the Muslim world now and then; interestingly it provides information not only in Java but related Islamic world that brought in the ideology of Sufism to Java. He mentions great deal on the lifestyle in pasantren, it details the mysticism and the Sufi way of life from the days of the nine Saints to the present day of practicing Sufi.
In line with this Julia Day Howell in ‘Sufism and the Indonesian Islamic Revival’ portrays another set of bird-eyes view on this field. She mentions ‘Indonesia’s Islamic revival has been portrayed as ‘scripturalist’ that is, as conforming to a conception of proper Muslim practice that rejects Sufi traditions as idolatrous accretions to the pristine faith….(p.702) She argues, despite this movements were made but Sufism still survives and in fact being enthusiastically pursued. Embarking on her notes my argument is that there are no doubts about Sufism being the traditional practice of one being closer to God’s path and more over it’s a favourite subject for most, in her article she mentions about a contemporary Neo-Modernist spirituality programs going on where usually about 40 people attended the lectures but when it comes to talking about tasawwuf, the class can come up to 120 people attending it(p.720) having said that I believe that Sufi teachings need extra caution on certain matters, therefore from my point of view it has to be carefully select by each and every individual, as the level of understanding differs from each other. Not every Muslim can directly jump into a Tariqah without having a proper fraction in their understanding of Islam. In other words, the ideology of Sufism has to be properly guided by a teacher. Like what I mentioned from the beginning of this response paper, from the sayings of al—Ghazali ultimately the best way is balancing the understanding of Sufism in Islam with Islamic Jurisprudence.
History of Religion Part 2- Prof Bernard Adeney- Risakotta and Prof Margana
Readings are from : Stephen C. Headley- Durga Mosque;
Mark Woodward, Islam in Java- Normative Piety and Mysticism in the Sultanate of Yogyakarta.
Julia Day Howell- Sufism and the Indonesian Islamic Revival
Let me start from a point that I’m clinging on to; which is derived from a well known scholar on this subject in general. Abu Hamid, Muhammad bin Muhammad Al-Ghazali (450-505 H/1058-1111) he said “ He who learns Islamic jurisprudence and neglects Sufism becomes a good-for-nothing he who learns Sufism and neglects Islamic Jurisprudence becomes an apostate and he who combines both attains realization of the truth”
Reading Headley’s work on ‘Sacred Wells and Shopping Malls’; glimpses of the reconstruction of social confidence in Solo after the fall of Soeharto. The reading reveals the performance of rituals and purification of a blended multi-religions mysticism practices. Mixture of Javanese indigenous practice, Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam. The ritual starts from the wayang, but not as the usual wayang, the content dialogues from the dhalang was transformed to another senario. He related its dilemma to the ‘Broom of the world’ to seek help from the current situation of mishaps that happened and on the same ritual, for the well, offerings are classified by the number nine that signifies and symbolise in Javanese and Islamic perspectives. On top of that many other elaborated offerings were also done. These are actually part of the rituals that are believed to be sacred to ‘ward off’ or so to speak ‘clean’ the ‘unwanted evil’ that dwells around the places of interest obstructing or being the cause of hindrance to their prosperity and ironically with a grand finale of invoking Allah as the One who will grant the fulfilment of prayers (p. 459, 465).
It is obvious to highlight that Islam is based on the basic understanding of Tauhid (unity of Allah) as Schimmels, 1975:146 puts it “In its most basic sense it means monotheism”. On the other hand here in this practice it is the interpretation and intention that played a larger role. Those who are interested in spirituality practices as mentioned above, mysticism will always bring excitement for most human kind. Well understood as a ‘something’ from the other world that not many has ‘seen’ from their naked eyes but certainly it would be safe to seek refuge from. Much as the drama can tell, personally I felt this is a result of cultural and religious diversity in Java. It takes a person with wisdom to separate every single practice into its own box. Therefore, there is no need for a call to say this is an Islamic practice or it is not a practice in Islam; as far as it is understood it is neither. For me it belongs to a unique set on its own.
Mark R. Woodward in his interesting research, Islam in Java provides a profound understanding in the Muslim world now and then; interestingly it provides information not only in Java but related Islamic world that brought in the ideology of Sufism to Java. He mentions great deal on the lifestyle in pasantren, it details the mysticism and the Sufi way of life from the days of the nine Saints to the present day of practicing Sufi.
In line with this Julia Day Howell in ‘Sufism and the Indonesian Islamic Revival’ portrays another set of bird-eyes view on this field. She mentions ‘Indonesia’s Islamic revival has been portrayed as ‘scripturalist’ that is, as conforming to a conception of proper Muslim practice that rejects Sufi traditions as idolatrous accretions to the pristine faith….(p.702) She argues, despite this movements were made but Sufism still survives and in fact being enthusiastically pursued. Embarking on her notes my argument is that there are no doubts about Sufism being the traditional practice of one being closer to God’s path and more over it’s a favourite subject for most, in her article she mentions about a contemporary Neo-Modernist spirituality programs going on where usually about 40 people attended the lectures but when it comes to talking about tasawwuf, the class can come up to 120 people attending it(p.720) having said that I believe that Sufi teachings need extra caution on certain matters, therefore from my point of view it has to be carefully select by each and every individual, as the level of understanding differs from each other. Not every Muslim can directly jump into a Tariqah without having a proper fraction in their understanding of Islam. In other words, the ideology of Sufism has to be properly guided by a teacher. Like what I mentioned from the beginning of this response paper, from the sayings of al—Ghazali ultimately the best way is balancing the understanding of Sufism in Islam with Islamic Jurisprudence.
THE INCLUSIVE NOTION FOR HUMANITY by Roma Ulinnuha
Islam and Java have been always an interesting notion to discuss not only on the relation between the Islamic faith and the Javanese cosmogony, but also the essence of tolerance and inclusiveness in Indonesia legacy. The close relation of the Islamic sphere on the one side and the Javanese culture on the other—as noted by Ricklefs (2007: 31) is manifest but it is also significant to note the virtues legacy of the institution.
The founding father of the Nahdlatul Ulama, K.H. Hasyim Asy’ari during his intellectual work had been studying almost all disciplines particularly on hadits (2005: xiii). In Tibyan, Asy’ari emphasizes the implementation of how a Mu’min should act to the other individuals so that the social disharmony is avoided. This is a central factor, I think, that is sometimes forgotten now by both internal and external relationships of the religious entity. In relation to sufism, mysticism and tradition, they are inherent in the institution, but I think, the idea should be more pointed on a refreshing initiative to widen a problem-solving of the civilization. If Muslims could grasp the contextual aspect of those traditions, I believe, the inclusive and tolerance stances could be succinctly accomplished, not the separation and extremity.
Furthermore Islam had been introduced by Sufi particularly in Java (2003: 3). The Walisongo has initiated the Pesantren, as the majority of Ulama believed, to maintain the spiritual development. In its later development, the Javanese Sufism focuses more on its mysticism aspect. In the midst of XIX and the beginning of XX, there was ‘Islamic Revivalism’ in Java (2003: 15). One of the evidence of the revivals is the massive Islamic teaching. It is interesting that some teaching of Tarekat affected the Javanese Literature of Serat Centini and Wirid Hidayat Jati.
In this sense, I would like to reiterate that the inclusive notion has been indorsed in its fullest point in seeing this particular tradition. The traits are respectfulness, tolerance, open-minded, and mediation to fight against ignorance, intolerance, narrow-minded and extremity. History, I believe, does not only provide us with the bulk of historical records, but does support us on what humans can achieve for the betterment of humanity, instead of fulfilling the interest of individuals or groups. The hope of inclusive mode is the designated projection that becomes the challenge for the Indonesian Muslim in particular and the Indonesian citizen in general in the present and in the following mirroring the past legacy of virtues.
MC, Ricklefs, Polarizing Javanese Society: Islamic and other Vision-1830-1930, Singapore: NUS, 2007; Asy’ari, Hasyim, The Kyai: On Islam and Society, Yogyakarta: Qirtas, 2005; Zulkifli, Sufi-Java: Tasawuf-Pesantren Relation, Yogyakarta: Pustaka Sufi, 2003
The founding father of the Nahdlatul Ulama, K.H. Hasyim Asy’ari during his intellectual work had been studying almost all disciplines particularly on hadits (2005: xiii). In Tibyan, Asy’ari emphasizes the implementation of how a Mu’min should act to the other individuals so that the social disharmony is avoided. This is a central factor, I think, that is sometimes forgotten now by both internal and external relationships of the religious entity. In relation to sufism, mysticism and tradition, they are inherent in the institution, but I think, the idea should be more pointed on a refreshing initiative to widen a problem-solving of the civilization. If Muslims could grasp the contextual aspect of those traditions, I believe, the inclusive and tolerance stances could be succinctly accomplished, not the separation and extremity.
