Tri Harmaji
History of Religions in Indonesia Part II: from c. 1900 to the Present
Religion, September 11, the “war on terror” and “clash of civilization”: the future of religious diversity in Indonesia; Noorhaidi Hasan, September 11 and Islamic Militancy in Post-New Order Indonesia, Bernard Adeney-Risakotta, The Impact of September 11 on Islam in Southeast Asia.
‘The clash of civilization’, like describes in the reading is a rejected theory to explain ‘the war against terrorism’ campaign led by United Stated of America with the main targets are Islamic country Afghanistan and Iraq following the September 11 attack on the two American symbols of superiority World Trade Centre and Pentagon. This theory is very dangerous to this campaign because the theory will make all ‘really’ Islamic country will not just give any support to the campaign but also will together against the campaign. But this theory, I think, is also not just like children story in bad. It perhaps has strong argumentations and reasons.
If we clean Islam from every modern (western) influence from philosophical idea such as human right declaration, gender equality etc. to material advantage such as technology, perhaps we can clearly see Islam as a really different civilization other than western civilization. To do this job now is perhaps very difficult because western modernity has profoundly penetrated Islamic world to their blood and bone. This penetration has been going on for the first time the two civilizations encountered. So many Muslim students from Islamic countries has gone to study in the western countries, learn it philosophy, ideas and technology, and then bring it back to their home countries to be implemented. What we can see liberal Islam in Indonesia for example is a kind of Islam that has already influenced by western philosophy and ideas. So what is the pure Islam then?
It is right that the Islamic version of radical fundamentalist groups perhaps is not the true and pure Islamic civilization. And perhaps there is no what is called as pure Islamic civilization anymore because Islamic world has together developed with western influences. But what is emerging from the phenomenon of fundamentalist Islam recently, perhaps, is really a sign that what is called as Islamic civilization is really exist. And this civilization is definitely different from western civilization.
If what I guessed above is right, then the theory of clash civilization is so not impossible. The well known crusade event is perhaps the first clash happened between these civilizations. Centuries later this first clash was followed by subsequent victories of the west over Islamic countries in the east by the policy of colonialism. Both clashes are definitely bloody and the second clash was ended in the nineteenth century by then ending of colonialism era. From these two clashes Islamic world had severely injured and many Muslim started to acknowledge the western superiority and went there to study. This last process has responsible for the sunk of Islamic civilization amid the powerful western civilization. Under this policy the idea or consciousness of the great Islamic civilization became more and more weaken among the Islamic communities especially Islamic people in Indonesia.
What is significant about the war against terrorism campaign of America toward Islamic countries is a wake up call for Islamic people to remember what they have lost today: their own civilization. The consciousness of Islamic civilization attacked and destroyed by western civilization then growing rapidly like mushroom in the rainy season. What is the end of this scene will be? In my opinion what is propagated by radical Islam now in Indonesia is definitely this theory, and on the other hand what is promoted by liberal Islam is the counter theory of it. And what we call as the future of religious diversity in Indonesia, in my opinion, will be decided especially by who is the winner of this struggle.
Minggu, 02 Mei 2010
The world goes to war on terror
MUCHA Q ARQUIZA
Another head hangs lowly, tied slowly to die
and the violence cause such silence
who are we mistaken
but, you see, it's not my family
in your head they are fighting...
Another mother's breaking heart has taken over
when the violence cause such silence
who are we mistaken
it’s the same old team since 1916
they are still fighting...’
[‘Zombie’, The Cranberry]
In the 60s,70s and the 80s, America waged terrible wars on terror. At first, it was Vietnam, and then, it was Afghanistan. There, the terrorist was itself, America. In its Afghan war, America harnessed international soldier-recruits to fight its holy war. The mujahideens were to reduce Afghanistan into smithereens to flush out Russian communists. Earlier, the same jihad was also fanned by American CIA in Indonesia that successfully cleansed the country off in less than a year of close to one million suspected member of the PKI and repudiated from society its future generations forever. Little did the Muslims and mujahideen in both countries knew that they were fighting a jihad not for Muslims, not for Allah, but for Uncle Sam.
In 2001, America again invested on a war on terrorism. The terrorists were the heroes it helped prop up and built-up in strength, Osama bin Laden, and Arab and Indonesian extremists. In this war America was again recruiting international allies to ‘be with us’ or else ‘you are against us’. The fight was called a crusade for ‘infinite justice’, later scaled down to ‘enduring freedom’. Little did the loyal allies knew that they were launching a crusade not for themselves, or for their gods or holy saints, but for the future of world religion – the Market – and the future god called Profit.
Ten years later now into the 2010, we have completely become and still are conscripted and embroiled into this war on terror that America has led us all. And each with his own defense to justify America’s and the West’s successes and interests as our own, this American holy war is also the world’s war. As the US, the world is to liberate Muslims from their autocratic regimes, for instance, and to democratize Islam that is not liberal enough; in the name of American ideals of liberty and freedom, the world is supposed to fight this, so it claims, 'oppressive and backward' religion of the 'illiterates' ruled by the 'savage laws of the desert nomads'. The new war doctrine says Muslims and Islam must be liberated to see the shining lights of US and Western democracy and liberal capitalistic lifestyle. The irony of all is that Muslims who have been coerced to be soldiers of this world war have been targeting its own, the women and secular intellectuals, most especially, yet perennially blind to the real instigator or the war-monger.
This war on terror, as America intends, is enduring freedom indeed, pervasively fought globally on a 24-7 basis, and worse than the previous world wars that went before us. For in this war, we fight at airports where we are made to remove our shoes, our belts, our coin purses; leave our toothpaste, shampoo and lotions and unconsumed bottled water; and if we are Muslims, in some airports, we are made to unrobe and untangle our jilbab and unhook our brassieres. The war goes to schools, too. In countries such as mine [Philippines] where Muslims are a minority, poor innocent grade-school kids with Arab sounding names get extra attention by suspicious teachers, and are demanded to narrate their ‘brief’ personal – meaning, religious – life history lest they be related, if distant, to any of the ‘terror-sounding’ names and hooded personalities. Or else, for someone declaring herself Muslim but bearing a ‘Christian-sounding’ name most likely gets into arguments where ‘curious’ [islamophobic?] school-mates are wont to investigate why, ‘but your name is Christian name, why are you a Muslim?’ -- as though being a Muslim is some sort of a disease or dreadful thing that one better stay away from. Overnight, everyone becomes self-conscious about their race and ethnicity, religion, gender and with other markers of identity that define ‘us’ and ‘they’. Suddenly, friends become enemies and fences are erected between neighbors. And when things go a little bit overheated, or overboard with too much politics, they apply the instant 'band-aid', a moral emergency kit called 'interfaith dialogue'.
The new war on terror as designed by the United States of America is a Zombie war, fought in the battlefield of emotions and intellect -- its weapons are anger and hatred stashed in hearts and fired away by fingertips and tongues; its target victims are not bodies but souls. And as the Cranberry sings the wars go on and on: ‘in your head, are their tanks, and their bombs and their guns, in your head…’
Another head hangs lowly, tied slowly to die
and the violence cause such silence
who are we mistaken
but, you see, it's not my family
in your head they are fighting...
Another mother's breaking heart has taken over
when the violence cause such silence
who are we mistaken
it’s the same old team since 1916
they are still fighting...’
[‘Zombie’, The Cranberry]
In the 60s,70s and the 80s, America waged terrible wars on terror. At first, it was Vietnam, and then, it was Afghanistan. There, the terrorist was itself, America. In its Afghan war, America harnessed international soldier-recruits to fight its holy war. The mujahideens were to reduce Afghanistan into smithereens to flush out Russian communists. Earlier, the same jihad was also fanned by American CIA in Indonesia that successfully cleansed the country off in less than a year of close to one million suspected member of the PKI and repudiated from society its future generations forever. Little did the Muslims and mujahideen in both countries knew that they were fighting a jihad not for Muslims, not for Allah, but for Uncle Sam.
