By Roma Ulinnuha
In the strong patronage of authoritarian power, many people say that Indonesia under the New Order era is seen as both bless and dismay. In the massive developmental jargon, the regime seemed quite reluctant promoting the religious realm in its truest sense. People were carefully alert to the religious discussion since it related to SARA (ethnic groups, religion, race and inter-groups) issue. In the process of the era, government tended to establish the artificial stability which was actually kept the waves of inconvenience among the citizen. The evidence is the end of the regime due to economic and political instability.
Aragon (2000) questioned the model of policy why Indonesian government did not necessarily relate the Christianity and ‘world religion’ to define modernity and national development (p.39). The response is surely easy to say in the common view of the wide Indonesian region, but it does not mean ‘people who do not yet have a religion’ has been taken seriously into consideration during the era. This segment, I think, occurred as the regime wanted to control the stability. One of the ways to carry out is to make religion as a reductive religious teachings and symbol. In political realm, government merged the aspiration of many religious facets into PPP which was not really satisfied the common people. Even a lot of religious moments were colored with the interest of the mono-loyalty to the government issues and policies.
As powerful regime but tended to dictatorship, Leo Suryadinata (1995) argues that Indonesia under Soeharto wanted to play role in the world affair. In approaching the issue of Palestine-Israel, many moments were engineering the Non Alignment Movements. In this case, Suryadinata argued that religion was not a major consideration for Indonesian Foreign Policy (p.295). I do agree with Suryadinata’s notion that religion is not significant factor in directing Indonesia’s policy at the time. The intensive notion I believe is the political interest to play role in international affair despite the fact that the regime was too far violating the national affairs—of freedom of religion, speech and expression.
Readings:
Lorraine V. Aragon, Fields of Lord: Animism, Christian Minorities, and State development in Indonesia (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000);
Leo Suryadinata, Islam and Suharto’s Foreign Policy: Indonesia, Middle East and Bosnia, Asian Survey, March 1995
Minggu, 18 April 2010
Religion during New Order by Nihayatul Wafiroh
Robert W. Hefner (2000) addresses the democratization and civil Islam in Indonesia. Indeed, culture, organization and religion influence in the process of democracy. In case of Indonesia, ICMI played an important rule during Suharto regime. Many components attempted to use ICMI as a vehicle to achieve their goals. In another side, the state played ICMI to control the opponents. From Hefner’s explanation, I could figure out that religious organization has bargaining position as civil society agents.
Meredith L. Weiss (2006) asserts that, “While CSAs played a pivotal role in opposing the ancient regime, they have retained little institutionalized clout since then except as monitors and petitioner.” It is understandable, moreover. When the regime wanted to give signs of his power, the religious issues were the perfect fuse. For instance, in the late 1998 and early 1999, there was the chaos in Banyuwangi. Hundreds people who were categorized as sorcerers were killed. Indeed, most of them were the religious teachers. It recalls me in the frightening situation at the time. In fact, it was to reduce the power of Gus Dur. Since the state always forced and controlled the religious organizations, they received sympathies from people.
In addition, it is understood that after the regime fell, the leaders from many religious organizations ran to the political sphere easily. Recently, Islamic boarding schools also take chances of this situation to send their people in the election. The networking, charisma, and popularity of the pesantren’s leaders are the guarantee for the candidates to be elected although they are lack capability in the politic.
Additionally, the position of students in the reformed era was significant. Weiss states that students who represented the social educated group voiced the condition of society. However, Weiss noted that some groups of student who linked to the NGO made the distance with the poor even though the issues of poor were their commodity to attack the state. In my understanding, this critic might be not for students in Islamic state university (IAIN) in Jogjakarta since the majority of the students there came from the farmers. They were already familiar with the condition of poor, so their demonstration against government was pure for the society, and they connected with the poor.
Economy was also the cause of Suharto’s fall. The economical development in Indonesia could be separated with the Chinese immigrants (John T Sidel). Although they are only minority, their power of economy controls other groups even the majority groups. The violence in May 1998 was the accumulation of abhorrence with Chinese.