Furthermore Islam had been introduced by Sufi particularly in Java (2003: 3). The Walisongo has initiated the Pesantren, as the majority of Ulama believed, to maintain the spiritual development. In its later development, the Javanese Sufism focuses more on its mysticism aspect. In the midst of XIX and the beginning of XX, there was ‘Islamic Revivalism’ in Java (2003: 15). One of the evidence of the revivals is the massive Islamic teaching. It is interesting that some teaching of Tarekat affected the Javanese Literature of Serat Centini and Wirid Hidayat Jati.
In this sense, I would like to reiterate that the inclusive notion has been indorsed in its fullest point in seeing this particular tradition. The traits are respectfulness, tolerance, open-minded, and mediation to fight against ignorance, intolerance, narrow-minded and extremity. History, I believe, does not only provide us with the bulk of historical records, but does support us on what humans can achieve for the betterment of humanity, instead of fulfilling the interest of individuals or groups. The hope of inclusive mode is the designated projection that becomes the challenge for the Indonesian Muslim in particular and the Indonesian citizen in general in the present and in the following mirroring the past legacy of virtues.
MC, Ricklefs, Polarizing Javanese Society: Islamic and other Vision-1830-1930, Singapore: NUS, 2007; Asy’ari, Hasyim, The Kyai: On Islam and Society, Yogyakarta: Qirtas, 2005; Zulkifli, Sufi-Java: Tasawuf-Pesantren Relation, Yogyakarta: Pustaka Sufi, 2003
Islam, Mysticism and Sufism in Indonesia by Nina Mariani Noor
From the three readings, it is obvious that Islam which develops in Indonesia experiencing adaptation and acculturation. Since the strong indigenous beliefs which already established long before the coming of Islam, particularly in Java, Islam which is practiced by Javanese people somehow is still embedded by those Javanism. These practices of Islam which are called by Ricklefs synthesis mysticism. However, I think, in practicing Islam, Javanese Muslims are not only influenced by Javanism but also Sufism. Those two terms are having some similarities to some extent but their foundation is different. The former is based on Javanese spiritual beliefs whereas the latter is based on Islamic foundation.
Looking at the practice of Sufism in Java, we will automatically look at tarekats and also Nahdlatul Ulama. Tarekats really have significant influence in Islamic practice in Indonesia even till today. Nahdlatul Ulama as one of Islamic Sufism in Indonesia really have very close relationship with Syeikh Abdul Qadir Jaelani (one of Sufism figure). In their ritual like tahlilan, praying, they always recite the biography of Syeikh Abdul Qadir Jaelani. This Syeikh is very popular among NU people.
In response to Ricklefs about the teaching of the mystic synthesis tradition of Javanese Islam in pesantrens (p.71), although I never experience living in pesantren, I do admit that such kind of teachings are likely still taught to santris in some traditional pesantrens nowadays. However, in my opinion, it seems to me that banishing such kind of practice is unlikely although there are some young generations who are trying to purify Islam from such kind of un-Islamic practice. This is because, for me, religion is not only dogmatic things but also cultural matters in which human beings can not detach from their contextual culture. It is okay to practice Islamic teachings influenced by our cultural context, as long as those cultures do not oppose Islamic teachings.
Looking at the practice of Sufism in Java, we will automatically look at tarekats and also Nahdlatul Ulama. Tarekats really have significant influence in Islamic practice in Indonesia even till today. Nahdlatul Ulama as one of Islamic Sufism in Indonesia really have very close relationship with Syeikh Abdul Qadir Jaelani (one of Sufism figure). In their ritual like tahlilan, praying, they always recite the biography of Syeikh Abdul Qadir Jaelani. This Syeikh is very popular among NU people.
In response to Ricklefs about the teaching of the mystic synthesis tradition of Javanese Islam in pesantrens (p.71), although I never experience living in pesantren, I do admit that such kind of teachings are likely still taught to santris in some traditional pesantrens nowadays. However, in my opinion, it seems to me that banishing such kind of practice is unlikely although there are some young generations who are trying to purify Islam from such kind of un-Islamic practice. This is because, for me, religion is not only dogmatic things but also cultural matters in which human beings can not detach from their contextual culture. It is okay to practice Islamic teachings influenced by our cultural context, as long as those cultures do not oppose Islamic teachings.
Common Ground - Roy AB Tolentino
"A Javanese of the later eighteenth century... might find in Islam not only the five pillars and the law, which were the proper container for mystical thought, but also support for anti-kafir sentiments and actions. But a Javanese Muslim need not doubt that Suwan Lawu, Goddess of the Southern Ocean, and all manner of indigenous spirit forces were as real as God’s final message to humankind through the Qur’an." (Ricklefs 2006:187)
This description ends M.C. Ricklefs’ account of the Islamic synthesis in the 18th to 19th centuries, but it might also be used to describe some Muslims in Java today. As Ricklefs’ research shows, there were many different styles of adaptation and incorporation as the Javanese tried to integrate Islam with their indigenous beliefs. The patterns of Power present in Javanese culture, the cosmology and belief in a spiritual realm, found a place within the sense of identity with the worldwide Muslim community. This is something Mark Woodward also documents in his work, Islam in Java. With the adoption of Islam in the Javanese court, the notion of Power which comes from indigenous Javanese belief is given an Islamic interpretation. As a center of Power, the king does not only wield political and social Power, but religious Power as well, “replacing the wali (saint) as the preeminent religious authority.” (Woodward 1989:107) The king is described as “the nail of the universe,” and his subjects are united to him in the flow of Power which comes from Allah. “The sultan... is, in theory, the perfect man, guided directly by the will of Allah and capable of ensuring the prosperity, power, and spirituality of all of his subjects.” (Woodward 1989:249)
Flowing from our discussions in the past weeks regarding the categories of religion, one can observe that there is no such thing as a “pure” religion; in every place where a religion spreads, it is appropriated in the fashion fitting to the local culture and habitus. In Java, which had a plurality of indigenous cultures to begin with, the acceptance of Islam came with the corresponding appropriation into Javanese culture. Of course, as Ricklefs and Woodward point out, there was no plan; this synthesis was not premeditated. Owing to historical contingencies, the appropriation of Islam came about on a number of levels, not only religious. The same thing has happened to Islam in other parts of the world; the same thing happens with any religion that is able to establish a foothold.
The question that arises in the contemporary period, however, is whether religions are allowed to renew themselves. The tension between N.U. and Muhammadiyah might well be described as the disparity between “sticking with the way things are, and have always been” and “the possibility of renewal and rediscovery;” these two positions might equally be ascribed to both groups. As Julia Day Howell observes, there is present “a fervent concern on the part of Muslims of both Traditionalist and Modernist backgrounds to infuse ‘outward’ expressions of faith (so strongly stressed in scripturalism) with an ‘inner’ meaning and experiential richness by drawing on Islam’s mystical tradition.” (Howell 2001:722) Given the rich tradition of Islam in Indonesia, there is enough common ground for discourse between the Traditionalists and the Modernists; the common ground is fertile ground, as well.
Howell, Julia Day. “Sufism and the Indonesian Islamic Revival,” The Journal of Asian Studies. Vol. 60, No. 3, August 2001.
Ricklefs, Merle C. Mystic Synthesis in Java. Norwalk: Eastbridge Books, 2006.
Woodward, Mark R. Islam in Java: Normative Piety and Mysticism in the Sultanate of Yogyakarta. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1989.
This description ends M.C. Ricklefs’ account of the Islamic synthesis in the 18th to 19th centuries, but it might also be used to describe some Muslims in Java today. As Ricklefs’ research shows, there were many different styles of adaptation and incorporation as the Javanese tried to integrate Islam with their indigenous beliefs. The patterns of Power present in Javanese culture, the cosmology and belief in a spiritual realm, found a place within the sense of identity with the worldwide Muslim community. This is something Mark Woodward also documents in his work, Islam in Java. With the adoption of Islam in the Javanese court, the notion of Power which comes from indigenous Javanese belief is given an Islamic interpretation. As a center of Power, the king does not only wield political and social Power, but religious Power as well, “replacing the wali (saint) as the preeminent religious authority.” (Woodward 1989:107) The king is described as “the nail of the universe,” and his subjects are united to him in the flow of Power which comes from Allah. “The sultan... is, in theory, the perfect man, guided directly by the will of Allah and capable of ensuring the prosperity, power, and spirituality of all of his subjects.” (Woodward 1989:249)
Flowing from our discussions in the past weeks regarding the categories of religion, one can observe that there is no such thing as a “pure” religion; in every place where a religion spreads, it is appropriated in the fashion fitting to the local culture and habitus. In Java, which had a plurality of indigenous cultures to begin with, the acceptance of Islam came with the corresponding appropriation into Javanese culture. Of course, as Ricklefs and Woodward point out, there was no plan; this synthesis was not premeditated. Owing to historical contingencies, the appropriation of Islam came about on a number of levels, not only religious. The same thing has happened to Islam in other parts of the world; the same thing happens with any religion that is able to establish a foothold.
