Much has been made of the necessity to understand Islam in the world after 9/11. Suddenly, the Western world realized that a sizeable chunk of the population subscribed to a world-view that appeared to be totally different from theirs. There was a sudden urgency to learn more about this world-view, and there was a great demand for experts in the field. To be perfectly honest, even my presence as a Catholic scholar in ICRS could be understood along those lines.
While this urgency has died down in the intervening years, this phenomenon has, on the other hand, obscured the fact that Islam is not new; Islam has been part of the world for centuries and will be for the foreseeable future. Thus, when Western-influenced scholars suddenly seize the opportunity to study this “emerging” religion, it seems honestly rather funny. The dialogue between Islam and Western secular culture (whatever that is) has been going on for some time now, despite occasional fits and many awkward pauses. While Islam constantly takes Western secularism to task for its “anti-religious” world-view, religion has never really been erased from world culture.
If we accept, then, that secularism has not stifled the discourse of religion completely, and that we have never really left the “age of faith,” then an important aspect of the dialogue between religion and culture is the dialogue within religions. If Indonesia is any indicator, the sheer plurality of Islam demands that this internal dialogue continues. Just the Indonesian reaction to 9/11 displays the tension within religion: “In Indonesia, home of the world’s largest Islamic population, reactions to 9/11 and subsequent strikes against Afghanistan were perhaps the most polarized in the region... Megawati was torn between, on the one hand, using the opportunity of the US-led anti-terrorist drive to gain international support and approval of Jakarta’s own battle with armed separatists in Aceh and Irian Jaya, and, on the other hand, keeping her distance from the USA in order not to give political ammunition to the moderate and radical Islamic organizations which constitute the most potent opposition to her government.” (Putzel 2003:177)
What has emerged, in my view, is not so much a revival of faith in an age of terror, but a necessity to understand terror in an age of faith. Terrorism is not so much a climate or a characteristic of an age, but a tool used by those who see no possibility of dialogue. To resort to terror, then, is to deny the dialogue that takes place between religions and within religions. Terrorism, while born of ressentiment, implies an ossification of religion, a stasis of faith. It is the task of religion to ensure that the internal and external discourses continue, to make room for difference and to mediate when those differences threaten to divide us. In Indonesia, I am glad to have seen that dialogue in play, although, of course, there is still much to be done. As Seyyed Hossein Nasr says, this dialogue enjoins Muslims “to make use of this intellectual and spiritual heritage to find a modus vivendi with Christianity and Judaism, and to present a version of Islam to the world that can live with the contemporary world without submitting itself to the follies of the world in which we live.” (Nasr 2008:74) The dynamism of faith will outlast the expediency of terror.
Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. “Religion in a Time of Anxiety” in Part of the Problem, Part of the Solution: Religion Today and Tomorrow. Ed. Arvind Sharma. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2008.
Putzel, James. "Political Islam in Southeast Asia and the US-Philippine Alliance" in Global Responses to Terrorism: 9/11, Afghanistan and Beyond. Ed. Mary Buckley and Rick Fawn. London: Routledge, 2003.
Minggu, 02 Mei 2010
Just war and Anti-terrorism Army
Religion, September 11, the “War on Terror” and the “Clash of civilizations”:
The Future of Religious Diversity in Indonesia.
Kristanto Budiprabowo (tatok)
Terrorism can be analyzed in several perspectives. First, in the first time the act of terror happened and take many lost, people see it as a disaster. Moreover, as any disaster, terrorist act creates “epistemological opportunity” in all of human dimension. After the disaster caused by terrorist act, the strongest reflection is about identity, nationality, religiosity, and the correlation among them. In interreligious relationship, this “epistemological opportunity” can be both in the contras direction whether to increase intolerance or to create new understanding. Refer to the September 11 tragedy, the dynamic on the worldwide politics and interreligious relationship post disaster can creates a space for each country and religion to aware it latent. Now is the opportunity for religions to re-identify their existence for the new human relationship in democratic, justice, and full with understanding and respect.