In 2001, America again invested on a war on terrorism. The terrorists were the heroes it helped prop up and built-up in strength, Osama bin Laden, and Arab and Indonesian extremists. In this war America was again recruiting international allies to ‘be with us’ or else ‘you are against us’. The fight was called a crusade for ‘infinite justice’, later scaled down to ‘enduring freedom’. Little did the loyal allies knew that they were launching a crusade not for themselves, or for their gods or holy saints, but for the future of world religion – the Market – and the future god called Profit.
Ten years later now into the 2010, we have completely become and still are conscripted and embroiled into this war on terror that America has led us all. And each with his own defense to justify America’s and the West’s successes and interests as our own, this American holy war is also the world’s war. As the US, the world is to liberate Muslims from their autocratic regimes, for instance, and to democratize Islam that is not liberal enough; in the name of American ideals of liberty and freedom, the world is supposed to fight this, so it claims, 'oppressive and backward' religion of the 'illiterates' ruled by the 'savage laws of the desert nomads'. The new war doctrine says Muslims and Islam must be liberated to see the shining lights of US and Western democracy and liberal capitalistic lifestyle. The irony of all is that Muslims who have been coerced to be soldiers of this world war have been targeting its own, the women and secular intellectuals, most especially, yet perennially blind to the real instigator or the war-monger.
This war on terror, as America intends, is enduring freedom indeed, pervasively fought globally on a 24-7 basis, and worse than the previous world wars that went before us. For in this war, we fight at airports where we are made to remove our shoes, our belts, our coin purses; leave our toothpaste, shampoo and lotions and unconsumed bottled water; and if we are Muslims, in some airports, we are made to unrobe and untangle our jilbab and unhook our brassieres. The war goes to schools, too. In countries such as mine [Philippines] where Muslims are a minority, poor innocent grade-school kids with Arab sounding names get extra attention by suspicious teachers, and are demanded to narrate their ‘brief’ personal – meaning, religious – life history lest they be related, if distant, to any of the ‘terror-sounding’ names and hooded personalities. Or else, for someone declaring herself Muslim but bearing a ‘Christian-sounding’ name most likely gets into arguments where ‘curious’ [islamophobic?] school-mates are wont to investigate why, ‘but your name is Christian name, why are you a Muslim?’ -- as though being a Muslim is some sort of a disease or dreadful thing that one better stay away from. Overnight, everyone becomes self-conscious about their race and ethnicity, religion, gender and with other markers of identity that define ‘us’ and ‘they’. Suddenly, friends become enemies and fences are erected between neighbors. And when things go a little bit overheated, or overboard with too much politics, they apply the instant 'band-aid', a moral emergency kit called 'interfaith dialogue'.
The new war on terror as designed by the United States of America is a Zombie war, fought in the battlefield of emotions and intellect -- its weapons are anger and hatred stashed in hearts and fired away by fingertips and tongues; its target victims are not bodies but souls. And as the Cranberry sings the wars go on and on: ‘in your head, are their tanks, and their bombs and their guns, in your head…’
Who are Terrorists? By Nihayatul Wafiroh
Last month I watched the movie “My Name is Khan.” For me, it is a good picture about the impact of September 11 for Muslim people although they did not involve in the terrorism. The first implication from this tragedy is that people attempt to determine the term “terrorism.” Who are terrorists? United States, in my opinion, gives the wrong direction in the identification of terrorists. US direct or indirect shows in their news that terrorists are from Muslim people. Indeed, this generalization gives negative effects for Muslim in all countries. Osama bin Laden who is assumed to be the leader of terrorist is a Muslim, but it does not mean that all Muslim follow his ideas.
I remember my experiences when I used to live in Hawaii. For Indonesian-Muslim men they need at least one and half-hour to deal with immigration staff when they arrived or departed to US. The US immigration always assumes that all Muslim men from Indonesia are suspected to be “dangerous” people, so they need to make sure that they are clean from terrorism. When the first time my husband came to Hawaii, he had to transit one hour in Guam. In Guam, the immigration staff asked him with many question. As a result he missed his flight and had to wait for 10 hours in Guam for another flight. We made a joke for his case, “although your name is without Muhammad, your face is look like al-Qaida.”
In Indonesia case, as a Muslim, I understand that in my country there are many types of Muslim groups : liberal, moderat and radical. Indonesian is a unique country, so all groups can develop together. Before September 11, I seemed that all groups did not have any problem. In fact, the tension among groups did not occur. Bernard Adeney-Risakotta mentions in his article that actually the impact of September 11 started in Indonesia since Bali bombing on October 12, 2002. It means before that terrorism was unknown in Indonesia.
As people in other countries, Indonesian people began to step far away from terrorist people. The problem in Indonesia is that the majority population in Indonesia is Muslim, as a result, they distrusted each other. Because of media, Indonesian people image that terrorists are who wear one-quarter pants, long shirt, a beard and have wives who wear the veil. This image is not far from the image of Osama bin Laden. People very strong held this picture, so when they meet people like this, they prefer to stand far from them. It is unfair for them and also for other Muslim people.
I personally disagree with this perspective. This generalization takes away their right. Indeed, not all people who wear this kind of dress are terrorists. Terrorism, in my view, is people who make other people’s feeling are terrorized, and they cannot live peacefully. With this determination, I think that capitalism is the big terrorism in the world, and the leader of capitalism is United States. So who are the truly terrorists?
I remember my experiences when I used to live in Hawaii. For Indonesian-Muslim men they need at least one and half-hour to deal with immigration staff when they arrived or departed to US. The US immigration always assumes that all Muslim men from Indonesia are suspected to be “dangerous” people, so they need to make sure that they are clean from terrorism. When the first time my husband came to Hawaii, he had to transit one hour in Guam. In Guam, the immigration staff asked him with many question. As a result he missed his flight and had to wait for 10 hours in Guam for another flight. We made a joke for his case, “although your name is without Muhammad, your face is look like al-Qaida.”
In Indonesia case, as a Muslim, I understand that in my country there are many types of Muslim groups : liberal, moderat and radical. Indonesian is a unique country, so all groups can develop together. Before September 11, I seemed that all groups did not have any problem. In fact, the tension among groups did not occur. Bernard Adeney-Risakotta mentions in his article that actually the impact of September 11 started in Indonesia since Bali bombing on October 12, 2002. It means before that terrorism was unknown in Indonesia.
As people in other countries, Indonesian people began to step far away from terrorist people. The problem in Indonesia is that the majority population in Indonesia is Muslim, as a result, they distrusted each other. Because of media, Indonesian people image that terrorists are who wear one-quarter pants, long shirt, a beard and have wives who wear the veil. This image is not far from the image of Osama bin Laden. People very strong held this picture, so when they meet people like this, they prefer to stand far from them. It is unfair for them and also for other Muslim people.
I personally disagree with this perspective. This generalization takes away their right. Indeed, not all people who wear this kind of dress are terrorists. Terrorism, in my view, is people who make other people’s feeling are terrorized, and they cannot live peacefully. With this determination, I think that capitalism is the big terrorism in the world, and the leader of capitalism is United States. So who are the truly terrorists?
Terror and Religious diversity in Indonesia
by Nina Mariani Noor
September 11th 2001 tragedy has called many different responses from the world. While George Bush utilized it to start attacking Afghanistan and calling for war against terrorism, some fundamentalism Muslims see it as “the great conspiracy of Israel and US” to destruct Muslims. These different views show the clash between “the west” and “Muslims” world that has already existed for ages and still exist today.