The question that arises in the contemporary period, however, is whether religions are allowed to renew themselves. The tension between N.U. and Muhammadiyah might well be described as the disparity between “sticking with the way things are, and have always been” and “the possibility of renewal and rediscovery;” these two positions might equally be ascribed to both groups. As Julia Day Howell observes, there is present “a fervent concern on the part of Muslims of both Traditionalist and Modernist backgrounds to infuse ‘outward’ expressions of faith (so strongly stressed in scripturalism) with an ‘inner’ meaning and experiential richness by drawing on Islam’s mystical tradition.” (Howell 2001:722) Given the rich tradition of Islam in Indonesia, there is enough common ground for discourse between the Traditionalists and the Modernists; the common ground is fertile ground, as well.
Howell, Julia Day. “Sufism and the Indonesian Islamic Revival,” The Journal of Asian Studies. Vol. 60, No. 3, August 2001.
Ricklefs, Merle C. Mystic Synthesis in Java. Norwalk: Eastbridge Books, 2006.
Woodward, Mark R. Islam in Java: Normative Piety and Mysticism in the Sultanate of Yogyakarta. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1989.
JAVANESE KAKUWATAN and KESEKTAN
Gender and politics in spirituality and power
Mucha Q Arquiza
Power is equated here not only as political, but also economic,social and cultural elements that one employs to dominate, control, conduct and manage the self and others - dominating, controlling and managing being techniques of governmentality (Foucault in Lemke 2001). Governmentality is all about subjection and control whether the object of subjection be the self i.e. subjection of the personal conduct; or of others and the environment i.e. subjection of the conduct of society (and nonhuman environs). Hence, both the act of exercising (i.e. deployment) of and the possession of the tool or technology of governmentality is called power. Power is seen as something both ‘outside’ and ‘inside’ resources. As external, power emanate from material sources that one must possess and accumulate and apply to the objects and subjects of subjection. In most cases, external power is derived from wealth and economic means, social prestige, and heredity [i.e. Moro political philosophy refer to political assets as bangsawan (race and descent) and ilmawan (wealth and wisdom)]. Internally. power is beheld to be intrinsic within the self but dormant and potent that one need to search within (often through the rigors of certain rituals and acts – Javanese, laku, i.e. steps to enlightenment) to stimulate its efficacy for it to deliver desired ends. And those internal resources are found by immersing oneself in theology (i.e. power as spiritual potency), and in philosophy (i.e. power as knowledge potency). The issue of power also brings to fore the issue of use of force or of its nonviolent benevolent dispersion (i.e. deployment of mercy and virtue) as the ‘source of strength’ where externalized power is often of the former and the interiorized power (i.e.potency) applies the latter. There is also the question of intention of power as malicious and malignant or altruistic and service-oriented.
Our heritage from Western theology and philosophy has resulted to a worldview of false dichotomies and dualisms: Matter/spirit; human/nonhuman nature; male/female; culture/nature; political/spiritual that the degradation of nature is attributed to the dominant Euro-American worldview, Carol Adams in her introduction to the book, The Ecofeminism and the Sacred (1993) considers indigenous and nontechnological cultures as sources for the creation of syncretic feminist spiritualities with earth-based spiritualities seen as alternatives to dominant (patriarchic) theologies with the belief that ‘incorporating diverse cultural and religious traditions within feminism is an important ethical/political question to raise about this syncretistic efforts’. Some ecofeminists among indigenous and ethnic and religious minorities would even push this line further and promote a belief [i.e. what other ‘rational’ feminists accuse as ‘myths’] in indigenous mindset as holist and non-dual, illustrating this through a supposed egalitarian economy and the naturally integrative and nonexistence of class or gender divide in indigenous and traditional cultures.
The ethnological study of Javanese power as kakuwatan by Keeler and as kesektan by Woodward are interesting studies of power that draws out observations seemingly antithetical to the indigenous ecofeminists’ optimism of egalitarian power in tradition and indigeniety as necessarily liberating to women and nature. Most astounding (although not surprising) among Keelers’ findings have shown that power in indigenous Javanese spirituality bear traces of the same patriarchic and male-dominated view of dualism of politics and theology of power. The kebatinan tradition that considers the kekuwatan batin or potential power (also, potency, referring to the secret, hidden, interiorized or mystical power) in some categories of power as ‘good’ and therefore theologically legitimate power as that of male power such as those acquired through asceticsm, prophecy and mystical revelations (i.e.appearance of saints or divine figures) or sourced and access through the mastery of sacred wisdom or ngelmu (wisdom or knowledge of the sacred) by a male potent self, a magic specialist or wong tua. Powers accessed and exercised by female such as the prewangan (i.e. possessed and spiritual mediums) and female healers is however considered profane, malevolent and vulgar. Note this parallelism in Calvinistic Christian and purist Muslim traditions of denigrating female ecstatic spirituality and maladizing it as a form of medical psychological disorder to be cured and ‘normalized’ or as spiritual impurity and satanic working of witch-craft that should be exorcised or burned to death. Ironically, a male version of such experiences of spiritual ecstasy are considered as a saintly or prophetic capabilities and a divine gift to be encouraged through asceticism and piety. And even as Keeler, of course, would show and define power, particularly male potency, to be autonomous and even inconsistent with godly benevolence or having no theological basis (i.e. potency as amoral and atheological), the genderedness of power and the inequality in its male-female agency, access and deployment of potency holds true as I argued.
Mark Woodward’s (1989) study of royal kingship of Yogyakarta and the theory of royal power or Kesektan, on the other hand talks about the synthesis of Javanese tradition and Islam and explained how the spirituality of Sufism has become the guide-book of good and just leadership for Javanese kings, at least after its revival by Ratu Pakubuwana, grandmother of young King Pakubuwana II in 1726 (Ricklefs 2006). The divine-blessings and approval of kingly rule is further legitimized in the Javanese spirit cults and theory of kingship as concerns the legality of marriage between humans and spirits, most prominent of which is the inherited brideship of Nyai Ratu Kidul (goddess of South Sea) by every reigning King of Yogyakarta throughout history. This may lack the theological basis, as various contentions in debates among ulama continues until today, in that the Qur’an is not only normative but Muhammad’s sunnah and hadith may be ‘essentially one of rationalization and simplification’ of Quranic precepts that Sufism bears no basis in both primary sources of Islamic syari’a since both Qur’an and hadith-wal-sunnah are ambiguous if not silent on mysticism. But with the revival and appropriation of Sufism as Islamic discipline and secret science of spirituality in Yogyakarta royal house and among the Islam Jawa practitioners, it provided the alternative spiritual legitimacy and rationalized divinity of the royal rule. (Woodward 1989: 63, also Ricklefs 2007). Central and I believe an important implication in Woodward’s work is that divine-gift and favor is exclusive only to privileged and elite segment of society, i.e. the royal and religious-intellectual classes, particularly those who would trace their descent to a royal or saintly silsilah that tries to link them and their ancestors to kings the local saints,the Arabian missionaries and the house of the prophet in Makkah. This is the main principle operative in royal rituals such as the celebratory ceremonies of kesektan (i.e. re-purification of royal pusaka) and observance of Grebeg Maulud, for example. The royal kesektan is dispersed and disseminated to the lowly kawula (i.e.royal subjects) as a form of kingly mercy and power through the rebutan (i.e. free-for-all jumble) for berakat (i.e.blessing). The perpetuation of this traditions thereby, in effect, maintaining the notion that the lower and less privileged classes in society can only be mere receivers of royal benevolence and can not by themselves transcend their wretched situation as they are disempowered to do so.
It is in view of interrogating the two gentlemen’s theoretical frameworks that I would suggest a discussion of history, politics and spirituality in Indonesian Islam might be pursued through understanding the theology of power and its execution in politics as gendered (i.e. patriarchic) and conservative if not oppressive by virtue of its privileging a certain class as I argue that the aspects of contemporaneous spiritual and political ‘potency’ so far studied and made visible (i.e. by mostly male scholars and researchers) have commonly represented traditional Islam (i.e.Nahdatul Ulama) and the modernist (i.e.Muhammadiyah) in the present Indonesian society as paradoxically one and the same, in as far as women and the oppressed segments of society are concerned, in that both traditionalist and modernist organizations embody and preach patriarchal paradigm of power, therefore not essentially modern enough to be progressive and liberative but remaining classic and traditional, and, especially in the case of Muhammadiyah, neoconservative, in its merely employing modern forms and agencies in as much as it is a modern reaction aimed to reform what it perceives to be old and traditionally ‘primitive or ignorant’ therefore ‘impure’ Islamic forms.