Second, most of us may agree that after the September 11 and the following terrorism attack worldwide, the face of the world socio-politic and the interreligious relationship come to the new era. At the political perspective, the reaction of a country is influenced not only by the dominant discourse among the politician based on the political trend and the prospective alliance, but also by religious leader from various religion and denominations. The big question to this reaction which is sometime ambiguous is about the concept of war. If we see that terrorism is not an act of war, whatever the argumentation behind the act, a country reaction should be also not a strategically military attack as in the wartime. As far as we see terrorism as an act of war and react with the same method, the question about who is the real terrorist will always rise. Is there a “just war” that can practice in fair although it is doing to eliminate the threat of terrorism?
Furthermore, at the economical perspective, terrorism is a sexy issue that always marketable. Even though terrorism attack like September 11 is a tragedy for many people in the world, it is an opportunity for the media, authors, and politicians to invest their asset for future benefit. Terrorism attack is a rude action and be more impolite in the market. In my opinion, beside the question about the socio-political impact in future international relation, it is also an open question in the immediate global market. Who get the biggest benefit from the threat of terrorism?
The Future of Religious Diversity in Indonesia.
Kristanto Budiprabowo (tatok)
Terrorism can be analyzed in several perspectives. First, in the first time the act of terror happened and take many lost, people see it as a disaster. Moreover, as any disaster, terrorist act creates “epistemological opportunity” in all of human dimension. After the disaster caused by terrorist act, the strongest reflection is about identity, nationality, religiosity, and the correlation among them. In interreligious relationship, this “epistemological opportunity” can be both in the contras direction whether to increase intolerance or to create new understanding. Refer to the September 11 tragedy, the dynamic on the worldwide politics and interreligious relationship post disaster can creates a space for each country and religion to aware it latent. Now is the opportunity for religions to re-identify their existence for the new human relationship in democratic, justice, and full with understanding and respect.
Second, most of us may agree that after the September 11 and the following terrorism attack worldwide, the face of the world socio-politic and the interreligious relationship come to the new era. At the political perspective, the reaction of a country is influenced not only by the dominant discourse among the politician based on the political trend and the prospective alliance, but also by religious leader from various religion and denominations. The big question to this reaction which is sometime ambiguous is about the concept of war. If we see that terrorism is not an act of war, whatever the argumentation behind the act, a country reaction should be also not a strategically military attack as in the wartime. As far as we see terrorism as an act of war and react with the same method, the question about who is the real terrorist will always rise. Is there a “just war” that can practice in fair although it is doing to eliminate the threat of terrorism?
Furthermore, at the economical perspective, terrorism is a sexy issue that always marketable. Even though terrorism attack like September 11 is a tragedy for many people in the world, it is an opportunity for the media, authors, and politicians to invest their asset for future benefit. Terrorism attack is a rude action and be more impolite in the market. In my opinion, beside the question about the socio-political impact in future international relation, it is also an open question in the immediate global market. Who get the biggest benefit from the threat of terrorism?
It is not about “Islam of Southeast Asia” rather “the powerless East” and “the powerful West” by Faqiiuddin Abdul Kodir
Bernard elucidates interestingly, although it is a general attempt, the paradigmatic differences between the West and Islam of Southeast Asia in seeing the tragedy of September 11. Western societies, he argues, are established on the paradigm of “social contract” in which values of individual freedom and safety are very central, while Muslims are influenced rather by values of the family in which the dignity and the well being of the ummah become very fundamental. On the one hand Western people are very much motivated by the belief in the free choice of individuals, and Muslims are rather “tied together by blood and fate” (p. 335).
I would like accordingly to go further that the differences above are not only about Muslims in Southeast Asia rather about Southeast Asian people in general and Western people also in general. Precisely the dimension, I think, is broader than only to be true among Muslims in Southeast Asia. It is not only Muslims of the regions for instance who distrust the governments. The notion that nationalism is less important than “religion” or “local religion” among contemporary Muslims is also true, I think, for Christians, and the adherents of other religions. This is due to the failure of the state as the symbol of nationalism to provide the needs of the civilians. The states of the regions are seen by their people to be exploited by the elites only for interests of the powerful elite including the West.
