sangat menyenangkan bisa mengetahui, menikmati, dan mengenang kembali peradaban tempoe doloe dari bangsa sendiri. suatu kebudayaan yang masih murni dan belum di campuri oleh kebudayaan colonial yang asing. namun setelah dilihat lebih dalam ternyata apa yang pikirkan sebagai masih murni tersebut ternyata tidak juga. buktinya beberapa kereta pusakanya ternyata buatan nederland. jadi gak murni lagi dong... trus juga saya bertanya. kok bisa ya kereta buatan asing yang tidak jelas siapa dan bagaimana pembuatannya bisa dijadikan pusaka? kalau liat kriss yang dibuat para empu jaman dulu dengan ritual dan kekuatan spiritual tertentu, nampaknya jadi menggelikan ketika melihat kereta belanda tersebut dianggap punya nilai magic and spiritual yang harus di pelihara oleh kereton. jadi bingung aku..
Tri Harmaji
Minggu, 28 Februari 2010
Indigenous Religions of Indonesia
Kristanto Budiprabowo (TATOK)
There are at least three different approaches to recognize indigenous religions of Indonesia. First, it is a missionary’s perspective that saw indigenous religious using their “western-Christian” viewpoint. In this viewpoint, the sources of information concerning indigenous religion of Indonesia in the beginning were full with prejudices. It is caused by many reasons. It can be because of missionaries who make a report and publish in the academic journal at that time did not train enough about Islam and another Asian’s religions (Ricklefs, 2007, p.93). With this background, on one side missionaries see indigenous religions in over generalize as same as another traditional religions phenomenon in Asia. On the other side they contrast religion using dichotomy between modern and ancient religion. Even though some information is very usefull, it can be make the readers come to bias in seeing indigenous religion not a religion at all.
Second, until now some scholars see about indigenous religions using whether sociological or religious point of view. Indigenous religions are a part of social phenomena that could be analyze as religion only if it categorize as “religion”. For example, Javanese religion is always connecting with one of the common religion in Indonesia such as Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity. Some scholar beliefs that there is a proto-religion that only can analyzed as religion as long as combine with one of the “official religion” of Indonesia. It is reasonable if we look to the indigenous religion practice. Javanese religion use many aspects from Hinduism-Buddism and Islam as integral part of their ritual, prayer, and as a basic of values. From the Islamic perspective it is can be easy to categorize that in two ways, as a process of Islamization or as indigenization of Islam.
Third, it is because religion in Indonesia is not just an individual matter, religion should be something formal, organized, and practicing in community in many forms and purposes. In this category, indigenous religion can see as a “polarization” of the real religion or as a community belief system that “synthesize” the newest religions. In every part of the world, community belief system has a dynamic that can transform two or more cultural encounter. The transformation process of Javanese religion also has a dynamic depend on social, economical and political context.
In the case of Javanese religion, based on three assumption above I see that Javanese religion is a capacity of “religious” community to use religions not only for their identity and social cohesion but also for another reason whether individual or communal. Only if religion can enrich communality and the sacred relationship with nature, it will anyhow transform to the community consciousness and even became a spirit to do social or political movement.
Kristanto Budiprabowo (TATOK)
There are at least three different approaches to recognize indigenous religions of Indonesia. First, it is a missionary’s perspective that saw indigenous religious using their “western-Christian” viewpoint. In this viewpoint, the sources of information concerning indigenous religion of Indonesia in the beginning were full with prejudices. It is caused by many reasons. It can be because of missionaries who make a report and publish in the academic journal at that time did not train enough about Islam and another Asian’s religions (Ricklefs, 2007, p.93). With this background, on one side missionaries see indigenous religions in over generalize as same as another traditional religions phenomenon in Asia. On the other side they contrast religion using dichotomy between modern and ancient religion. Even though some information is very usefull, it can be make the readers come to bias in seeing indigenous religion not a religion at all.
Second, until now some scholars see about indigenous religions using whether sociological or religious point of view. Indigenous religions are a part of social phenomena that could be analyze as religion only if it categorize as “religion”. For example, Javanese religion is always connecting with one of the common religion in Indonesia such as Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity. Some scholar beliefs that there is a proto-religion that only can analyzed as religion as long as combine with one of the “official religion” of Indonesia. It is reasonable if we look to the indigenous religion practice. Javanese religion use many aspects from Hinduism-Buddism and Islam as integral part of their ritual, prayer, and as a basic of values. From the Islamic perspective it is can be easy to categorize that in two ways, as a process of Islamization or as indigenization of Islam.
Third, it is because religion in Indonesia is not just an individual matter, religion should be something formal, organized, and practicing in community in many forms and purposes. In this category, indigenous religion can see as a “polarization” of the real religion or as a community belief system that “synthesize” the newest religions. In every part of the world, community belief system has a dynamic that can transform two or more cultural encounter. The transformation process of Javanese religion also has a dynamic depend on social, economical and political context.
In the case of Javanese religion, based on three assumption above I see that Javanese religion is a capacity of “religious” community to use religions not only for their identity and social cohesion but also for another reason whether individual or communal. Only if religion can enrich communality and the sacred relationship with nature, it will anyhow transform to the community consciousness and even became a spirit to do social or political movement.
Marapu as Indigenous religion of Laboya People: Respecting the Ancestors for the Benefits of Descendants by Faqihuddin Abdul Kodir
Indonesia officially only recognize five religions; Islam, Protestantism, Catholics, Hinduism, and Buddhism, and during reformation era one that has been recognized as religion officially is Confucianism. However, indigenous religions in Indonesia still live among people independently or as parts of and mixed with the official religions. Laboya people of West Sumbawa who convert officially to Protestant-Christianity, prefer to recognize themselves as the follower of “Marapu religion”. In the explanation given by Geirnaert, Marapu literally means the ancestors. This religion, generally, is based on the beliefs that living people still have strong connection with the dead ones. The deceased people often influence conditions of the nature in depending on how the living respect them by creating funeral properly and feed them along of their lifetimes.
From the article of Geirnaert “Witnessing the creation of ancestors in Laboya (West Sumbawa, Eastern Indonesia)”, it is obviously understood that religion or belief may be created for the sake of societal benefits. In this regard, Hoga Bora’s funeral was prepared by him before his death and created by his family and colleagues in order to found “a new uma” separated from “the already crowded of Raja Laboya uma” which is centered on his eldest brother Lora Bora. At least, Hoga’s funeral which is a basic ritual of Marapu religion, was trying to integrate his foreign wife, Ibu Julie a Javanese Catholic, and her children fully into Laboya society. Among Indonesian people, religion or rituals of religion are the effective means to integrate foreign people or foreign ideas into their social systems.
I think it is true also in the case of many religions in Indonesia and for many of Indonesian people. Religion in the daily life of Indonesian people is often placed as a mediator between them and the others. They will easily accept foreign people of the same religion they belong to. If not, they will negotiate their religious values by inviting the foreigners into their rituals conducted in their community. The ideas which acknowledged as coming from the other also are often negotiated with the values of religion. Religion is very center for Indonesian people. However, what I mean by religion is not only official religions, but also local beliefs which live among many of Indonesian people as shown by Geirnaert on Marapu religion of Laboya people. Religion accordingly, is how people negotiate their inner beliefs in accordance with their outer demands. For those who have strong willing for the change, they may create ‘a new religion’ or ‘a new religious thought’ in order to move people into the changes of societal demands.
Resources:
1. Danielle C. Geirnaert, “Witnessing the creation of ancestors in Laboya (West Sumbawa, Eastern Indonesia)” in Henry Chambert-Loir and Anthony Reid, eds. The Potent Dead: Ancestors, Saints and Heroes in Contemporary Indonesia, pp. 32-47.
From the article of Geirnaert “Witnessing the creation of ancestors in Laboya (West Sumbawa, Eastern Indonesia)”, it is obviously understood that religion or belief may be created for the sake of societal benefits. In this regard, Hoga Bora’s funeral was prepared by him before his death and created by his family and colleagues in order to found “a new uma” separated from “the already crowded of Raja Laboya uma” which is centered on his eldest brother Lora Bora. At least, Hoga’s funeral which is a basic ritual of Marapu religion, was trying to integrate his foreign wife, Ibu Julie a Javanese Catholic, and her children fully into Laboya society. Among Indonesian people, religion or rituals of religion are the effective means to integrate foreign people or foreign ideas into their social systems.
I think it is true also in the case of many religions in Indonesia and for many of Indonesian people. Religion in the daily life of Indonesian people is often placed as a mediator between them and the others. They will easily accept foreign people of the same religion they belong to. If not, they will negotiate their religious values by inviting the foreigners into their rituals conducted in their community. The ideas which acknowledged as coming from the other also are often negotiated with the values of religion. Religion is very center for Indonesian people. However, what I mean by religion is not only official religions, but also local beliefs which live among many of Indonesian people as shown by Geirnaert on Marapu religion of Laboya people. Religion accordingly, is how people negotiate their inner beliefs in accordance with their outer demands. For those who have strong willing for the change, they may create ‘a new religion’ or ‘a new religious thought’ in order to move people into the changes of societal demands.
Resources:
1. Danielle C. Geirnaert, “Witnessing the creation of ancestors in Laboya (West Sumbawa, Eastern Indonesia)” in Henry Chambert-Loir and Anthony Reid, eds. The Potent Dead: Ancestors, Saints and Heroes in Contemporary Indonesia, pp. 32-47.
Field Trip Report Monday, 22nd Feb. 2010 by Joko Wicoyo
The exhibition of the inheritance of Sultan Palace performed during a week from 18th – 26th February 2010 in Pagelaran of Sultan’s Palace is very interesting and very wonderful. It shows the visitors the glory of the past of the Mataram Kingdom and it enriches the visitors’ notion and understanding especially the students of ICRS Yogya about the life, social, economic, cultural, religious activities, and bureaucracy of Mataram Kingdom in the 18th century. How powerful, rich and legitimate the bureaucracy of Sultan’s court and its daily life activities in Yogyakarta and its surroundings were at that time. It can be seen from the carts that were exhibited, the structures of social, cultural, economical, religious and political activities which were displayed through the pictures, photos, narratives, statues, heirlooms, art and crafts (wayang, keris, gamelan, batik, Javanese costumes)
The field trip was interesting and enjoyable since we were guided by the English spoken guide who has got broad and comprehensive knowledge in explaining what were displayed in that exhibition. I think this field trip is valuable for us, ICRS Students, and it can enrich our knowledge since it has good relationship with the subject of History of Religions in Indonesia. We are very lucky studying and living in Yogyakarta which is rich in cultural and religious events and its people fully appreciate multicultural and pluralistic life. This fieldtrip really enriches our knowledge and experiences comprehensively.
The field trip was interesting and enjoyable since we were guided by the English spoken guide who has got broad and comprehensive knowledge in explaining what were displayed in that exhibition. I think this field trip is valuable for us, ICRS Students, and it can enrich our knowledge since it has good relationship with the subject of History of Religions in Indonesia. We are very lucky studying and living in Yogyakarta which is rich in cultural and religious events and its people fully appreciate multicultural and pluralistic life. This fieldtrip really enriches our knowledge and experiences comprehensively.
Indigenous Religions of Indonesia: Stephen C. Headley, Durga’s Mosque: Cosmology, Conversion and Community in Central Javanese Islam
Tri Harmaji
History of Religions in Indonesia Part II: from c. 1900 to the Present
Indigenous Religions of Indonesia: Stephen C. Headley, Durga’s Mosque: Cosmology, Conversion and Community in Central Javanese Islam (Singapore: ISEAS, 2004).
To read this book makes me conscious that we have actually our own philosophy, our own religion where we can find explanations about this world and life and where we can make a good life based on it. In Indonesia now just a few people that still recognize this treasure as well as who still practice it. Almost in every ethnic communities in Indonesia there is one particular religion that different each other, a treasure that have been forgotten by the long history of Islam and Christian penetration in this country. Now the people consider them as Islam, Christian, Hindu, or Buddhist; all five religion that acknowledged by the government.
When I read the book I begin to realize that especially amongst the Javanese the philosophy of life was so high. It is right the philosophy does not bring the people into high technology like what had happened in Christianity, but it is undeniable that the religion had brought the people close to the nature to life in harmony with it. Something that after great destruction caused by what people admire as high technology has become a hot issue that is being pursued for one more time by many. Now we have arrived in the consciousness of its goodness and so many researches is being done in this subject. But my question is what can we get from such researches other knowledge? And what the knowledge is for other than to fill our libraries collection?
I wonder why the founding fathers of this country just include those five foreign religions as Indonesian official religions. Are they infected by evolutionism theory so they thought that indigenous religion was still animistic that inferior than the monotheism ones? But whatever the reason behind this decision the not-included of indigenous religion as official in the first days of this country has become the main factor of its later complete extinction, like Headley also imply when he describes about Durga ritual in the village of Krendawahana (p. 256). From another reading I read about one indigenous religion in Sulawesi I know that after this decision the people that still adhere their traditional religion was considered as backward and stupid, as the people of the mountain that was isolated from urban advancement. Even the term agomo at that time was just used for those five official religions while the traditional religions were just called as beliefs.
But back to my question before, what then we have to do for this indigenous religions? Is it enough just to document this religion and keep it in the library or something more like do a real act to preserve and keep the religion to go alive in its own land???
History of Religions in Indonesia Part II: from c. 1900 to the Present
Indigenous Religions of Indonesia: Stephen C. Headley, Durga’s Mosque: Cosmology, Conversion and Community in Central Javanese Islam (Singapore: ISEAS, 2004).
To read this book makes me conscious that we have actually our own philosophy, our own religion where we can find explanations about this world and life and where we can make a good life based on it. In Indonesia now just a few people that still recognize this treasure as well as who still practice it. Almost in every ethnic communities in Indonesia there is one particular religion that different each other, a treasure that have been forgotten by the long history of Islam and Christian penetration in this country. Now the people consider them as Islam, Christian, Hindu, or Buddhist; all five religion that acknowledged by the government.
When I read the book I begin to realize that especially amongst the Javanese the philosophy of life was so high. It is right the philosophy does not bring the people into high technology like what had happened in Christianity, but it is undeniable that the religion had brought the people close to the nature to life in harmony with it. Something that after great destruction caused by what people admire as high technology has become a hot issue that is being pursued for one more time by many. Now we have arrived in the consciousness of its goodness and so many researches is being done in this subject. But my question is what can we get from such researches other knowledge? And what the knowledge is for other than to fill our libraries collection?
I wonder why the founding fathers of this country just include those five foreign religions as Indonesian official religions. Are they infected by evolutionism theory so they thought that indigenous religion was still animistic that inferior than the monotheism ones? But whatever the reason behind this decision the not-included of indigenous religion as official in the first days of this country has become the main factor of its later complete extinction, like Headley also imply when he describes about Durga ritual in the village of Krendawahana (p. 256). From another reading I read about one indigenous religion in Sulawesi I know that after this decision the people that still adhere their traditional religion was considered as backward and stupid, as the people of the mountain that was isolated from urban advancement. Even the term agomo at that time was just used for those five official religions while the traditional religions were just called as beliefs.
But back to my question before, what then we have to do for this indigenous religions? Is it enough just to document this religion and keep it in the library or something more like do a real act to preserve and keep the religion to go alive in its own land???
THE KRATON OF YOGYAKARTA AND INDONESIA: A STRUGGLE AND A UNITY
THE VISIT TO THE KRATON OF YOGYAKARTA
MONDAY, FEB 22, 2010
Roma Ulinnuha-ICRS 2009
THE KRATON OF YOGYAKARTA AND INDONESIA: A STRUGGLE AND A UNITY
When I walked down the kraton of Yogya stairs a week ago, I remembered Emha Ainun Najib effort sharing his idea to the Indonesian betterment. Engineered by musical performance of Kyai kanjeng, he presents some notions concerning the unity of Indonesia. He argues that although many have confessed the Indonesian unity,they were in separated stance within their bodies, minds and souls.
Related to the Kraton of Jogja, it is urgent start to think of Kraton contribution to the unity of the Republic of Indonesia. The sultanate of Yogyakarta is widely known for one of the Indonesian heritages, but it seems that everyone should know the long struggle of its existence as a free region or ‘tanah perdikan’ prior to the Indonesian unity. This fact I argue is central since sometimes people ask how Yogyakarta comes into term ‘Daerah Istimewa’ in Indonesia.
Tracing back the role of the Sultanate, actually the institution could choose whether the area would join to the Republic of Indonesia or not during the early period of Indonesian history. The decision as a struggle directed by the Sultan joining the country is one of the distinctive values for the region of Yogyakarta.
The guide told us that the kraton also supported the education type of strategy. University of Gadjah Mada was born in and within the motherhood of Kasultanan. Sultan Hamengkubuwana IX, I think, has not only served as a Sultan, but he also acts as a state man. The evidence is his idea to initiate the attack of Yogyakarta in 1949 claiming the establishment of Republic of Indonesia. In addition, he plays also a significant role to the tribute of Indonesian unity instead of the interest of particular group or individuals.
In the heart of Java Island, Yogyakarta is the replica of Indonesia miniature. Tribes speaking different languages and dialects are welcomed. Cultural and social diversities are manifest in the city however the notion above strengthens the aspect of nationalism.
Enhancing Indonesian unity is a central factor, I think, shaping Yogyakarta a city of tolerance for a struggle and a unity after a field-trip to the Kraton of Yogyakarta.
MONDAY, FEB 22, 2010
Roma Ulinnuha-ICRS 2009
THE KRATON OF YOGYAKARTA AND INDONESIA: A STRUGGLE AND A UNITY
When I walked down the kraton of Yogya stairs a week ago, I remembered Emha Ainun Najib effort sharing his idea to the Indonesian betterment. Engineered by musical performance of Kyai kanjeng, he presents some notions concerning the unity of Indonesia. He argues that although many have confessed the Indonesian unity,they were in separated stance within their bodies, minds and souls.
Related to the Kraton of Jogja, it is urgent start to think of Kraton contribution to the unity of the Republic of Indonesia. The sultanate of Yogyakarta is widely known for one of the Indonesian heritages, but it seems that everyone should know the long struggle of its existence as a free region or ‘tanah perdikan’ prior to the Indonesian unity. This fact I argue is central since sometimes people ask how Yogyakarta comes into term ‘Daerah Istimewa’ in Indonesia.