An exceptional study done by Muhammadiyah young woman and scholar in gender and politics, Siti Syamsiyatun (2008), attempted to use the gender lens in showing how the Muhammadiyah women youth have formed the Aisiyah as autonomous ‘daughter’ of Muhammadiyah by negotiating their own place as women and youth living the challenges of their contemporary time, wading through the tradition of patriarchy and feudal culture (i.e. not only of male-dominance but also one that privileges tradition and seniority as represented by the older Muhammadiyah women patriarchs) and asserting their identity. Yet this initial attempts have so far succeeded only in describing the operative situation of politics in its secular form as organizational practice, but not dared so much as interrogating the underlying value-assumptions of its theological and philosophical foundations that entrench patriarchal politics and inform practice, hence succeeding only in affirming the rightness of the patriarchs’ projects and view of the transformative mission of modernism as a form of neoconservatism, that of reforming of the old by updating the ‘ignorance’ in practice and ridding Islam of its ‘impurities’ but not in dismantling the structures of injustice where Islam might thrive the best. This is bearing in mind that reformism while a modern thought is not necessarily progressive and liberationist. An alternative reading and study, as attempted by women scholars like Syamsiyatun, must therefore be advocated and pushed further to excavate another route to the politics and theology of power by reclaiming kakuwatan and kesektan as potencies and resources for liberation for the marginal and less privileged segments of society. This I believe is not impossible as the notion of power in both its traditional and modern senses have always been consistently demonstrating human persons – both male and female – as equally having the capacities of spiritual agency and possessing potencies akin to, although not the same, as of ‘divinity’; as selfless, altruistic and humanist human persons guided and favored by an All-powerful and All-merciful God. In this, the indigenous feminist voices that argue for egalitarianism in tradition and spirituality might afterall be right and deserve a fair hearing.
---
Carol Adams, ed. (1993) Ecofeminism and the Sacred. NY: The Continuum Publishing.
Thomas Lemke (2001) Birth of Neoliberalism Michel Foucault’s Lecture on Neoliberalism and Biopolitics
Ward Keeler (1987) Javanese Shadow Plays, Javanese Selves. Pp. 38-140
M. C. Ricklefs (2006) Mystic Synthesis in Java; M.C. Ricklefs (2007) Polarizing Javanese Society
Mark Woodward (1989 ) Islam in Java: Normative Piety and Mysticism in the Sultanate of Yogyakarta, pp.53-148
Siti Syamsiyatun in Blackburn, et. al. eds. (2008) ‘Women negotiating feminism and Islam in Indonesian Islam’ in a ‘New Era: How women negotiate their Muslim identities’. Clayton:Monash University Press.
Mucha Q Arquiza
Power is equated here not only as political, but also economic,social and cultural elements that one employs to dominate, control, conduct and manage the self and others - dominating, controlling and managing being techniques of governmentality (Foucault in Lemke 2001). Governmentality is all about subjection and control whether the object of subjection be the self i.e. subjection of the personal conduct; or of others and the environment i.e. subjection of the conduct of society (and nonhuman environs). Hence, both the act of exercising (i.e. deployment) of and the possession of the tool or technology of governmentality is called power. Power is seen as something both ‘outside’ and ‘inside’ resources. As external, power emanate from material sources that one must possess and accumulate and apply to the objects and subjects of subjection. In most cases, external power is derived from wealth and economic means, social prestige, and heredity [i.e. Moro political philosophy refer to political assets as bangsawan (race and descent) and ilmawan (wealth and wisdom)]. Internally. power is beheld to be intrinsic within the self but dormant and potent that one need to search within (often through the rigors of certain rituals and acts – Javanese, laku, i.e. steps to enlightenment) to stimulate its efficacy for it to deliver desired ends. And those internal resources are found by immersing oneself in theology (i.e. power as spiritual potency), and in philosophy (i.e. power as knowledge potency). The issue of power also brings to fore the issue of use of force or of its nonviolent benevolent dispersion (i.e. deployment of mercy and virtue) as the ‘source of strength’ where externalized power is often of the former and the interiorized power (i.e.potency) applies the latter. There is also the question of intention of power as malicious and malignant or altruistic and service-oriented.
Our heritage from Western theology and philosophy has resulted to a worldview of false dichotomies and dualisms: Matter/spirit; human/nonhuman nature; male/female; culture/nature; political/spiritual that the degradation of nature is attributed to the dominant Euro-American worldview, Carol Adams in her introduction to the book, The Ecofeminism and the Sacred (1993) considers indigenous and nontechnological cultures as sources for the creation of syncretic feminist spiritualities with earth-based spiritualities seen as alternatives to dominant (patriarchic) theologies with the belief that ‘incorporating diverse cultural and religious traditions within feminism is an important ethical/political question to raise about this syncretistic efforts’. Some ecofeminists among indigenous and ethnic and religious minorities would even push this line further and promote a belief [i.e. what other ‘rational’ feminists accuse as ‘myths’] in indigenous mindset as holist and non-dual, illustrating this through a supposed egalitarian economy and the naturally integrative and nonexistence of class or gender divide in indigenous and traditional cultures.
The ethnological study of Javanese power as kakuwatan by Keeler and as kesektan by Woodward are interesting studies of power that draws out observations seemingly antithetical to the indigenous ecofeminists’ optimism of egalitarian power in tradition and indigeniety as necessarily liberating to women and nature. Most astounding (although not surprising) among Keelers’ findings have shown that power in indigenous Javanese spirituality bear traces of the same patriarchic and male-dominated view of dualism of politics and theology of power. The kebatinan tradition that considers the kekuwatan batin or potential power (also, potency, referring to the secret, hidden, interiorized or mystical power) in some categories of power as ‘good’ and therefore theologically legitimate power as that of male power such as those acquired through asceticsm, prophecy and mystical revelations (i.e.appearance of saints or divine figures) or sourced and access through the mastery of sacred wisdom or ngelmu (wisdom or knowledge of the sacred) by a male potent self, a magic specialist or wong tua. Powers accessed and exercised by female such as the prewangan (i.e. possessed and spiritual mediums) and female healers is however considered profane, malevolent and vulgar. Note this parallelism in Calvinistic Christian and purist Muslim traditions of denigrating female ecstatic spirituality and maladizing it as a form of medical psychological disorder to be cured and ‘normalized’ or as spiritual impurity and satanic working of witch-craft that should be exorcised or burned to death. Ironically, a male version of such experiences of spiritual ecstasy are considered as a saintly or prophetic capabilities and a divine gift to be encouraged through asceticism and piety. And even as Keeler, of course, would show and define power, particularly male potency, to be autonomous and even inconsistent with godly benevolence or having no theological basis (i.e. potency as amoral and atheological), the genderedness of power and the inequality in its male-female agency, access and deployment of potency holds true as I argued.
Mark Woodward’s (1989) study of royal kingship of Yogyakarta and the theory of royal power or Kesektan, on the other hand talks about the synthesis of Javanese tradition and Islam and explained how the spirituality of Sufism has become the guide-book of good and just leadership for Javanese kings, at least after its revival by Ratu Pakubuwana, grandmother of young King Pakubuwana II in 1726 (Ricklefs 2006). The divine-blessings and approval of kingly rule is further legitimized in the Javanese spirit cults and theory of kingship as concerns the legality of marriage between humans and spirits, most prominent of which is the inherited brideship of Nyai Ratu Kidul (goddess of South Sea) by every reigning King of Yogyakarta throughout history. This may lack the theological basis, as various contentions in debates among ulama continues until today, in that the Qur’an is not only normative but Muhammad’s sunnah and hadith may be ‘essentially one of rationalization and simplification’ of Quranic precepts that Sufism bears no basis in both primary sources of Islamic syari’a since both Qur’an and hadith-wal-sunnah are ambiguous if not silent on mysticism. But with the revival and appropriation of Sufism as Islamic discipline and secret science of spirituality in Yogyakarta royal house and among the Islam Jawa practitioners, it provided the alternative spiritual legitimacy and rationalized divinity of the royal rule. (Woodward 1989: 63, also Ricklefs 2007). Central and I believe an important implication in Woodward’s work is that divine-gift and favor is exclusive only to privileged and elite segment of society, i.e. the royal and religious-intellectual classes, particularly those who would trace their descent to a royal or saintly silsilah that tries to link them and their ancestors to kings the local saints,the Arabian missionaries and the house of the prophet in Makkah. This is the main principle operative in royal rituals such as the celebratory ceremonies of kesektan (i.e. re-purification of royal pusaka) and observance of Grebeg Maulud, for example. The royal kesektan is dispersed and disseminated to the lowly kawula (i.e.royal subjects) as a form of kingly mercy and power through the rebutan (i.e. free-for-all jumble) for berakat (i.e.blessing). The perpetuation of this traditions thereby, in effect, maintaining the notion that the lower and less privileged classes in society can only be mere receivers of royal benevolence and can not by themselves transcend their wretched situation as they are disempowered to do so.