Turning to terrorism, those two parties also have different definition on terrorism. Bush sees September 11 was committed by terrorists, particularly Muslims terrorists so that he called for global crusade against terrorists, whereas Muslims see Bush’s action in attacking Afghanistanand starting war is kind of terrorism toward Muslims world. So, who is the terrorist depends on who see and define it.
Accordingly, in Indonesia the spirit of “Jihad” grew up among Muslims in response to US’ action. Some fundamentalist Muslims eagerly sent their people to do Jihad in Afghanistan or in other way, they committed “suicide bombing” that they did in Indonesia by targeting Americans and other “white foreigners”. Unfortunately, people who were affected by those bombing actions are not only what so called ‘Americans” but also Indonesian and Muslims. Furthermore, those bombing actions bring about negative sentiment toward Muslims from others and also make the harmony among different religious communities is in critical point.
In my opinion, the actors of September 11 are terrorists, and both Bush and Muslims committing bombing in Indonesia are also terrorists since all of them have made other people suffer and also place world peace in danger. Moreover, it seems to me that those kinds of terrorism tend to continue in the future if we do not attempt to deal with it.
Therefore, in Indonesian context, our duty now is how to maintain the harmony among different religious communities in order to continue our idea in building Indonesian nation state. Doing more dialogue among different religions to be more understanding not only on the surface but in deep conversation, I think will have effective impacts on building a democratic nation state that respect all religions.
Readings: Hasan, Noorhaidi, “September 11 and Islamic Militancy in Post-New Order Indonesia”
Adeney-Risakotta, Bernard, The Impact of September 11 on Islam in Southeast Asia’.
September 11th 2001 tragedy has called many different responses from the world. While George Bush utilized it to start attacking Afghanistan and calling for war against terrorism, some fundamentalism Muslims see it as “the great conspiracy of Israel and US” to destruct Muslims. These different views show the clash between “the west” and “Muslims” world that has already existed for ages and still exist today.
Turning to terrorism, those two parties also have different definition on terrorism. Bush sees September 11 was committed by terrorists, particularly Muslims terrorists so that he called for global crusade against terrorists, whereas Muslims see Bush’s action in attacking Afghanistanand starting war is kind of terrorism toward Muslims world. So, who is the terrorist depends on who see and define it.
Accordingly, in Indonesia the spirit of “Jihad” grew up among Muslims in response to US’ action. Some fundamentalist Muslims eagerly sent their people to do Jihad in Afghanistan or in other way, they committed “suicide bombing” that they did in Indonesia by targeting Americans and other “white foreigners”. Unfortunately, people who were affected by those bombing actions are not only what so called ‘Americans” but also Indonesian and Muslims. Furthermore, those bombing actions bring about negative sentiment toward Muslims from others and also make the harmony among different religious communities is in critical point.
In my opinion, the actors of September 11 are terrorists, and both Bush and Muslims committing bombing in Indonesia are also terrorists since all of them have made other people suffer and also place world peace in danger. Moreover, it seems to me that those kinds of terrorism tend to continue in the future if we do not attempt to deal with it.
Therefore, in Indonesian context, our duty now is how to maintain the harmony among different religious communities in order to continue our idea in building Indonesian nation state. Doing more dialogue among different religions to be more understanding not only on the surface but in deep conversation, I think will have effective impacts on building a democratic nation state that respect all religions.
Readings: Hasan, Noorhaidi, “September 11 and Islamic Militancy in Post-New Order Indonesia”
Adeney-Risakotta, Bernard, The Impact of September 11 on Islam in Southeast Asia’.
Religion, September 11, the “War on Terror” and the “Clash of Civilizayions”: The Future of Religious Diversity in Indonesia
by Joko Wicoyo
I think the appearance of ‘radical’ and/or violent expressions of political Islam in Indonesia after 11 September is not simply understood as a function of the flaws of Indonesia’s post-Soeharto democracy but it can be more fruitfully understood in relation to similar historical and sociological processes intertwined with the ebb and flow of various kinds of Islamic-based movements in many parts of the world over the last half century. Much of this took place in the context of and in relation to the exigencies of the Cold War. Thus, there is an inter-relationship between developments in the international sphere and the nature of social conflict in the domestic which must be scrutinized.
I think it should be kept in mind that the political nature of Indonesian organized Islam, even at the very early stages, could never be separated from a broader international and historical milieu. At its moment of birth it was profoundly affected by the rise of anti colonial movements worldwide in the first decades of the twentieth century. Political Islam was clearly deeply influenced politically by its appearance in the context of growing nationalist and proto-nationalist sentiment in the colonial-era Dutch East Indies, and other parts of the colonized world – one manifestation of which was the Pan Islamic movement. As is well documented, the emergence of political Islam in Indonesia can be traced back at least to the early responses of the class of traders and merchants who perceived their social and economic position to be under threat within the colonial-era Dutch East Indies at the turn of the twentieth century, or thought their social mobility to be severely constrained. It is because of such a historical legacy that social justice ideals, often strongly tinged with a combination of nationalist and anti-capitalist sentiments–in whatever permutation – remain Islamic Militancy and Jihadist Activism
The complexity of the transition process following the fall of Suharto is confirmed by the act that, in tandem with the spread of democratic discourse, a number of militant Islamist groups, including the Front Pembela Islam (FPI) [Front of the Defenders of Islam], the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) [Indonesia’s Party of Liberation], the Laskar Jihad (LJ) [Jihad Paramilitary Force], the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) [Indonesian Holy Warrior Council] and the Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), achieved notoriety by taking to the streets to demand the comprehensive implementation of the shari’a and by raiding cafes, discotheques, casinos, brothels and other reputed dens of iniquity. In response to the bloody communal conflicts in various trouble spots, they stated their determination to fight jihad and mobilized members and other aspirants of mujahidin to venture to the frontlines. The key to the success of the groups’ mobilizing process lay in the existing Islamist networks that had become widespread across the country in tandem with the efflorescence of Islamist ideology.
Framed in general terms, that what happens in Indonesia has very much to do with the global crisis in the Muslim world, the groups proclaimed their determination to offer the shari’a, khilafa system and jihad as the only solution to curb the continuing crises and disasters afflicting Indonesia today. Implicitly and explicitly they questioned the format of the modern nation-state and expressed their profound desire to establish an Islamic state. They asserted that only then would the Indonesian Muslim umma be protected and saved from the attacks of ‘belligerent infidels.’ Action frames developed by the militant Islamist groups could resonate widely in the public sphere of Indonesia, which is friendly to Islam. As a result of the Islamisation process over the past two decades, Islam has increasingly served as a determining variable behind political negotiations and become the most important frame of reference for many Indonesians to reflect upon the socio-political system they imagined capable of bringing about justice and attaining veritable development. According to them, by keeping pace with the growing influence of Islam on politics, Indonesia has witnessed new global forms of religious identity, whose effect is mediated by specific, historically situated, local institutions. The expansion of this so-called ‘global’ Islam appears to be correlated with the accentuation of religious symbols in the public sphere, the increase of personal religiosity as well as the proliferation of Islamic institutions and new life-styles.
In this context, in the wake of September 11, the name of Osama bin Laden came into the political arena of Indonesia. In this socially and politically ‘Islamised’ public sphere, the FPI came to the fore with a basic agenda to raid cafes, discotheques, casinos and brothels. These actions were claimed to be part of their attempts to secure Indonesia from the hegemony of a Zionist–Christian global conspiracy to undermine Islam. HTI appeared to the public to criticize the existing political system and to propose the khilafat system as an alternative to cope with all the problems facing Indonesia today. They claim that the collapse of the khilafat system was the prime cause of the crisis afflicting the Muslim world, which remains under the shadow of the Zionist–Christian hegemony.