Edward Aspirall (2005) categorizes four main responses to the mixture of repression and tolerance under New Order regime: Mobilizational opposition, Semiopposition, Alegal, and Social Organizations. Muridan Swijoyo also classified two groups. First is Gerakan Kritik Orde Baru (GKOB), the critical movement against new order. The second one is Gerakan Anti Orde Baru (GAOB), the anti New Order movement. They had different perspectives of New Order, and, as a result, the expression to demonstrate was not same.
Meredith L. Weiss (2006) asserts that, “While CSAs played a pivotal role in opposing the ancient regime, they have retained little institutionalized clout since then except as monitors and petitioner.” It is understandable, moreover. When the regime wanted to give signs of his power, the religious issues were the perfect fuse. For instance, in the late 1998 and early 1999, there was the chaos in Banyuwangi. Hundreds people who were categorized as sorcerers were killed. Indeed, most of them were the religious teachers. It recalls me in the frightening situation at the time. In fact, it was to reduce the power of Gus Dur. Since the state always forced and controlled the religious organizations, they received sympathies from people.
In addition, it is understood that after the regime fell, the leaders from many religious organizations ran to the political sphere easily. Recently, Islamic boarding schools also take chances of this situation to send their people in the election. The networking, charisma, and popularity of the pesantren’s leaders are the guarantee for the candidates to be elected although they are lack capability in the politic.
Additionally, the position of students in the reformed era was significant. Weiss states that students who represented the social educated group voiced the condition of society. However, Weiss noted that some groups of student who linked to the NGO made the distance with the poor even though the issues of poor were their commodity to attack the state. In my understanding, this critic might be not for students in Islamic state university (IAIN) in Jogjakarta since the majority of the students there came from the farmers. They were already familiar with the condition of poor, so their demonstration against government was pure for the society, and they connected with the poor.
Economy was also the cause of Suharto’s fall. The economical development in Indonesia could be separated with the Chinese immigrants (John T Sidel). Although they are only minority, their power of economy controls other groups even the majority groups. The violence in May 1998 was the accumulation of abhorrence with Chinese.
Edward Aspirall (2005) categorizes four main responses to the mixture of repression and tolerance under New Order regime: Mobilizational opposition, Semiopposition, Alegal, and Social Organizations. Muridan Swijoyo also classified two groups. First is Gerakan Kritik Orde Baru (GKOB), the critical movement against new order. The second one is Gerakan Anti Orde Baru (GAOB), the anti New Order movement. They had different perspectives of New Order, and, as a result, the expression to demonstrate was not same.
Sabtu, 17 April 2010
Innocuous Religion - Roy Allan B Tolentino
Religion, despite its necessarily vague definition, has always been a dangerous idea. By providing a vision of reality that almost always competes with more mundane constructions of power and legitimacy, religion can provide a scathing critique of governance. That is, of course, unless the government is able to subvert the power of religion or make religion an accomplice. This is something that we have seen played out time and again; in the New Order period, much effort was expended in making religion innocuous.