Tracing back the role of the Sultanate, actually the institution could choose whether the area would join to the Republic of Indonesia or not during the early period of Indonesian history. The decision as a struggle directed by the Sultan joining the country is one of the distinctive values for the region of Yogyakarta.
The guide told us that the kraton also supported the education type of strategy. University of Gadjah Mada was born in and within the motherhood of Kasultanan. Sultan Hamengkubuwana IX, I think, has not only served as a Sultan, but he also acts as a state man. The evidence is his idea to initiate the attack of Yogyakarta in 1949 claiming the establishment of Republic of Indonesia. In addition, he plays also a significant role to the tribute of Indonesian unity instead of the interest of particular group or individuals.
In the heart of Java Island, Yogyakarta is the replica of Indonesia miniature. Tribes speaking different languages and dialects are welcomed. Cultural and social diversities are manifest in the city however the notion above strengthens the aspect of nationalism.
Enhancing Indonesian unity is a central factor, I think, shaping Yogyakarta a city of tolerance for a struggle and a unity after a field-trip to the Kraton of Yogyakarta.
Understanding Javanese Indigenous Religion by Timotius Wibowo
Stephen C. Headley’s book, Durga’s Mosque, shows that the cult of Sri, as an indigenous religion, has played its roles well among Javanese people. It relates them with the ultimate being. It answers the question of their origin, which practically provides their identity and sense of unity. It also secures their most important element of daily life, i.e. rice. It also guides them in ruling their social relations: in the family, with their society, and with their leaders. However, the most important contribution of the cult of Sri (and its related myths) is the mancapat, which provides the social structure of Javanese people. Thus, for Javanese people, the most important contribution that a religion can give them is a social structure, instead of theology (as in Christianity) and laws (as in Islam). That is why Christianity or Islam can never totally play a role of a “complete” religion for Javanese people.
Headley’s research on the cult of Sri also shows the syncretetic character of Javanese people. They welcome the other goddesses, Durga of Hindu believes and Lara Kidul of the people of the southern part of Java, to be assimilated to their goddess, Sri. They also gave the same response to the new religions that came to them, such as Christianity and Islam. If we consider the tendency of achieving religious purification that characterized both Christianity and Islam, we should admit that syncretism is the best “defense mechanism” that Javanese people have. This fact also suggests that contextualization, instead of purification, is more acceptable for them. The history has taught Javanese people the best way to deal with the coming of new religions. However, it seems that these new religions never learn something to find a better approach to indigenous religions.
Headley’s research on the cult of Sri also shows the syncretetic character of Javanese people. They welcome the other goddesses, Durga of Hindu believes and Lara Kidul of the people of the southern part of Java, to be assimilated to their goddess, Sri. They also gave the same response to the new religions that came to them, such as Christianity and Islam. If we consider the tendency of achieving religious purification that characterized both Christianity and Islam, we should admit that syncretism is the best “defense mechanism” that Javanese people have. This fact also suggests that contextualization, instead of purification, is more acceptable for them. The history has taught Javanese people the best way to deal with the coming of new religions. However, it seems that these new religions never learn something to find a better approach to indigenous religions.
Javanese Muslims and their indigenous beliefs by Nina Mariani Noor
March, 1st 2010
Indigenous Religions of Indonesia
Readings: - Stephen C. Headley, Durga’s Mosque, Cosmology, conversion, and community in Central Javanese Islam
- MC. Ricklefs, Polarising Javanese Society
By : Nina Mariani Noor
Subject : History of Religion in Indonesia Part I: 20th century
Both two authors talk about Javanese Islam and their practices. They argue that for Javanese, to be Muslims is part of their identity. However, Javanese especially in Central Java are well known for their synthesis between Islam and Javanism in which they embrace Islam and try hard to fulfill the five pillar of Islam as their ritual life but they also practice their indigenous believes such as accepting local spiritual forces like Goddess Sri or Nyai Roro Kidul. I do admit with their arguments about Javanese Muslims since most of Javanese Muslims are proud of declaring that they are Javanese Muslims, not merely Muslims. For us, being Muslims means we are part of ummat Muslims all around the world, but it does not mean that we have to loose our identity as Javanese.
Besides that, as a Javanese and also as a Muslim, I do witness that many Javanese Muslims in my neighborhood still practice their Javanism till today, like believing in the existence and the role of “birth siblings” (sedulur) in the life of a new baby born. It seems to me that the existence of practicing the indigenous belief of Javanism for Javanese Muslims is difficult to be erased because it is part of their identities. In addition, for Javanese, they do not only Islamized Javanese cultures but also Javanized Islamic values in order to be Javanese Muslims.
Talking about synthesis mysticism, Javanese Muslims are always considered as the real example of that practice. My questions is that, do these circumstances also happen in other part of this world? Does it only appear in Java or also in other places? Are there any synthesis between Christianity and European’s indigenous believes for example?
I am interested in Headley’s statement in page 49, “As a secular state, Indonesia is not formally a religious regime, but the Ministry of Religion can hardly be said to be indifferent to the promotion of Islam”. This statement led me to rethink about the relevance of Ministry of Religion for Indonesia as nation-state. And a critical question came to mind, do we still need this Ministry of Religion which in fact is dominated by Muslims? Is it kind of oppression that is committed by the majority through government?
In my opinion, Ministry of Religion can be necessary in one side but also sometimes dangerous on the other side. It is necessary when we talk about its role in providing facilities for worshipping for all religions adherents. However, it is dangerous when it comes to manage and even uniform the beliefs and the way of practicing of religions for people. It would be better if the state lets their people to believe what they believe and practice their beliefs freely without any worried. It often happens recently that some people from dominant religion are trying to force others who do not believe and practice like them by committing violence which causes many losses. And unfortunately, their attempts are mostly based on government’s act. I think, in this religious pluralism, the significance of Ministry of Religion is better to be evaluated.
Indigenous Religions of Indonesia
Readings: - Stephen C. Headley, Durga’s Mosque, Cosmology, conversion, and community in Central Javanese Islam
- MC. Ricklefs, Polarising Javanese Society
By : Nina Mariani Noor
Subject : History of Religion in Indonesia Part I: 20th century
Both two authors talk about Javanese Islam and their practices. They argue that for Javanese, to be Muslims is part of their identity. However, Javanese especially in Central Java are well known for their synthesis between Islam and Javanism in which they embrace Islam and try hard to fulfill the five pillar of Islam as their ritual life but they also practice their indigenous believes such as accepting local spiritual forces like Goddess Sri or Nyai Roro Kidul. I do admit with their arguments about Javanese Muslims since most of Javanese Muslims are proud of declaring that they are Javanese Muslims, not merely Muslims. For us, being Muslims means we are part of ummat Muslims all around the world, but it does not mean that we have to loose our identity as Javanese.
Besides that, as a Javanese and also as a Muslim, I do witness that many Javanese Muslims in my neighborhood still practice their Javanism till today, like believing in the existence and the role of “birth siblings” (sedulur) in the life of a new baby born. It seems to me that the existence of practicing the indigenous belief of Javanism for Javanese Muslims is difficult to be erased because it is part of their identities. In addition, for Javanese, they do not only Islamized Javanese cultures but also Javanized Islamic values in order to be Javanese Muslims.
Talking about synthesis mysticism, Javanese Muslims are always considered as the real example of that practice. My questions is that, do these circumstances also happen in other part of this world? Does it only appear in Java or also in other places? Are there any synthesis between Christianity and European’s indigenous believes for example?
I am interested in Headley’s statement in page 49, “As a secular state, Indonesia is not formally a religious regime, but the Ministry of Religion can hardly be said to be indifferent to the promotion of Islam”. This statement led me to rethink about the relevance of Ministry of Religion for Indonesia as nation-state. And a critical question came to mind, do we still need this Ministry of Religion which in fact is dominated by Muslims? Is it kind of oppression that is committed by the majority through government?
In my opinion, Ministry of Religion can be necessary in one side but also sometimes dangerous on the other side. It is necessary when we talk about its role in providing facilities for worshipping for all religions adherents. However, it is dangerous when it comes to manage and even uniform the beliefs and the way of practicing of religions for people. It would be better if the state lets their people to believe what they believe and practice their beliefs freely without any worried. It often happens recently that some people from dominant religion are trying to force others who do not believe and practice like them by committing violence which causes many losses. And unfortunately, their attempts are mostly based on government’s act. I think, in this religious pluralism, the significance of Ministry of Religion is better to be evaluated.
Indigenous Religions in Indonesia by Joko Wicoyo
The Religion of Java written by Clifford Geertz describes the religious life of the three main social classes of an east central Javanese town: farmers, tradesmen and aristocrats. The book starts with the religious life of the farmers and contains a fascinating chapter about the slametan, communal feast as a core ritual of Javanese religious system (pp:16-20), the farmers' spirit beliefs: memedis (frightening spirits), lelembuts (possessing spirits), tuyuls (familiar spirits), demits (place spirits) and danjangs (guardian spirits) ,pp 21-34). These spirits represent disorder, the uncivilized, non human. Written with a rare combination of analysis and speculation, this comprehensive study of Javanese religion is one of the few books on the religion of a non-Western people which emphasizes variation and conflict in belief as well as similarity and harmony. The reader becomes aware of the intricacy and depth of Javanese spiritual life and the problems of political and social integration reflected in the religion.
Geertz divides the Javanese society into three "variants," that is Abangan, Santri and Priyayi. With abangan he means those Javanese who are only nominal Muslims, that is the group not performing the five daily prayers prescribed by Islamic law or fasting during the month of Ramadan. The abangan group is the largest variant of religiosity in Java according to Geertz and it is a syncretism of Hindu-, Buddhist-, animistic- and Islamic elements wherein the pre-Islamic elements seem to dominate. The santri, according to Geertz, comprises the Javanese who first and foremost identifies themselves as Muslims (and not Javanese), and they perform according to their abilities the five pillars of Islam (Confession of faith, the five daily prayers, the taxes, fasting during Ramadan, and performing the pilgrimage to Mekkah). According to Geertz, this variant of Javanese religion is very textual oriented and show a great concern with Islamic doctrines, while abangan is more concerned with the ritual aspects of their religious life. The priyayi, according to Geertz, is the Hindu cultural elite which primarily is connected to the bureaucratic parts of the society (in contrast to the abangan who are peasants and the santri who are merchants). In saying this, Geertz is often criticized on the basis that priyayi is not a religious grouping in Javanese society, but rahter a social class. In sum then, Geertz divides the Javanese religious landscape into three different variants: the syncretic abangan, the Islamic santri and the Hindu priyayi.
I think the opinion of Geertz has not reflected the Javanese reality nowadays and will attract a discussion about the differences of opinion that arises between the abangan, santri and priyayi, Geertz’s idea has been already criticized by Mark Woodward. According to Woodward the division between "normative Islam" and "Islam Jawa" (Javanese Islam) is more applicable than what Geertz’s describes. The normative Muslims according to Woodward can be divided into kaum muda, the "young group" influenced by the Middle Eastern reformist movements, and kaum tua, the "old group" who participates in the ritual and mystical aspects of Islam Jawa. In Woodward's view, the Islamic law (shari`ah) together with the Qur'an and the hadith form the core of normative Islam in Java, while the adherents of Islam Jawa confine themselves to perform certain life crisis rituals in accordance with the shari`ah while saying that other aspects of this law-centered piety are optional. Both normative Islam and Islam Jawa are in Woodward's view purely Islamic traditions and this together with his observance that these categories often fade into each other and incorporate space for personal and regional variation are his major contributions to the study of religion in Java. As he says: "Islam is the predominant force in the religious beliefs and rites of central Javanese, and... it shapes the character of social interaction and daily life in all segments of Javanese society."
However, through Geertz’s book, I believe, the readers will be enriched a lot about the cultural life of the Javanese people, their spiritual beliefs and rituals, their attitude towards magic, and a lot more. The book is a perfect example of the western academics needs to label everything and put it into nice interesting little boxes, because in my mind, this book exposes the authors limited understanding of religion, which he sees only the surface.
Geertz divides the Javanese society into three "variants," that is Abangan, Santri and Priyayi. With abangan he means those Javanese who are only nominal Muslims, that is the group not performing the five daily prayers prescribed by Islamic law or fasting during the month of Ramadan. The abangan group is the largest variant of religiosity in Java according to Geertz and it is a syncretism of Hindu-, Buddhist-, animistic- and Islamic elements wherein the pre-Islamic elements seem to dominate. The santri, according to Geertz, comprises the Javanese who first and foremost identifies themselves as Muslims (and not Javanese), and they perform according to their abilities the five pillars of Islam (Confession of faith, the five daily prayers, the taxes, fasting during Ramadan, and performing the pilgrimage to Mekkah). According to Geertz, this variant of Javanese religion is very textual oriented and show a great concern with Islamic doctrines, while abangan is more concerned with the ritual aspects of their religious life. The priyayi, according to Geertz, is the Hindu cultural elite which primarily is connected to the bureaucratic parts of the society (in contrast to the abangan who are peasants and the santri who are merchants). In saying this, Geertz is often criticized on the basis that priyayi is not a religious grouping in Javanese society, but rahter a social class. In sum then, Geertz divides the Javanese religious landscape into three different variants: the syncretic abangan, the Islamic santri and the Hindu priyayi.
I think the opinion of Geertz has not reflected the Javanese reality nowadays and will attract a discussion about the differences of opinion that arises between the abangan, santri and priyayi, Geertz’s idea has been already criticized by Mark Woodward. According to Woodward the division between "normative Islam" and "Islam Jawa" (Javanese Islam) is more applicable than what Geertz’s describes. The normative Muslims according to Woodward can be divided into kaum muda, the "young group" influenced by the Middle Eastern reformist movements, and kaum tua, the "old group" who participates in the ritual and mystical aspects of Islam Jawa. In Woodward's view, the Islamic law (shari`ah) together with the Qur'an and the hadith form the core of normative Islam in Java, while the adherents of Islam Jawa confine themselves to perform certain life crisis rituals in accordance with the shari`ah while saying that other aspects of this law-centered piety are optional. Both normative Islam and Islam Jawa are in Woodward's view purely Islamic traditions and this together with his observance that these categories often fade into each other and incorporate space for personal and regional variation are his major contributions to the study of religion in Java. As he says: "Islam is the predominant force in the religious beliefs and rites of central Javanese, and... it shapes the character of social interaction and daily life in all segments of Javanese society."
However, through Geertz’s book, I believe, the readers will be enriched a lot about the cultural life of the Javanese people, their spiritual beliefs and rituals, their attitude towards magic, and a lot more. The book is a perfect example of the western academics needs to label everything and put it into nice interesting little boxes, because in my mind, this book exposes the authors limited understanding of religion, which he sees only the surface.
Comment for Fieldtrip : How was the Gender Role in Sultan's Family in the Past? By Nihayatul Wafiroh
When I joined fieldtrip at Sultan Palace last Monday, I was shock when the guide described the different clothes for married and unmarried women in Sultan’s family. For unmarried women, they wore kemben (a long narrow sash worn at or above the waist), and for married women, their clothes covered all body. What is the reason behind this? It is interesting for me. I think that it is not just natural rule but there must be philosophical reasons. Islam was known in kingdom family since around 17-18 century, but the tradition of clothes for women did not change. In fact, Sultan Hamengkubono IX established a mosque. It indicates that Islam had been followed. Indeed, Islam promoted that women should cover their whole body, and it did not any differences for unmarried or married women. Therefore, while until recently unmarried women still wore kemben, it means that Islam tenets did not influence in the daily life. I am sure that the clothes code affects in life. So I am wondering to know how women’s role before and after married in Sultan’s family.
Another thing is the carriage for permasuri (King’s wife). It is too small, and according to the guide, it was used. I cannot image how she set on the carriage. I think that it is impossible if she laid down in the carriage. Again, I do not believe that it was made without any purpose. I am sure that gender reason became one of the causes when it was created. The carriage totally is dissimilar with King’s carriage. For the King, carriage is open, so people from outside could see King easily. For permasuri, the carriage is like a box. As a result, permasuri and people from outside could not see each other. I think that studying the gender roles in Sultan family with using these kinds of Sultan’s heritages will enrich the knowledge regarding women’s position and role in Sultan’s family.
Another thing is the carriage for permasuri (King’s wife). It is too small, and according to the guide, it was used. I cannot image how she set on the carriage. I think that it is impossible if she laid down in the carriage. Again, I do not believe that it was made without any purpose. I am sure that gender reason became one of the causes when it was created. The carriage totally is dissimilar with King’s carriage. For the King, carriage is open, so people from outside could see King easily. For permasuri, the carriage is like a box. As a result, permasuri and people from outside could not see each other. I think that studying the gender roles in Sultan family with using these kinds of Sultan’s heritages will enrich the knowledge regarding women’s position and role in Sultan’s family.
Indigenous Religions of Indonesia by Nihayatul wafiroh
Last Friday I attended at Grebekan Sekaten in Alun-alun Utara. I saw that thousands people from around Yogyakarta and outside Yogyakarta joined in this ritual. I understand that the meaning of Sekaten already changed. Right now, for young generation Sekaten is just like communal party (pesta rakyat) rather than religious and cultural ritual. However, when the day of Sekaten on Friday 26, 2010, I was able to figure out that for many people Sekaten is still an important ritual. Many people tried to get such vegetables from gunungan that was provided by Kraton. They do believe that it will bring them on blessing life. I am sure that most of them are moslems. I could see that they wore Jilbab which is the symbol for Moslem women. From this picture, what Stephen C Headley points out is true. Religion in this case Islam in Java still cannot be separated from the Javanese cosmology.
Actually, I can say that the influences of Javanese cosmology do not only occur in kingdom areas such Yogyakarta and Surakarta. In other parts of Indonesia such Banyuwangi. I do believe that religions do not come in an empty room. There is already having cultures. When Islam came to archipelago, there were already some indigenous religions. According to Barbara Watson Andaya who is the professor in University of Hawaii at Manoa and the director of Southeast Asian Studies at UHM and Yoneo Ishi, they discuss about the religious development in Southeast Asia. It is interesting to study religions in SEA because many religions can embody in SEA’s cultures, and each religion could grow well. According to them, actually before Islam came to SEA, the religion already appeared in SEA although the forms of this religions were not as Abrahamic religions. Indigenous religion already existed before Islam had been introduced in SEA, particularly in archipelago. However, the symbol of spirit was to be the central of ritual. For instance, they believed that mountain had sacred spirit, so they did ritual in mountain.