The dimension of September 11, I think, even goes further to distinguish the perspective of those who feel powerless against those who are powerful, people to people or state to state and even among people in the US. I often read the articles of Americans, such as Michael Parenti the outstanding writer on the critics of capitalism of the State, that the tragedy of September 11 was designed deliberately by the US particularly Bush’s administration to maintain capitalism which makes nothing for people of the US. I am not discussing about the perspective of conspiracy in seeing the tragedy of September 11 among Muslims. I just get impressed, even from the perspective of the news and the articles shown in Kompas run by Indonesian Catholic, that the tragedy tells us more about the idea of social justice between the East and the West, or the South and the North, or the powerless and powerful, and the poor and the rich. This distinguishable perspective exists obviously in many countries of the world even in the State.
Readings:
1. Bernard Adeney-Risakotta, “The Impact of September 11 on Islam in Southeast Asia”, in: K.S. Nathan and Mohammad Hashim Kamali (eds.), Islam in Southeast Asia”, (Singapore: ISEAS, 2005), pp. 325-345.
I would like accordingly to go further that the differences above are not only about Muslims in Southeast Asia rather about Southeast Asian people in general and Western people also in general. Precisely the dimension, I think, is broader than only to be true among Muslims in Southeast Asia. It is not only Muslims of the regions for instance who distrust the governments. The notion that nationalism is less important than “religion” or “local religion” among contemporary Muslims is also true, I think, for Christians, and the adherents of other religions. This is due to the failure of the state as the symbol of nationalism to provide the needs of the civilians. The states of the regions are seen by their people to be exploited by the elites only for interests of the powerful elite including the West.
The dimension of September 11, I think, even goes further to distinguish the perspective of those who feel powerless against those who are powerful, people to people or state to state and even among people in the US. I often read the articles of Americans, such as Michael Parenti the outstanding writer on the critics of capitalism of the State, that the tragedy of September 11 was designed deliberately by the US particularly Bush’s administration to maintain capitalism which makes nothing for people of the US. I am not discussing about the perspective of conspiracy in seeing the tragedy of September 11 among Muslims. I just get impressed, even from the perspective of the news and the articles shown in Kompas run by Indonesian Catholic, that the tragedy tells us more about the idea of social justice between the East and the West, or the South and the North, or the powerless and powerful, and the poor and the rich. This distinguishable perspective exists obviously in many countries of the world even in the State.
Readings:
1. Bernard Adeney-Risakotta, “The Impact of September 11 on Islam in Southeast Asia”, in: K.S. Nathan and Mohammad Hashim Kamali (eds.), Islam in Southeast Asia”, (Singapore: ISEAS, 2005), pp. 325-345.
Sabtu, 01 Mei 2010
9/11 Legacy and its Aftermath: Perception and Education
by
Roma Ulinnuha
As noted by Noorhadi Hasan and Bernard Adeney Risakotta, the particular moment of 9/11 has attributed different perception in different times and spaces. While Hasan pointed out ‘the tension between the proponents of radical Islam and Liberal Islam has turned into open clash’ in Indonesia context (p.317), Adeney-Risakotta argued that there was a need to clarify some differences between the perception of Westerners and South-East Asian Muslims’ (p.342).
I firmly argue that Islam and the West as entities are not in single representation. What have been ‘borrowed’ by terrorists and who have been ‘accused’ as them is not an absolute perspective. Muslim perception in South East Asia is diverse but they are, indeed, together in ultimate mindset. The tightly-bounded framework is against injustice, unfairness and oppression.
9/11 uproar is intolerable, but the more miserable things are false prejudices, and mounted hatred among any entities. Political bias, economic greediness, cultural backwardness and social pathology, I believe, are on the corridor of almost every tension. The tension is even worse, when on the traffic of the corridor, those aspects are engineered by any forms of religious icons directly or indirectly.