The government and pro-democracy groups’ pressure against violent discourse and jihadist activism has gradually forced the militant Islamist groups to leave behind their high profile politics and shift to a strategy of implementing the shari’a from below. These militant groups apparently no longer see any relevance of jihad as a means to realizing the application of the shari’a. Instead, they argue that da’wa (Islamic proselytizing) is more appropriate to endorse the Indonesian Muslims’ awareness of their duty to uphold the supremacy of the shari’a. They also believe that non-violent endeavors would be more suitable to Indonesia’s current situation and crucial to defend Muslim solidarity and long-term struggle for the comprehensive application of the shari’a. In my mind, their campaign to apply the shari’a from above is considered less effective if there are no activists working at the grass-roots level to boost Muslims’ commitment to the application of the shari’a in their everyday lives. As Ba’asyir pointed out, the strategy for implementing the shari’a suitable for current situation in Indonesia is not jihad, but rather informing the Indonesian Muslims about the magnificence of the shari’a. In his eyes, it is the prophetic strategy of da’wa to give hope and threat; the hope of heaven and the threat of hell. Following the prophet, he relates the implementation of the shari’a to the relationship between man’s life in this world and that in the hereafter. Every individual is leader: leader for himself, his family, his village, and above all his country. They are responsible in the hereafter for whatever they have done in this world. Political leaders who do not take any initiatives to create laws that might prevent their people from being put in hell will fall into trouble in the hereafter; they will be responsible for all people’s sins caused by the absence of the shari’a. However, this does not mean that Ba’asyir totally neglected the importance of jihad; he just sees that da’wa is more appropriate for current peaceful Indonesia. For him, da’wa and jihad are twin concepts to establish God’s laws on earth. In his eyes, the West has demonized and criminalized jihad, because they are afraid of Muslim’s return to the past glorious victory of Islam. He argued that if separated from jihad, Islam becomes weak. Islam will gain honorable victory only with jihad. However, he emphasized that jihad should not be understood simply as holy war. It connotes any effort to establish God’s laws, and da’wa in this context is considered the most suitable condition for realizing the spirit of jihad. I think in this case only God knows what is right and what is wrong!
Readings : Noorhaidi Hasan “September 11 and Islamic Militancy in Post-New Order Indonesia” and Bernard Adeney-Risakotta, ”The Impact of September 11 on Islam in Southeast Asia
I think the appearance of ‘radical’ and/or violent expressions of political Islam in Indonesia after 11 September is not simply understood as a function of the flaws of Indonesia’s post-Soeharto democracy but it can be more fruitfully understood in relation to similar historical and sociological processes intertwined with the ebb and flow of various kinds of Islamic-based movements in many parts of the world over the last half century. Much of this took place in the context of and in relation to the exigencies of the Cold War. Thus, there is an inter-relationship between developments in the international sphere and the nature of social conflict in the domestic which must be scrutinized.
I think it should be kept in mind that the political nature of Indonesian organized Islam, even at the very early stages, could never be separated from a broader international and historical milieu. At its moment of birth it was profoundly affected by the rise of anti colonial movements worldwide in the first decades of the twentieth century. Political Islam was clearly deeply influenced politically by its appearance in the context of growing nationalist and proto-nationalist sentiment in the colonial-era Dutch East Indies, and other parts of the colonized world – one manifestation of which was the Pan Islamic movement. As is well documented, the emergence of political Islam in Indonesia can be traced back at least to the early responses of the class of traders and merchants who perceived their social and economic position to be under threat within the colonial-era Dutch East Indies at the turn of the twentieth century, or thought their social mobility to be severely constrained. It is because of such a historical legacy that social justice ideals, often strongly tinged with a combination of nationalist and anti-capitalist sentiments–in whatever permutation – remain Islamic Militancy and Jihadist Activism
The complexity of the transition process following the fall of Suharto is confirmed by the act that, in tandem with the spread of democratic discourse, a number of militant Islamist groups, including the Front Pembela Islam (FPI) [Front of the Defenders of Islam], the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) [Indonesia’s Party of Liberation], the Laskar Jihad (LJ) [Jihad Paramilitary Force], the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) [Indonesian Holy Warrior Council] and the Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), achieved notoriety by taking to the streets to demand the comprehensive implementation of the shari’a and by raiding cafes, discotheques, casinos, brothels and other reputed dens of iniquity. In response to the bloody communal conflicts in various trouble spots, they stated their determination to fight jihad and mobilized members and other aspirants of mujahidin to venture to the frontlines. The key to the success of the groups’ mobilizing process lay in the existing Islamist networks that had become widespread across the country in tandem with the efflorescence of Islamist ideology.
Framed in general terms, that what happens in Indonesia has very much to do with the global crisis in the Muslim world, the groups proclaimed their determination to offer the shari’a, khilafa system and jihad as the only solution to curb the continuing crises and disasters afflicting Indonesia today. Implicitly and explicitly they questioned the format of the modern nation-state and expressed their profound desire to establish an Islamic state. They asserted that only then would the Indonesian Muslim umma be protected and saved from the attacks of ‘belligerent infidels.’ Action frames developed by the militant Islamist groups could resonate widely in the public sphere of Indonesia, which is friendly to Islam. As a result of the Islamisation process over the past two decades, Islam has increasingly served as a determining variable behind political negotiations and become the most important frame of reference for many Indonesians to reflect upon the socio-political system they imagined capable of bringing about justice and attaining veritable development. According to them, by keeping pace with the growing influence of Islam on politics, Indonesia has witnessed new global forms of religious identity, whose effect is mediated by specific, historically situated, local institutions. The expansion of this so-called ‘global’ Islam appears to be correlated with the accentuation of religious symbols in the public sphere, the increase of personal religiosity as well as the proliferation of Islamic institutions and new life-styles.
In this context, in the wake of September 11, the name of Osama bin Laden came into the political arena of Indonesia. In this socially and politically ‘Islamised’ public sphere, the FPI came to the fore with a basic agenda to raid cafes, discotheques, casinos and brothels. These actions were claimed to be part of their attempts to secure Indonesia from the hegemony of a Zionist–Christian global conspiracy to undermine Islam. HTI appeared to the public to criticize the existing political system and to propose the khilafat system as an alternative to cope with all the problems facing Indonesia today. They claim that the collapse of the khilafat system was the prime cause of the crisis afflicting the Muslim world, which remains under the shadow of the Zionist–Christian hegemony.
The government and pro-democracy groups’ pressure against violent discourse and jihadist activism has gradually forced the militant Islamist groups to leave behind their high profile politics and shift to a strategy of implementing the shari’a from below. These militant groups apparently no longer see any relevance of jihad as a means to realizing the application of the shari’a. Instead, they argue that da’wa (Islamic proselytizing) is more appropriate to endorse the Indonesian Muslims’ awareness of their duty to uphold the supremacy of the shari’a. They also believe that non-violent endeavors would be more suitable to Indonesia’s current situation and crucial to defend Muslim solidarity and long-term struggle for the comprehensive application of the shari’a. In my mind, their campaign to apply the shari’a from above is considered less effective if there are no activists working at the grass-roots level to boost Muslims’ commitment to the application of the shari’a in their everyday lives. As Ba’asyir pointed out, the strategy for implementing the shari’a suitable for current situation in Indonesia is not jihad, but rather informing the Indonesian Muslims about the magnificence of the shari’a. In his eyes, it is the prophetic strategy of da’wa to give hope and threat; the hope of heaven and the threat of hell. Following the prophet, he relates the implementation of the shari’a to the relationship between man’s life in this world and that in the hereafter. Every individual is leader: leader for himself, his family, his village, and above all his country. They are responsible in the hereafter for whatever they have done in this world. Political leaders who do not take any initiatives to create laws that might prevent their people from being put in hell will fall into trouble in the hereafter; they will be responsible for all people’s sins caused by the absence of the shari’a. However, this does not mean that Ba’asyir totally neglected the importance of jihad; he just sees that da’wa is more appropriate for current peaceful Indonesia. For him, da’wa and jihad are twin concepts to establish God’s laws on earth. In his eyes, the West has demonized and criminalized jihad, because they are afraid of Muslim’s return to the past glorious victory of Islam. He argued that if separated from jihad, Islam becomes weak. Islam will gain honorable victory only with jihad. However, he emphasized that jihad should not be understood simply as holy war. It connotes any effort to establish God’s laws, and da’wa in this context is considered the most suitable condition for realizing the spirit of jihad. I think in this case only God knows what is right and what is wrong!