From these arguments, I think that it becomes clear that religions in Java, particularly, still run with keeping Javanese tradition. So the question in my mind is that right now the Javanese rituals become weak, and modernism leads as the king in every aspect of life, but in reality some people still keep the rituals, is it indication that religion cannot fulfill their needs such as happiness, peacefulness, etc?
Actually, I can say that the influences of Javanese cosmology do not only occur in kingdom areas such Yogyakarta and Surakarta. In other parts of Indonesia such Banyuwangi. I do believe that religions do not come in an empty room. There is already having cultures. When Islam came to archipelago, there were already some indigenous religions. According to Barbara Watson Andaya who is the professor in University of Hawaii at Manoa and the director of Southeast Asian Studies at UHM and Yoneo Ishi, they discuss about the religious development in Southeast Asia. It is interesting to study religions in SEA because many religions can embody in SEA’s cultures, and each religion could grow well. According to them, actually before Islam came to SEA, the religion already appeared in SEA although the forms of this religions were not as Abrahamic religions. Indigenous religion already existed before Islam had been introduced in SEA, particularly in archipelago. However, the symbol of spirit was to be the central of ritual. For instance, they believed that mountain had sacred spirit, so they did ritual in mountain.
From these arguments, I think that it becomes clear that religions in Java, particularly, still run with keeping Javanese tradition. So the question in my mind is that right now the Javanese rituals become weak, and modernism leads as the king in every aspect of life, but in reality some people still keep the rituals, is it indication that religion cannot fulfill their needs such as happiness, peacefulness, etc?
Indigenious Religions of Indonesia
LEYAKET ALI MOHAMED OMAR
History of Religion Part 2- Prof Bernard Adeney- Risakotta and Prof Margana
Readings are from : Danielle C. Geirnaert- Witnessing the creation of ancestors in Laboya.
Stephen C. Headley- Durga’s Mosque:Cosmology, Converstion and Community in Central Javanese Islam .
The study of traditional practices by tribe of Laboya is an interesting phenomenon. These religions conceal, often barely, older indigenous systems of belief embedded in distinctively local forms of ritual practice. These involve beliefs in and respect for a range of supernatural beings, many of them embodied in features of the local landscape and natural species. But a central element in almost all is the role of beings known generically as ancestors-those who lived and died before, but remain a real part of the lives of their descendants-powerful, perhaps dangerous, and in a way still part of the community of the living.
The exploration of ancestor practices ranges from across Indonesia. Among the other rituals are the Tiwah. It is a rare traditional ritual of Dayak tribe in Borneo to send the soul of dead person to heaven. In Dayak Ngaju belief, the death is a commencement of a long journey to the Lewu Tatu (Heaven). The soul of the dead stays around one's living area until the family performs this ritual. The substance of this ritual is the respect to ancestor and elder person. This is also a very long exotic ritual, rich with natural wisdom.
Given that example and having Indonesia on the other hand which consists of so many separate island and more than a hundred ethnic groups, it is certainly difficult and problematic to define what Indonesian culture is. Although Christians, Hindu and Islam has been the major religion in the region and with all respect to the more ancient religion, these indigenous practices are still almost in every corner of Indonesia and today with the vast work of missionary work from the Christian and Islam they are either blended together with Islam and Christian practices or on its own. These can be seen unique for some or even the academician but to most Muslim or probably Christian this is unacceptable.
Stephen C. Headley in his account on Jihad had aspire me to a greater height of capturing what his understanding of its meaning through his interpretation from a few authentic resources. It is a notion that has to be amplified that Jihad in Islam never meant war against the enemy blindly. The qur'an has to parallel to the tradition of Prophet in its translations. During the period of the Prophet Muhammad (PBH), he always used it as a defence and not attack . Jihad in the path of Allah means to struggle in defence. Scholars of Islam have always emphasis the meaning of Jihad is to struggle in the obligations that Allah has ordained upon His followers.
History of Religion Part 2- Prof Bernard Adeney- Risakotta and Prof Margana
Readings are from : Danielle C. Geirnaert- Witnessing the creation of ancestors in Laboya.
Stephen C. Headley- Durga’s Mosque:Cosmology, Converstion and Community in Central Javanese Islam .
The study of traditional practices by tribe of Laboya is an interesting phenomenon. These religions conceal, often barely, older indigenous systems of belief embedded in distinctively local forms of ritual practice. These involve beliefs in and respect for a range of supernatural beings, many of them embodied in features of the local landscape and natural species. But a central element in almost all is the role of beings known generically as ancestors-those who lived and died before, but remain a real part of the lives of their descendants-powerful, perhaps dangerous, and in a way still part of the community of the living.
The exploration of ancestor practices ranges from across Indonesia. Among the other rituals are the Tiwah. It is a rare traditional ritual of Dayak tribe in Borneo to send the soul of dead person to heaven. In Dayak Ngaju belief, the death is a commencement of a long journey to the Lewu Tatu (Heaven). The soul of the dead stays around one's living area until the family performs this ritual. The substance of this ritual is the respect to ancestor and elder person. This is also a very long exotic ritual, rich with natural wisdom.
Given that example and having Indonesia on the other hand which consists of so many separate island and more than a hundred ethnic groups, it is certainly difficult and problematic to define what Indonesian culture is. Although Christians, Hindu and Islam has been the major religion in the region and with all respect to the more ancient religion, these indigenous practices are still almost in every corner of Indonesia and today with the vast work of missionary work from the Christian and Islam they are either blended together with Islam and Christian practices or on its own. These can be seen unique for some or even the academician but to most Muslim or probably Christian this is unacceptable.
Stephen C. Headley in his account on Jihad had aspire me to a greater height of capturing what his understanding of its meaning through his interpretation from a few authentic resources. It is a notion that has to be amplified that Jihad in Islam never meant war against the enemy blindly. The qur'an has to parallel to the tradition of Prophet in its translations. During the period of the Prophet Muhammad (PBH), he always used it as a defence and not attack . Jihad in the path of Allah means to struggle in defence. Scholars of Islam have always emphasis the meaning of Jihad is to struggle in the obligations that Allah has ordained upon His followers.
Grebeg Maulud and the Theatre State of Yogyakarta by MUCHA
By Mucha Q. Arquiza
01 March 2010
Let’s never cease from thinking –
What is this “civilization” in which we find ourselves?
What are these ceremonies and why should we take part in them?
What are these professions and why should we make money out of them?
Where, in short, is it leading us, the procession of the sons of educated men?- Virginia Woolf, Three Guineas 1938
As much as I have savored the grandeur and excitement of the Grebeg Maulud, after being completely awed by the theatre kingship of Yogyakarta that now for the past week has been playing in the Kraton grounds, and so I also foresaw its future and potentials, in much the same way as I have seen the passing away and mutation of the barrio fiestas in many Catholic villages in the Philippines. Of how similar tradition and religious rituals had silently succumbed to and benefited commerce, and continue to do so in the name of cultural tourism, profiting the state and its capers, by creatively transforming communal tradition of once simple religious ritual of commemorating a (catholic) patron saint into one big mall of local Fiesta of culture. And as such would I predict the fate of Grebeg Maulud. If it is any consolation, this one would definitely resound with a global impact. Perhaps performing even better than the Philippines, the Grebeg Maulud in Yogyakarta could prove to be more convulsive when accompanied with the clearest grandest gamelang ever played by a receptive media and social marketers in the academe.
If indulged a little bit more in my daydreaming, I could freely advance-scan into my mind’s liquid crystal display and foresee the same devoted crowd gathered in last Friday’s ritual-event - maybe even more (in number) would come, mostly consisting of foreign and local tourists, students of culture and academic researchers, artists and media – virtually flowing from every corner of the globe, these cultural voyeurs in various stripes and shades were there to ogle and to have fun while pretending to document an exotic but living tradition unfolding in the actual disposal of kingly power and deployment of his benevolence. “This tradition is both of cultural significance, a Javanese kebudayaan (i.e.culture), as well as of religious relevance, an Islamic ibadah (i.e.faith)”, the commentator repeatedly emphasized over the woro-woro (i.e. PA system) lest the public was misled into thinking otherwise (and should there be reason to think so?). Religion and culture, indeed, walked hand-in-hand in the king’s gait and his royal entourage of imperial army in full regalia: tradition multiple-player-in-flesh-real-time-gaming with modern crowd. And, last but not least significant of all attractions the opulent and ostentatious life, past and present, long pickled and bottled-up, were on that special day uncapped, forked and tasted. The rustic royal carriages, kereta, in various make and style and the unblemished vintage cars, the various keris and royal blades in all shapes and sizes; the Pusaka, royal heritage, where power of the king really emanated. Naturally, the princes, princesses and their royal court of loyal attendants, servants and wide-eyed maids-in-waiting – and the king himself – the people, all had to play their part in stone-and-wax. For isn’t it what theatre is all about, power-playing in shifting signs and elusive symbols?
At around the same moment, one could actually witness the kingly power come to life -as from the alun-alun square marched down the dusty road were three
gunungan and ushered into the inner courtyard of the King Agung’s mosque, where slaves and subjects in cameo-roles - genuine ones in flesh and blood - waited in awe and were at their most humble and subservient selves. Later, as their scripts had always carefully prescribed, they were expected to scramble and fight-over a mound of blessed rice. Much much later into the morning, some would - so to keep the action rolling - still be left scratching and sifting through the dust unmindful of trampled dignity fading with daylight, each remaining eager to out-win one another in partaking of royal benevolence and divine blessings.
As for the ‘culturally outsiders’ – the avid spectators and excited audience – who would constitute the biggest market for this future Grebeg in my head, their presence and contingency in such event would have to be large enough to potentially benefit every actor in this stage. Not least of all, the ordinary people who laboriously eked out a living, in selling, not only their own stuff of ‘power’ (jav. kesakten) and ‘blessing’ (jav. berakat) in the flea-market of jimat and sirih (i.e. amulet and betel). Were they not forced to also hand them over to hooded thieves of souls and brains in under-the-table deals? Traditional wisdom and indigenous knowledge - those secrets were long-guarded by their folk and ancestors, but now they have to apportion and repack in small retail sizes, and peddle for the best price from the audience. Most often, the measly sum would barely buy a kilo of rice or a slab of tahu or strip of tempe. And so to augment, they have come to put themselves up for sale as well - the kawula and masyarakat , royal subjects and the lowly ones - each Grebeg Maulud day, untiringly performed and unself-consciously posed as actors and cultural artifacts for the same interested buyers of entertainment and collectors of newly-olden (fil. bagong-luma) antiques of the living tradition. To be bodily photographed and their stories to be reduced into hasty sketches and enumerated into bullet-points in field observation journals, hence, ordinary people were bought, neatly packed and locked away into the researchers’ notebook. And having possessed the frozen smiles, poised actions and unlocked best-kept indigenous secrets, safely captured in film or digital imaging format, now readied in ink-and-paper and electronic files to be hurled around the cyberspace and whirled around-the-globe. These voyeurs, cultural oglers and documenters, if they stayed meticulous with their craft and were disciplined enough to know how to suspend their humanity and restrain their ethics at the right moment and time, in turn, they too could profit dearly from this enterprise and hopefully earn the desired additional titles and appendages to their names and build monumental bodies of work that would last them for multiple life-times.
And if still allowed to go on any further into this day-dreaming…I would surmise (for the above to succeed), some innovations have to be in order. For one, the grebeg could do without the potentially discordant rebutan. Instead, the Kraton’s generosity could possibly extend fairly to everyone. A small bungkus consisting of gunungan rice or tiny portions of the blessed goodies as free take-away won’t hurt so much the royal purse. This would lend both respectability and order into the process, so that people need not have to scratch and peck at the dirt for stray grains or crumbs or morsels. The king’s supply of blessings and mercy could be made more generous literally pouring and flowing like river of berakat-laden rice on a long table spread out (i.e. read the warning in Al-Qur’an surah al-maida) running from the alun-alun to the masjid agung courtyard where the kawulas and masyarakat need not have to fight, no more risking of limbs, no more sacrificing of lives, end to the violent procedures for the dispersal of blessings.
And here, the royal event planners could gain much by organizing an educational tour to learn a lesson or two from Filipino fiestas, and from the patented creativity of Philippine tourism authorities especially those stationed in still pristine and culture mine-field Mindanao, who have tucked into their hats best practices, road-tested and effective social marketing strategies to sell culture without hitch especially in precarious times such as in the midst of war (i.e. thanks to generous foreign-donors that have been training local government units on culture of peace and capacity-building for good governance). The trip may be organized on anytime of the year as on a year-round basis Philippine villages, towns or cities are never short of events perpetually obsessed at breaking the record and landing on the Guiness World book for the biggest, grandest, longest cultural ‘any-thing’, so that no television networks would go hungry for months and years; many still manage to make big bucks from ‘healthy’ competitioÿÿ to get exclusives (i.e. rights to cover). For all the world to see…well, that maybe… but more particularly, for the vast culture market waiting out there – that advertising moguls might continue to religiously rake in blessings by rightly positioning their products in a ‘free-for-all’ rebutan of their own on a global scale.
Such could also be initially aimed for by the Grebeg Maulud organizers in Yogyakarta. If this project succeeds, on future Grebeg Maulud, I foresee that everyone’s energy could be productively pooled and positively focused, for instance, people could now properly appreciate the splendor of the gunungan without restless minds anxiously straying to the rebutan. Or else, despondent and desperate, others might need not be resigned to plunge into an endless ferris-wheel ride in the Sekaten outside, instead their eyes could happily feast now on the Kraton’s pusaka. After the feast for the eyes and ears, one might just as orderly line-up and partake of the berakat, with health and safety assured and dignity intact, everyone could peacefully come home, at least, with a fist-full or cupful of the sumptuous nasi kuning from the gunungan. This long line of flowing rice is to be made available the whole day long on Grebeg day. With that accomplished, it could even earn Yogyakarta and its kingship a Guinness’ World record for the longest flowing river of rice and the widest public dispersal of blessing ever. A sure-hit for tourists, positive scholarly reviews and generous media write-ups would not be far behind. And lest it be forgotten, as for revenues that this innovation would invite, this, the regency could use for social improvements, such as decent housing and livelihood for the poor and improvement of drainage and sewerage that would make the perennial problem of banjir (i.e. flooding) in Yogyakarta history.###
01 March 2010
Let’s never cease from thinking –
What is this “civilization” in which we find ourselves?
What are these ceremonies and why should we take part in them?
What are these professions and why should we make money out of them?
Where, in short, is it leading us, the procession of the sons of educated men?- Virginia Woolf, Three Guineas 1938
As much as I have savored the grandeur and excitement of the Grebeg Maulud, after being completely awed by the theatre kingship of Yogyakarta that now for the past week has been playing in the Kraton grounds, and so I also foresaw its future and potentials, in much the same way as I have seen the passing away and mutation of the barrio fiestas in many Catholic villages in the Philippines. Of how similar tradition and religious rituals had silently succumbed to and benefited commerce, and continue to do so in the name of cultural tourism, profiting the state and its capers, by creatively transforming communal tradition of once simple religious ritual of commemorating a (catholic) patron saint into one big mall of local Fiesta of culture. And as such would I predict the fate of Grebeg Maulud. If it is any consolation, this one would definitely resound with a global impact. Perhaps performing even better than the Philippines, the Grebeg Maulud in Yogyakarta could prove to be more convulsive when accompanied with the clearest grandest gamelang ever played by a receptive media and social marketers in the academe.
If indulged a little bit more in my daydreaming, I could freely advance-scan into my mind’s liquid crystal display and foresee the same devoted crowd gathered in last Friday’s ritual-event - maybe even more (in number) would come, mostly consisting of foreign and local tourists, students of culture and academic researchers, artists and media – virtually flowing from every corner of the globe, these cultural voyeurs in various stripes and shades were there to ogle and to have fun while pretending to document an exotic but living tradition unfolding in the actual disposal of kingly power and deployment of his benevolence. “This tradition is both of cultural significance, a Javanese kebudayaan (i.e.culture), as well as of religious relevance, an Islamic ibadah (i.e.faith)”, the commentator repeatedly emphasized over the woro-woro (i.e. PA system) lest the public was misled into thinking otherwise (and should there be reason to think so?). Religion and culture, indeed, walked hand-in-hand in the king’s gait and his royal entourage of imperial army in full regalia: tradition multiple-player-in-flesh-real-time-gaming with modern crowd. And, last but not least significant of all attractions the opulent and ostentatious life, past and present, long pickled and bottled-up, were on that special day uncapped, forked and tasted. The rustic royal carriages, kereta, in various make and style and the unblemished vintage cars, the various keris and royal blades in all shapes and sizes; the Pusaka, royal heritage, where power of the king really emanated. Naturally, the princes, princesses and their royal court of loyal attendants, servants and wide-eyed maids-in-waiting – and the king himself – the people, all had to play their part in stone-and-wax. For isn’t it what theatre is all about, power-playing in shifting signs and elusive symbols?
At around the same moment, one could actually witness the kingly power come to life -as from the alun-alun square marched down the dusty road were three
gunungan and ushered into the inner courtyard of the King Agung’s mosque, where slaves and subjects in cameo-roles - genuine ones in flesh and blood - waited in awe and were at their most humble and subservient selves. Later, as their scripts had always carefully prescribed, they were expected to scramble and fight-over a mound of blessed rice. Much much later into the morning, some would - so to keep the action rolling - still be left scratching and sifting through the dust unmindful of trampled dignity fading with daylight, each remaining eager to out-win one another in partaking of royal benevolence and divine blessings.