It is in view of interrogating the two gentlemen’s theoretical frameworks that I would suggest a discussion of history, politics and spirituality in Indonesian Islam might be pursued through understanding the theology of power and its execution in politics as gendered (i.e. patriarchic) and conservative if not oppressive by virtue of its privileging a certain class as I argue that the aspects of contemporaneous spiritual and political ‘potency’ so far studied and made visible (i.e. by mostly male scholars and researchers) have commonly represented traditional Islam (i.e.Nahdatul Ulama) and the modernist (i.e.Muhammadiyah) in the present Indonesian society as paradoxically one and the same, in as far as women and the oppressed segments of society are concerned, in that both traditionalist and modernist organizations embody and preach patriarchal paradigm of power, therefore not essentially modern enough to be progressive and liberative but remaining classic and traditional, and, especially in the case of Muhammadiyah, neoconservative, in its merely employing modern forms and agencies in as much as it is a modern reaction aimed to reform what it perceives to be old and traditionally ‘primitive or ignorant’ therefore ‘impure’ Islamic forms.
An exceptional study done by Muhammadiyah young woman and scholar in gender and politics, Siti Syamsiyatun (2008), attempted to use the gender lens in showing how the Muhammadiyah women youth have formed the Aisiyah as autonomous ‘daughter’ of Muhammadiyah by negotiating their own place as women and youth living the challenges of their contemporary time, wading through the tradition of patriarchy and feudal culture (i.e. not only of male-dominance but also one that privileges tradition and seniority as represented by the older Muhammadiyah women patriarchs) and asserting their identity. Yet this initial attempts have so far succeeded only in describing the operative situation of politics in its secular form as organizational practice, but not dared so much as interrogating the underlying value-assumptions of its theological and philosophical foundations that entrench patriarchal politics and inform practice, hence succeeding only in affirming the rightness of the patriarchs’ projects and view of the transformative mission of modernism as a form of neoconservatism, that of reforming of the old by updating the ‘ignorance’ in practice and ridding Islam of its ‘impurities’ but not in dismantling the structures of injustice where Islam might thrive the best. This is bearing in mind that reformism while a modern thought is not necessarily progressive and liberationist. An alternative reading and study, as attempted by women scholars like Syamsiyatun, must therefore be advocated and pushed further to excavate another route to the politics and theology of power by reclaiming kakuwatan and kesektan as potencies and resources for liberation for the marginal and less privileged segments of society. This I believe is not impossible as the notion of power in both its traditional and modern senses have always been consistently demonstrating human persons – both male and female – as equally having the capacities of spiritual agency and possessing potencies akin to, although not the same, as of ‘divinity’; as selfless, altruistic and humanist human persons guided and favored by an All-powerful and All-merciful God. In this, the indigenous feminist voices that argue for egalitarianism in tradition and spirituality might afterall be right and deserve a fair hearing.
---
Carol Adams, ed. (1993) Ecofeminism and the Sacred. NY: The Continuum Publishing.
Thomas Lemke (2001) Birth of Neoliberalism Michel Foucault’s Lecture on Neoliberalism and Biopolitics
Ward Keeler (1987) Javanese Shadow Plays, Javanese Selves. Pp. 38-140
M. C. Ricklefs (2006) Mystic Synthesis in Java; M.C. Ricklefs (2007) Polarizing Javanese Society
Mark Woodward (1989 ) Islam in Java: Normative Piety and Mysticism in the Sultanate of Yogyakarta, pp.53-148
Siti Syamsiyatun in Blackburn, et. al. eds. (2008) ‘Women negotiating feminism and Islam in Indonesian Islam’ in a ‘New Era: How women negotiate their Muslim identities’. Clayton:Monash University Press.
Sabtu, 20 Maret 2010
Minority religions and the Panca Sila ‘government’
Minority religions and the Panca Sila ‘government’
Mucha Q. Arquiza
In this response, I attempted to recapitulate my sharing in last Friday’s class by first seconding what Paq Tato suggested that religions must follow government laws and regulations, for the pragmatic reason of economic and cultural survival.
The first of five declarations in Indonesia’s national ideology of Panca Sila is Ketuhanan Maha Eyang Esa, or ‘One Lordship ’. Over the succession of various national leaders starting with the founding fathers under the leadership of Sukarno, to the regime of New Order under Suharto until the present, the Panca Sila has been variously interpreted. These interpretations have one common agreement that the Panca Sila is a principle of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika - Unity in Diversity. One interpretation in particular, from the point of view of Christian and other minority religions the Panca Sila has preserved Indonesia’s secularism and protected it from the extreme interests and projects of Islamic statehood and godless communism (T.S. Simatupang --- and E. Darmaputera 1982). There are five official religions recognized in the context of Panca Sila. The Hindu, Buddhist and Confucian religions are the minority religions.
For the religious minorities, namely, Hindu, Buddhist and Confusian Indonesians, the Panca sila and government’s attempts of categorizing and regulating religion as identity and practice has been met with passivity if not docile submission for the practical reason of survival. As Indonesian historian SriMargono explains, the continuity of Balinese Hindu traditions is contingent to its adaptive capabilities to the various governmental transitions in Bali since the Dutch colonial era in as much as, one, the Hindu religion is very diverse and therefore necessitates a common ‘medium’ to capture the rich diversity and, two, owing to the history of Hindu Bali as a product of succession of population dispersals starting in the massive migration caused by a grave natural disaster during the Sanjaya dynasty in the 8th century and the second wave of migration after the fall of Madjapahit empire, these historical developments have contributed to the marginalization of the Hindu Bali not only economically but also culturally. ‘The Hindu Balinese own nothing but their culture’, Paq Margono laments, and so collaboration with and co-optation to governmental policies on culture is strategic for their survival as distinct ethnic and religious identity. And since Indonesian government’s main basis for categorization of religious communities is through the visibility of each faith-community, that is, population count and material culture, it is but necessary that minority religions have to provide these requirements. For instance, while Buddhism is said to be in a decline, in fact, one Banthey in the Candy Moncut monastery near Borubudor informed that there are only a total four senior bikkhus in the entire city of Yogyakarta (i.e. in fact, my impression is that in the entire country), yet they maintain an expansive complex of monastery (i.e. that Buddhist inherited from Japanese kempetai army) that government lavishly funded to refurbish. The prominence of Buddhist material culture in the form and structures of various temples and spectacular ceremonies that it must build and continue should maintain and ensure their visibility. This is not withstanding the fact that it is a complete contradiction to Buddhist ideal principles and philosophy, where Buddhism is generally and mostly an interiorized ‘religion’ of ethics and self-knowledge, that ‘physicality’ and showy tendencies in maintaining temples and lavish ceremonies are considered a form of attachment, greed and delusion, all anathema to Buddhist ethics. The same can be said of Hinduism especially in Bali. The Balinese hindu art and architectural forms are famous in its aesthetical as well as spiritual attractions. The grandeur and spectacular ceremonies of Hindu devotion in Bali is famous and one-of-a-kind, it is proverbial, that one not familiar with its history would in fact mistake it (as I did) as a form of performance and dance arts that are purely commercialized and touristic project devoid of spiritual meaning. Yet these are not so, when Balinese dancers and ritual performers do their devotional rituals, they are not acting, but are participating fully in a sacred performance. The materialization and spectacularization of faith practices are necessary recourses that minority religions have to take in order to survive a religious policy that exacts these forms of visibility from them, for them to be recognized as part of the norm of categorization in the Panca sila. A question may be asked if the pre-eminence of material culture still ensures the authenticity of spiritual and sacred meaning-contents of religion in the case of these minority religions?
Contextualization
In order to aid in further understanding the predicament of minority religions of Hindu, Buddhists and Confusians under the Indonesian ideology of Panca Sila, it may be profitable to illustrate through comparison with an indigenous ethnic minority that I am most familiar with.