One strategy that was employed was the rewriting of history. With the rise of Suharto, the consolidation of military power provided an opportunity to recast history in favour of the military. As David Bourchier notes:
"The official texts, predictably enough, hail the achievements of Suharto and the New Order and contrast them with the turbulence and strife of the 'Old Order.' What is most striking about their coverage of the period between the declaration of independence and 1965 is the prominence given to the exploits of the military. The central and unmistakable message of both the text and the photographs is that ever since 1945 the military have been the true guardians of the Indonesian State and ideology. They have stood by to provide leadership whenever the State has been threatened by regional revolts, religious fanaticism, communist subversion and the incompetence of self-interested civilian politicians." (Bourchier 1994:52)
Painting a picture of military heroism, the history that was propagated during the New Order subtly eroded the idea of stability and moral ascendancy that religion might have claimed. Official policy depoliticizing Islam effectively relegated religion to a compartment within Suharto’s governance that allowed him to mobilize religion according to his own agenda. Of course, the disorganization of the religious sector only helped to fence them in, as Bahtiar Effendy recounts:
"When the position of political Islam appeared to be worsening, particularly following the New Order's manoeuvre to restructure Indonesia's political format, many of [political Islam's] leaders became increasingly reactionary. In the view of some observers of Indonesian political Islam, this was a sign of the inability of Islamic political thinkers and activists to structure intelligent religious-political responses pertinent to these challenges." (Effendy 2003:67)
Even to the last years of Suharto, many religious leaders were still held on a tight leash: “In December 1992 Interior Minister Rudini lectured members of the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association (ICMI) that any move to turn ICMI into a political party would revive the turmoil of the liberal 1950s.” (Bourchier 1994:59) The religious sector still seems to be recovering from this long-term restriction and disorganization. Am I suggesting, therefore, that religion ought to meddle in affairs of governance? Not necessarily. There is, however, a position that religion must necessarily take in order to become an ethical resource for criticizing governance, and religion cannot assume that position as long as government keeps religion innocuous.
Bourchier, David. "The 1950s in New Order Ideology and Politics" in Democracy in Indonesia: 1950s and 1990s. Ed. David Bourchier and John Legge. Victoria: CSEAS, Monash University, 1994.
Effendy, Bahtiar. Islam and the State in Indonesia. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2003.
One strategy that was employed was the rewriting of history. With the rise of Suharto, the consolidation of military power provided an opportunity to recast history in favour of the military. As David Bourchier notes:
"The official texts, predictably enough, hail the achievements of Suharto and the New Order and contrast them with the turbulence and strife of the 'Old Order.' What is most striking about their coverage of the period between the declaration of independence and 1965 is the prominence given to the exploits of the military. The central and unmistakable message of both the text and the photographs is that ever since 1945 the military have been the true guardians of the Indonesian State and ideology. They have stood by to provide leadership whenever the State has been threatened by regional revolts, religious fanaticism, communist subversion and the incompetence of self-interested civilian politicians." (Bourchier 1994:52)
Painting a picture of military heroism, the history that was propagated during the New Order subtly eroded the idea of stability and moral ascendancy that religion might have claimed. Official policy depoliticizing Islam effectively relegated religion to a compartment within Suharto’s governance that allowed him to mobilize religion according to his own agenda. Of course, the disorganization of the religious sector only helped to fence them in, as Bahtiar Effendy recounts:
"When the position of political Islam appeared to be worsening, particularly following the New Order's manoeuvre to restructure Indonesia's political format, many of [political Islam's] leaders became increasingly reactionary. In the view of some observers of Indonesian political Islam, this was a sign of the inability of Islamic political thinkers and activists to structure intelligent religious-political responses pertinent to these challenges." (Effendy 2003:67)
Even to the last years of Suharto, many religious leaders were still held on a tight leash: “In December 1992 Interior Minister Rudini lectured members of the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association (ICMI) that any move to turn ICMI into a political party would revive the turmoil of the liberal 1950s.” (Bourchier 1994:59) The religious sector still seems to be recovering from this long-term restriction and disorganization. Am I suggesting, therefore, that religion ought to meddle in affairs of governance? Not necessarily. There is, however, a position that religion must necessarily take in order to become an ethical resource for criticizing governance, and religion cannot assume that position as long as government keeps religion innocuous.
Bourchier, David. "The 1950s in New Order Ideology and Politics" in Democracy in Indonesia: 1950s and 1990s. Ed. David Bourchier and John Legge. Victoria: CSEAS, Monash University, 1994.
Effendy, Bahtiar. Islam and the State in Indonesia. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2003.