As for the ‘culturally outsiders’ – the avid spectators and excited audience – who would constitute the biggest market for this future Grebeg in my head, their presence and contingency in such event would have to be large enough to potentially benefit every actor in this stage. Not least of all, the ordinary people who laboriously eked out a living, in selling, not only their own stuff of ‘power’ (jav. kesakten) and ‘blessing’ (jav. berakat) in the flea-market of jimat and sirih (i.e. amulet and betel). Were they not forced to also hand them over to hooded thieves of souls and brains in under-the-table deals? Traditional wisdom and indigenous knowledge - those secrets were long-guarded by their folk and ancestors, but now they have to apportion and repack in small retail sizes, and peddle for the best price from the audience. Most often, the measly sum would barely buy a kilo of rice or a slab of tahu or strip of tempe. And so to augment, they have come to put themselves up for sale as well - the kawula and masyarakat , royal subjects and the lowly ones - each Grebeg Maulud day, untiringly performed and unself-consciously posed as actors and cultural artifacts for the same interested buyers of entertainment and collectors of newly-olden (fil. bagong-luma) antiques of the living tradition. To be bodily photographed and their stories to be reduced into hasty sketches and enumerated into bullet-points in field observation journals, hence, ordinary people were bought, neatly packed and locked away into the researchers’ notebook. And having possessed the frozen smiles, poised actions and unlocked best-kept indigenous secrets, safely captured in film or digital imaging format, now readied in ink-and-paper and electronic files to be hurled around the cyberspace and whirled around-the-globe. These voyeurs, cultural oglers and documenters, if they stayed meticulous with their craft and were disciplined enough to know how to suspend their humanity and restrain their ethics at the right moment and time, in turn, they too could profit dearly from this enterprise and hopefully earn the desired additional titles and appendages to their names and build monumental bodies of work that would last them for multiple life-times.
And if still allowed to go on any further into this day-dreaming…I would surmise (for the above to succeed), some innovations have to be in order. For one, the grebeg could do without the potentially discordant rebutan. Instead, the Kraton’s generosity could possibly extend fairly to everyone. A small bungkus consisting of gunungan rice or tiny portions of the blessed goodies as free take-away won’t hurt so much the royal purse. This would lend both respectability and order into the process, so that people need not have to scratch and peck at the dirt for stray grains or crumbs or morsels. The king’s supply of blessings and mercy could be made more generous literally pouring and flowing like river of berakat-laden rice on a long table spread out (i.e. read the warning in Al-Qur’an surah al-maida) running from the alun-alun to the masjid agung courtyard where the kawulas and masyarakat need not have to fight, no more risking of limbs, no more sacrificing of lives, end to the violent procedures for the dispersal of blessings.
And here, the royal event planners could gain much by organizing an educational tour to learn a lesson or two from Filipino fiestas, and from the patented creativity of Philippine tourism authorities especially those stationed in still pristine and culture mine-field Mindanao, who have tucked into their hats best practices, road-tested and effective social marketing strategies to sell culture without hitch especially in precarious times such as in the midst of war (i.e. thanks to generous foreign-donors that have been training local government units on culture of peace and capacity-building for good governance). The trip may be organized on anytime of the year as on a year-round basis Philippine villages, towns or cities are never short of events perpetually obsessed at breaking the record and landing on the Guiness World book for the biggest, grandest, longest cultural ‘any-thing’, so that no television networks would go hungry for months and years; many still manage to make big bucks from ‘healthy’ competitioÿÿ to get exclusives (i.e. rights to cover). For all the world to see…well, that maybe… but more particularly, for the vast culture market waiting out there – that advertising moguls might continue to religiously rake in blessings by rightly positioning their products in a ‘free-for-all’ rebutan of their own on a global scale.
Such could also be initially aimed for by the Grebeg Maulud organizers in Yogyakarta. If this project succeeds, on future Grebeg Maulud, I foresee that everyone’s energy could be productively pooled and positively focused, for instance, people could now properly appreciate the splendor of the gunungan without restless minds anxiously straying to the rebutan. Or else, despondent and desperate, others might need not be resigned to plunge into an endless ferris-wheel ride in the Sekaten outside, instead their eyes could happily feast now on the Kraton’s pusaka. After the feast for the eyes and ears, one might just as orderly line-up and partake of the berakat, with health and safety assured and dignity intact, everyone could peacefully come home, at least, with a fist-full or cupful of the sumptuous nasi kuning from the gunungan. This long line of flowing rice is to be made available the whole day long on Grebeg day. With that accomplished, it could even earn Yogyakarta and its kingship a Guinness’ World record for the longest flowing river of rice and the widest public dispersal of blessing ever. A sure-hit for tourists, positive scholarly reviews and generous media write-ups would not be far behind. And lest it be forgotten, as for revenues that this innovation would invite, this, the regency could use for social improvements, such as decent housing and livelihood for the poor and improvement of drainage and sewerage that would make the perennial problem of banjir (i.e. flooding) in Yogyakarta history.###
When Religion and Culture collide: the Issue of Islam and Javanese Realm
History of Religions in Indonesia pt. 2. 1900 to the Present—
Prof. Bernard Adeney-Risakotta & Dr. Sri Margana
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Roma Ulinnuha-ICRS 2009
Reading:
1. Stephen C. Headley, Durga’s Mosque: Cosmology, Conversion, and Community in Central Javanese Islam (Singapore: ISEAS, 2004)
2. M.C. Riklefs,Polarizing Javanese Society: Islamic and Other Visions (c: 1830- 1930) (Singapore: NUS Press, 2007)
Week #5: Indigenous Religions in Indonesia
When Religion and Culture collide: the Issue of Islam and Javanese Realm
Much has been elaborated on the existence of religion in the one side and the development of culture on the other. In the fertile land of religion in Java, I do emphasize that religion always mingles within it the fabrics of cultural elements. I argue that the religion itself serves as a virtue console in which it brings peaceful teachings as well as a relative flexibility. In so doing, the notion or religion comes to its fullest essence.
Headley (2004) argue that the popular oral wayang repertory continued to function as kind of shared knowledge drawing on many sources (p.417). For most Javanese communities, one of the most favorite sources of the teaching comes undeniably from the stylistic figures of wayang. The fact explains the pivotal aspect when one tries to investigate the religion in Javanese habitus.
In particular, between being Javanese and being Muslim, there are complexities need further meticulous research. Ricklefs’ 2007 study helps us in studying deeper on the issue, but I argue the focus should not ignore the four frames in approaching Javanese and Muslim entities. The four frames cover, firstly, the acceptance of the Javanese to embrace Islam to a certain limit. This element confesses the Islamic dogma but they are not yet performing the teachings of Islam. The second is for those who accepting of both being Javanese and being a pious Muslim. The second category, I argue, has equilibrium of ‘faith’ between the rituals of Javanese and Islam. This particularity does often not present in the research on the religion in Java. The third is those who are strong in Islamic values but they still related to the Javanese cultures. This is different to the second category since the balance is absent. The tendency then can go deeper whether on Islamic or on Javanese values. The last representation is most Muslims who try to rid of the Javanese values from religion. Of course, notwithstanding its limitation, the scheme needs further research on the instances in a certain place and time however such concern should be proposed prior the study of religion in Java.
To sum up, I am of the opinion that in Javanese realm actually there have been no conflicts between Islam and a “Javanese’ rejection of Islam, but the issue has been ultimately the negotiation among the four schemes. The inquiry needs a keen observation to elaborate the religion and culture in Java.
Prof. Bernard Adeney-Risakotta & Dr. Sri Margana
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Roma Ulinnuha-ICRS 2009
Reading:
1. Stephen C. Headley, Durga’s Mosque: Cosmology, Conversion, and Community in Central Javanese Islam (Singapore: ISEAS, 2004)
2. M.C. Riklefs,Polarizing Javanese Society: Islamic and Other Visions (c: 1830- 1930) (Singapore: NUS Press, 2007)
Week #5: Indigenous Religions in Indonesia
When Religion and Culture collide: the Issue of Islam and Javanese Realm
Much has been elaborated on the existence of religion in the one side and the development of culture on the other. In the fertile land of religion in Java, I do emphasize that religion always mingles within it the fabrics of cultural elements. I argue that the religion itself serves as a virtue console in which it brings peaceful teachings as well as a relative flexibility. In so doing, the notion or religion comes to its fullest essence.
Headley (2004) argue that the popular oral wayang repertory continued to function as kind of shared knowledge drawing on many sources (p.417). For most Javanese communities, one of the most favorite sources of the teaching comes undeniably from the stylistic figures of wayang. The fact explains the pivotal aspect when one tries to investigate the religion in Javanese habitus.
In particular, between being Javanese and being Muslim, there are complexities need further meticulous research. Ricklefs’ 2007 study helps us in studying deeper on the issue, but I argue the focus should not ignore the four frames in approaching Javanese and Muslim entities. The four frames cover, firstly, the acceptance of the Javanese to embrace Islam to a certain limit. This element confesses the Islamic dogma but they are not yet performing the teachings of Islam. The second is for those who accepting of both being Javanese and being a pious Muslim. The second category, I argue, has equilibrium of ‘faith’ between the rituals of Javanese and Islam. This particularity does often not present in the research on the religion in Java. The third is those who are strong in Islamic values but they still related to the Javanese cultures. This is different to the second category since the balance is absent. The tendency then can go deeper whether on Islamic or on Javanese values. The last representation is most Muslims who try to rid of the Javanese values from religion. Of course, notwithstanding its limitation, the scheme needs further research on the instances in a certain place and time however such concern should be proposed prior the study of religion in Java.
To sum up, I am of the opinion that in Javanese realm actually there have been no conflicts between Islam and a “Javanese’ rejection of Islam, but the issue has been ultimately the negotiation among the four schemes. The inquiry needs a keen observation to elaborate the religion and culture in Java.
Sabtu, 27 Februari 2010
The Trouble with Nostalgia - Roy Allan B Tolentino
My apologies in advance. I mean no offense with the following observations, and I am sure I am in error somewhere, but allow me to explain.
I have always been mystified by the place the Sultan and the Kraton occupy in the consciousness of Yogyakarta. Perhaps it is because the Philippines never had a kingdom in the scale of Majapahit or Mataram, but I really am perplexed about the cult that surrounds the ruler of Java and all his trappings.
To be quite honest, every visit to the Kraton reminds me of Malacanang in Manila, the official residence of the President of the Republic of the Philippines. More than an administrative office, however, Malacanang to my mind represents the folly of power. Beyond the current shenanigans that take place behind the walls of Malacanang, the building itself contains the relics of the Marcos regime. From murals depicting Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos as the mythical first Filipino man and woman, to the luxurious furnishings, to the infamous pairs of shoes, Malacanang for me represents a time when Filipinos were made fools of by their own leaders. The late President Corazon Aquino famously refused to live in Malacanang, preferring
instead an adjacent guesthouse on the grounds, for the same reasons I have described.
And so forgive me if the pusaka of the Sultan remind me of that. When our guide explained how the carriages had been produced in Holland or England, I could not help but wonder how much those had cost and if that money could have been better used elsewhere. When we saw the portraits of the Sultan and the various mythological attributes ascribed to him, I could not help but remember how Marcos had tried to propagate a revised history of the Philippines which depicted him as a great war hero.
In Shakespeare's Julius Caesar, Cassius famously remarks: "The fault, dear Brutus, lies not in our stars, but in ourselves, that we are underlings." I do not know if there really is, according to an old sociology professor back home, "a human tendency towards oligarchy," but I wonder if this nostalgia of ours simply proves Shakespeare right.
I have always been mystified by the place the Sultan and the Kraton occupy in the consciousness of Yogyakarta. Perhaps it is because the Philippines never had a kingdom in the scale of Majapahit or Mataram, but I really am perplexed about the cult that surrounds the ruler of Java and all his trappings.
To be quite honest, every visit to the Kraton reminds me of Malacanang in Manila, the official residence of the President of the Republic of the Philippines. More than an administrative office, however, Malacanang to my mind represents the folly of power. Beyond the current shenanigans that take place behind the walls of Malacanang, the building itself contains the relics of the Marcos regime. From murals depicting Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos as the mythical first Filipino man and woman, to the luxurious furnishings, to the infamous pairs of shoes, Malacanang for me represents a time when Filipinos were made fools of by their own leaders. The late President Corazon Aquino famously refused to live in Malacanang, preferring
instead an adjacent guesthouse on the grounds, for the same reasons I have described.
And so forgive me if the pusaka of the Sultan remind me of that. When our guide explained how the carriages had been produced in Holland or England, I could not help but wonder how much those had cost and if that money could have been better used elsewhere. When we saw the portraits of the Sultan and the various mythological attributes ascribed to him, I could not help but remember how Marcos had tried to propagate a revised history of the Philippines which depicted him as a great war hero.
In Shakespeare's Julius Caesar, Cassius famously remarks: "The fault, dear Brutus, lies not in our stars, but in ourselves, that we are underlings." I do not know if there really is, according to an old sociology professor back home, "a human tendency towards oligarchy," but I wonder if this nostalgia of ours simply proves Shakespeare right.
Purity and Authenticity - Roy Allan B Tolentino
The theme of this week’s readings leads me to continue reflecting upon the dynamics of religion, its diffusion and assimilation, and the questions of integrity that inevitably arise from such dynamics.
Clifford Geertz’s taxonomy of the “types” of Islam found in Indonesia reveals the variance to which inculturation has been implemented. Although Geertz paints in rather broad strokes in order to differentiate between the “kolot” and “moderen,” and ascribes certain positions to each group, he nonetheless makes a claim which I find troublesome. Geertz says:
“It is very hard, given his tradition and his social structure, for a Javanese to be a ‘real Moslem’ –to accept fully at the deepest emotional levels a religion which, in the words of H.A.R. Gibb ‘set[s] the terms of a new experiment in human religion, an experiment in pure monotheism, unsupported by any of the symbolism or other forms of appeal to the emotions of the common man, which had remained embedded in the earlier monotheistic religions.’” (Geertz 1960:160)
Geertz goes on to describe a tension between the tenets of Islam and the traditional views of the Javanese, a tension which for him can never be fully resolved, despite the attempts of the modernists. The problem, I think, lies in the concept of a “real Moslem,’ to use the term employed by Geertz. Inasmuch as religions must necessarily have features which differentiate them from other religions, what a “real” adherent of religion is proves very difficult to define, much less find. Given that religions and cultures do interpenetrate and influence each other, the ideal of “purity” seems to me to be a pipe dream; at worst, the definition or ideal can be used to buttress certain power and group relations and even perpetuate oppression.
Rather than “purity,” I find that “authenticity” is more helpful. And I would define “authenticity” not merely as compliance with some external measure, but more importantly, authenticity on the level of lived experience. To what extent does this religion permeate the life and consciousness of an individual, of a group? Granted, this makes the discussion more complicated; questions regarding the appraisal of authenticity would inevitably be raised. Moreover, a phenomenology of the religious experience and the experience of authenticity would be required, if only to come to some common understanding of what it means to believe. Such questioning would lead us out of sociology and anthropology and bring us to psychology and philosophy, even theology. And that is a direction that some specialists are unwilling to explore, preferring to stay within the confines of the social sciences.
I think, however, that such a discourse would bring us closer to the reality of the religious experience. To define religion merely in terms of sociological or anthropological data to the detriment of its theological or philosophical underpinnings would be to disregard the place religion holds in the lives of its adherents. To posit a “pure” form of religion would be to forget the dynamics of culture and human systems. Geertz’s evaluation of the Javanese “dilemma” as such comes dangerously close to prescribing a “pure” form of Islam; and I think it is not even Geertz’s place to make that claim at all.
Understanding religion in terms of authenticity and not of purity might allow religions to look at the features common to all those who make some sort of profession of faith. Such an understanding would bode well for inter-religious dialogue and ethical relations between religions. Even if we believe in different things, there is something shared, something human, in the act of believing. Perhaps where concepts of purity divide us, an understanding of authenticity can provide unity.
Geertz, Clifford. The Religion of Java (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960)
Clifford Geertz’s taxonomy of the “types” of Islam found in Indonesia reveals the variance to which inculturation has been implemented. Although Geertz paints in rather broad strokes in order to differentiate between the “kolot” and “moderen,” and ascribes certain positions to each group, he nonetheless makes a claim which I find troublesome. Geertz says:
“It is very hard, given his tradition and his social structure, for a Javanese to be a ‘real Moslem’ –to accept fully at the deepest emotional levels a religion which, in the words of H.A.R. Gibb ‘set[s] the terms of a new experiment in human religion, an experiment in pure monotheism, unsupported by any of the symbolism or other forms of appeal to the emotions of the common man, which had remained embedded in the earlier monotheistic religions.’” (Geertz 1960:160)
Geertz goes on to describe a tension between the tenets of Islam and the traditional views of the Javanese, a tension which for him can never be fully resolved, despite the attempts of the modernists. The problem, I think, lies in the concept of a “real Moslem,’ to use the term employed by Geertz. Inasmuch as religions must necessarily have features which differentiate them from other religions, what a “real” adherent of religion is proves very difficult to define, much less find. Given that religions and cultures do interpenetrate and influence each other, the ideal of “purity” seems to me to be a pipe dream; at worst, the definition or ideal can be used to buttress certain power and group relations and even perpetuate oppression.
Rather than “purity,” I find that “authenticity” is more helpful. And I would define “authenticity” not merely as compliance with some external measure, but more importantly, authenticity on the level of lived experience. To what extent does this religion permeate the life and consciousness of an individual, of a group? Granted, this makes the discussion more complicated; questions regarding the appraisal of authenticity would inevitably be raised. Moreover, a phenomenology of the religious experience and the experience of authenticity would be required, if only to come to some common understanding of what it means to believe. Such questioning would lead us out of sociology and anthropology and bring us to psychology and philosophy, even theology. And that is a direction that some specialists are unwilling to explore, preferring to stay within the confines of the social sciences.
I think, however, that such a discourse would bring us closer to the reality of the religious experience. To define religion merely in terms of sociological or anthropological data to the detriment of its theological or philosophical underpinnings would be to disregard the place religion holds in the lives of its adherents. To posit a “pure” form of religion would be to forget the dynamics of culture and human systems. Geertz’s evaluation of the Javanese “dilemma” as such comes dangerously close to prescribing a “pure” form of Islam; and I think it is not even Geertz’s place to make that claim at all.