The Sama Dilaut, also known generically in Southeast Asia as Bajau or Bajo, have been traditionally plying the Sulu-Sulawesi-Bornean waters. Where the Bajos of Sulawesi and Borneo are noted to have been fully integrated into Islamic communities and most having managed to move upstairs socially, now lead affluent lives. Meanwhile, those in the Philippine seas remain to be the most marginalized and the least Islamized of the 13 ethnolinguistic groupings collectively called the Bangsamoro people, and remaining the least profited from agricultural and industrial economy because of their sea habitat and nomadic existence. In terms of religion, the Sama Dilaut is probably an epitome of multi-religious followership, albeit in a more ‘pristine’ sense, as they practice a curious admix of ‘religions’ for the same pragmatic reason as the religious minorities in Indonesia have been re-coursed to cultural adaptation and economic survival.
In recent times of conflict, an increasing number of Sama Dilaut have been forced to abandon their traditional lifestyle to adventure into dry land where, living in ‘lahat hangkut’ (i.e. diaspora community) and in ‘lahat bisaya’ (i.e. Christian land), the Sama Dilaut have been mostly subsisting on begging. Lately, many have converted to the ‘mag-sandes’ (i.e. ‘Sunday’s) who are protestant evangelical sects of either the Baptist, Alliance or born-again Christians such as the JIL (Jesus is Lord) as these Christian denominations have been actively prosyletizing among indigenous populations and offer handsome incentives such as free housing, cash capital for modest livelihood, schooling for their children or sometimes even a boat to allow them to pursue their old trade. On return to their homewaters in Sulu or Basilan, however, the Sama Dilaut would rebuild their make-shift houses on stilts (called Lumah Dilaut), renew their sense of community with the surrounding mangroves and coral reefs and follow the religion of their nearest kin-group, the Sama (i.e. my ethnic family), whom they share a common language and, like the sedentary Sama, they call upon ‘Omboh Tuhan’ (Great Ancestor the Lord) as Allah. Although most of them do not observe all the five prayers (i.e. they pray only once during the Friday jamaat), they have their own way of observing the fast in Ramadhan (i.e. which is observing the first 3-5 days of Ramadhan in detachment from the world, with no food, no water, no sex, no conversation and not even moving to defecate or staying as immobile as possible, then they spend the rest of Ramadhan normally until the last 3-5 days when they again performed the ‘fast’ as described above) and never miss to celebrate auspicious occasions as Mauludun nabi , Nisfu sha’ban and the feasts of Eid where the grand Omboh rituals are usually conducted. In their thanksgiving, birthing, marriage and mourning rituals Sama Dilaut would chant ‘Ella Allah! Tuhan de kawuh kawuh’, i.e. ‘Allah, the only One Great God”. After which they would follow up with the main and official ceremony of ‘pag-omboh’, an intricate rice (and fresh fruit harvest) offertory rites to ancestors.
In one of my field-visits in a migrant land [1] , I wondered aloud to Omboh Kuraysiya, an old crone and shaman (i.e. she was also the tribal chieftain called omboh Panglima) if the Sama Dilaut believed in Tuhan Isa (Lord Jesus), and she said ‘yes’. Do they also believe in Tuhan Allah (Lord God)? Yes, she confirmed. ‘And so how do you pray?’ I asked. We ‘ask for blessings and mercy’ from our Omboh (i.e. ancestral spirits) was her answer. If they also pray to Tuhan Isa and Tuhan Allah, she replied also affirmatively. How? ‘A na, ameyah-meyah na sadja koh kita ndeh!’ [we will just have to mimic how they do it, child!].
‘How could that be possible, you are subscribing to three agama at the same time?’, I persisted. To which her octogenarian voice excited and quivered that they did not have agama. But how come?
‘You do not know anything, child!’, she then gently scolded me. ’Tuhan Isa itu maka Tuhan Allah itu, na, magka-partida ru ko heh! [Lord Jesus and Lord Allah belong to the same ‘partida’], she patiently explained.
‘Maka sigaam heh, da munda ru, ondeh, ya sa munda sigaam heh parinta!’ [And they belong to the same moorage with the head of the moorage as the government].
‘Na kitabi se heh pehak Sama, ya na mag-omboh kita se heh, ito ya bineyanan ta be patundanan ta be heh!’ [And as for us who belong to the Sama, our ancestors is the head of our tundan].
To the uninitiated, this may sound complicated and confusing. And to understand this richly metaphorical frame, a little background of the Sama Dilaut economic life is necessary. The Sama Dilaut main economic life is the sea and fishing. They used to practice traditional way of fishing called mag-ambit (‘to hold on to each other’) where a number of fishing boats (usually unmotorized dug-outs with outriggers) organized into a group called da-munda (i.e. following one ‘lead’) where one main boat is assigned as the ‘munda’ or the ‘leader’ of the contingent; and the rest of the individual boats are called ‘tundan’ (lit. ‘those who are being towed’) or followers. The outing usually lasts from 3-7 days, at the end of which the participants in the pag-ambit would equally share in the collective catch of the group. This basic economic metaphor is important frame to enable us to enter the world of the Sama Dilaut especially their sense of community organization, leadership and governance. For the Sama Dilaut then, what we call ‘agama’ or ‘religion’ is like a fishing trip where individual boats follow a munda (i.e. common lead) with the rest affiliated as the tundan (i.e. those who are towed), as followers. In traditional religion, the munda used to be the omboh or the revered ancestral spirits.
In more recent times, especially in their life in migration, the traditional fishing practice of pag-ambit has completely disappeared and has been replaced by the system of ‘partida’, a capitalist-based fishing economy that operates like a cooperative where a big fishing boat owned and managed by fishing capitalist hire dockhands, stevedores and crew. The capitalist is usually a rich businessman belonging to other ethnic grouping as a Tausug or Yakan (i.e. Muslim ethnic groups in Sulu and Basilan) or an Ilonggo (i.e. a Christian majority ethnic). The partida usually recruits individual Sama Dilaut fishers to form part of its ‘hired labor’ as divers and fishers since part of the partida prospects would be exotic aquarium fishes, sharks and deep sea fish species that need to be ‘pinatuli’ or ‘put to sleep’, through cyanide spraying or use of similar poison, thus dazed and immobile, are now readied for harvesting. The partida need the Sama Dilaut expertise as divers to do the spraying as the latter’s familiarity of the underwater environment enable them to spot the most inconspicuous fish and they could also ‘speak’ to the sharks to ask for its fins. Sama Dilaut are famed for their ability to swim deep even without proper diving gears and air-tanks. Having to ride along in their small unmotorized boats, the Sama Dilaut are towed by the big boat into the open seas, in the same manner as they used to be ‘tinundan’ in pag-ambit, except that the entire catch of the partida goes to the capitalist and in return for their services individual fishermen are paid wages usually ranging from 100-150 pesos per day (i.e. 20,000 rupiah). It is usually the practice that a Sama Dilaut fisherman would have already withdrawn in advance his entire wage for the season, say, of seven days, as he needs to leave the balanja (i.e. budget/subsistence) for his family before he ventures off for the sea. In short, the individual partida member do not actually have anything to collect from their master at the end of the fishing trip, instead it is more likely that he would have to ask for a new credit to bring something to the family on his return, in this way, the Sama Dilaut remains in perpetual bondage to the capitalist.
Going back to the metaphor of religion and the partida, the Sama Dilaut looks at the omboh or ancestral worship as benevolent one in the frame of traditional fishing ways where the common catch of the fishers who followed the pag-ambit used to be equally divided among the participants. To this ‘religion’, the kapehakan (i.e.clan) truly belongs and their propitiations and supplications are directly answered with blessings and mercy. In the present situation of living in diaspora, migrant Sama Dilaut have to affiliate with a Partida to survive. It is in this context that they view the new religions in migrant lands, either of the Christians or of non-Sama Muslims, who like crewmen in a partida, are their business partners, whom the Sama Dilaut temporarily affiliate with and must assist in ‘their prayers’ so that the Sama would be paid off with economic benefits (i.e. house, boat, livelihood, education). These religions are not only led by those who are ‘not one of their [sama dilaut] own’ but on whose employment they are increasingly dependent upon, yet at the end of the day, their services could be dismissed and they are freed from allegiance, they could return back to their families and stilt-houses where the Omboh dwell. Interestingly, the great capitalist and leader of this partida is a detached entity called a ‘government’. [18 March 2010]
-------
1. There has been varied interpretations of this phrase which Eka Darmaputera (1982) provided a direct transliteration from Bahasa to English as ‘One Lordship’.
2. Fieldwork done in from April to August in 2003 in Tulay Tabako, Cagayan de Oro City, Northern Mindanao by HAGS, Inc. A field report is published in the Mindanao Journal of MSU-IIT in 2004.