Minggu, 11 April 2010
Religion, the Fall of Sukarno and the Elimination of Communism in Indonesia: G30S PKI and the mass killings of 1965-1966
Kristanto Budiprabowo (Tatok)
Discussing the history of mass killings in Indonesia especially in Java PKI mass murder, the first thing that come to my mind is my mother expression when she talking about anything correlating with PKI and the fellow organizations. I always remember how she in sorrow told to us, her children, about her old sister who can escape from the mass systematic murder and about her young brother who was an army but imprisoned because his commander suspected has a good correlation with communist people. When I was in the first high school, it was already 18 years after the PKI become a dangerous issue, in our simple house, she keep very carefully some Sukarno’s books beneath a big box to contain rice. When I found it, she express angry and afraid in her whispering message to keep the secret that she has those collections. Even though I was grew up in the more stable political era but beginning in my house, in the village community, in the school, and from the media information communism and PKI describe as “latent danger” that the present will destroy this country.
Since high school I have been suspicious of that over warning of communism. And I always have several big questions that often I couldn’t find the appropriate answer. History is the story of the winner, the heroes, and the power that dominated the complex truth. But for me, whatever the reasons and purposes, whether it has social or political purpose, whether it has cultural or religious reason, mass killing is always the terrible history of the murderer. In the case of PKI mass murder in Indonesia, it is quite clear that when political interpretation to such a group of people get religious legitimacy it will cause powerful social movement. In this situation, there are many possibilities can happen. There are at least two scenarios to interpret the killings. First, it was an organized action of the certain governmental wing that has good negotiation with local social and religious leader and also has a prospectus affair with international political leader. Second, it is the natural social reaction to the PKI action in killing numbers of generals and to some PKI group effort to take offer local control power.
All of the scenarios are look right for me. But my big question is still haunt me, why the social group who most active in that mass killing was a most traditional religious organization? And, why almost all of religious organizations give a green light or event insist to it adherents to joint in the murder? If I notice the stereotyping to the communist people as an anti-religion, I only see that perhaps that murder was mostly happened in religious motive in spite of political motive. Because, this stereotyping is obviously come from religious people.
Discussing the history of mass killings in Indonesia especially in Java PKI mass murder, the first thing that come to my mind is my mother expression when she talking about anything correlating with PKI and the fellow organizations. I always remember how she in sorrow told to us, her children, about her old sister who can escape from the mass systematic murder and about her young brother who was an army but imprisoned because his commander suspected has a good correlation with communist people. When I was in the first high school, it was already 18 years after the PKI become a dangerous issue, in our simple house, she keep very carefully some Sukarno’s books beneath a big box to contain rice. When I found it, she express angry and afraid in her whispering message to keep the secret that she has those collections. Even though I was grew up in the more stable political era but beginning in my house, in the village community, in the school, and from the media information communism and PKI describe as “latent danger” that the present will destroy this country.
Since high school I have been suspicious of that over warning of communism. And I always have several big questions that often I couldn’t find the appropriate answer. History is the story of the winner, the heroes, and the power that dominated the complex truth. But for me, whatever the reasons and purposes, whether it has social or political purpose, whether it has cultural or religious reason, mass killing is always the terrible history of the murderer. In the case of PKI mass murder in Indonesia, it is quite clear that when political interpretation to such a group of people get religious legitimacy it will cause powerful social movement. In this situation, there are many possibilities can happen. There are at least two scenarios to interpret the killings. First, it was an organized action of the certain governmental wing that has good negotiation with local social and religious leader and also has a prospectus affair with international political leader. Second, it is the natural social reaction to the PKI action in killing numbers of generals and to some PKI group effort to take offer local control power.
All of the scenarios are look right for me. But my big question is still haunt me, why the social group who most active in that mass killing was a most traditional religious organization? And, why almost all of religious organizations give a green light or event insist to it adherents to joint in the murder? If I notice the stereotyping to the communist people as an anti-religion, I only see that perhaps that murder was mostly happened in religious motive in spite of political motive. Because, this stereotyping is obviously come from religious people.
Religion, the fall of Sukarno and the elimination of communism in Indonesia: G30S PKI and the mass killings of 1965-66;
Tri Harmaji
History of Religions in Indonesia Part II: from c. 1900 to the Present
Religion, the fall of Sukarno and the elimination of communism in Indonesia: G30S PKI and the mass killings of 1965-66; Robert Cribb, the Indonesian killings of 1965-66, Robert W Hefner, the political economy of mountain java: an interpretative history.