Understanding religion in terms of authenticity and not of purity might allow religions to look at the features common to all those who make some sort of profession of faith. Such an understanding would bode well for inter-religious dialogue and ethical relations between religions. Even if we believe in different things, there is something shared, something human, in the act of believing. Perhaps where concepts of purity divide us, an understanding of authenticity can provide unity.
Geertz, Clifford. The Religion of Java (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960)
Minggu, 21 Februari 2010
Cap-cay Thoughts on Religion, Nationalism and Colonialism in Indonesia
By Mucha Q. Arquiza
INDONESIAN RELIGION-BASED NATIONALISM AND CIVIL SOCIETY
Although a little dated, Delia Noer’s (1973) account of the modernist Muslim movement in Indonesia especially in Minangkabau and Java provides important details useful in understanding the present Indonesian religion and politics. Noer stressed the role of education and information access as primary vehicles of Indonesia’s religion-based political movement. By the late 18th century, Indonesian society was already highly literate and its permuda (i.e. young generation) had high level of awareness not only on matters of religion but more so on politics. This was aided in no small measure by the availability and popularity of systems of mass education in both formal and informal setting. With the community-based school system in place, the mass media culture (i.e. journalism and literature in both oral and written forms) subsequently established a popular culture that values religious morality and literacy, dialectically reinforcing and sustaining the peoples’ religious and political education. Education and mass media were beyond the control of colonial hands (i.e. the Dutch) and were allowed to flourish as local initiatives, therefore, its contents freely resonated the Indonesians’ sentiments and aspirations, namely, the majority’s religious ideals and anti-colonial sentiments.
This feature of Indonesia’s modernist movement could be comparable to the Philippines’ Propaganda Movement of the late 19th century. What might have defined the shaping of Indonesian and Philippine nationalisms, and hence contrasting them, were the fact that where the Arab world (particularly Makkah) and western Asia were the intellectual haven for young Indonesian kiyai and ulama, Mother Spain and Europe were the cradle of knowledge for the Philippine illustrados (i.e. elite).
These traditions of cultural and socio-political (i.e. grassroot politics) autonomy have proven to be important resources and social capital not only as foundation of present-day Indonesian civil society, but as impetus and precursor in creating an enabling environment for Indonesian society and peoples’ directly governing their lives sans the state . It is clear even today that Indonesian civil society is imbued with high morale, extreme degree of freedom and political will and enjoys popular patronage. Consequently, the civil society by itself have become an expression of people’s governance, constituted as a synergy of elite moral leadership and politicized grassroot that is readily mobilized and willing to effect change outside of state influence, or even DESPITE the state. This is manifested in organizations such as Muhammadiyah, Nahdatul Ulama, the various Jaringans, pesantrens, and tarekats that have proven to be the sustaining energies behind Indonesia’s community development and progress, especially at grassroot levels, in the midst of perennial bureaucratic anomalies and unhampered corruptions by state leadership. By all indications, Indonesian civil society have become the ‘alternative government’, or else a ‘state-less’ government of and by the people, seeming to affirm the idea that governance can be self-governance of purely popular initiative. It is amusing how an ordinary Javanese have been routinely ignoring the fatwa issued by the government institution, the Majlis Ulama Indonesia (MUI), and instead heed the counsel of her/his kiyai or kaum toa on matters of religious ethics and even politics.
With the blessings of its archipelagic nature (i.e.dispersed population centers; many still remaining as isolated island-territories) and long tradition of highly decentralized autonomous polity at various levels, it is not far-fetched to infer that it is perhaps this dynamism and flux, blended with contemporary realities of an extremely willful and independent-minded people, that have fortunately prevented the full materialization of RI’s so-called ‘democratization’ based purely on Western concepts of centralized bureaucracy, unitary state and government.
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PANCA SILA: TAKE TWO
In my previous posting on ‘Revolution and the Panca Sila’, I argued that while it was theoretically the best formula, Panca Sila came at a wrong time. Specifically, I wanted to note how the PKI would have read the signs of the time: the national consciousness of Indonesian masses was not yet ripe and the political moment required to achieve strategic victory for a socialist revolution was not yet at its peak as the bourgeoisie and elite (i.e. feudal lords and economic oligarchs) still controlled the rein of economic power-base. The main strategists in this project, the Marxist-Leninists in the PKI (i.e. Communist Party of Indonesia) leadership couldn’t have been myopic and missed out this particular detail that without the unjust structures of a class-divided society dismantled, and without the backbone of society (i.e. peasantry) sufficiently awakened and the vanguard working class sufficiently organized - not only to carry out a peoples’ revolution - but more importantly to pick-up the shards in the event of post-conflict reconstruction, it was a political strategy that was deemed to fail from the very onset because it would be reduced to mere exercise of political adventurism (i.e. putzism) on the part of elite central leadership, and true enough, the nationalist revolution went crumbling down headed for a political catastrophe as it was when the communists attempted a coup in the mid 1960s that resulted to the tragic G30S massacre. Indeed, it takes a colossal blunder in history, and unfortunate loss of many lives and dreams, to provide present-day revolutions with important lessons on strategizing poly-contextual and multi-national neocolonial liberation struggles.
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THE DARKER SIDE OF MULTICULTURALISM AND PLURALITY DISCOURSE
The rhetoric of plurality, multiculturalism and tolerance is such a double-edged issue especially when deployed as political tool that many Asian governments, not least of all Indonesia and the Philippines, have exploited and unscrupulously used to ‘anaesthesize’ and render the masses passive and indifferent to social change. To many political activists participating in neocolonialism (anti-imperialism) struggles in SEA, plurality, multiculturalism, and the rhetoric of minority politics often send chills in the back reminiscent of the Cold War era back to the time when Western political strategists (particularly America) hatched and exported by Asian dictators a war virus called ‘Low Intensity Conflict’ (LIC), in Muslim parlance, a fitnah, that pitted sibling against each other, and sent comrades on a frenzy of mass purgation of fellow comrades, bringing out the worst case of distrust and treachery among humankind. In the Philippines, most infamously applied during the height of cold war in the ‘80s against communist-led or -influenced insurgencies especially at a time when revolutionaries have declared that the political playing field had now reached a supposed ‘advanced substage of strategic defensive’ characterized by a substantive degree of consolidated organizing of critical mass-base and having achieved an optimal level of conscientization enabling them, at their own accord and initiative, to launch massive political action in the open that is capable of toppling a reactionary State (e.g. such was perceived to be the stage in 1986 during the People Power revolution in the Philippines that toppled the Marcos regime). Militarily, it was portended to signal the next sub-stage of the revolution where the protracted war of defense was now to be taken into the streets, transforming legal mass actions into urban mass uprising, and complimenting it in the countrysides with bold moves of counter-offensives aimed at ‘liberating frontiers’ or sustaining small pockets of populations and villages where revolutionary governance could then be established and implemented to supplant status quo. As history would show, in the Philippine experience, such were however better said in theory, precisely because LIC had worked out its poison before the political basketball white-board was even ready for execution in practice!
The counter-response from the State was purported to have been a military strategy of at least two components: 1. massive infiltration into the ranks of the insurgents and creating schisms within (as what happened in the Mindanao Left in the early 1990s), and 2. waging battles for the minds and hearts of the mass-base or ‘winning the hearts and mind of the people’. In principle, these basically employed the classic divide-and-rule tactics of colonial wars, whereby the reactionary State might even tactically support identity-based political struggles such as in launching peace-talks (e.g. Peace Processes with MNLF Muslims in southern Philippines, or with Acheh’s GAM, in Indonesia) in the pretexts of accommodating the demands of minority nationalities, these pacification projects or programs of political clemency to insurgents, were in fact disguised strategic move of containment and weakening of a potentially fatal unified country-wide resistance. The ‘peace strategy’ have been coupled with massive efforts of education and information, mobilizing the academia and media as producers and purveyors of knowledge, popularizing a discourse that the political struggle had all along been just a mere cultural or religious war (i.e. a subtler version not different from the Huntington nightmare), befitting no more than ‘cultural’ solutions, hence, ‘eutopian hopes’ (see in Adeney-Risacotta) are peddled in promises that assure social equity is actually possible in non-armed struggle, through ‘negotiations’ for a multicultural and pluralist setting and by inculturating tolerance (as do patience, passivity, suffering and submissiveness) as ‘resurrected’ religious and cultural virtues. Meanwhile historical injustices could actually be redressed and healed, if we are to believe this myth, through inter-cultural as well as interfaith dialogue and other rituals of pacifism. We are so familiar with the stuff: peaceful rally, prayer vigils denouncing war and violence and lots of unpeaceful photo-ops and media coverage of government officials and surrendered insurgents, sometimes graced with holy presences of bishops or ulama, grinning while happily dove-freeing/flying, hand-shaking, candle-lighting, gunungan-cutting-and-sampling, signing peace covenants and singing of peace-hymns, etc. while the guns and bombs in the countrysides continue every ticking second snuffing off lives and obliterating ecology into smithereens, again, alluding to some religious acts or practices captioned as ‘staying tranquil in the midst of chaos’ (i.e. with no intention of poking pun at the Buddhist belief). If these rituals appear to be mostly of catholic or christian ones, it is by no means coincidental, as the LIC strategists are mostly of catholic/christian/jewish neo-conservatives. Yet ironically, disarming the State militia, controlling proliferation of small arms and curbing international arms deals are not to be part of the peaceful strategies. This, an economic side, an unwarranted encroachment into the domains of World Bank-IMF, WTO and the war-tech makers and traders, US and Israel, are, of course, beside the point that are better off conveniently side-lined by locally-spun ‘softer’ human rights issues (i.e. economic, social and cultural rights - ESCR) in half-hearted complaints about government’s violations by ‘commission and omission’ in the increasing burden of a domestic war and vicious counter-insurgency campaigns heaving seriously at the expense of social and economic development , sacrificing the Millenium Development Goals, whileas, in conflict-affected areas, in a split-second, militarization and human insecurity have been the major causes of infant and adult mortality than are low reproductive rights awareness, illiteracy, hunger and disease combined.
Amnesty International recently noted that Philippine Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita reported to the UN Commission that Philippines has been channeling much of the UNDP funds and official development assistance for development to counter-insurgency in the south. But then that would have to be another story.
22 February 2010
INDONESIAN RELIGION-BASED NATIONALISM AND CIVIL SOCIETY
Although a little dated, Delia Noer’s (1973) account of the modernist Muslim movement in Indonesia especially in Minangkabau and Java provides important details useful in understanding the present Indonesian religion and politics. Noer stressed the role of education and information access as primary vehicles of Indonesia’s religion-based political movement. By the late 18th century, Indonesian society was already highly literate and its permuda (i.e. young generation) had high level of awareness not only on matters of religion but more so on politics. This was aided in no small measure by the availability and popularity of systems of mass education in both formal and informal setting. With the community-based school system in place, the mass media culture (i.e. journalism and literature in both oral and written forms) subsequently established a popular culture that values religious morality and literacy, dialectically reinforcing and sustaining the peoples’ religious and political education. Education and mass media were beyond the control of colonial hands (i.e. the Dutch) and were allowed to flourish as local initiatives, therefore, its contents freely resonated the Indonesians’ sentiments and aspirations, namely, the majority’s religious ideals and anti-colonial sentiments.
This feature of Indonesia’s modernist movement could be comparable to the Philippines’ Propaganda Movement of the late 19th century. What might have defined the shaping of Indonesian and Philippine nationalisms, and hence contrasting them, were the fact that where the Arab world (particularly Makkah) and western Asia were the intellectual haven for young Indonesian kiyai and ulama, Mother Spain and Europe were the cradle of knowledge for the Philippine illustrados (i.e. elite).
These traditions of cultural and socio-political (i.e. grassroot politics) autonomy have proven to be important resources and social capital not only as foundation of present-day Indonesian civil society, but as impetus and precursor in creating an enabling environment for Indonesian society and peoples’ directly governing their lives sans the state . It is clear even today that Indonesian civil society is imbued with high morale, extreme degree of freedom and political will and enjoys popular patronage. Consequently, the civil society by itself have become an expression of people’s governance, constituted as a synergy of elite moral leadership and politicized grassroot that is readily mobilized and willing to effect change outside of state influence, or even DESPITE the state. This is manifested in organizations such as Muhammadiyah, Nahdatul Ulama, the various Jaringans, pesantrens, and tarekats that have proven to be the sustaining energies behind Indonesia’s community development and progress, especially at grassroot levels, in the midst of perennial bureaucratic anomalies and unhampered corruptions by state leadership. By all indications, Indonesian civil society have become the ‘alternative government’, or else a ‘state-less’ government of and by the people, seeming to affirm the idea that governance can be self-governance of purely popular initiative. It is amusing how an ordinary Javanese have been routinely ignoring the fatwa issued by the government institution, the Majlis Ulama Indonesia (MUI), and instead heed the counsel of her/his kiyai or kaum toa on matters of religious ethics and even politics.
With the blessings of its archipelagic nature (i.e.dispersed population centers; many still remaining as isolated island-territories) and long tradition of highly decentralized autonomous polity at various levels, it is not far-fetched to infer that it is perhaps this dynamism and flux, blended with contemporary realities of an extremely willful and independent-minded people, that have fortunately prevented the full materialization of RI’s so-called ‘democratization’ based purely on Western concepts of centralized bureaucracy, unitary state and government.
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PANCA SILA: TAKE TWO
In my previous posting on ‘Revolution and the Panca Sila’, I argued that while it was theoretically the best formula, Panca Sila came at a wrong time. Specifically, I wanted to note how the PKI would have read the signs of the time: the national consciousness of Indonesian masses was not yet ripe and the political moment required to achieve strategic victory for a socialist revolution was not yet at its peak as the bourgeoisie and elite (i.e. feudal lords and economic oligarchs) still controlled the rein of economic power-base. The main strategists in this project, the Marxist-Leninists in the PKI (i.e. Communist Party of Indonesia) leadership couldn’t have been myopic and missed out this particular detail that without the unjust structures of a class-divided society dismantled, and without the backbone of society (i.e. peasantry) sufficiently awakened and the vanguard working class sufficiently organized - not only to carry out a peoples’ revolution - but more importantly to pick-up the shards in the event of post-conflict reconstruction, it was a political strategy that was deemed to fail from the very onset because it would be reduced to mere exercise of political adventurism (i.e. putzism) on the part of elite central leadership, and true enough, the nationalist revolution went crumbling down headed for a political catastrophe as it was when the communists attempted a coup in the mid 1960s that resulted to the tragic G30S massacre. Indeed, it takes a colossal blunder in history, and unfortunate loss of many lives and dreams, to provide present-day revolutions with important lessons on strategizing poly-contextual and multi-national neocolonial liberation struggles.
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THE DARKER SIDE OF MULTICULTURALISM AND PLURALITY DISCOURSE
The rhetoric of plurality, multiculturalism and tolerance is such a double-edged issue especially when deployed as political tool that many Asian governments, not least of all Indonesia and the Philippines, have exploited and unscrupulously used to ‘anaesthesize’ and render the masses passive and indifferent to social change. To many political activists participating in neocolonialism (anti-imperialism) struggles in SEA, plurality, multiculturalism, and the rhetoric of minority politics often send chills in the back reminiscent of the Cold War era back to the time when Western political strategists (particularly America) hatched and exported by Asian dictators a war virus called ‘Low Intensity Conflict’ (LIC), in Muslim parlance, a fitnah, that pitted sibling against each other, and sent comrades on a frenzy of mass purgation of fellow comrades, bringing out the worst case of distrust and treachery among humankind. In the Philippines, most infamously applied during the height of cold war in the ‘80s against communist-led or -influenced insurgencies especially at a time when revolutionaries have declared that the political playing field had now reached a supposed ‘advanced substage of strategic defensive’ characterized by a substantive degree of consolidated organizing of critical mass-base and having achieved an optimal level of conscientization enabling them, at their own accord and initiative, to launch massive political action in the open that is capable of toppling a reactionary State (e.g. such was perceived to be the stage in 1986 during the People Power revolution in the Philippines that toppled the Marcos regime). Militarily, it was portended to signal the next sub-stage of the revolution where the protracted war of defense was now to be taken into the streets, transforming legal mass actions into urban mass uprising, and complimenting it in the countrysides with bold moves of counter-offensives aimed at ‘liberating frontiers’ or sustaining small pockets of populations and villages where revolutionary governance could then be established and implemented to supplant status quo. As history would show, in the Philippine experience, such were however better said in theory, precisely because LIC had worked out its poison before the political basketball white-board was even ready for execution in practice!
The counter-response from the State was purported to have been a military strategy of at least two components: 1. massive infiltration into the ranks of the insurgents and creating schisms within (as what happened in the Mindanao Left in the early 1990s), and 2. waging battles for the minds and hearts of the mass-base or ‘winning the hearts and mind of the people’. In principle, these basically employed the classic divide-and-rule tactics of colonial wars, whereby the reactionary State might even tactically support identity-based political struggles such as in launching peace-talks (e.g. Peace Processes with MNLF Muslims in southern Philippines, or with Acheh’s GAM, in Indonesia) in the pretexts of accommodating the demands of minority nationalities, these pacification projects or programs of political clemency to insurgents, were in fact disguised strategic move of containment and weakening of a potentially fatal unified country-wide resistance. The ‘peace strategy’ have been coupled with massive efforts of education and information, mobilizing the academia and media as producers and purveyors of knowledge, popularizing a discourse that the political struggle had all along been just a mere cultural or religious war (i.e. a subtler version not different from the Huntington nightmare), befitting no more than ‘cultural’ solutions, hence, ‘eutopian hopes’ (see in Adeney-Risacotta) are peddled in promises that assure social equity is actually possible in non-armed struggle, through ‘negotiations’ for a multicultural and pluralist setting and by inculturating tolerance (as do patience, passivity, suffering and submissiveness) as ‘resurrected’ religious and cultural virtues. Meanwhile historical injustices could actually be redressed and healed, if we are to believe this myth, through inter-cultural as well as interfaith dialogue and other rituals of pacifism. We are so familiar with the stuff: peaceful rally, prayer vigils denouncing war and violence and lots of unpeaceful photo-ops and media coverage of government officials and surrendered insurgents, sometimes graced with holy presences of bishops or ulama, grinning while happily dove-freeing/flying, hand-shaking, candle-lighting, gunungan-cutting-and-sampling, signing peace covenants and singing of peace-hymns, etc. while the guns and bombs in the countrysides continue every ticking second snuffing off lives and obliterating ecology into smithereens, again, alluding to some religious acts or practices captioned as ‘staying tranquil in the midst of chaos’ (i.e. with no intention of poking pun at the Buddhist belief). If these rituals appear to be mostly of catholic or christian ones, it is by no means coincidental, as the LIC strategists are mostly of catholic/christian/jewish neo-conservatives. Yet ironically, disarming the State militia, controlling proliferation of small arms and curbing international arms deals are not to be part of the peaceful strategies. This, an economic side, an unwarranted encroachment into the domains of World Bank-IMF, WTO and the war-tech makers and traders, US and Israel, are, of course, beside the point that are better off conveniently side-lined by locally-spun ‘softer’ human rights issues (i.e. economic, social and cultural rights - ESCR) in half-hearted complaints about government’s violations by ‘commission and omission’ in the increasing burden of a domestic war and vicious counter-insurgency campaigns heaving seriously at the expense of social and economic development , sacrificing the Millenium Development Goals, whileas, in conflict-affected areas, in a split-second, militarization and human insecurity have been the major causes of infant and adult mortality than are low reproductive rights awareness, illiteracy, hunger and disease combined.