Mucha Q. Arquiza
In this response, I attempted to recapitulate my sharing in last Friday’s class by first seconding what Paq Tato suggested that religions must follow government laws and regulations, for the pragmatic reason of economic and cultural survival.
The first of five declarations in Indonesia’s national ideology of Panca Sila is Ketuhanan Maha Eyang Esa, or ‘One Lordship ’. Over the succession of various national leaders starting with the founding fathers under the leadership of Sukarno, to the regime of New Order under Suharto until the present, the Panca Sila has been variously interpreted. These interpretations have one common agreement that the Panca Sila is a principle of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika - Unity in Diversity. One interpretation in particular, from the point of view of Christian and other minority religions the Panca Sila has preserved Indonesia’s secularism and protected it from the extreme interests and projects of Islamic statehood and godless communism (T.S. Simatupang --- and E. Darmaputera 1982). There are five official religions recognized in the context of Panca Sila. The Hindu, Buddhist and Confucian religions are the minority religions.
For the religious minorities, namely, Hindu, Buddhist and Confusian Indonesians, the Panca sila and government’s attempts of categorizing and regulating religion as identity and practice has been met with passivity if not docile submission for the practical reason of survival. As Indonesian historian SriMargono explains, the continuity of Balinese Hindu traditions is contingent to its adaptive capabilities to the various governmental transitions in Bali since the Dutch colonial era in as much as, one, the Hindu religion is very diverse and therefore necessitates a common ‘medium’ to capture the rich diversity and, two, owing to the history of Hindu Bali as a product of succession of population dispersals starting in the massive migration caused by a grave natural disaster during the Sanjaya dynasty in the 8th century and the second wave of migration after the fall of Madjapahit empire, these historical developments have contributed to the marginalization of the Hindu Bali not only economically but also culturally. ‘The Hindu Balinese own nothing but their culture’, Paq Margono laments, and so collaboration with and co-optation to governmental policies on culture is strategic for their survival as distinct ethnic and religious identity. And since Indonesian government’s main basis for categorization of religious communities is through the visibility of each faith-community, that is, population count and material culture, it is but necessary that minority religions have to provide these requirements. For instance, while Buddhism is said to be in a decline, in fact, one Banthey in the Candy Moncut monastery near Borubudor informed that there are only a total four senior bikkhus in the entire city of Yogyakarta (i.e. in fact, my impression is that in the entire country), yet they maintain an expansive complex of monastery (i.e. that Buddhist inherited from Japanese kempetai army) that government lavishly funded to refurbish. The prominence of Buddhist material culture in the form and structures of various temples and spectacular ceremonies that it must build and continue should maintain and ensure their visibility. This is not withstanding the fact that it is a complete contradiction to Buddhist ideal principles and philosophy, where Buddhism is generally and mostly an interiorized ‘religion’ of ethics and self-knowledge, that ‘physicality’ and showy tendencies in maintaining temples and lavish ceremonies are considered a form of attachment, greed and delusion, all anathema to Buddhist ethics. The same can be said of Hinduism especially in Bali. The Balinese hindu art and architectural forms are famous in its aesthetical as well as spiritual attractions. The grandeur and spectacular ceremonies of Hindu devotion in Bali is famous and one-of-a-kind, it is proverbial, that one not familiar with its history would in fact mistake it (as I did) as a form of performance and dance arts that are purely commercialized and touristic project devoid of spiritual meaning. Yet these are not so, when Balinese dancers and ritual performers do their devotional rituals, they are not acting, but are participating fully in a sacred performance. The materialization and spectacularization of faith practices are necessary recourses that minority religions have to take in order to survive a religious policy that exacts these forms of visibility from them, for them to be recognized as part of the norm of categorization in the Panca sila. A question may be asked if the pre-eminence of material culture still ensures the authenticity of spiritual and sacred meaning-contents of religion in the case of these minority religions?
Contextualization
In order to aid in further understanding the predicament of minority religions of Hindu, Buddhists and Confusians under the Indonesian ideology of Panca Sila, it may be profitable to illustrate through comparison with an indigenous ethnic minority that I am most familiar with.
The Sama Dilaut, also known generically in Southeast Asia as Bajau or Bajo, have been traditionally plying the Sulu-Sulawesi-Bornean waters. Where the Bajos of Sulawesi and Borneo are noted to have been fully integrated into Islamic communities and most having managed to move upstairs socially, now lead affluent lives. Meanwhile, those in the Philippine seas remain to be the most marginalized and the least Islamized of the 13 ethnolinguistic groupings collectively called the Bangsamoro people, and remaining the least profited from agricultural and industrial economy because of their sea habitat and nomadic existence. In terms of religion, the Sama Dilaut is probably an epitome of multi-religious followership, albeit in a more ‘pristine’ sense, as they practice a curious admix of ‘religions’ for the same pragmatic reason as the religious minorities in Indonesia have been re-coursed to cultural adaptation and economic survival.
In recent times of conflict, an increasing number of Sama Dilaut have been forced to abandon their traditional lifestyle to adventure into dry land where, living in ‘lahat hangkut’ (i.e. diaspora community) and in ‘lahat bisaya’ (i.e. Christian land), the Sama Dilaut have been mostly subsisting on begging. Lately, many have converted to the ‘mag-sandes’ (i.e. ‘Sunday’s) who are protestant evangelical sects of either the Baptist, Alliance or born-again Christians such as the JIL (Jesus is Lord) as these Christian denominations have been actively prosyletizing among indigenous populations and offer handsome incentives such as free housing, cash capital for modest livelihood, schooling for their children or sometimes even a boat to allow them to pursue their old trade. On return to their homewaters in Sulu or Basilan, however, the Sama Dilaut would rebuild their make-shift houses on stilts (called Lumah Dilaut), renew their sense of community with the surrounding mangroves and coral reefs and follow the religion of their nearest kin-group, the Sama (i.e. my ethnic family), whom they share a common language and, like the sedentary Sama, they call upon ‘Omboh Tuhan’ (Great Ancestor the Lord) as Allah. Although most of them do not observe all the five prayers (i.e. they pray only once during the Friday jamaat), they have their own way of observing the fast in Ramadhan (i.e. which is observing the first 3-5 days of Ramadhan in detachment from the world, with no food, no water, no sex, no conversation and not even moving to defecate or staying as immobile as possible, then they spend the rest of Ramadhan normally until the last 3-5 days when they again performed the ‘fast’ as described above) and never miss to celebrate auspicious occasions as Mauludun nabi , Nisfu sha’ban and the feasts of Eid where the grand Omboh rituals are usually conducted. In their thanksgiving, birthing, marriage and mourning rituals Sama Dilaut would chant ‘Ella Allah! Tuhan de kawuh kawuh’, i.e. ‘Allah, the only One Great God”. After which they would follow up with the main and official ceremony of ‘pag-omboh’, an intricate rice (and fresh fruit harvest) offertory rites to ancestors.
In one of my field-visits in a migrant land [1] , I wondered aloud to Omboh Kuraysiya, an old crone and shaman (i.e. she was also the tribal chieftain called omboh Panglima) if the Sama Dilaut believed in Tuhan Isa (Lord Jesus), and she said ‘yes’. Do they also believe in Tuhan Allah (Lord God)? Yes, she confirmed. ‘And so how do you pray?’ I asked. We ‘ask for blessings and mercy’ from our Omboh (i.e. ancestral spirits) was her answer. If they also pray to Tuhan Isa and Tuhan Allah, she replied also affirmatively. How? ‘A na, ameyah-meyah na sadja koh kita ndeh!’ [we will just have to mimic how they do it, child!].
‘How could that be possible, you are subscribing to three agama at the same time?’, I persisted. To which her octogenarian voice excited and quivered that they did not have agama. But how come?
‘You do not know anything, child!’, she then gently scolded me. ’Tuhan Isa itu maka Tuhan Allah itu, na, magka-partida ru ko heh! [Lord Jesus and Lord Allah belong to the same ‘partida’], she patiently explained.
‘Maka sigaam heh, da munda ru, ondeh, ya sa munda sigaam heh parinta!’ [And they belong to the same moorage with the head of the moorage as the government].
‘Na kitabi se heh pehak Sama, ya na mag-omboh kita se heh, ito ya bineyanan ta be patundanan ta be heh!’ [And as for us who belong to the Sama, our ancestors is the head of our tundan].