Readings : Noorhaidi Hasan “September 11 and Islamic Militancy in Post-New Order Indonesia” and Bernard Adeney-Risakotta, ”The Impact of September 11 on Islam in Southeast Asia
Complexity of Writing History in Post-Suharto Era
by Faqihuddin Abdul Kodir
History is not about facts of the past rather perspectives of present people about those facts for the benefits of establishing their future. Suharto was true in seeing history for building his perspective of the future of Indonesia; one nation, unity in diversity, economic development, national stability, and social prosperity of all citizens. For these reasons, history should be written in a single perspective owned by the government. Sukarno did the same for his own perspective of the future of Indonesia. The leaders of Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) also would likely do the same if they took over the power. This was the critical historical moment of modern Indonesian people having learnt that the truth is one and the source of the truth also one.
At the end of Suharto’s era, after thirty years seizing the power, people had been able to delegitimize the source of “the truth” which was his government. Reformation era following Suharto’s fall from the power in 1999 opened eyes of many people to look at their own sources of the truth. Without any single legitimized source of the truth, each group of Indonesian people spread “their own truth” from “their own source”. Historiography in this period becomes no longer monolithic and nor in single perspective. At least, in the account of Klinken, there have been emerged four historiographical streams in Indonesia: (1) Orthodox nationalist stream, (2) Societal historiographies at the national level, (3) Regional ethno-nationalisms, and (4) Local sources of historiography. These streams provide not only many facts about the same event, but many perspectives, many historical interpretations, and of course many truths.
From these multi-perspectives of writing history, we Indonesian people begin to learn many truths from many sources. At least, we rely not only on government to know and spread our national history. Although each people believe in their own resource, we Indonesian people attempt to negotiate ‘truths’ among us and learn each from other. However, is really the truth many or only one? I think historical fact about certain thing is single and has only one truth, while interpretation of the fact varies, comes from multi-perspectives, and proposes many truths. We will learn more from interpretation rather than from the fact. However the power, anyone owns it, tends to limit the perspectives for its own interests and at the cost of other perspectives owned by people. Unless we control the power, we may back to the era that the source of the truth is only one and will scare us again as we experienced in the era of Suharto. The power here is not necessary the government, but also mass-media and even religion.
Readings:
1. Gerry Van Klinken, “The Battle for History after Suharto”, in Mary Zurbuchen ed., Beginning to Remember. pp. 233-258.
History is not about facts of the past rather perspectives of present people about those facts for the benefits of establishing their future. Suharto was true in seeing history for building his perspective of the future of Indonesia; one nation, unity in diversity, economic development, national stability, and social prosperity of all citizens. For these reasons, history should be written in a single perspective owned by the government. Sukarno did the same for his own perspective of the future of Indonesia. The leaders of Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) also would likely do the same if they took over the power. This was the critical historical moment of modern Indonesian people having learnt that the truth is one and the source of the truth also one.
At the end of Suharto’s era, after thirty years seizing the power, people had been able to delegitimize the source of “the truth” which was his government. Reformation era following Suharto’s fall from the power in 1999 opened eyes of many people to look at their own sources of the truth. Without any single legitimized source of the truth, each group of Indonesian people spread “their own truth” from “their own source”. Historiography in this period becomes no longer monolithic and nor in single perspective. At least, in the account of Klinken, there have been emerged four historiographical streams in Indonesia: (1) Orthodox nationalist stream, (2) Societal historiographies at the national level, (3) Regional ethno-nationalisms, and (4) Local sources of historiography. These streams provide not only many facts about the same event, but many perspectives, many historical interpretations, and of course many truths.
From these multi-perspectives of writing history, we Indonesian people begin to learn many truths from many sources. At least, we rely not only on government to know and spread our national history. Although each people believe in their own resource, we Indonesian people attempt to negotiate ‘truths’ among us and learn each from other. However, is really the truth many or only one? I think historical fact about certain thing is single and has only one truth, while interpretation of the fact varies, comes from multi-perspectives, and proposes many truths. We will learn more from interpretation rather than from the fact. However the power, anyone owns it, tends to limit the perspectives for its own interests and at the cost of other perspectives owned by people. Unless we control the power, we may back to the era that the source of the truth is only one and will scare us again as we experienced in the era of Suharto. The power here is not necessary the government, but also mass-media and even religion.
Readings:
1. Gerry Van Klinken, “The Battle for History after Suharto”, in Mary Zurbuchen ed., Beginning to Remember. pp. 233-258.
Revival of Jihad
LEYAKET ALI MOHAMED OMAR
History of Religion Part 2- Prof Bernard Adeney- Risakotta and Prof Margana
Readings from: K.S Nathan & Mohammad Kamali- Islam In Southeast Asia & Bernard Adeney- Risakotta- The Impact of September 11 on Islam In Southeast Asia
Noorhaidi Hasan account defines the role that the Islamic militancy in the post-new order Indonesia. It is illustrated that basically there is no way these radical Islamic militants are ready for a diplomatic dialogues; it seems that they tends to have an idea of supremacy in their doctrine, it goes like ‘It is either you are with us or you are against us’. As a result of the principle that they grip and hold on tightly, they tend make a total shut off to any other theories or interpretation and hence in order to seek knowledge from another sources is not in their dictionary at all.
The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States constituted the single most important new development in the international security environment around the globe. On the other hand in Indonesia changes are taken place almost immediately after that significant event and Jihad has no longer been anything new to Indonesia political sphere. It has been long awaited since after the New Order.
We know that long before the new order it has always been a subject that kept its leader on guard; its roots in Darul Islam, a radical movement in Indonesia in the 1940s. Example is Jemaah Islamiah which was formally founded on 1 January 1993 by JI leaders, Abu Bakar Bashir and Abdullah Sungkar while hiding in Malaysia from the persecution of the Suharto Government. After the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998, both men returned to Indonesia where JI gained a terrorist edge when one of its founders, the late Abdullah Sungkar established contact with Osama Bin Laden’s- al-Qaeda network.
Time bomb as I may call it but the fact, it is a time bomb, the only new thing is that they have a new focus violent operations that previously began as the communal conflicts in Maluku and Poso. It shifted its attention to targeting US and Western interests in Indonesia and the wider Southeast Asian region since the start of the US-led war on terror. The question I may want to ask is that, is it true that the reason behind this is the faith? Or it’s the marginalized Muslims that are frustrated due to economical factors? Well, I believed it’s the second one and religion became its tools to work on the ‘enemy’. The revival of Jihad are developed by the certain radical group who are against the West with an understanding that they are responsible for the marginalized as Hasan mentions ‘ Abu Bakar Baasyir, for instance, points out ‘Violence in the framework of Jihad is allowed to resist against belligerent unbelievers attacking Muslims”(p.313)
History of Religion Part 2- Prof Bernard Adeney- Risakotta and Prof Margana
Readings from: K.S Nathan & Mohammad Kamali- Islam In Southeast Asia & Bernard Adeney- Risakotta- The Impact of September 11 on Islam In Southeast Asia
Noorhaidi Hasan account defines the role that the Islamic militancy in the post-new order Indonesia. It is illustrated that basically there is no way these radical Islamic militants are ready for a diplomatic dialogues; it seems that they tends to have an idea of supremacy in their doctrine, it goes like ‘It is either you are with us or you are against us’. As a result of the principle that they grip and hold on tightly, they tend make a total shut off to any other theories or interpretation and hence in order to seek knowledge from another sources is not in their dictionary at all.