If we have to relate between the mass killings of 1965-66 with religion, then what I can say about it is a religious tragedy. This event took place in many parts of Indonesian region, but java, especially central and east java is the worst place. These two areas are the biggest PKI stronghold, but also the place where Islam (NU) got many followers. Like was analyzed by Cribb there are some political agendas of military behind this inhuman action, that is this action was taken to eliminate their political rival in order/ as well as to strengthen their own power and authority. Although in somewhat different way, in the next new order government, military also took the same political action to silent their Islamic political rival. It is common in military government to use coercion and violence in their political agenda, and so, from the political point of view, in the event of 1965-66 mass killings.
But what more interesting to me now is the participation of some religious organization in this massacre. Like explained widely in the readings, especially youth body of NU, ANSOR, was very active in this event. Why do they actively and even eagerly involve in this killing? What is their motivation, and what is it mean to Indonesian subsequent history? From Hefner explanation about especially Tengger mid and highland killing done by lowland people give somewhat clear pictures about religious role in this killing. And what had happened here was also happened in other parts of Indonesia in very similar characteristic. From these events it is clear that the hostility between these two parties has going on far time before the event itself.
Besides regional problem, in the national scale Islam just realized its failure to build Islamic state in Indonesia after the general election in 1955. Nothing can they do about this result, but their idea about Islamic state was never given up in their mind. In this frame of thinking, one of their most serious enemies was PKI. It is because besides PKI irreligious atheist, they also frankly refused and against Islamic state in their campaigns. I think there is such idea of how to destroy PKI among Muslim leaders at that time, and coincide with it, when PKI coup was failed and military authority gave sanction to destroy PKI, and then their idea got a good opportunity to be implemented. It is why then when some Islamic body like ANSOR involved in this killing they called this action as jihad for the building of Islamic state, to replace the failed of guided democracy of Sukarno.
Islamic state is the most important political agenda of Islamic parties from the first days of Indonesian independence. They had been disappointed in the first stage when the Japanese authority just gave them a few seats in the BPUPKI that was very important step in directing Indonesia to be Islamic state. However, in their limited vote they have finally successful in bringing Islamic color in would be Indonesian constitution in what is called as Jakarta charter after long discussion and debate with nationalist party. But unfortunately, this achievement was also ruined by Christian objection a few hours before the proclamation. At this moment I can imagine how the disappointment they felt. Throwing away this disappointment, they begun to build confidence to win the first general election and take over the governance. They quite sure about this because the fact that more than 90% of Indonesian population was Muslim.
But, like I have mentioned before, Islamic parties failed to get the major vote and consequently failed to implement their Islamic state idea. I think this failure after long hope and struggle had caused some kind of frustration amongst the Islamic parties and people. This frustration then was exploded in the PKI killing of 1965-66, and along with it, the hope of Islamic state came to emerge again. In this event they eagerly helped the military to clear off PKI from the Indonesian land. This action then becomes one of the eleven factors that Avery T. Willis argues as why two millions people convert to Christianity after the tragedy.
The question now is, is the frustration has ended after it erupted in this massacre? The history tells that it is not. The new government, instead of building Islamic state the Islamic parties hope but on the contrary they even oppressed Islamic parties harder. The new order has disappointed them and sent them into more frustration. This frustration has become a negative collective memory along the history of new order era. And in my opinion what had happened in the 1998 riots (“the war” against Christianity in Ambon, Poso and other parts in java) is also another explosion of this accumulated frustration of Islamic people in dealing with the idea of Islamic state in Indonesia. After the communist was eliminated the turn has come for another obstacle that is Christianity.
History of Religions in Indonesia Part II: from c. 1900 to the Present
Religion, the fall of Sukarno and the elimination of communism in Indonesia: G30S PKI and the mass killings of 1965-66; Robert Cribb, the Indonesian killings of 1965-66, Robert W Hefner, the political economy of mountain java: an interpretative history.