On the one side, the tragedy will always happen in the present and the future, but the most sound-ways of efforts is rethinking perceptions among Islam and the West. When media is both promising and evading, there is a need to share a little room where every entity is present. A fair contestation then should start.
Among serious issues should address is the portrayal of Islam and the West as seen in media—TV, Movies, and News papers—as one of the vast contributors constructing the mindset of the people. When media is balanced, I believe, it can work prospectively with the line of educational-type of strategy. Therefore one of the ways to enhance a better perception is educating people, particularly on the relation between Islam and the West.
What we can do now, in this regards, is delivering and accelerating opinions, ideas, and works in any religious basis to promote the notion of inclusiveness, tolerance and plurality. Those words have never been cliché, since some history has proven written in horrible notions by the state, organization, institution, including religious entity as the result of different perceptions in different times and spaces. The challenge is waiting before us.
Readings:
Hasan, Noorhaidi, “September 11 and Islamic Militancy in Post-New Order Indonesia”;
Adeney-Risakotta, Bernard, The Impact of September 11 on Islam in Southeast Asia’.
Roma Ulinnuha
As noted by Noorhadi Hasan and Bernard Adeney Risakotta, the particular moment of 9/11 has attributed different perception in different times and spaces. While Hasan pointed out ‘the tension between the proponents of radical Islam and Liberal Islam has turned into open clash’ in Indonesia context (p.317), Adeney-Risakotta argued that there was a need to clarify some differences between the perception of Westerners and South-East Asian Muslims’ (p.342).
I firmly argue that Islam and the West as entities are not in single representation. What have been ‘borrowed’ by terrorists and who have been ‘accused’ as them is not an absolute perspective. Muslim perception in South East Asia is diverse but they are, indeed, together in ultimate mindset. The tightly-bounded framework is against injustice, unfairness and oppression.
9/11 uproar is intolerable, but the more miserable things are false prejudices, and mounted hatred among any entities. Political bias, economic greediness, cultural backwardness and social pathology, I believe, are on the corridor of almost every tension. The tension is even worse, when on the traffic of the corridor, those aspects are engineered by any forms of religious icons directly or indirectly.
On the one side, the tragedy will always happen in the present and the future, but the most sound-ways of efforts is rethinking perceptions among Islam and the West. When media is both promising and evading, there is a need to share a little room where every entity is present. A fair contestation then should start.
Among serious issues should address is the portrayal of Islam and the West as seen in media—TV, Movies, and News papers—as one of the vast contributors constructing the mindset of the people. When media is balanced, I believe, it can work prospectively with the line of educational-type of strategy. Therefore one of the ways to enhance a better perception is educating people, particularly on the relation between Islam and the West.
What we can do now, in this regards, is delivering and accelerating opinions, ideas, and works in any religious basis to promote the notion of inclusiveness, tolerance and plurality. Those words have never been cliché, since some history has proven written in horrible notions by the state, organization, institution, including religious entity as the result of different perceptions in different times and spaces. The challenge is waiting before us.
Readings:
Hasan, Noorhaidi, “September 11 and Islamic Militancy in Post-New Order Indonesia”;
Adeney-Risakotta, Bernard, The Impact of September 11 on Islam in Southeast Asia’.
September 11: It Changed the Color Tone, Not the Picture
By Timotius Wibowo
September 11 attack has been the most popular reference in discussing Islam-Western relation in 21st century. However, is the impact as great as many people supposed to? In a certain case, the answer is yes, but in some cases, no. It is true that the attack has been great impact for American people, both in economics and in politics. It is also true, that economical impact of that happened to America had been widely spread in global level. Even, the global economical crisis that followed has not been yet totally overcome. However, the political impact, especially in Southeast Asia is not so great. It might change the tone of the colors, yet it did not change the picture of Islam-Western political relation. Before and after the attack, the people and political groups would still in their previous positions. The radical Islam groups would still radically oppose the Western. The pro-Western political groups would still oppose the radical Islam groups. Similarly, the moderate groups would still stay in between. Why is it as such? In my opinion, there are at least two reason.