Amnesty International recently noted that Philippine Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita reported to the UN Commission that Philippines has been channeling much of the UNDP funds and official development assistance for development to counter-insurgency in the south. But then that would have to be another story.
22 February 2010
Religion and Nationalism in Indonesia
Kristanto Budiprabowo (TATOK)
There are at least three considerations to see the complexity of the relation between religion and Indonesian nationalism during the struggle to build Indonesia. First, there were some efforts to institutionalize religious groups. As a new organization they struggle in different purposes and goals but basically found the form because of influence by colonialism and the movement of Islam in the world. Consequently on one side, organization or institutional ideas in modern though influence the formation of particular religious group and on the other, religious values and organizational system based on traditional though still exist in more deep exception. In the optimism of the effort to build the nation-state this institutionalization of religious groups found their various form. But in this situation there was a long story behind the existence of the religious institution building that not only cause by the euphoria to reach independency but also to establish religious teaching in facing Christianity and communism. So nationalism growth cause by complex reason and happened in a proper time when many countries struggle with the same situation.
Second, because Dutch was not build enough school for local people, initiated by young reformist the ideological teaching spreading among local religious groups through their own system that inherited from the religious origin and their culture. The need of education and ideological new ideas that based on religious teaching further met with the modern ideas about nationality and the form of nation-state. The result was the building of the school of thought in very various forms also. But it is over generalized if we correlated all of the effort to build that school of thought have a political motive. In order to give best serve to the adherent and society in common, religion always struggle with power. If the immediate power position is in the different side of the religious organization, the struggle can be the opposition attitude that trigger to the open clash between religious organization and the government.
Third, there was also the role of some person who has good relationship with various communities and social and political movement. Their new idea and their religiosity complement each other and build a unique person with specific noble characteristic. Some of them have international networking especially in the ideological group which at the time compete each other. In this case, Sukarno is perfect example. His religious and belief background combine by his organizational experience and intelligent not only produced excellent idea concerning Indonesia nationality but also challenging religious group to build organizational system more effectively in politic. There were also many brilliant persons who struggle deeply in their religiosity and their nationality in one consciousness. It was seems that someone who can make balance religious thought and political idea he/she can survive. The negotiating skill was the important skill.
The combination of these three aspects has an important contribution in early Indonesian struggle on nationality. As a big pluralistic community, Indonesian experience happened in the good time when international political situation also struggling to find the best nation-state formation. Combination or balancing tension between religious idea on a religious country and philosophical idea on secular country has big consequence as we see in today Indonesia.
Kristanto Budiprabowo (TATOK)
There are at least three considerations to see the complexity of the relation between religion and Indonesian nationalism during the struggle to build Indonesia. First, there were some efforts to institutionalize religious groups. As a new organization they struggle in different purposes and goals but basically found the form because of influence by colonialism and the movement of Islam in the world. Consequently on one side, organization or institutional ideas in modern though influence the formation of particular religious group and on the other, religious values and organizational system based on traditional though still exist in more deep exception. In the optimism of the effort to build the nation-state this institutionalization of religious groups found their various form. But in this situation there was a long story behind the existence of the religious institution building that not only cause by the euphoria to reach independency but also to establish religious teaching in facing Christianity and communism. So nationalism growth cause by complex reason and happened in a proper time when many countries struggle with the same situation.
Second, because Dutch was not build enough school for local people, initiated by young reformist the ideological teaching spreading among local religious groups through their own system that inherited from the religious origin and their culture. The need of education and ideological new ideas that based on religious teaching further met with the modern ideas about nationality and the form of nation-state. The result was the building of the school of thought in very various forms also. But it is over generalized if we correlated all of the effort to build that school of thought have a political motive. In order to give best serve to the adherent and society in common, religion always struggle with power. If the immediate power position is in the different side of the religious organization, the struggle can be the opposition attitude that trigger to the open clash between religious organization and the government.
Third, there was also the role of some person who has good relationship with various communities and social and political movement. Their new idea and their religiosity complement each other and build a unique person with specific noble characteristic. Some of them have international networking especially in the ideological group which at the time compete each other. In this case, Sukarno is perfect example. His religious and belief background combine by his organizational experience and intelligent not only produced excellent idea concerning Indonesia nationality but also challenging religious group to build organizational system more effectively in politic. There were also many brilliant persons who struggle deeply in their religiosity and their nationality in one consciousness. It was seems that someone who can make balance religious thought and political idea he/she can survive. The negotiating skill was the important skill.
The combination of these three aspects has an important contribution in early Indonesian struggle on nationality. As a big pluralistic community, Indonesian experience happened in the good time when international political situation also struggling to find the best nation-state formation. Combination or balancing tension between religious idea on a religious country and philosophical idea on secular country has big consequence as we see in today Indonesia.
Religion and nationalism: Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 1900-1942
Tri Harmaji
History of Religions in Indonesia Part II: from c. 1900 to the Present
Religion and nationalism: Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 1900-1942
I think the question of this lecture and also the question that is tried to answer in this reading, what and how the relation between religion and nationalism is, is very important thing in the context of Indonesia. Indonesia is a religious country as well as ‘a secular country’. As religious country Indonesia highly considers the importance of religion but as a secular country Indonesia base its philosophy and law on more secular value and not on one particular religious value. Here to know the relation between religions as one of the most important entities in the life of society and nationalism the most important ideology to unite the diverse community in the country finds its important ground.
Deliar Noer has explained well of how in the first decades before the independence of Indonesia religion, and especially Islam, has served the function of ‘nationalism’ to unite Indonesian people against the Dutch colonial. Noer explains that Islam has effectively become the only enemy and obstacle of the colonial government to rule and exploit Indonesian people. In other entities of Indonesia such as race and kingdom have no strong hatred other that economic interest, Islam has religious hatred toward the Dutch colonial that they consider as infidel or kafir, something that actually much strongest than any other hatred. This hatred was also strengthened by the fact of crusade that put East Islamic world and West Christian world as lasting enemy.
This special characteristic (Islam against the Dutch colonial) then created a kind of consciousness that Islam is the only identity that can clearly and definitely separate and differentiate Indonesian people from the colonial government. This consciousness emerged more when many Islamic leaders perceived the later Dutch’s intention to convert all Indonesian people, and especially the Muslim, into Christianity as one of its strategies to establish its good colonial rule over all Indonesian people. This consciousness made Islamic leaders to think of creating something that could be used to refuse and ‘fight’ against this Dutch intention. What then emerged from this problem is some Islamic organization that especially worked on the educational matters as a response of the government restriction for Islamic children to enter their schools. These organizations then found their own schools for Muslim children. These schools firstly focused more on religious teaching but later, as it was stated by Muhammadiah, also gave attention for more secular things. Muhammadiah also one organization that encouraged people to be proud of being Muslim and made Islam as their first identity in the face of the Dutch colonial government.
It this reading I do agree if the author has clearly explained of how the first days Islam has become the most important identity against the Dutch; Islam has actually become the first ‘nationalism’ of Indonesia. It is good writing, but my question here is how is about other religion? Like we know, other religious people were also involved in the independence struggle; then is their religion also use to served as ‘nationalism’ against the Dutch? Until now Hinduism and Buddhism never became the important indentity of Indonesia and even Christianity often put closed to the West, now Islam, like what appeared from many Islamic political parties, was stayed against the nationalist one. So, how can if in the first time Islam has served as nationalism but in the end she becomes the ‘enemy’ of nationalism?
History of Religions in Indonesia Part II: from c. 1900 to the Present
Religion and nationalism: Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 1900-1942
I think the question of this lecture and also the question that is tried to answer in this reading, what and how the relation between religion and nationalism is, is very important thing in the context of Indonesia. Indonesia is a religious country as well as ‘a secular country’. As religious country Indonesia highly considers the importance of religion but as a secular country Indonesia base its philosophy and law on more secular value and not on one particular religious value. Here to know the relation between religions as one of the most important entities in the life of society and nationalism the most important ideology to unite the diverse community in the country finds its important ground.
Deliar Noer has explained well of how in the first decades before the independence of Indonesia religion, and especially Islam, has served the function of ‘nationalism’ to unite Indonesian people against the Dutch colonial. Noer explains that Islam has effectively become the only enemy and obstacle of the colonial government to rule and exploit Indonesian people. In other entities of Indonesia such as race and kingdom have no strong hatred other that economic interest, Islam has religious hatred toward the Dutch colonial that they consider as infidel or kafir, something that actually much strongest than any other hatred. This hatred was also strengthened by the fact of crusade that put East Islamic world and West Christian world as lasting enemy.
This special characteristic (Islam against the Dutch colonial) then created a kind of consciousness that Islam is the only identity that can clearly and definitely separate and differentiate Indonesian people from the colonial government. This consciousness emerged more when many Islamic leaders perceived the later Dutch’s intention to convert all Indonesian people, and especially the Muslim, into Christianity as one of its strategies to establish its good colonial rule over all Indonesian people. This consciousness made Islamic leaders to think of creating something that could be used to refuse and ‘fight’ against this Dutch intention. What then emerged from this problem is some Islamic organization that especially worked on the educational matters as a response of the government restriction for Islamic children to enter their schools. These organizations then found their own schools for Muslim children. These schools firstly focused more on religious teaching but later, as it was stated by Muhammadiah, also gave attention for more secular things. Muhammadiah also one organization that encouraged people to be proud of being Muslim and made Islam as their first identity in the face of the Dutch colonial government.
It this reading I do agree if the author has clearly explained of how the first days Islam has become the most important identity against the Dutch; Islam has actually become the first ‘nationalism’ of Indonesia. It is good writing, but my question here is how is about other religion? Like we know, other religious people were also involved in the independence struggle; then is their religion also use to served as ‘nationalism’ against the Dutch? Until now Hinduism and Buddhism never became the important indentity of Indonesia and even Christianity often put closed to the West, now Islam, like what appeared from many Islamic political parties, was stayed against the nationalist one. So, how can if in the first time Islam has served as nationalism but in the end she becomes the ‘enemy’ of nationalism?
Religion and Nationalism by Joko Wicoyo
After an introduction which describes the general roles of Islam in a modernizing society and illustrates the traditional role of Islam in Indonesia, the writer proceeds to a clear and detailed historical account of Indonesian Islamic reformism.
The first section describes reformist educational-social-religious-tendentious emerging in the early twentieth century among Minangkabau and Arabs, then mobilized by such organizations like the Muhammadiyah and Persatuan Islam. The second section provides an account of such reformist political parties as Sarekat Islam, which was established in 1911 and shared many of the reformist beliefs. The third section considers the Dutch reaction to those movements expressed both in governmental repression and missionary competition. The forth section analyzes the response of traditionalist and nationalists, the former rejecting reform in favor of the old schools of law (madzhap), rites, charms and mysticism, while the latter subordinated God to the romanticized motherland. The writer’s conclusion usefully formulates the basic presuppositions of these four factions and the essential tenets of reformation in Indonesia.
In my mind, this book doesn’t claim a central thesis. It only states certain patterns which illustrate the general image of reformism in Indonesia by giving account of historical context to such ethnographic dichotomies as santri/abangan as emphasized by the work of Clifford Geertz, and by stressing the influence of Dutch Christianity on reformism. I think the writer gave detailed and insightful illustrations about the role of educational-social-religious reformists and their roles to compete with the challenging forces of Dutch colonialism and Christian penetration by not to continue their traditional activities to uphold Islam. He suggested to apply new methods which had been brought by the colonial and the Christian missionary powers to make educational-social-religious reformists’ movements succeeded. I think this issue will attract young Indonesian generation in enriching their perspectives towards the social, cultural educational and political movements which were based on religious awareness which was used to be the basic spiritual principle to fight colonialism and Christianity brought by the Dutch in that time. I think in this book, Delia Noer was successful to synthesize an impressive array of Dutch, Indonesian and Malay documents as well as interviews with major figures and their descendents like Sjech Ahmad Chatib, Sjech Thaher Djalaludin, Sjech Muhammad Djamil Djhambek. HAMKA, Haji Abdullah Ahmad etc.
The first section describes reformist educational-social-religious-tendentious emerging in the early twentieth century among Minangkabau and Arabs, then mobilized by such organizations like the Muhammadiyah and Persatuan Islam. The second section provides an account of such reformist political parties as Sarekat Islam, which was established in 1911 and shared many of the reformist beliefs. The third section considers the Dutch reaction to those movements expressed both in governmental repression and missionary competition. The forth section analyzes the response of traditionalist and nationalists, the former rejecting reform in favor of the old schools of law (madzhap), rites, charms and mysticism, while the latter subordinated God to the romanticized motherland. The writer’s conclusion usefully formulates the basic presuppositions of these four factions and the essential tenets of reformation in Indonesia.
In my mind, this book doesn’t claim a central thesis. It only states certain patterns which illustrate the general image of reformism in Indonesia by giving account of historical context to such ethnographic dichotomies as santri/abangan as emphasized by the work of Clifford Geertz, and by stressing the influence of Dutch Christianity on reformism. I think the writer gave detailed and insightful illustrations about the role of educational-social-religious reformists and their roles to compete with the challenging forces of Dutch colonialism and Christian penetration by not to continue their traditional activities to uphold Islam. He suggested to apply new methods which had been brought by the colonial and the Christian missionary powers to make educational-social-religious reformists’ movements succeeded. I think this issue will attract young Indonesian generation in enriching their perspectives towards the social, cultural educational and political movements which were based on religious awareness which was used to be the basic spiritual principle to fight colonialism and Christianity brought by the Dutch in that time. I think in this book, Delia Noer was successful to synthesize an impressive array of Dutch, Indonesian and Malay documents as well as interviews with major figures and their descendents like Sjech Ahmad Chatib, Sjech Thaher Djalaludin, Sjech Muhammad Djamil Djhambek. HAMKA, Haji Abdullah Ahmad etc.
Islam and Nationalism in Indonesian Context by Faqihuddin Abdul Kodir
Nationalism in wide meaning, I think, can be defined as loving the own country by uniting its people, championing for their prosperity, and fighting against its enemies. Having a common norm shared by members of the country, at most, also can be the first content of nationalism. As it is a new concept introduced contemporarily by Western civilization, before Indonesia was formed in 1945, the only social and ideological norm in which Indonesian people of diverse ethnics and social backgrounds can share their needs is religion. In this respect, I am in agreement with Deliar Noer that “Islam was the synonymous with nationality”. (p. 7).
Noer argues that being Muslim in colonial period “meant that the person concerned belonged to the indigenous population whether Malay, Javanese, or others”. Malay meant Muslim, and converting into Islam was also called as being Malay. It was also true for Javanese people, since they called all Bumiputera (literally sons of the earth/island) wong selam or Muslims vis a vis the Dutch as wong kape, the infidels which were the imperialists. He argues also that the most ideological norm that often used widely by Indonesian people to fight the imperialist is Islam and that any movement against Dutch in Indonesia was originally that of Muslims. He concludes accordingly that “It can be said that nationalism in Indonesia started with Muslim nationalism”. (P. 7).
What does the notion mean? Does it mean that Indonesia belongs to Muslims? Indonesian nationalism should be based on religion that is Islam? Indonesian state should be operated in accordance to Islam? Practically Indonesian Muslims have disputed about the notion from the beginning they founded Indonesian state when they prepared to its independence in 1945. Indonesian nationalism, in the next searching of a common geographic, linguistic, cultural, and historical identity for all of diverse ethnics and religions of members of the archipelago, have designated the dispute among the founders and the leaders. Practically, those who were educated and influenced by Western way of thought led the country and fashioned its fundamental constitution. In the next historical moments of Indonesia, “Ideological Islam” was marginalized by Soekarno and Soeharto.
However, if we are willing to bring back “Ideological Islam” into the account of “Indonesian nationalism” based on the fact that it played its important role in the very critical moment of Indonesia in pre-independence period, I think, we should be ready also to bring back “Ideological socialism and communism” in our debate as it played also the same important role in uniting Indonesia people to fight against imperialism. Indonesian nationalism is not a final notion, in which the state can monopolize its meaning against any different attempt to define it, whether form Islam, socialism, or communism, or other.
Noer argues that being Muslim in colonial period “meant that the person concerned belonged to the indigenous population whether Malay, Javanese, or others”. Malay meant Muslim, and converting into Islam was also called as being Malay. It was also true for Javanese people, since they called all Bumiputera (literally sons of the earth/island) wong selam or Muslims vis a vis the Dutch as wong kape, the infidels which were the imperialists. He argues also that the most ideological norm that often used widely by Indonesian people to fight the imperialist is Islam and that any movement against Dutch in Indonesia was originally that of Muslims. He concludes accordingly that “It can be said that nationalism in Indonesia started with Muslim nationalism”. (P. 7).