The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States constituted the single most important new development in the international security environment around the globe. On the other hand in Indonesia changes are taken place almost immediately after that significant event and Jihad has no longer been anything new to Indonesia political sphere. It has been long awaited since after the New Order.
We know that long before the new order it has always been a subject that kept its leader on guard; its roots in Darul Islam, a radical movement in Indonesia in the 1940s. Example is Jemaah Islamiah which was formally founded on 1 January 1993 by JI leaders, Abu Bakar Bashir and Abdullah Sungkar while hiding in Malaysia from the persecution of the Suharto Government. After the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998, both men returned to Indonesia where JI gained a terrorist edge when one of its founders, the late Abdullah Sungkar established contact with Osama Bin Laden’s- al-Qaeda network.
Time bomb as I may call it but the fact, it is a time bomb, the only new thing is that they have a new focus violent operations that previously began as the communal conflicts in Maluku and Poso. It shifted its attention to targeting US and Western interests in Indonesia and the wider Southeast Asian region since the start of the US-led war on terror. The question I may want to ask is that, is it true that the reason behind this is the faith? Or it’s the marginalized Muslims that are frustrated due to economical factors? Well, I believed it’s the second one and religion became its tools to work on the ‘enemy’. The revival of Jihad are developed by the certain radical group who are against the West with an understanding that they are responsible for the marginalized as Hasan mentions ‘ Abu Bakar Baasyir, for instance, points out ‘Violence in the framework of Jihad is allowed to resist against belligerent unbelievers attacking Muslims”(p.313)
Terror in an Age of Faith - Roy Allan B Tolentino
Much has been made of the necessity to understand Islam in the world after 9/11. Suddenly, the Western world realized that a sizeable chunk of the population subscribed to a world-view that appeared to be totally different from theirs. There was a sudden urgency to learn more about this world-view, and there was a great demand for experts in the field. To be perfectly honest, even my presence as a Catholic scholar in ICRS could be understood along those lines.
While this urgency has died down in the intervening years, this phenomenon has, on the other hand, obscured the fact that Islam is not new; Islam has been part of the world for centuries and will be for the foreseeable future. Thus, when Western-influenced scholars suddenly seize the opportunity to study this “emerging” religion, it seems honestly rather funny. The dialogue between Islam and Western secular culture (whatever that is) has been going on for some time now, despite occasional fits and many awkward pauses. While Islam constantly takes Western secularism to task for its “anti-religious” world-view, religion has never really been erased from world culture.
If we accept, then, that secularism has not stifled the discourse of religion completely, and that we have never really left the “age of faith,” then an important aspect of the dialogue between religion and culture is the dialogue within religions. If Indonesia is any indicator, the sheer plurality of Islam demands that this internal dialogue continues. Just the Indonesian reaction to 9/11 displays the tension within religion: “In Indonesia, home of the world’s largest Islamic population, reactions to 9/11 and subsequent strikes against Afghanistan were perhaps the most polarized in the region... Megawati was torn between, on the one hand, using the opportunity of the US-led anti-terrorist drive to gain international support and approval of Jakarta’s own battle with armed separatists in Aceh and Irian Jaya, and, on the other hand, keeping her distance from the USA in order not to give political ammunition to the moderate and radical Islamic organizations which constitute the most potent opposition to her government.” (Putzel 2003:177)
What has emerged, in my view, is not so much a revival of faith in an age of terror, but a necessity to understand terror in an age of faith. Terrorism is not so much a climate or a characteristic of an age, but a tool used by those who see no possibility of dialogue. To resort to terror, then, is to deny the dialogue that takes place between religions and within religions. Terrorism, while born of ressentiment, implies an ossification of religion, a stasis of faith. It is the task of religion to ensure that the internal and external discourses continue, to make room for difference and to mediate when those differences threaten to divide us. In Indonesia, I am glad to have seen that dialogue in play, although, of course, there is still much to be done. As Seyyed Hossein Nasr says, this dialogue enjoins Muslims “to make use of this intellectual and spiritual heritage to find a modus vivendi with Christianity and Judaism, and to present a version of Islam to the world that can live with the contemporary world without submitting itself to the follies of the world in which we live.” (Nasr 2008:74) The dynamism of faith will outlast the expediency of terror.
Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. “Religion in a Time of Anxiety” in Part of the Problem, Part of the Solution: Religion Today and Tomorrow. Ed. Arvind Sharma. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2008.
Putzel, James. "Political Islam in Southeast Asia and the US-Philippine Alliance" in Global Responses to Terrorism: 9/11, Afghanistan and Beyond. Ed. Mary Buckley and Rick Fawn. London: Routledge, 2003.
While this urgency has died down in the intervening years, this phenomenon has, on the other hand, obscured the fact that Islam is not new; Islam has been part of the world for centuries and will be for the foreseeable future. Thus, when Western-influenced scholars suddenly seize the opportunity to study this “emerging” religion, it seems honestly rather funny. The dialogue between Islam and Western secular culture (whatever that is) has been going on for some time now, despite occasional fits and many awkward pauses. While Islam constantly takes Western secularism to task for its “anti-religious” world-view, religion has never really been erased from world culture.
If we accept, then, that secularism has not stifled the discourse of religion completely, and that we have never really left the “age of faith,” then an important aspect of the dialogue between religion and culture is the dialogue within religions. If Indonesia is any indicator, the sheer plurality of Islam demands that this internal dialogue continues. Just the Indonesian reaction to 9/11 displays the tension within religion: “In Indonesia, home of the world’s largest Islamic population, reactions to 9/11 and subsequent strikes against Afghanistan were perhaps the most polarized in the region... Megawati was torn between, on the one hand, using the opportunity of the US-led anti-terrorist drive to gain international support and approval of Jakarta’s own battle with armed separatists in Aceh and Irian Jaya, and, on the other hand, keeping her distance from the USA in order not to give political ammunition to the moderate and radical Islamic organizations which constitute the most potent opposition to her government.” (Putzel 2003:177)
What has emerged, in my view, is not so much a revival of faith in an age of terror, but a necessity to understand terror in an age of faith. Terrorism is not so much a climate or a characteristic of an age, but a tool used by those who see no possibility of dialogue. To resort to terror, then, is to deny the dialogue that takes place between religions and within religions. Terrorism, while born of ressentiment, implies an ossification of religion, a stasis of faith. It is the task of religion to ensure that the internal and external discourses continue, to make room for difference and to mediate when those differences threaten to divide us. In Indonesia, I am glad to have seen that dialogue in play, although, of course, there is still much to be done. As Seyyed Hossein Nasr says, this dialogue enjoins Muslims “to make use of this intellectual and spiritual heritage to find a modus vivendi with Christianity and Judaism, and to present a version of Islam to the world that can live with the contemporary world without submitting itself to the follies of the world in which we live.” (Nasr 2008:74) The dynamism of faith will outlast the expediency of terror.
Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. “Religion in a Time of Anxiety” in Part of the Problem, Part of the Solution: Religion Today and Tomorrow. Ed. Arvind Sharma. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2008.
Putzel, James. "Political Islam in Southeast Asia and the US-Philippine Alliance" in Global Responses to Terrorism: 9/11, Afghanistan and Beyond. Ed. Mary Buckley and Rick Fawn. London: Routledge, 2003.