If we have to relate between the mass killings of 1965-66 with religion, then what I can say about it is a religious tragedy. This event took place in many parts of Indonesian region, but java, especially central and east java is the worst place. These two areas are the biggest PKI stronghold, but also the place where Islam (NU) got many followers. Like was analyzed by Cribb there are some political agendas of military behind this inhuman action, that is this action was taken to eliminate their political rival in order/ as well as to strengthen their own power and authority. Although in somewhat different way, in the next new order government, military also took the same political action to silent their Islamic political rival. It is common in military government to use coercion and violence in their political agenda, and so, from the political point of view, in the event of 1965-66 mass killings.
But what more interesting to me now is the participation of some religious organization in this massacre. Like explained widely in the readings, especially youth body of NU, ANSOR, was very active in this event. Why do they actively and even eagerly involve in this killing? What is their motivation, and what is it mean to Indonesian subsequent history? From Hefner explanation about especially Tengger mid and highland killing done by lowland people give somewhat clear pictures about religious role in this killing. And what had happened here was also happened in other parts of Indonesia in very similar characteristic. From these events it is clear that the hostility between these two parties has going on far time before the event itself.
Besides regional problem, in the national scale Islam just realized its failure to build Islamic state in Indonesia after the general election in 1955. Nothing can they do about this result, but their idea about Islamic state was never given up in their mind. In this frame of thinking, one of their most serious enemies was PKI. It is because besides PKI irreligious atheist, they also frankly refused and against Islamic state in their campaigns. I think there is such idea of how to destroy PKI among Muslim leaders at that time, and coincide with it, when PKI coup was failed and military authority gave sanction to destroy PKI, and then their idea got a good opportunity to be implemented. It is why then when some Islamic body like ANSOR involved in this killing they called this action as jihad for the building of Islamic state, to replace the failed of guided democracy of Sukarno.
Islamic state is the most important political agenda of Islamic parties from the first days of Indonesian independence. They had been disappointed in the first stage when the Japanese authority just gave them a few seats in the BPUPKI that was very important step in directing Indonesia to be Islamic state. However, in their limited vote they have finally successful in bringing Islamic color in would be Indonesian constitution in what is called as Jakarta charter after long discussion and debate with nationalist party. But unfortunately, this achievement was also ruined by Christian objection a few hours before the proclamation. At this moment I can imagine how the disappointment they felt. Throwing away this disappointment, they begun to build confidence to win the first general election and take over the governance. They quite sure about this because the fact that more than 90% of Indonesian population was Muslim.
But, like I have mentioned before, Islamic parties failed to get the major vote and consequently failed to implement their Islamic state idea. I think this failure after long hope and struggle had caused some kind of frustration amongst the Islamic parties and people. This frustration then was exploded in the PKI killing of 1965-66, and along with it, the hope of Islamic state came to emerge again. In this event they eagerly helped the military to clear off PKI from the Indonesian land. This action then becomes one of the eleven factors that Avery T. Willis argues as why two millions people convert to Christianity after the tragedy.
The question now is, is the frustration has ended after it erupted in this massacre? The history tells that it is not. The new government, instead of building Islamic state the Islamic parties hope but on the contrary they even oppressed Islamic parties harder. The new order has disappointed them and sent them into more frustration. This frustration has become a negative collective memory along the history of new order era. And in my opinion what had happened in the 1998 riots (“the war” against Christianity in Ambon, Poso and other parts in java) is also another explosion of this accumulated frustration of Islamic people in dealing with the idea of Islamic state in Indonesia. After the communist was eliminated the turn has come for another obstacle that is Christianity.
