A Critical Response to Boland's book, The Struggle of Islam in Indonesia

ICRS Yogya
Class of History of Religion in Indonesia Part II
Dr. Bernard Adeney-Risakotta
Dr. Sri Margono

Assignment week 4
Abraham S. Wilar

Religion and Nationalism
A Critical Response to B. J. Boland’s book
The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia

After had been under the Dutch power and fell in the Japanese occupation, the new state of Republic of Indonesia was surprisingly born and declared on August 17th, 1945, seven days earlier than the agreed date, August 24th, 1945, as was set up by the Japanese and the three representative of Indonesian people (Soekarno, Hatta and Radjiman; Boland, p.34). And as the new state was born, the potential political factions that had been awaiting the right moment to show up their forces seemed to have the legitimating moment to claim rights on determining the state’s ideology, its judicial foundation, and its formation. At that time, there were some potential groups such as the military group, the civil-nationalist, the communist group, and the Muslim group which had opportunity to influence the political agenda of the new state. All this group had established each own political party, with an exception for the military group which still remained non-political party but had power and influence on politics. The Muslim group built Masjumi which had temporarily become an inclusive party for all Muslim (p.42), the nationalist was forming Partai Nasional Indonesia, and the communist had established Partai Komunis Indonesia.

The August 18th meeting, which was attended by Hatta, Teuku Mohammad Hassan (from Aceh), K. Bagus H. Hadikusumo, Wahid Hasjim, and other leaders, held after the declaration of independence was finally led to the decision that the new Indonesia only could become and remain in a unity if the Constitution contained nothing that was directly connected with Islam (p.36). As a consequence, articles on Islam as the official religion of the state, the condition that the President must be a Muslim and the obligation for adherents of Islam to practice Islamic law had to be removed (p.36). Therefore, the new Indonesia came into being neither as an Islamic state nor as a secular state.

And as Boland’s book has in particular dealt with the struggle of Islam in Indonesia after its independence declaration to influence the political agenda, I have benefited from reading his book. The book has explored and sketched the struggle of Islam both in political arena, and in religious interaction with other religion. After having reading this book done, and looking at the issues discussed by Boland, I have got impression that for many Muslim Islam has been become their nationality. For many Muslim, religion is their national identity, Islam is their real national ideology, umma is the nation, and syari’a is the Constitution. I consider this understanding as the actual framework that has been shaping the horizon of many Muslim as they come to and deal with politics and people of other faiths. And as contrast, the modern Christians, for example, have never looked their religion in similar way as do Muslims. In other words, Muslims never comes to see religion as a different entity to politics, and, by so doing, Muslims have generated much tensions for their efforts applying or imposing such way of thinking into the new Indonesia whose inhabitants are not only Muslims.

Inflexibility or, perhaps, a condition of not being accustomed with living in separation of politics and religious affairs has led Muslims to have only a little choice; to apply syari’a, which means to be religiously and socially considered as part of devotion to God, and to reject not-Islamic foundation for becoming their guidance in the new Indonesia. This is the constructed knowledge of Islam shared within Muslim community, and such knowledge construction which was derived from the Arab context is subject to some degree of historical and political accountability. Therefore, any policies confirming that knowledge would be welcomed by and pleased Muslim community. There would be no resistances raised within the community. And as has been mentioned in this book, the Japanese occupation had in fact comforted and increased the role of Islam as national identity amongst Muslim of Indonesia (p.10-13). It explains why during the Japanese occupation Muslims had been less ‘active’ protesting the occupation even though they knew and lived under the foreign powers.

The social and religious horizons of Muslims which have been inheriting and maintaining the belief of the unity of religion and politics, and for some Muslims they seem to have been ‘predestined’ to manifest such belief into practice in Indonesia, all of these are direct opposition to the gentle agreement made by Hatta, and other Muslim leaders. This is the fact of Muslim Indonesia, living in a plural community within their community and internally bearing potential clash amongst them selves. To put it in other way and in much clearer statement, the community of Muslim is not monolithic, and the ‘internal’ problem derived from the ‘constructed knowledge of Islam’ has become the source of friction. Therefore, the paper believes that the following are the actual and the most basic struggle for Muslims in modern Indonesia; to see and interpret Islam with the angle of Indonesian culture and its social condition, not the Arab culture and its social condition. And, building cooperation with people of other faiths to bring prosperity to the people, as suggested by Boland (p.242), is definitively another calling for Muslim to struggle with.