First, the radical Muslim group is not the only influential group in Southeast Asia. It is true that the radical group is usually the most vocal one. However, it does not mean that they were the most influential one. Azyumardi Azra points out, “it is terribly wrong to assume that these radical groups are influential in Southeast Asia” (p.19). Second, in Southeast Asia, especially in Indonesia, Islam is not a monolithic religion, instead multi-facet in many aspects. Even, locality can be a determining factor for what kind of Muslim they would be. As Adeney-Risakotta points out, “Local communities of Muslims are constantly creating new meanings to mediate the conflicting values and demands of their life in the real world” (p.342). In short, multi-facet character of Indonesian and Southeast Asian Islam has save the region from a single and absolute interpretation of September 11, which could easily make the situation worse for both sides. In this sense, there is actually no new interpretation to the event. Every body will interpreted the event as same as what they previously had. Accordingly, there would be minor changes in the political of Muslim people in Southeast Asia.
September 11 attack has been the most popular reference in discussing Islam-Western relation in 21st century. However, is the impact as great as many people supposed to? In a certain case, the answer is yes, but in some cases, no. It is true that the attack has been great impact for American people, both in economics and in politics. It is also true, that economical impact of that happened to America had been widely spread in global level. Even, the global economical crisis that followed has not been yet totally overcome. However, the political impact, especially in Southeast Asia is not so great. It might change the tone of the colors, yet it did not change the picture of Islam-Western political relation. Before and after the attack, the people and political groups would still in their previous positions. The radical Islam groups would still radically oppose the Western. The pro-Western political groups would still oppose the radical Islam groups. Similarly, the moderate groups would still stay in between. Why is it as such? In my opinion, there are at least two reason.
First, the radical Muslim group is not the only influential group in Southeast Asia. It is true that the radical group is usually the most vocal one. However, it does not mean that they were the most influential one. Azyumardi Azra points out, “it is terribly wrong to assume that these radical groups are influential in Southeast Asia” (p.19). Second, in Southeast Asia, especially in Indonesia, Islam is not a monolithic religion, instead multi-facet in many aspects. Even, locality can be a determining factor for what kind of Muslim they would be. As Adeney-Risakotta points out, “Local communities of Muslims are constantly creating new meanings to mediate the conflicting values and demands of their life in the real world” (p.342). In short, multi-facet character of Indonesian and Southeast Asian Islam has save the region from a single and absolute interpretation of September 11, which could easily make the situation worse for both sides. In this sense, there is actually no new interpretation to the event. Every body will interpreted the event as same as what they previously had. Accordingly, there would be minor changes in the political of Muslim people in Southeast Asia.
Minggu, 25 April 2010
Religion and Violence in the Fall of Suharto
Kristanto Budiprabowo (Tatok)
Looking back to the history of the fall of Suharto in the perspective of the history of religion, in my opinion, there are several situations that should be our consideration. First, at that time global political situation directs to the struggle of democratization which combines with the rise of religious criticism and ethno-nationalism. In Indonesia, this situation content with the international negotiation especially in the economical trend. Second, in the regional Asians countries, the economical crisis is the most fatal hit and seems to be the most reasonable thing that fastens social change. In Indonesia, even though government tried using every possibility to save national economical stability, but the political and social instability already uncontrolled. This situation, somehow, show the religious ambiguity. On one side, there were some religious leaders who give religious interpretation to support Suharto’s establishment. On the other side, some religious leader use religious organization as a political movement to criticize him.
Third, in the local context, influence by international and regional situation, the real national situation was exposed. Poverty, inequality between provinces, low income laborer, is some of the social reality that triggers riots in some places. Student’s protest and scholars critics to the government and also political competition among politicians whether civilian or military in background, are the daily news. And because the control from Jakarta weakened, there were also the competition among local elite. In this situation, religion is very easy manipulated as a social solidarity to do violence. The religious violence, for instance in Ambon, is an example that international, regional and local situation have a significant influence. Moreover, in my opinion, in areas which have long history interreligious competition to have political power, religious violence happens more easily.