What does the notion mean? Does it mean that Indonesia belongs to Muslims? Indonesian nationalism should be based on religion that is Islam? Indonesian state should be operated in accordance to Islam? Practically Indonesian Muslims have disputed about the notion from the beginning they founded Indonesian state when they prepared to its independence in 1945. Indonesian nationalism, in the next searching of a common geographic, linguistic, cultural, and historical identity for all of diverse ethnics and religions of members of the archipelago, have designated the dispute among the founders and the leaders. Practically, those who were educated and influenced by Western way of thought led the country and fashioned its fundamental constitution. In the next historical moments of Indonesia, “Ideological Islam” was marginalized by Soekarno and Soeharto.
However, if we are willing to bring back “Ideological Islam” into the account of “Indonesian nationalism” based on the fact that it played its important role in the very critical moment of Indonesia in pre-independence period, I think, we should be ready also to bring back “Ideological socialism and communism” in our debate as it played also the same important role in uniting Indonesia people to fight against imperialism. Indonesian nationalism is not a final notion, in which the state can monopolize its meaning against any different attempt to define it, whether form Islam, socialism, or communism, or other.
Islam and Nationalism by Nina Mariani Noor
Talking about nationalism in Indonesia, particularly in colonialism era, we can not neglect the rule of religion in supporting the emerging of nationalism. Deliar Noer, in his book have succeeded describing some religion movements (Islam) which directly influenced the spirit of Indonesian to get their independence.
It is interesting that Noer points out that Indonesian nationalism meaning Muslim Nationalism (p.7). Before I read this book, although I know that most of struggles done during Dutch colonialism were under Islam banner, I never thought that idea.
The increasing number of Indonesian people who did pilgrimage (hajj) did amplified the force to oppose Dutch who colonized Indonesia for hundreds of year. It is shown by the noteworthy number of rebellions to Dutch or revolts which were led by haji. It seems that being Hajj at that time truly valuable in struggling for a better life for their community. Trying to bring these circumstances into today’s situation in which every year, the number of Muslims who go pilgrimage increases significantly. It can be assumed that many hajj will struggle with their people to improve their quality of life. Unfortunately, it seems for me that many hajis now do not do it at all since there are still many people, particularly Muslims who still live in poverty.
In my opinion, by depicting some Muslim movements which were established by Muslims from different areas and different background such as Djamiat Chair in Jakarta, Persyarikatan Ulama in Majalengka, Muhammadiyah in Yogyakarta, Persis in Bandung, and some movements in Minangkabau, Noer has effectively convinced the readers about the fact that Muslims really took part essentially in growing nationalism among Indonesian Muslims at that time through social and educational movements regardless their diversities in understanding and practicing Islamic teachings.
It is interesting that Noer points out that Indonesian nationalism meaning Muslim Nationalism (p.7). Before I read this book, although I know that most of struggles done during Dutch colonialism were under Islam banner, I never thought that idea.
The increasing number of Indonesian people who did pilgrimage (hajj) did amplified the force to oppose Dutch who colonized Indonesia for hundreds of year. It is shown by the noteworthy number of rebellions to Dutch or revolts which were led by haji. It seems that being Hajj at that time truly valuable in struggling for a better life for their community. Trying to bring these circumstances into today’s situation in which every year, the number of Muslims who go pilgrimage increases significantly. It can be assumed that many hajj will struggle with their people to improve their quality of life. Unfortunately, it seems for me that many hajis now do not do it at all since there are still many people, particularly Muslims who still live in poverty.
In my opinion, by depicting some Muslim movements which were established by Muslims from different areas and different background such as Djamiat Chair in Jakarta, Persyarikatan Ulama in Majalengka, Muhammadiyah in Yogyakarta, Persis in Bandung, and some movements in Minangkabau, Noer has effectively convinced the readers about the fact that Muslims really took part essentially in growing nationalism among Indonesian Muslims at that time through social and educational movements regardless their diversities in understanding and practicing Islamic teachings.
Religion and Nationalism: Should they stand in opposite poles? by Timotius Wibowo
As some articles in the previous weeks show us, Moslem people had played a quite important role in Indonesia’s revolution of independency. Despite this fact, Islam does not be automatically credited if one talks about Indonesia’s nationalism. In recent political discourse, religion (in this case, Islam) and nationalism are often seen as two opposite poles. Political parties that involves in the elections can be categorized in two groups, the parties with a religious platform and the parties with nationalism platform. This situation indicates that religion and nationalism sit in different chairs.
In the Introduction of his book, The Modernist Muslim Movements in Indonesia 1900-1942, Deliar Noer writes, “It can be said that nationalism in Indonesia started with Muslim nationalism” (p.7). This sentence seems to be a logical conclusion drawn from the fact that most of important revolutionary movements in Indonesia were held by Muslim people. However, in my opinion, such a conclusion needs criticizing since “Muslim nationalism” is in itself a problematic terminology. The Islamic concept of nationality, as Noer explains in his next sentences, is in fact a “multi-ethnicity of Moslem people.” This concept is certainly different with the concept of nationalism in a pluralistic sense.
The history of Islamic movements in Indonesia shows that their leaders fought for their own religious interests. That is why the goal of such movements is in fact a process of Islamization. In other words, they were motivated more by “religion building” than “nation building.” One may argues that the first should be done for the sake of the second. This argument, in my opinion, neglects the context of multi-ethnicity and multi-religiosity of Indonesia people.
Islamic revolts against Dutch and Japanese were certainly anti-colonialism movements. However, the process of Islamization of Indonesia’s archipelago could also be regarded as a “religious-colonialism.” Moreover, since the process of Islamization was often accompanied with the replacement of Indonesian cultures with Arabic cultures, it then could be regarded as a “cultural-colonialism.” This way of thinking is certainly true not only for Islam, but also for any religion that applied the same process in Indonesia’s archipelago. In the pluralistic context of Indonesia, in my opinion, it was the spirit of proselytization that had thrown religions to the opposite pole of nationalism.
Should religions be in the opposite pole against nationalism? No, it should not. On the contrary, religions should play their important roles in the future of Indonesia. To play such important roles, religious people should determine the proper place of their own religion in the pluralistic reality of Indonesia (see Noer, p. 1). This is certainly never an easy process since it might also need a theological renewal as suggested by Bachtiar Effendy (in Islam and the State in Indonesia, p. 66). In short, religious people of Indonesia (especially their religious leaders) need to revisit their basic principles of relating their religious “ideology” with the spirit of nationalism.
In the Introduction of his book, The Modernist Muslim Movements in Indonesia 1900-1942, Deliar Noer writes, “It can be said that nationalism in Indonesia started with Muslim nationalism” (p.7). This sentence seems to be a logical conclusion drawn from the fact that most of important revolutionary movements in Indonesia were held by Muslim people. However, in my opinion, such a conclusion needs criticizing since “Muslim nationalism” is in itself a problematic terminology. The Islamic concept of nationality, as Noer explains in his next sentences, is in fact a “multi-ethnicity of Moslem people.” This concept is certainly different with the concept of nationalism in a pluralistic sense.
The history of Islamic movements in Indonesia shows that their leaders fought for their own religious interests. That is why the goal of such movements is in fact a process of Islamization. In other words, they were motivated more by “religion building” than “nation building.” One may argues that the first should be done for the sake of the second. This argument, in my opinion, neglects the context of multi-ethnicity and multi-religiosity of Indonesia people.
Islamic revolts against Dutch and Japanese were certainly anti-colonialism movements. However, the process of Islamization of Indonesia’s archipelago could also be regarded as a “religious-colonialism.” Moreover, since the process of Islamization was often accompanied with the replacement of Indonesian cultures with Arabic cultures, it then could be regarded as a “cultural-colonialism.” This way of thinking is certainly true not only for Islam, but also for any religion that applied the same process in Indonesia’s archipelago. In the pluralistic context of Indonesia, in my opinion, it was the spirit of proselytization that had thrown religions to the opposite pole of nationalism.
Should religions be in the opposite pole against nationalism? No, it should not. On the contrary, religions should play their important roles in the future of Indonesia. To play such important roles, religious people should determine the proper place of their own religion in the pluralistic reality of Indonesia (see Noer, p. 1). This is certainly never an easy process since it might also need a theological renewal as suggested by Bachtiar Effendy (in Islam and the State in Indonesia, p. 66). In short, religious people of Indonesia (especially their religious leaders) need to revisit their basic principles of relating their religious “ideology” with the spirit of nationalism.
Two Mainstreams of Contestation: Religion and Nationalism in Indonesia
History of Religions in Indonesia pt. 2. 1900 to the Present—
Prof. Bernard Adeney-Risakotta & Dr. Sri Margana
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Roma Ulinnuha-ICRS 2009
Reading:
1. Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 1900 -1942 (Singapore:Oxfopd University Press, 1973)
2. Surwandono, The Islamic Political Thoughts, (Yogyakarta: LPPI, 2001), p. 25-26.
Week #4: Religion and Nationalism
Two Mainstreams of Contestation: Religion and Nationalism in Indonesia
The religious movement played a significant role in promoting a nationalism sense in Indonesia. As I noted earlier in Religion and Colonialism weekly report, there have been transformations in carrying out nationalism aspects—from the struggle for Indonesian’ independence, the formation of the state to the consensus of the way of life Indonesia. Notwithstanding its difference, the spirit of nationalism is central.
Deliar Noer (1973) states that the Muslims in Indonesia have often been involved in theoretical and ideological controversies, either with the secular nationalists or amongst themselves (p. 4). Noer basically addresses the three transformations that I have already mentioned earlier. He depicted how Muslim institutions and intellectuals had been influenced much from education type of strategies. In order to present the issue, the history and the empowerment of the educated people in Indonesia were shown applying historical perspective.
I think the evidence of the massive tribute from religious entities toward Indonesian nationalism is manifest, however the issue goes deeply on the contestation between two mainstreams representing the modern Islamic thoughts—‘the substantive and formalist type of schools’.
In this respect, I believe that Muslim in Indonesia has successfully challenged the formalist stance in which the issue of religion and the state is a unity (din wa daulah). The stance of Indonesian political mode is that the state cannot be influenced by any belief or religion. The substantive type of thought is ideally appropriate since Indonesia consists of multicultural entities. Applying this mode, the nationalism awareness mingles within it.
History teaches us the crucial religious position in relation to the state at the center of nationalism element. Despite its limitation, the implementation of nationalism in a form of a secular type of the state in Indonesia is an outstanding achievement. The position is unique since the secular state of Indonesia is somewhat succinctly engineered by the solid religious framework and the sense of nationalism.
Prof. Bernard Adeney-Risakotta & Dr. Sri Margana
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Roma Ulinnuha-ICRS 2009
Reading:
1. Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 1900 -1942 (Singapore:Oxfopd University Press, 1973)
2. Surwandono, The Islamic Political Thoughts, (Yogyakarta: LPPI, 2001), p. 25-26.
Week #4: Religion and Nationalism
Two Mainstreams of Contestation: Religion and Nationalism in Indonesia
The religious movement played a significant role in promoting a nationalism sense in Indonesia. As I noted earlier in Religion and Colonialism weekly report, there have been transformations in carrying out nationalism aspects—from the struggle for Indonesian’ independence, the formation of the state to the consensus of the way of life Indonesia. Notwithstanding its difference, the spirit of nationalism is central.
Deliar Noer (1973) states that the Muslims in Indonesia have often been involved in theoretical and ideological controversies, either with the secular nationalists or amongst themselves (p. 4). Noer basically addresses the three transformations that I have already mentioned earlier. He depicted how Muslim institutions and intellectuals had been influenced much from education type of strategies. In order to present the issue, the history and the empowerment of the educated people in Indonesia were shown applying historical perspective.
I think the evidence of the massive tribute from religious entities toward Indonesian nationalism is manifest, however the issue goes deeply on the contestation between two mainstreams representing the modern Islamic thoughts—‘the substantive and formalist type of schools’.
In this respect, I believe that Muslim in Indonesia has successfully challenged the formalist stance in which the issue of religion and the state is a unity (din wa daulah). The stance of Indonesian political mode is that the state cannot be influenced by any belief or religion. The substantive type of thought is ideally appropriate since Indonesia consists of multicultural entities. Applying this mode, the nationalism awareness mingles within it.
History teaches us the crucial religious position in relation to the state at the center of nationalism element. Despite its limitation, the implementation of nationalism in a form of a secular type of the state in Indonesia is an outstanding achievement. The position is unique since the secular state of Indonesia is somewhat succinctly engineered by the solid religious framework and the sense of nationalism.
Religious Movements and Politic in Indonesian History By Nihayatul Wafiroh
Discussion religious movements in Indonesia will not separate from politic. Delier Noer clearly addressed that religious movements influenced in the political sphere in Indonesia. Religion is not seen just as the relationship between people and God. Religion, indeed, affects in the all human being’s activities including politic. Although in the early movement, the religious movements just focused on education and religious activities for instance, in the development, the condition of politic in Indonesia pressed them to take place in the politic. Muhammadiah and Nahdlatul Ulama are the great examples of religious organizations that right now deal with politic. Although they always argue that, they do not involve in political parties, in reality, the leaders of these organizations become the participants in political parties. For sure, it will be difficult to make distance when they are the leaders of religious organizations and when they are participants of political parties. The distance is blur.
Indeed, the Islamic movement in Indonesia connected to the scholars who studied in Middle East. For example, the figures of reformists in Minangkabau which is the important area in the spreading of the ideas of reformation, had mostly studied in Middle East. The knowledge that they received from Middle East was brought to Indonesia. Their activities were not only pure on teaching Islam but also they dealt directly or indirectly with politic.
In my view, there are positive things when religious movements can also inspire in the political spheres. However, the negative points could not also be avoided. In the positive things, we are able to figure out that Indonesian people at the time had skeptical perception of politic. However, when religious leaders involved in politic, people began to realize that politic would be another way to achieve the Indonesia freedom. On the other hand, when religions already engage the politic, the functions of religion and state are not clear. As the result, state takes parts in the religious roles. Another thing is that people become antipathy with religious organizations since they think that religious organizations are not pure religious movements any more. In fact, political agendas are already behind of their agendas. As Indonesians, I think we have to determine whether to put religions as a private or public sphere. In some cases,
Indeed, the Islamic movement in Indonesia connected to the scholars who studied in Middle East. For example, the figures of reformists in Minangkabau which is the important area in the spreading of the ideas of reformation, had mostly studied in Middle East. The knowledge that they received from Middle East was brought to Indonesia. Their activities were not only pure on teaching Islam but also they dealt directly or indirectly with politic.
In my view, there are positive things when religious movements can also inspire in the political spheres. However, the negative points could not also be avoided. In the positive things, we are able to figure out that Indonesian people at the time had skeptical perception of politic. However, when religious leaders involved in politic, people began to realize that politic would be another way to achieve the Indonesia freedom. On the other hand, when religions already engage the politic, the functions of religion and state are not clear. As the result, state takes parts in the religious roles. Another thing is that people become antipathy with religious organizations since they think that religious organizations are not pure religious movements any more. In fact, political agendas are already behind of their agendas. As Indonesians, I think we have to determine whether to put religions as a private or public sphere. In some cases,
Religion and Nationalism
LEYAKET ALI MOHAMED OMAR
History of Religion Part 2- Prof Bernard Adeney- Risakotta and Prof Margana
Readings are from : Deliar Noer- The Modernist Muslim Movement In Indonesia; Harry J. Benda- Indonesian Islam Under the Japanese Occupation.
The essay by Noer, Modern Muslim Movement in Indonesia is a thorough work of research in Indonesia and its movements it provides a realm of activities happening during those times, it gave me a great insight from the regions to its religions; it’s like a continuation from the first course study, History of Religion part 1; at least for a Singaporean like me that are new to this.
Embarking in this line some chapters are perhaps a little distinctive, but overall I find her work compared a nice balance between comprehensiveness and variety with elaborations and combining it with variety of linguistics, genetics, and archaeology, in what is effectively a condensed version of her highly, thorough research on the subject.
Javanese religion and society are Islamic because aspects of Islam’s doctrine have taken the place of those of Hinduism and Buddhism as the way of life to the Javanese culture. Furthermore, Sufi concepts of sainthood and the mystical path are employed in the formulation of an imperial cult.
Therefore, it can be said that Islam has penetrated so quickly and so deeply into the fabric of Javanese culture because it was embraced by the royal courts as the basis for a theocratic state. Hence, in this view I saw the same pattern arises in the early twentieth century where the fights for authority over other religion are over but more to the fragments of sects from Islamic perspective that remains and these are the main character of frictions between fellow Indonesians during those period in fact till today.
There are scholars whose main ideas are to eradicate traditions that are not Islamic and those of staunch traditionalist that still persist on the Hindus or other early traditions. Embedded in these two extremes there are also scholars that permits this acts. Muhammadiah was established in 1912 by KH Ahmad Dahlan, a Meccan graduate, with a clear aim to promote and protect the “purest” and the “truest” version of Islam and to abandon the “polluted” or “contaminated” version of Islam by referring directly only to the Qur’an and the Hadith (Prophet Traditions). For this everyone is expected to conduct ijtihad. In my humble opinion with respect to his initiative of the organisation, this means that all the conditions to be Mujtahid (a person who performs ijtihad) will be held collectively by jurists acting together; not just a single jurist. He then performs it together with other jurists, who have expertise in other areas and this takes a community to perform not as an individual but together.
This is parallel to the sayings of the Prophet: ‘I (‘Ali bin Abi Talib) said to the Prophet, ‘O, Prophet, (what if) there is a case among us, while neither revelation comes, nor the Sunnah exists.’ The Prophet replied, ‘(you should) have meetings with the scholars – or in another version: the pious servants – and consult with them. Do not make a decision only by a single opinion.
History of Religion Part 2- Prof Bernard Adeney- Risakotta and Prof Margana
Readings are from : Deliar Noer- The Modernist Muslim Movement In Indonesia; Harry J. Benda- Indonesian Islam Under the Japanese Occupation.
The essay by Noer, Modern Muslim Movement in Indonesia is a thorough work of research in Indonesia and its movements it provides a realm of activities happening during those times, it gave me a great insight from the regions to its religions; it’s like a continuation from the first course study, History of Religion part 1; at least for a Singaporean like me that are new to this.
Embarking in this line some chapters are perhaps a little distinctive, but overall I find her work compared a nice balance between comprehensiveness and variety with elaborations and combining it with variety of linguistics, genetics, and archaeology, in what is effectively a condensed version of her highly, thorough research on the subject.