Religious Problems in Finding the Fact of the Killing of 1965-66 by Faqihuddin Abdul Kodir
Beside the technical problems in the historiography of Indonesian massacre in 1965, Robert Cribb accounts also the problems of philosophy from which Indonesian as well as Western historians see the facts and interpret them. For Indonesians, I think, the major factors behind the historiography are the state’s factor and religious factor. For more than thirty years the regime of New Order under Suharto monopolized the historiography of Indonesia for the favor of its own ‘nationalism’. The only interpretation of historical facts and events accepted by the regime is its own. Moreover, in this case the massacre of 1965, the regime easily gained supports from the majority of diverse organizations of Indonesian Muslims, including Nahdlatul Ulama which had been the supporter of communism politically in the era of ‘guided democracy’. The part of religion in the notion “NASAKOM” (Nasionalisme, Agama, dan Komunisme/Nationalism, religion, and communism) was the Nahdlatul Ulama.
However, the military regime of New Order gained political benefits more than religious element from the state’s interpretation of the killings. From the case of PKI of 65, the regime controlled and restricted any political activities in order not to have the same case like the PKI. Not only Islamic parties were restricted, but also women’s activities which assumed to be politics. Any political movement of women was associated with the most dangerous women’s organizations, Gerwani, female wing of PKI the Indonesian Communist Party, in the eye of the regime. The ‘historical myth’ was circulated around the country that members of Gerwani tortured sexual organs of military generals in the story 65’s coup (G 30 S PKI). The message of the story, according to Ayu Ratih, was very clear that “women who are actively in politics will threaten the safety and the integrity of the nation” (Ayu Ratih, 2009: 128). Accordingly women's organizations were subject to heavy restrictions in the New Order regime.
From the shadows of the 65’s coup, the New Order regime dictated its own concept of nationalism and the unity of Indonesia by restricting all kinds of political activities, including what relates to Muslims and women. In the Reformation era of Gus Dur, the state opened political access widely to Muslims, women, and those who joined the PKI. However, many Muslims criticized the state of Gus Dur for his open policy to ex-members of PKI. Religious people in Indonesia, especially Muslims, still step behind any effort to restrict PKI and not to open gate for their political activities. This is the reason, I think, that religion also is the main problems of writing the history of the killings.
Readings:
1. Robert Cribb, “Problems in the Historiography of the Killings in Indonesia”, in Robert CribbHoward ed., The Indonesian Killings of 1965-66, pp. 1-43.
2. Ayu Ratih, I Gusti Agung. (2009). “Perempuan, Sejarah, dan Keindonesiaan”. Jurnal Perempuan. No. 61. Pp. 121-135.
However, the military regime of New Order gained political benefits more than religious element from the state’s interpretation of the killings. From the case of PKI of 65, the regime controlled and restricted any political activities in order not to have the same case like the PKI. Not only Islamic parties were restricted, but also women’s activities which assumed to be politics. Any political movement of women was associated with the most dangerous women’s organizations, Gerwani, female wing of PKI the Indonesian Communist Party, in the eye of the regime. The ‘historical myth’ was circulated around the country that members of Gerwani tortured sexual organs of military generals in the story 65’s coup (G 30 S PKI). The message of the story, according to Ayu Ratih, was very clear that “women who are actively in politics will threaten the safety and the integrity of the nation” (Ayu Ratih, 2009: 128). Accordingly women's organizations were subject to heavy restrictions in the New Order regime.
From the shadows of the 65’s coup, the New Order regime dictated its own concept of nationalism and the unity of Indonesia by restricting all kinds of political activities, including what relates to Muslims and women. In the Reformation era of Gus Dur, the state opened political access widely to Muslims, women, and those who joined the PKI. However, many Muslims criticized the state of Gus Dur for his open policy to ex-members of PKI. Religious people in Indonesia, especially Muslims, still step behind any effort to restrict PKI and not to open gate for their political activities. This is the reason, I think, that religion also is the main problems of writing the history of the killings.
Readings:
1. Robert Cribb, “Problems in the Historiography of the Killings in Indonesia”, in Robert CribbHoward ed., The Indonesian Killings of 1965-66, pp. 1-43.
