Religion, September 11, the “War on Terror” and the “Clash of Civilizayions”: The Future of Religious Diversity in Indonesia

by Joko Wicoyo
I think the appearance of ‘radical’ and/or violent expressions of political Islam in Indonesia after 11 September is not simply understood as a function of the flaws of Indonesia’s post-Soeharto democracy but it can be more fruitfully understood in relation to similar historical and sociological processes intertwined with the ebb and flow of various kinds of Islamic-based movements in many parts of the world over the last half century. Much of this took place in the context of and in relation to the exigencies of the Cold War. Thus, there is an inter-relationship between developments in the international sphere and the nature of social conflict in the domestic which must be scrutinized.
I think it should be kept in mind that the political nature of Indonesian organized Islam, even at the very early stages, could never be separated from a broader international and historical milieu. At its moment of birth it was profoundly affected by the rise of anti colonial movements worldwide in the first decades of the twentieth century. Political Islam was clearly deeply influenced politically by its appearance in the context of growing nationalist and proto-nationalist sentiment in the colonial-era Dutch East Indies, and other parts of the colonized world – one manifestation of which was the Pan Islamic movement. As is well documented, the emergence of political Islam in Indonesia can be traced back at least to the early responses of the class of traders and merchants who perceived their social and economic position to be under threat within the colonial-era Dutch East Indies at the turn of the twentieth century, or thought their social mobility to be severely constrained. It is because of such a historical legacy that social justice ideals, often strongly tinged with a combination of nationalist and anti-capitalist sentiments–in whatever permutation – remain Islamic Militancy and Jihadist Activism
The complexity of the transition process following the fall of Suharto is confirmed by the act that, in tandem with the spread of democratic discourse, a number of militant Islamist groups, including the Front Pembela Islam (FPI) [Front of the Defenders of Islam], the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) [Indonesia’s Party of Liberation], the Laskar Jihad (LJ) [Jihad Paramilitary Force], the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) [Indonesian Holy Warrior Council] and the Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), achieved notoriety by taking to the streets to demand the comprehensive implementation of the shari’a and by raiding cafes, discotheques, casinos, brothels and other reputed dens of iniquity. In response to the bloody communal conflicts in various trouble spots, they stated their determination to fight jihad and mobilized members and other aspirants of mujahidin to venture to the frontlines. The key to the success of the groups’ mobilizing process lay in the existing Islamist networks that had become widespread across the country in tandem with the efflorescence of Islamist ideology.
Framed in general terms, that what happens in Indonesia has very much to do with the global crisis in the Muslim world, the groups proclaimed their determination to offer the shari’a, khilafa system and jihad as the only solution to curb the continuing crises and disasters afflicting Indonesia today. Implicitly and explicitly they questioned the format of the modern nation-state and expressed their profound desire to establish an Islamic state. They asserted that only then would the Indonesian Muslim umma be protected and saved from the attacks of ‘belligerent infidels.’ Action frames developed by the militant Islamist groups could resonate widely in the public sphere of Indonesia, which is friendly to Islam. As a result of the Islamisation process over the past two decades, Islam has increasingly served as a determining variable behind political negotiations and become the most important frame of reference for many Indonesians to reflect upon the socio-political system they imagined capable of bringing about justice and attaining veritable development. According to them, by keeping pace with the growing influence of Islam on politics, Indonesia has witnessed new global forms of religious identity, whose effect is mediated by specific, historically situated, local institutions. The expansion of this so-called ‘global’ Islam appears to be correlated with the accentuation of religious symbols in the public sphere, the increase of personal religiosity as well as the proliferation of Islamic institutions and new life-styles.
In this context, in the wake of September 11, the name of Osama bin Laden came into the political arena of Indonesia. In this socially and politically ‘Islamised’ public sphere, the FPI came to the fore with a basic agenda to raid cafes, discotheques, casinos and brothels. These actions were claimed to be part of their attempts to secure Indonesia from the hegemony of a Zionist–Christian global conspiracy to undermine Islam. HTI appeared to the public to criticize the existing political system and to propose the khilafat system as an alternative to cope with all the problems facing Indonesia today. They claim that the collapse of the khilafat system was the prime cause of the crisis afflicting the Muslim world, which remains under the shadow of the Zionist–Christian hegemony.

The government and pro-democracy groups’ pressure against violent discourse and jihadist activism has gradually forced the militant Islamist groups to leave behind their high profile politics and shift to a strategy of implementing the shari’a from below. These militant groups apparently no longer see any relevance of jihad as a means to realizing the application of the shari’a. Instead, they argue that da’wa (Islamic proselytizing) is more appropriate to endorse the Indonesian Muslims’ awareness of their duty to uphold the supremacy of the shari’a. They also believe that non-violent endeavors would be more suitable to Indonesia’s current situation and crucial to defend Muslim solidarity and long-term struggle for the comprehensive application of the shari’a. In my mind, their campaign to apply the shari’a from above is considered less effective if there are no activists working at the grass-roots level to boost Muslims’ commitment to the application of the shari’a in their everyday lives. As Ba’asyir pointed out, the strategy for implementing the shari’a suitable for current situation in Indonesia is not jihad, but rather informing the Indonesian Muslims about the magnificence of the shari’a. In his eyes, it is the prophetic strategy of da’wa to give hope and threat; the hope of heaven and the threat of hell. Following the prophet, he relates the implementation of the shari’a to the relationship between man’s life in this world and that in the hereafter. Every individual is leader: leader for himself, his family, his village, and above all his country. They are responsible in the hereafter for whatever they have done in this world. Political leaders who do not take any initiatives to create laws that might prevent their people from being put in hell will fall into trouble in the hereafter; they will be responsible for all people’s sins caused by the absence of the shari’a. However, this does not mean that Ba’asyir totally neglected the importance of jihad; he just sees that da’wa is more appropriate for current peaceful Indonesia. For him, da’wa and jihad are twin concepts to establish God’s laws on earth. In his eyes, the West has demonized and criminalized jihad, because they are afraid of Muslim’s return to the past glorious victory of Islam. He argued that if separated from jihad, Islam becomes weak. Islam will gain honorable victory only with jihad. However, he emphasized that jihad should not be understood simply as holy war. It connotes any effort to establish God’s laws, and da’wa in this context is considered the most suitable condition for realizing the spirit of jihad. I think in this case only God knows what is right and what is wrong!
Readings : Noorhaidi Hasan “September 11 and Islamic Militancy in Post-New Order Indonesia” and Bernard Adeney-Risakotta, ”The Impact of September 11 on Islam in Southeast Asia