Javanese religion and society are Islamic because aspects of Islam’s doctrine have taken the place of those of Hinduism and Buddhism as the way of life to the Javanese culture. Furthermore, Sufi concepts of sainthood and the mystical path are employed in the formulation of an imperial cult.
Therefore, it can be said that Islam has penetrated so quickly and so deeply into the fabric of Javanese culture because it was embraced by the royal courts as the basis for a theocratic state. Hence, in this view I saw the same pattern arises in the early twentieth century where the fights for authority over other religion are over but more to the fragments of sects from Islamic perspective that remains and these are the main character of frictions between fellow Indonesians during those period in fact till today.
There are scholars whose main ideas are to eradicate traditions that are not Islamic and those of staunch traditionalist that still persist on the Hindus or other early traditions. Embedded in these two extremes there are also scholars that permits this acts. Muhammadiah was established in 1912 by KH Ahmad Dahlan, a Meccan graduate, with a clear aim to promote and protect the “purest” and the “truest” version of Islam and to abandon the “polluted” or “contaminated” version of Islam by referring directly only to the Qur’an and the Hadith (Prophet Traditions). For this everyone is expected to conduct ijtihad. In my humble opinion with respect to his initiative of the organisation, this means that all the conditions to be Mujtahid (a person who performs ijtihad) will be held collectively by jurists acting together; not just a single jurist. He then performs it together with other jurists, who have expertise in other areas and this takes a community to perform not as an individual but together.
This is parallel to the sayings of the Prophet: ‘I (‘Ali bin Abi Talib) said to the Prophet, ‘O, Prophet, (what if) there is a case among us, while neither revelation comes, nor the Sunnah exists.’ The Prophet replied, ‘(you should) have meetings with the scholars – or in another version: the pious servants – and consult with them. Do not make a decision only by a single opinion.
Sabtu, 20 Februari 2010
Orthodoxy, Orthopraxis, and Inculturation - Roy AB Tolentino
In my brief time in Indonesia, one of my continuing struggles is to understand the mental topography of the Indonesian people. As with any culture, there are certain ideas that are accepted and maintained as part of “the way things are” that cannot be understood except by living here and becoming part of the Indonesian lebenswelt. One of those nuances that I am gradually coming to understand is the difference between NU and Muhammadiyah, and the rest of the groups that have been formed in the history of this country. Deliar Noer’s work, as well as the history written by M.C. Ricklefs, has served to fine-tune those nuances for me, though I admit the distinction still confuses me at times.
Perhaps this confusion comes from being a foreigner, and moreover, being a Catholic. Inculturation has been part of the Catholic discourse since the Second Vatican Council, and it is something the Filipino Catholic Church has learned to employ (and at times, regulate) in the milieu I am from. Certain devotions and practices are peculiar to Filipino Catholics, but these are not considered example of syncretism; rather, they are rationalized and accepted as edifying to the faith. Certainly, not all practices fall under this rubric; those deemed inimical to the faith are of course condemned or discouraged. In my experience, inculturation has produced advances in worship and practice that allow people to identify more with their faith, and make faith an integral part of their lives.
Of course, the adoption of inculturation as a value and strategy came only after much debate and conflict. There is, after all, the notion that there is a pure form of religion, which must remain unadulterated at all costs. While this advocacy is admirable, it would be helpful to remember that cultures interpenetrate and inform one another, religions influence and challenge each other, such that “purity,” at best, is a relative thing. Orthodoxy and orthopraxis never occur as absolutes, but are products of phronetic judgment and rooted in historical consciousness. Too often, the discourse of purity conceals an epistemological schizophrenia; much like a person who writes a scathing critique of technology using Microsoft Word.
To return to the history of Indonesia, then, the rise of reformist groups and the conflict between the moderns and the traditionalists reveals the question that underlies this whole issue. Deliar Noer phrases it in this way: “Can Muslims maintain the basic teachings of Islam while modernizing the country and the state? Will they be able to uphold the principle that Islam is not merely a religion but also a civil and political society? Or will they carry out a transformation, limiting its function to religious life while leaving worldly activities outside its realm?” (Noer 1973:2-3) While Noer frames the question according to the discourse of religion and state, the underlying epistemological challenge is the same. How much change can one allow into one’s religion without sacrificing its integrity? How much should local culture inform and influence religious practice? The way I have phrased these questions implies a separation between culture and religion; the truth of the matter is that there is no such separation. Religion is as much a product of culture as culture is modified and influenced by religion.
Inasmuch as religion makes absolute claims and inspires faith, the very experience of belief reveals an inherent inadequacy in religion. While believers make a “leap of faith” and can have true certainty and confidence in their religion, religion remains irrevocably conditioned by the limitations of human understanding. As Hans-Georg Gadamer notes, “inherent [in religious experience] is the fact that the false paths of human self-understanding only reach their true end through divine grace. That is, only thereby do we reach the insight that all paths lead us to our own salvation. All human self-understanding is determined in itself by its inadequacy.” (Gadamer 1976:80)
Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Philosophical Hermeneutics. Trans. David Linge. Berkeley: UCPress, 1976.
Noer, Deliar. The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia: 1900-1942. London: Oxford UP, 1973.
Perhaps this confusion comes from being a foreigner, and moreover, being a Catholic. Inculturation has been part of the Catholic discourse since the Second Vatican Council, and it is something the Filipino Catholic Church has learned to employ (and at times, regulate) in the milieu I am from. Certain devotions and practices are peculiar to Filipino Catholics, but these are not considered example of syncretism; rather, they are rationalized and accepted as edifying to the faith. Certainly, not all practices fall under this rubric; those deemed inimical to the faith are of course condemned or discouraged. In my experience, inculturation has produced advances in worship and practice that allow people to identify more with their faith, and make faith an integral part of their lives.
Of course, the adoption of inculturation as a value and strategy came only after much debate and conflict. There is, after all, the notion that there is a pure form of religion, which must remain unadulterated at all costs. While this advocacy is admirable, it would be helpful to remember that cultures interpenetrate and inform one another, religions influence and challenge each other, such that “purity,” at best, is a relative thing. Orthodoxy and orthopraxis never occur as absolutes, but are products of phronetic judgment and rooted in historical consciousness. Too often, the discourse of purity conceals an epistemological schizophrenia; much like a person who writes a scathing critique of technology using Microsoft Word.
To return to the history of Indonesia, then, the rise of reformist groups and the conflict between the moderns and the traditionalists reveals the question that underlies this whole issue. Deliar Noer phrases it in this way: “Can Muslims maintain the basic teachings of Islam while modernizing the country and the state? Will they be able to uphold the principle that Islam is not merely a religion but also a civil and political society? Or will they carry out a transformation, limiting its function to religious life while leaving worldly activities outside its realm?” (Noer 1973:2-3) While Noer frames the question according to the discourse of religion and state, the underlying epistemological challenge is the same. How much change can one allow into one’s religion without sacrificing its integrity? How much should local culture inform and influence religious practice? The way I have phrased these questions implies a separation between culture and religion; the truth of the matter is that there is no such separation. Religion is as much a product of culture as culture is modified and influenced by religion.
Inasmuch as religion makes absolute claims and inspires faith, the very experience of belief reveals an inherent inadequacy in religion. While believers make a “leap of faith” and can have true certainty and confidence in their religion, religion remains irrevocably conditioned by the limitations of human understanding. As Hans-Georg Gadamer notes, “inherent [in religious experience] is the fact that the false paths of human self-understanding only reach their true end through divine grace. That is, only thereby do we reach the insight that all paths lead us to our own salvation. All human self-understanding is determined in itself by its inadequacy.” (Gadamer 1976:80)
Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Philosophical Hermeneutics. Trans. David Linge. Berkeley: UCPress, 1976.
Noer, Deliar. The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia: 1900-1942. London: Oxford UP, 1973.
Minggu, 14 Februari 2010
Pluralism and Tolerance: Political Survival of the Fittest?
By Mucha Q. Arquiza
15 February 2010
Sukarno and Hatta and the rest of the founding fathers of independence were the best and ideal leaders any nationalist would have dreamt of, they were not only ideologically-equipped but were culturally (and spiritually) grounded. And as though heaven was in their aid, the Japanese occupation came at the most opportune time, weakening Dutch colonialism and dislodging its political grip on the NEI and in less than a week after the drafting of the plan for independence,local leaders were inaugurated into an independent republic. Nothing could have been more serendipitous for any revolution, indeed, such moments are desperately prayed-for miracle by any national democratic revolution. Unlike in most unitary republican nations in SEA, the core issue embroiling Indonesian politics is not so much about a non-working democracy or of want of good leadership with strong political will. Sukarno, the founding fathers and the Pancasila mostly provided those. In my mind, the Pancasila, while theoretically a best possible option for creating a unitary Indonesia, came at a wrong junction in history. As political strategy it was deemed to fail from the very inception because colonial Indonesia was very much a splintered society then composed of suzereign states ruled as empires by royalties and various forms of leadership vested on indigenous governance systems that were very much alive, and in fact, had been the well-spring of anti-colonial struggle that provided the self-appointed ‘central’ leadership (i.e. ideologues mostly in exile or otherwise incarcerated) the necessary waves and spurts to sustain a protracted insurrectionary fervor (noted in accounts of Acheh, the Moluccas, Banten, etc. in Hefner, Ricklefs, F.Addeney-Risacotta, Kartodirdjo). These ethnic, clan and kinship-based governance were autonomous, if not independent, political structures. A centralized unitary form of government, albeit nationalist-led, was a new form of colonialism and was the very anti-thesis of self-determination already enjoyed by the sovereign states, for even as the Dutch colonial government had tried to impose itself upon these independent states by excising forced taxation and other forms of political and economic subservience, it (Dutch) could only succeed at its strongest point, only at the central seat such as Batavia (or Jakarta) and among the priyayi class. Along the peripheries, sultanates and principalities led by Panghulus, for instance, exercised utmost autonomy; and the middle and lower class (santri and abangan), were certainly not passive and impassionate in asserting their freedom, socially and politically.
In what almost sounded like to a post-mortem of the Pancasila, Nurcholish Madjid (in Woodward, eds. 1996) and Bernard Adeney-Risacotta (in Sterkens, et. al., eds. 2009) presented their hindsights and foresights of what pluralism would mean and how it might work in Indonesia. Madjid gave an overview of the Islamic roots and the Qur’anic basis of pluralism and how it should ideally be in agreement to mainstream Muslim values and practice. His stance is however reflective of the majority (i.e. not only of dominant in population, but dominant in ideology or socio-political thought, as well -- the Muslims) and rationalizes the practicality of pluralism in terms of maintaining order as well as ensuring equitability. Adeney-Risacotta, on the other hand, explained the potential of pluralism as a form of multiculturalism, a workable arrangement through continuous negotiation and accommodation, through cultivating the culture of tolerance. Adeney-Risacotta’s option could best work within the ambit of the suprastructures – institutions of culture and value. This alternative is not necessarily a numerically dominant position, but nonetheless mainstreamed view shot from a position of power, particularly, of elite and middle class. Both authors however seem to undermine the veiled implications inherent in pluralism and tolerance it self; that these principles are based on evolutionary theory of political survival of the fittest. Pluralism of co-existence in multiculturalism from the vantage of majority always presupposes a kind of affirmative action or negative discrimination (to borrow the ‘liberal’ human rights language), for it to work, political majority must be willing to stake or concede in favor of the minorities, and symbiotically, political minority must agree to be ‘integrated and mainstreamed’. In the final analysis, it all depends on the political space afforded by the mainstream as playing field for minority voices. Indeed, I agree with Madjid and Adeney-Risacotta, that this stake is not to be a privilege or honor of a partisan state (who, most likely would have the elite interest at its behest), but is obligated of other stakeholders such as civil society. In the parlance of human rights, the duty bearers in multiculturalism and tolerance, if it is to succeed, are to be the ‘enlightened’ segment of the privileged society; or in Madjid’s theological ethical view, the human responsibility to protect and to champion social-justice and equality lies in the elite and middle class. And Indonesia is indeed fortunate that this civil society is adequately constituted in the Muhammadiya, NU and its secular humanist leaders. On the other hand, both authors also spoke of tolerance. Tolerance as a political act/strategy, is an option of one in a position of power, it is a privilege, in other words, of those who can choose to ignore diversity and pass-off idiosyncracies because its interests are assured and may be comfortably entrenched on account of its position of power. It is not to be an option for one who is a minority (i.e. one who begs ‘to be tolerated’) situated within the periphery; and here, we are not speaking only of numerical minority or of geographic urban-rural orientation, but spatial orientation vis-à-vis the seat of power, as in the case of indigenous majority –so called coloured Muslims– and the rest of religious non-Muslim communities in Indonesia who may have the number but are still coerced to ‘submit’ to the anarchic and nihilistic tendencies of few radical white Muslims. In any event, it is these recessive types of social genes (i.e.coloured and non-Muslim religious genetic varieties), segments or types of societies, who may not be fit enough to survive and ‘negotiate’ and partake of the fruits of multiculturalism and plurality. ###
15 February 2010
Sukarno and Hatta and the rest of the founding fathers of independence were the best and ideal leaders any nationalist would have dreamt of, they were not only ideologically-equipped but were culturally (and spiritually) grounded. And as though heaven was in their aid, the Japanese occupation came at the most opportune time, weakening Dutch colonialism and dislodging its political grip on the NEI and in less than a week after the drafting of the plan for independence,local leaders were inaugurated into an independent republic. Nothing could have been more serendipitous for any revolution, indeed, such moments are desperately prayed-for miracle by any national democratic revolution. Unlike in most unitary republican nations in SEA, the core issue embroiling Indonesian politics is not so much about a non-working democracy or of want of good leadership with strong political will. Sukarno, the founding fathers and the Pancasila mostly provided those. In my mind, the Pancasila, while theoretically a best possible option for creating a unitary Indonesia, came at a wrong junction in history. As political strategy it was deemed to fail from the very inception because colonial Indonesia was very much a splintered society then composed of suzereign states ruled as empires by royalties and various forms of leadership vested on indigenous governance systems that were very much alive, and in fact, had been the well-spring of anti-colonial struggle that provided the self-appointed ‘central’ leadership (i.e. ideologues mostly in exile or otherwise incarcerated) the necessary waves and spurts to sustain a protracted insurrectionary fervor (noted in accounts of Acheh, the Moluccas, Banten, etc. in Hefner, Ricklefs, F.Addeney-Risacotta, Kartodirdjo). These ethnic, clan and kinship-based governance were autonomous, if not independent, political structures. A centralized unitary form of government, albeit nationalist-led, was a new form of colonialism and was the very anti-thesis of self-determination already enjoyed by the sovereign states, for even as the Dutch colonial government had tried to impose itself upon these independent states by excising forced taxation and other forms of political and economic subservience, it (Dutch) could only succeed at its strongest point, only at the central seat such as Batavia (or Jakarta) and among the priyayi class. Along the peripheries, sultanates and principalities led by Panghulus, for instance, exercised utmost autonomy; and the middle and lower class (santri and abangan), were certainly not passive and impassionate in asserting their freedom, socially and politically.
In what almost sounded like to a post-mortem of the Pancasila, Nurcholish Madjid (in Woodward, eds. 1996) and Bernard Adeney-Risacotta (in Sterkens, et. al., eds. 2009) presented their hindsights and foresights of what pluralism would mean and how it might work in Indonesia. Madjid gave an overview of the Islamic roots and the Qur’anic basis of pluralism and how it should ideally be in agreement to mainstream Muslim values and practice. His stance is however reflective of the majority (i.e. not only of dominant in population, but dominant in ideology or socio-political thought, as well -- the Muslims) and rationalizes the practicality of pluralism in terms of maintaining order as well as ensuring equitability. Adeney-Risacotta, on the other hand, explained the potential of pluralism as a form of multiculturalism, a workable arrangement through continuous negotiation and accommodation, through cultivating the culture of tolerance. Adeney-Risacotta’s option could best work within the ambit of the suprastructures – institutions of culture and value. This alternative is not necessarily a numerically dominant position, but nonetheless mainstreamed view shot from a position of power, particularly, of elite and middle class. Both authors however seem to undermine the veiled implications inherent in pluralism and tolerance it self; that these principles are based on evolutionary theory of political survival of the fittest. Pluralism of co-existence in multiculturalism from the vantage of majority always presupposes a kind of affirmative action or negative discrimination (to borrow the ‘liberal’ human rights language), for it to work, political majority must be willing to stake or concede in favor of the minorities, and symbiotically, political minority must agree to be ‘integrated and mainstreamed’. In the final analysis, it all depends on the political space afforded by the mainstream as playing field for minority voices. Indeed, I agree with Madjid and Adeney-Risacotta, that this stake is not to be a privilege or honor of a partisan state (who, most likely would have the elite interest at its behest), but is obligated of other stakeholders such as civil society. In the parlance of human rights, the duty bearers in multiculturalism and tolerance, if it is to succeed, are to be the ‘enlightened’ segment of the privileged society; or in Madjid’s theological ethical view, the human responsibility to protect and to champion social-justice and equality lies in the elite and middle class. And Indonesia is indeed fortunate that this civil society is adequately constituted in the Muhammadiya, NU and its secular humanist leaders. On the other hand, both authors also spoke of tolerance. Tolerance as a political act/strategy, is an option of one in a position of power, it is a privilege, in other words, of those who can choose to ignore diversity and pass-off idiosyncracies because its interests are assured and may be comfortably entrenched on account of its position of power. It is not to be an option for one who is a minority (i.e. one who begs ‘to be tolerated’) situated within the periphery; and here, we are not speaking only of numerical minority or of geographic urban-rural orientation, but spatial orientation vis-à-vis the seat of power, as in the case of indigenous majority –so called coloured Muslims– and the rest of religious non-Muslim communities in Indonesia who may have the number but are still coerced to ‘submit’ to the anarchic and nihilistic tendencies of few radical white Muslims. In any event, it is these recessive types of social genes (i.e.coloured and non-Muslim religious genetic varieties), segments or types of societies, who may not be fit enough to survive and ‘negotiate’ and partake of the fruits of multiculturalism and plurality. ###
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