2. Ayu Ratih, I Gusti Agung. (2009). “Perempuan, Sejarah, dan Keindonesiaan”. Jurnal Perempuan. No. 61. Pp. 121-135.
Politics: The Hidden Hand of the Story
by Timotius Wibowo
Both Robert Cribb’s and Robert Hefner’s articles on mass killing show how cruel politics can be. When politics came to the stage, it will dominate the innermost part of the people, often in the most subtle way. In Indonesian mass killings, politics had shown its dominance over at least three important aspects of Indonesian people. In those tragedies, politics had been a hidden hand that determined both the opening and the ending of the story.
First, it shows us politics’ dominance over religions. One may say that religion is the best motives of people’s attitude and behavior. However, in fact, religions could easily manipulated by political powers. As well as Pasuruan’s highlanders in Hefner’s research had inaccurate assessment of the situation (p. 215), the people involved in a mass conflict usually never realize the political interests behind it. Political motives are always hidden in religious spirit of war. In my opinion, hidden political agendas could easily penetrate the religious symbols because people’s lack of knowledge on both politics and religions. Such conflicts might be diminished by educating more people on politics, as well as on religions.
Second, the Indonesian mass killings obviously show us the dominance of politics over humanity. In those cases, humanity was sacrificed for political agendas. This fact, in my opinion, is not easy to explain. How could political motives undermine the humanity, which naturally embedded in human beings? Searching an answer for this question, I come to the most ancient motives of human mass conflict: ethnic rivalry. Certainly, I am not so sure with this. In fact, in all of mass killing cases, ethnicity is always intertwined with other motives. In Indonesian mass killing cases, the Chinese ethnic is always the most suffered victims. It will be interesting to discuss this phenomenon.
The last but not least, the narratives of Indonesian mass killings shows us the dominance of politics over “history.” As Cribb observes, the historiography of Indonesian mass killings presents the problems of information, problems of philosophy, and problems of interpretation (p. 2). As explained in the article, these problems raised due to political interests of the ruling regimes. It means that a historiography is never objective, instead polluted with subjective interests of the historiographers. What should we do to diminish such destructive pollutant in our historiography? The stories about Indonesian mass killings proof that this is never an easy task of Indonesian historians.
Both Robert Cribb’s and Robert Hefner’s articles on mass killing show how cruel politics can be. When politics came to the stage, it will dominate the innermost part of the people, often in the most subtle way. In Indonesian mass killings, politics had shown its dominance over at least three important aspects of Indonesian people. In those tragedies, politics had been a hidden hand that determined both the opening and the ending of the story.
First, it shows us politics’ dominance over religions. One may say that religion is the best motives of people’s attitude and behavior. However, in fact, religions could easily manipulated by political powers. As well as Pasuruan’s highlanders in Hefner’s research had inaccurate assessment of the situation (p. 215), the people involved in a mass conflict usually never realize the political interests behind it. Political motives are always hidden in religious spirit of war. In my opinion, hidden political agendas could easily penetrate the religious symbols because people’s lack of knowledge on both politics and religions. Such conflicts might be diminished by educating more people on politics, as well as on religions.
Second, the Indonesian mass killings obviously show us the dominance of politics over humanity. In those cases, humanity was sacrificed for political agendas. This fact, in my opinion, is not easy to explain. How could political motives undermine the humanity, which naturally embedded in human beings? Searching an answer for this question, I come to the most ancient motives of human mass conflict: ethnic rivalry. Certainly, I am not so sure with this. In fact, in all of mass killing cases, ethnicity is always intertwined with other motives. In Indonesian mass killing cases, the Chinese ethnic is always the most suffered victims. It will be interesting to discuss this phenomenon.
The last but not least, the narratives of Indonesian mass killings shows us the dominance of politics over “history.” As Cribb observes, the historiography of Indonesian mass killings presents the problems of information, problems of philosophy, and problems of interpretation (p. 2). As explained in the article, these problems raised due to political interests of the ruling regimes. It means that a historiography is never objective, instead polluted with subjective interests of the historiographers. What should we do to diminish such destructive pollutant in our historiography? The stories about Indonesian mass killings proof that this is never an easy task of Indonesian historians.
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