Just war and Anti-terrorism Army
Religion, September 11, the “War on Terror” and the “Clash of civilizations”:
The Future of Religious Diversity in Indonesia.
Kristanto Budiprabowo (tatok)
Terrorism can be analyzed in several perspectives. First, in the first time the act of terror happened and take many lost, people see it as a disaster. Moreover, as any disaster, terrorist act creates “epistemological opportunity” in all of human dimension. After the disaster caused by terrorist act, the strongest reflection is about identity, nationality, religiosity, and the correlation among them. In interreligious relationship, this “epistemological opportunity” can be both in the contras direction whether to increase intolerance or to create new understanding. Refer to the September 11 tragedy, the dynamic on the worldwide politics and interreligious relationship post disaster can creates a space for each country and religion to aware it latent. Now is the opportunity for religions to re-identify their existence for the new human relationship in democratic, justice, and full with understanding and respect.
Second, most of us may agree that after the September 11 and the following terrorism attack worldwide, the face of the world socio-politic and the interreligious relationship come to the new era. At the political perspective, the reaction of a country is influenced not only by the dominant discourse among the politician based on the political trend and the prospective alliance, but also by religious leader from various religion and denominations. The big question to this reaction which is sometime ambiguous is about the concept of war. If we see that terrorism is not an act of war, whatever the argumentation behind the act, a country reaction should be also not a strategically military attack as in the wartime. As far as we see terrorism as an act of war and react with the same method, the question about who is the real terrorist will always rise. Is there a “just war” that can practice in fair although it is doing to eliminate the threat of terrorism?
Furthermore, at the economical perspective, terrorism is a sexy issue that always marketable. Even though terrorism attack like September 11 is a tragedy for many people in the world, it is an opportunity for the media, authors, and politicians to invest their asset for future benefit. Terrorism attack is a rude action and be more impolite in the market. In my opinion, beside the question about the socio-political impact in future international relation, it is also an open question in the immediate global market. Who get the biggest benefit from the threat of terrorism?
The Future of Religious Diversity in Indonesia.
Kristanto Budiprabowo (tatok)
Terrorism can be analyzed in several perspectives. First, in the first time the act of terror happened and take many lost, people see it as a disaster. Moreover, as any disaster, terrorist act creates “epistemological opportunity” in all of human dimension. After the disaster caused by terrorist act, the strongest reflection is about identity, nationality, religiosity, and the correlation among them. In interreligious relationship, this “epistemological opportunity” can be both in the contras direction whether to increase intolerance or to create new understanding. Refer to the September 11 tragedy, the dynamic on the worldwide politics and interreligious relationship post disaster can creates a space for each country and religion to aware it latent. Now is the opportunity for religions to re-identify their existence for the new human relationship in democratic, justice, and full with understanding and respect.
Second, most of us may agree that after the September 11 and the following terrorism attack worldwide, the face of the world socio-politic and the interreligious relationship come to the new era. At the political perspective, the reaction of a country is influenced not only by the dominant discourse among the politician based on the political trend and the prospective alliance, but also by religious leader from various religion and denominations. The big question to this reaction which is sometime ambiguous is about the concept of war. If we see that terrorism is not an act of war, whatever the argumentation behind the act, a country reaction should be also not a strategically military attack as in the wartime. As far as we see terrorism as an act of war and react with the same method, the question about who is the real terrorist will always rise. Is there a “just war” that can practice in fair although it is doing to eliminate the threat of terrorism?
Furthermore, at the economical perspective, terrorism is a sexy issue that always marketable. Even though terrorism attack like September 11 is a tragedy for many people in the world, it is an opportunity for the media, authors, and politicians to invest their asset for future benefit. Terrorism attack is a rude action and be more impolite in the market. In my opinion, beside the question about the socio-political impact in future international relation, it is also an open question in the immediate global market. Who get the biggest benefit from the threat of terrorism?
It is not about “Islam of Southeast Asia” rather “the powerless East” and “the powerful West” by Faqiiuddin Abdul Kodir
Bernard elucidates interestingly, although it is a general attempt, the paradigmatic differences between the West and Islam of Southeast Asia in seeing the tragedy of September 11. Western societies, he argues, are established on the paradigm of “social contract” in which values of individual freedom and safety are very central, while Muslims are influenced rather by values of the family in which the dignity and the well being of the ummah become very fundamental. On the one hand Western people are very much motivated by the belief in the free choice of individuals, and Muslims are rather “tied together by blood and fate” (p. 335).
I would like accordingly to go further that the differences above are not only about Muslims in Southeast Asia rather about Southeast Asian people in general and Western people also in general. Precisely the dimension, I think, is broader than only to be true among Muslims in Southeast Asia. It is not only Muslims of the regions for instance who distrust the governments. The notion that nationalism is less important than “religion” or “local religion” among contemporary Muslims is also true, I think, for Christians, and the adherents of other religions. This is due to the failure of the state as the symbol of nationalism to provide the needs of the civilians. The states of the regions are seen by their people to be exploited by the elites only for interests of the powerful elite including the West.
The dimension of September 11, I think, even goes further to distinguish the perspective of those who feel powerless against those who are powerful, people to people or state to state and even among people in the US. I often read the articles of Americans, such as Michael Parenti the outstanding writer on the critics of capitalism of the State, that the tragedy of September 11 was designed deliberately by the US particularly Bush’s administration to maintain capitalism which makes nothing for people of the US. I am not discussing about the perspective of conspiracy in seeing the tragedy of September 11 among Muslims. I just get impressed, even from the perspective of the news and the articles shown in Kompas run by Indonesian Catholic, that the tragedy tells us more about the idea of social justice between the East and the West, or the South and the North, or the powerless and powerful, and the poor and the rich. This distinguishable perspective exists obviously in many countries of the world even in the State.
Readings:
1. Bernard Adeney-Risakotta, “The Impact of September 11 on Islam in Southeast Asia”, in: K.S. Nathan and Mohammad Hashim Kamali (eds.), Islam in Southeast Asia”, (Singapore: ISEAS, 2005), pp. 325-345.
I would like accordingly to go further that the differences above are not only about Muslims in Southeast Asia rather about Southeast Asian people in general and Western people also in general. Precisely the dimension, I think, is broader than only to be true among Muslims in Southeast Asia. It is not only Muslims of the regions for instance who distrust the governments. The notion that nationalism is less important than “religion” or “local religion” among contemporary Muslims is also true, I think, for Christians, and the adherents of other religions. This is due to the failure of the state as the symbol of nationalism to provide the needs of the civilians. The states of the regions are seen by their people to be exploited by the elites only for interests of the powerful elite including the West.
The dimension of September 11, I think, even goes further to distinguish the perspective of those who feel powerless against those who are powerful, people to people or state to state and even among people in the US. I often read the articles of Americans, such as Michael Parenti the outstanding writer on the critics of capitalism of the State, that the tragedy of September 11 was designed deliberately by the US particularly Bush’s administration to maintain capitalism which makes nothing for people of the US. I am not discussing about the perspective of conspiracy in seeing the tragedy of September 11 among Muslims. I just get impressed, even from the perspective of the news and the articles shown in Kompas run by Indonesian Catholic, that the tragedy tells us more about the idea of social justice between the East and the West, or the South and the North, or the powerless and powerful, and the poor and the rich. This distinguishable perspective exists obviously in many countries of the world even in the State.
Readings:
1. Bernard Adeney-Risakotta, “The Impact of September 11 on Islam in Southeast Asia”, in: K.S. Nathan and Mohammad Hashim Kamali (eds.), Islam in Southeast Asia”, (Singapore: ISEAS, 2005), pp. 325-345.