To the uninitiated, this may sound complicated and confusing. And to understand this richly metaphorical frame, a little background of the Sama Dilaut economic life is necessary. The Sama Dilaut main economic life is the sea and fishing. They used to practice traditional way of fishing called mag-ambit (‘to hold on to each other’) where a number of fishing boats (usually unmotorized dug-outs with outriggers) organized into a group called da-munda (i.e. following one ‘lead’) where one main boat is assigned as the ‘munda’ or the ‘leader’ of the contingent; and the rest of the individual boats are called ‘tundan’ (lit. ‘those who are being towed’) or followers. The outing usually lasts from 3-7 days, at the end of which the participants in the pag-ambit would equally share in the collective catch of the group. This basic economic metaphor is important frame to enable us to enter the world of the Sama Dilaut especially their sense of community organization, leadership and governance. For the Sama Dilaut then, what we call ‘agama’ or ‘religion’ is like a fishing trip where individual boats follow a munda (i.e. common lead) with the rest affiliated as the tundan (i.e. those who are towed), as followers. In traditional religion, the munda used to be the omboh or the revered ancestral spirits.
In more recent times, especially in their life in migration, the traditional fishing practice of pag-ambit has completely disappeared and has been replaced by the system of ‘partida’, a capitalist-based fishing economy that operates like a cooperative where a big fishing boat owned and managed by fishing capitalist hire dockhands, stevedores and crew. The capitalist is usually a rich businessman belonging to other ethnic grouping as a Tausug or Yakan (i.e. Muslim ethnic groups in Sulu and Basilan) or an Ilonggo (i.e. a Christian majority ethnic). The partida usually recruits individual Sama Dilaut fishers to form part of its ‘hired labor’ as divers and fishers since part of the partida prospects would be exotic aquarium fishes, sharks and deep sea fish species that need to be ‘pinatuli’ or ‘put to sleep’, through cyanide spraying or use of similar poison, thus dazed and immobile, are now readied for harvesting. The partida need the Sama Dilaut expertise as divers to do the spraying as the latter’s familiarity of the underwater environment enable them to spot the most inconspicuous fish and they could also ‘speak’ to the sharks to ask for its fins. Sama Dilaut are famed for their ability to swim deep even without proper diving gears and air-tanks. Having to ride along in their small unmotorized boats, the Sama Dilaut are towed by the big boat into the open seas, in the same manner as they used to be ‘tinundan’ in pag-ambit, except that the entire catch of the partida goes to the capitalist and in return for their services individual fishermen are paid wages usually ranging from 100-150 pesos per day (i.e. 20,000 rupiah). It is usually the practice that a Sama Dilaut fisherman would have already withdrawn in advance his entire wage for the season, say, of seven days, as he needs to leave the balanja (i.e. budget/subsistence) for his family before he ventures off for the sea. In short, the individual partida member do not actually have anything to collect from their master at the end of the fishing trip, instead it is more likely that he would have to ask for a new credit to bring something to the family on his return, in this way, the Sama Dilaut remains in perpetual bondage to the capitalist.
Going back to the metaphor of religion and the partida, the Sama Dilaut looks at the omboh or ancestral worship as benevolent one in the frame of traditional fishing ways where the common catch of the fishers who followed the pag-ambit used to be equally divided among the participants. To this ‘religion’, the kapehakan (i.e.clan) truly belongs and their propitiations and supplications are directly answered with blessings and mercy. In the present situation of living in diaspora, migrant Sama Dilaut have to affiliate with a Partida to survive. It is in this context that they view the new religions in migrant lands, either of the Christians or of non-Sama Muslims, who like crewmen in a partida, are their business partners, whom the Sama Dilaut temporarily affiliate with and must assist in ‘their prayers’ so that the Sama would be paid off with economic benefits (i.e. house, boat, livelihood, education). These religions are not only led by those who are ‘not one of their [sama dilaut] own’ but on whose employment they are increasingly dependent upon, yet at the end of the day, their services could be dismissed and they are freed from allegiance, they could return back to their families and stilt-houses where the Omboh dwell. Interestingly, the great capitalist and leader of this partida is a detached entity called a ‘government’. [18 March 2010]
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1. There has been varied interpretations of this phrase which Eka Darmaputera (1982) provided a direct transliteration from Bahasa to English as ‘One Lordship’.
2. Fieldwork done in from April to August in 2003 in Tulay Tabako, Cagayan de Oro City, Northern Mindanao by HAGS, Inc. A field report is published in the Mindanao Journal of MSU-IIT in 2004.
Rabu, 17 Maret 2010
Hinduism in Modern History by Faqihuddin Abdul Kodir
Hinduism in Indonesia, mostly in Bali, is not only unique and different from the originating Indian Hinduism because of its political separation from the center of Hinduism since seven centuries ago, but rather due to uniqueness of Indonesia people; their traditions, cultures, and social-contexts. The contemporary history of Indonesia in founding and introducing the ideology of the state is not only challenging Islam or Muslims as the majority, but also minorities of religions not excluded Hinduism and Buddhism. Although severe debate has occurred obviously among Indonesian Muslims on the first principle of Pancasila –the Great Unity of Deity [Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa], but it does not mean that the principle is easily accepted by people of Hinduism and Buddhism in Indonesia. The principle denotes noticeably monotheism which suits to Islam and slightly to Christianity, rather than to Hinduism and Buddhism.
This is to say that recent history of Hinduism in Indonesia is flourished by its struggle to fit the context of national politics and demands of peaceful relationship to other religions. National agenda of building one nation under the name of Indonesia from diversities of religions, cultures, tribes, and organizations defines the development of Hinduism in Indonesia. Distinguishing traditionalist from rationalized Hinduism, in the context of Indonesia, at least until few years before the fall of New Order of Suharto, is defined mostly by its relationship with the agenda of ‘One Nation’ under Pancasila as the ideology of the state.
In Clifford Geertz’s Chapter on “Internal Conversion in Contemporary Bali”, it is shown how difficulties of Balinese people to get recognized equally in the ministry of religion with Islam and Christianity. Muslims often accused that Balinese religion is not monotheistic and it tends to ‘wild’ religion rather than monotheistic religions as Islam and Christianity. According to conservative Muslims, Balinese religion worships many gods and has no book of guidance. It made Balinese people struggling hardly to get the recognition and brought them into severe debate on their own belief.
I think current history of the development of Bali-Hinduism is defined much more with the local and national agenda of tourism. The debate is coming to the fore on ways of introducing Hinduism to the foreigners and other believers, serving them religiously in the name of tourism, and educating Hinduism to Balinese own people in the reality of tourism. The very serious challenge for Hinduism is also global demands for peaceful religion to the earth to reduce global warming. For many activists, let say for instance Ayu Utami the Catholic Indonesian Novelist in her latest work “Bilangan Fu”, Hinduism is much more friendly religion to the nature rather than Islam and Christianity. It is not promising, I think, rather challenging.
Resources:
1. Clifford Geertz, “Internal Conversion in Contemporary Bali”, in Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, New York: Basic Books, 2000. (1973), pp. 170-189.
2. Fredrik Barth, Balinese Worlds, Chicago and London: The University Press, 1993. Pp. 3-25, 191-220.
This is to say that recent history of Hinduism in Indonesia is flourished by its struggle to fit the context of national politics and demands of peaceful relationship to other religions. National agenda of building one nation under the name of Indonesia from diversities of religions, cultures, tribes, and organizations defines the development of Hinduism in Indonesia. Distinguishing traditionalist from rationalized Hinduism, in the context of Indonesia, at least until few years before the fall of New Order of Suharto, is defined mostly by its relationship with the agenda of ‘One Nation’ under Pancasila as the ideology of the state.
In Clifford Geertz’s Chapter on “Internal Conversion in Contemporary Bali”, it is shown how difficulties of Balinese people to get recognized equally in the ministry of religion with Islam and Christianity. Muslims often accused that Balinese religion is not monotheistic and it tends to ‘wild’ religion rather than monotheistic religions as Islam and Christianity. According to conservative Muslims, Balinese religion worships many gods and has no book of guidance. It made Balinese people struggling hardly to get the recognition and brought them into severe debate on their own belief.
I think current history of the development of Bali-Hinduism is defined much more with the local and national agenda of tourism. The debate is coming to the fore on ways of introducing Hinduism to the foreigners and other believers, serving them religiously in the name of tourism, and educating Hinduism to Balinese own people in the reality of tourism. The very serious challenge for Hinduism is also global demands for peaceful religion to the earth to reduce global warming. For many activists, let say for instance Ayu Utami the Catholic Indonesian Novelist in her latest work “Bilangan Fu”, Hinduism is much more friendly religion to the nature rather than Islam and Christianity. It is not promising, I think, rather challenging.
Resources:
1. Clifford Geertz, “Internal Conversion in Contemporary Bali”, in Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, New York: Basic Books, 2000. (1973), pp. 170-189.
2. Fredrik Barth, Balinese Worlds, Chicago and London: The University Press, 1993. Pp. 3-25, 191-220.
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