Looking back to the history of the fall of Suharto in the perspective of the history of religion, in my opinion, there are several situations that should be our consideration. First, at that time global political situation directs to the struggle of democratization which combines with the rise of religious criticism and ethno-nationalism. In Indonesia, this situation content with the international negotiation especially in the economical trend. Second, in the regional Asians countries, the economical crisis is the most fatal hit and seems to be the most reasonable thing that fastens social change. In Indonesia, even though government tried using every possibility to save national economical stability, but the political and social instability already uncontrolled. This situation, somehow, show the religious ambiguity. On one side, there were some religious leaders who give religious interpretation to support Suharto’s establishment. On the other side, some religious leader use religious organization as a political movement to criticize him.
Third, in the local context, influence by international and regional situation, the real national situation was exposed. Poverty, inequality between provinces, low income laborer, is some of the social reality that triggers riots in some places. Student’s protest and scholars critics to the government and also political competition among politicians whether civilian or military in background, are the daily news. And because the control from Jakarta weakened, there were also the competition among local elite. In this situation, religion is very easy manipulated as a social solidarity to do violence. The religious violence, for instance in Ambon, is an example that international, regional and local situation have a significant influence. Moreover, in my opinion, in areas which have long history interreligious competition to have political power, religious violence happens more easily.
Religion and violence in the fall of Suharto and toward democratization;
Tri Harmaji
History of Religions in Indonesia Part II: from c. 1900 to the Present
Religion and violence in the fall of Suharto and toward democratization; Kevin O’Rourke, Reformasi, struggle for power in post-Suharto Indonesia, pg. 87-153 & Mary S. Zurbuchen, Beginning to remember- the past in the Indonesian present, pg. 38-74 & 150-168
In the time, before and after, of Suharto fall most big cities in Indonesia and especially Jakarta were colored by violence. The violence took place in many places and it cost much lives and material loss. But the question here is where religion is in this tragic scene? Did religion involve in this violence? Because the ruined facilities were not just economic or government facilities and building but also some religious facilities such as church buildings, religious involvement is believed to have prevailed in this scene. But from the readings, especially O,Rourke’s analysis about who behind the riot, it is clear that military was the most likely to have masterminding this riot. It is true that some religious figures like Amin Rais, Nucholis Majid and Gusdur were actively participate in the days of Suharto resignation. But it is almost clear also that their role in this scene can not be related to the violence happened in that very tension time. No religious motive was found in that chaotic time of the struggle to step down Suharto from his office. It is likely that the main cause of the people and students’ struggle was economic crisis caused by KKN the Suharto government practiced.
Suharto himself has done his best to defend his power. In his opinion, I perceive, he was a great leader of Indonesia who has brought prosperity to the country. Regardless that in his governance there were many human right abuse, corruption, environment destruction, foreign debt ect. he still thinks that there was much goodness also he has done for the country. It is why when firstly he signaled his willingness to resign in Egypt, he said that it was just because the people have no trust any more to him, then he will ‘make himself close to God’ and become pandito. It is characteristically Javanese religious word. Is really Suharto a religious person? If he is, how about especially mass killing he had done to PKI? In “beginning to remember” a dalang, Ki Trisuti Rachmadi, tells his experience as one victim of Suharto campaign against PKI. From his story I can imagine how suffer they were when they were put in the prison as well as after they were freed. After the fall of Suharto many people begun to bring this issue to the public, and so the badness of Suharto begun more and more apparent. But the question is back again, ‘do this action, killing PKI, contradict to religion?’ for the people now, the answer is clearly ‘Yes!’ but perhaps it was different from religious perspective at that time. Like we know, religious organization also actively played role in the killing, and so it was sure that there was a strong religious justification to the killing at that time.