Sabtu, 01 Mei 2010
9/11 Legacy and its Aftermath: Perception and Education
by
Roma Ulinnuha
As noted by Noorhadi Hasan and Bernard Adeney Risakotta, the particular moment of 9/11 has attributed different perception in different times and spaces. While Hasan pointed out ‘the tension between the proponents of radical Islam and Liberal Islam has turned into open clash’ in Indonesia context (p.317), Adeney-Risakotta argued that there was a need to clarify some differences between the perception of Westerners and South-East Asian Muslims’ (p.342).
I firmly argue that Islam and the West as entities are not in single representation. What have been ‘borrowed’ by terrorists and who have been ‘accused’ as them is not an absolute perspective. Muslim perception in South East Asia is diverse but they are, indeed, together in ultimate mindset. The tightly-bounded framework is against injustice, unfairness and oppression.
9/11 uproar is intolerable, but the more miserable things are false prejudices, and mounted hatred among any entities. Political bias, economic greediness, cultural backwardness and social pathology, I believe, are on the corridor of almost every tension. The tension is even worse, when on the traffic of the corridor, those aspects are engineered by any forms of religious icons directly or indirectly.
On the one side, the tragedy will always happen in the present and the future, but the most sound-ways of efforts is rethinking perceptions among Islam and the West. When media is both promising and evading, there is a need to share a little room where every entity is present. A fair contestation then should start.
Among serious issues should address is the portrayal of Islam and the West as seen in media—TV, Movies, and News papers—as one of the vast contributors constructing the mindset of the people. When media is balanced, I believe, it can work prospectively with the line of educational-type of strategy. Therefore one of the ways to enhance a better perception is educating people, particularly on the relation between Islam and the West.
What we can do now, in this regards, is delivering and accelerating opinions, ideas, and works in any religious basis to promote the notion of inclusiveness, tolerance and plurality. Those words have never been cliché, since some history has proven written in horrible notions by the state, organization, institution, including religious entity as the result of different perceptions in different times and spaces. The challenge is waiting before us.
Readings:
Hasan, Noorhaidi, “September 11 and Islamic Militancy in Post-New Order Indonesia”;
Adeney-Risakotta, Bernard, The Impact of September 11 on Islam in Southeast Asia’.
Roma Ulinnuha
As noted by Noorhadi Hasan and Bernard Adeney Risakotta, the particular moment of 9/11 has attributed different perception in different times and spaces. While Hasan pointed out ‘the tension between the proponents of radical Islam and Liberal Islam has turned into open clash’ in Indonesia context (p.317), Adeney-Risakotta argued that there was a need to clarify some differences between the perception of Westerners and South-East Asian Muslims’ (p.342).
I firmly argue that Islam and the West as entities are not in single representation. What have been ‘borrowed’ by terrorists and who have been ‘accused’ as them is not an absolute perspective. Muslim perception in South East Asia is diverse but they are, indeed, together in ultimate mindset. The tightly-bounded framework is against injustice, unfairness and oppression.
9/11 uproar is intolerable, but the more miserable things are false prejudices, and mounted hatred among any entities. Political bias, economic greediness, cultural backwardness and social pathology, I believe, are on the corridor of almost every tension. The tension is even worse, when on the traffic of the corridor, those aspects are engineered by any forms of religious icons directly or indirectly.
On the one side, the tragedy will always happen in the present and the future, but the most sound-ways of efforts is rethinking perceptions among Islam and the West. When media is both promising and evading, there is a need to share a little room where every entity is present. A fair contestation then should start.
Among serious issues should address is the portrayal of Islam and the West as seen in media—TV, Movies, and News papers—as one of the vast contributors constructing the mindset of the people. When media is balanced, I believe, it can work prospectively with the line of educational-type of strategy. Therefore one of the ways to enhance a better perception is educating people, particularly on the relation between Islam and the West.
What we can do now, in this regards, is delivering and accelerating opinions, ideas, and works in any religious basis to promote the notion of inclusiveness, tolerance and plurality. Those words have never been cliché, since some history has proven written in horrible notions by the state, organization, institution, including religious entity as the result of different perceptions in different times and spaces. The challenge is waiting before us.
Readings:
Hasan, Noorhaidi, “September 11 and Islamic Militancy in Post-New Order Indonesia”;
Adeney-Risakotta, Bernard, The Impact of September 11 on Islam in Southeast Asia’.
September 11: It Changed the Color Tone, Not the Picture
By Timotius Wibowo
September 11 attack has been the most popular reference in discussing Islam-Western relation in 21st century. However, is the impact as great as many people supposed to? In a certain case, the answer is yes, but in some cases, no. It is true that the attack has been great impact for American people, both in economics and in politics. It is also true, that economical impact of that happened to America had been widely spread in global level. Even, the global economical crisis that followed has not been yet totally overcome. However, the political impact, especially in Southeast Asia is not so great. It might change the tone of the colors, yet it did not change the picture of Islam-Western political relation. Before and after the attack, the people and political groups would still in their previous positions. The radical Islam groups would still radically oppose the Western. The pro-Western political groups would still oppose the radical Islam groups. Similarly, the moderate groups would still stay in between. Why is it as such? In my opinion, there are at least two reason.
First, the radical Muslim group is not the only influential group in Southeast Asia. It is true that the radical group is usually the most vocal one. However, it does not mean that they were the most influential one. Azyumardi Azra points out, “it is terribly wrong to assume that these radical groups are influential in Southeast Asia” (p.19). Second, in Southeast Asia, especially in Indonesia, Islam is not a monolithic religion, instead multi-facet in many aspects. Even, locality can be a determining factor for what kind of Muslim they would be. As Adeney-Risakotta points out, “Local communities of Muslims are constantly creating new meanings to mediate the conflicting values and demands of their life in the real world” (p.342). In short, multi-facet character of Indonesian and Southeast Asian Islam has save the region from a single and absolute interpretation of September 11, which could easily make the situation worse for both sides. In this sense, there is actually no new interpretation to the event. Every body will interpreted the event as same as what they previously had. Accordingly, there would be minor changes in the political of Muslim people in Southeast Asia.
September 11 attack has been the most popular reference in discussing Islam-Western relation in 21st century. However, is the impact as great as many people supposed to? In a certain case, the answer is yes, but in some cases, no. It is true that the attack has been great impact for American people, both in economics and in politics. It is also true, that economical impact of that happened to America had been widely spread in global level. Even, the global economical crisis that followed has not been yet totally overcome. However, the political impact, especially in Southeast Asia is not so great. It might change the tone of the colors, yet it did not change the picture of Islam-Western political relation. Before and after the attack, the people and political groups would still in their previous positions. The radical Islam groups would still radically oppose the Western. The pro-Western political groups would still oppose the radical Islam groups. Similarly, the moderate groups would still stay in between. Why is it as such? In my opinion, there are at least two reason.
First, the radical Muslim group is not the only influential group in Southeast Asia. It is true that the radical group is usually the most vocal one. However, it does not mean that they were the most influential one. Azyumardi Azra points out, “it is terribly wrong to assume that these radical groups are influential in Southeast Asia” (p.19). Second, in Southeast Asia, especially in Indonesia, Islam is not a monolithic religion, instead multi-facet in many aspects. Even, locality can be a determining factor for what kind of Muslim they would be. As Adeney-Risakotta points out, “Local communities of Muslims are constantly creating new meanings to mediate the conflicting values and demands of their life in the real world” (p.342). In short, multi-facet character of Indonesian and Southeast Asian Islam has save the region from a single and absolute interpretation of September 11, which could easily make the situation worse for both sides. In this sense, there is actually no new interpretation to the event. Every body will interpreted the event as same as what they previously had. Accordingly, there would be minor changes in the political of Muslim people in Southeast Asia.
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