Another violence interesting to me here is the ninja killing. This tragedy took place in east java shortly after the fall of Suharto, and the victims of this killing were mostly Islamic leaders affiliated to NU. Who are the ninja and who masterminding it? Some people accused Suharto who was taking revenge for his fall. And another opinion, especially from Hasyim, the killing must be performed by the communist who took revenge for what they experienced more that 30 years ago. Both opinions make sense. But on the other side this guess still leave other questions; if the ninja was the communist, why they did not take revenge to Suharto too as the most responsible person to the PKI killing at that time? Or if Suharto was behind this terror, why he just kills Islamic leaders? Is the main actor of his fall was student and perhaps military itself isn’t it?
All of the questions above perhaps can not be answered satisfactorily all the time. And perhaps we do not have to too focus on those questions in understanding the violence around the fall of Suharto. What is universally true is that the small people will always become the victims if two big people are fighting each other. “dua gajah berkelahi, pelanduk mati di tengahnya”.
History of Religions in Indonesia Part II: from c. 1900 to the Present
Religion and violence in the fall of Suharto and toward democratization; Kevin O’Rourke, Reformasi, struggle for power in post-Suharto Indonesia, pg. 87-153 & Mary S. Zurbuchen, Beginning to remember- the past in the Indonesian present, pg. 38-74 & 150-168
In the time, before and after, of Suharto fall most big cities in Indonesia and especially Jakarta were colored by violence. The violence took place in many places and it cost much lives and material loss. But the question here is where religion is in this tragic scene? Did religion involve in this violence? Because the ruined facilities were not just economic or government facilities and building but also some religious facilities such as church buildings, religious involvement is believed to have prevailed in this scene. But from the readings, especially O,Rourke’s analysis about who behind the riot, it is clear that military was the most likely to have masterminding this riot. It is true that some religious figures like Amin Rais, Nucholis Majid and Gusdur were actively participate in the days of Suharto resignation. But it is almost clear also that their role in this scene can not be related to the violence happened in that very tension time. No religious motive was found in that chaotic time of the struggle to step down Suharto from his office. It is likely that the main cause of the people and students’ struggle was economic crisis caused by KKN the Suharto government practiced.
Suharto himself has done his best to defend his power. In his opinion, I perceive, he was a great leader of Indonesia who has brought prosperity to the country. Regardless that in his governance there were many human right abuse, corruption, environment destruction, foreign debt ect. he still thinks that there was much goodness also he has done for the country. It is why when firstly he signaled his willingness to resign in Egypt, he said that it was just because the people have no trust any more to him, then he will ‘make himself close to God’ and become pandito. It is characteristically Javanese religious word. Is really Suharto a religious person? If he is, how about especially mass killing he had done to PKI? In “beginning to remember” a dalang, Ki Trisuti Rachmadi, tells his experience as one victim of Suharto campaign against PKI. From his story I can imagine how suffer they were when they were put in the prison as well as after they were freed. After the fall of Suharto many people begun to bring this issue to the public, and so the badness of Suharto begun more and more apparent. But the question is back again, ‘do this action, killing PKI, contradict to religion?’ for the people now, the answer is clearly ‘Yes!’ but perhaps it was different from religious perspective at that time. Like we know, religious organization also actively played role in the killing, and so it was sure that there was a strong religious justification to the killing at that time.
Another violence interesting to me here is the ninja killing. This tragedy took place in east java shortly after the fall of Suharto, and the victims of this killing were mostly Islamic leaders affiliated to NU. Who are the ninja and who masterminding it? Some people accused Suharto who was taking revenge for his fall. And another opinion, especially from Hasyim, the killing must be performed by the communist who took revenge for what they experienced more that 30 years ago. Both opinions make sense. But on the other side this guess still leave other questions; if the ninja was the communist, why they did not take revenge to Suharto too as the most responsible person to the PKI killing at that time? Or if Suharto was behind this terror, why he just kills Islamic leaders? Is the main actor of his fall was student and perhaps military itself isn’t it?
All of the questions above perhaps can not be answered satisfactorily all the time. And perhaps we do not have to too focus on those questions in understanding the violence around the fall of Suharto. What is universally true is that the small people will always become the victims if two big people are fighting each other. “dua gajah berkelahi, pelanduk mati di tengahnya”.
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