Pluralism and Tolerance: Political Survival of the Fittest?

By Mucha Q. Arquiza
15 February 2010

Sukarno and Hatta and the rest of the founding fathers of independence were the best and ideal leaders any nationalist would have dreamt of, they were not only ideologically-equipped but were culturally (and spiritually) grounded. And as though heaven was in their aid, the Japanese occupation came at the most opportune time, weakening Dutch colonialism and dislodging its political grip on the NEI and in less than a week after the drafting of the plan for independence,local leaders were inaugurated into an independent republic. Nothing could have been more serendipitous for any revolution, indeed, such moments are desperately prayed-for miracle by any national democratic revolution. Unlike in most unitary republican nations in SEA, the core issue embroiling Indonesian politics is not so much about a non-working democracy or of want of good leadership with strong political will. Sukarno, the founding fathers and the Pancasila mostly provided those. In my mind, the Pancasila, while theoretically a best possible option for creating a unitary Indonesia, came at a wrong junction in history. As political strategy it was deemed to fail from the very inception because colonial Indonesia was very much a splintered society then composed of suzereign states ruled as empires by royalties and various forms of leadership vested on indigenous governance systems that were very much alive, and in fact, had been the well-spring of anti-colonial struggle that provided the self-appointed ‘central’ leadership (i.e. ideologues mostly in exile or otherwise incarcerated) the necessary waves and spurts to sustain a protracted insurrectionary fervor (noted in accounts of Acheh, the Moluccas, Banten, etc. in Hefner, Ricklefs, F.Addeney-Risacotta, Kartodirdjo). These ethnic, clan and kinship-based governance were autonomous, if not independent, political structures. A centralized unitary form of government, albeit nationalist-led, was a new form of colonialism and was the very anti-thesis of self-determination already enjoyed by the sovereign states, for even as the Dutch colonial government had tried to impose itself upon these independent states by excising forced taxation and other forms of political and economic subservience, it (Dutch) could only succeed at its strongest point, only at the central seat such as Batavia (or Jakarta) and among the priyayi class. Along the peripheries, sultanates and principalities led by Panghulus, for instance, exercised utmost autonomy; and the middle and lower class (santri and abangan), were certainly not passive and impassionate in asserting their freedom, socially and politically.

In what almost sounded like to a post-mortem of the Pancasila, Nurcholish Madjid (in Woodward, eds. 1996) and Bernard Adeney-Risacotta (in Sterkens, et. al., eds. 2009) presented their hindsights and foresights of what pluralism would mean and how it might work in Indonesia. Madjid gave an overview of the Islamic roots and the Qur’anic basis of pluralism and how it should ideally be in agreement to mainstream Muslim values and practice. His stance is however reflective of the majority (i.e. not only of dominant in population, but dominant in ideology or socio-political thought, as well -- the Muslims) and rationalizes the practicality of pluralism in terms of maintaining order as well as ensuring equitability. Adeney-Risacotta, on the other hand, explained the potential of pluralism as a form of multiculturalism, a workable arrangement through continuous negotiation and accommodation, through cultivating the culture of tolerance. Adeney-Risacotta’s option could best work within the ambit of the suprastructures – institutions of culture and value. This alternative is not necessarily a numerically dominant position, but nonetheless mainstreamed view shot from a position of power, particularly, of elite and middle class. Both authors however seem to undermine the veiled implications inherent in pluralism and tolerance it self; that these principles are based on evolutionary theory of political survival of the fittest. Pluralism of co-existence in multiculturalism from the vantage of majority always presupposes a kind of affirmative action or negative discrimination (to borrow the ‘liberal’ human rights language), for it to work, political majority must be willing to stake or concede in favor of the minorities, and symbiotically, political minority must agree to be ‘integrated and mainstreamed’. In the final analysis, it all depends on the political space afforded by the mainstream as playing field for minority voices. Indeed, I agree with Madjid and Adeney-Risacotta, that this stake is not to be a privilege or honor of a partisan state (who, most likely would have the elite interest at its behest), but is obligated of other stakeholders such as civil society. In the parlance of human rights, the duty bearers in multiculturalism and tolerance, if it is to succeed, are to be the ‘enlightened’ segment of the privileged society; or in Madjid’s theological ethical view, the human responsibility to protect and to champion social-justice and equality lies in the elite and middle class. And Indonesia is indeed fortunate that this civil society is adequately constituted in the Muhammadiya, NU and its secular humanist leaders. On the other hand, both authors also spoke of tolerance. Tolerance as a political act/strategy, is an option of one in a position of power, it is a privilege, in other words, of those who can choose to ignore diversity and pass-off idiosyncracies because its interests are assured and may be comfortably entrenched on account of its position of power. It is not to be an option for one who is a minority (i.e. one who begs ‘to be tolerated’) situated within the periphery; and here, we are not speaking only of numerical minority or of geographic urban-rural orientation, but spatial orientation vis-à-vis the seat of power, as in the case of indigenous majority –so called coloured Muslims– and the rest of religious non-Muslim communities in Indonesia who may have the number but are still coerced to ‘submit’ to the anarchic and nihilistic tendencies of few radical white Muslims. In any event, it is these recessive types of social genes (i.e.coloured and non-Muslim religious genetic varieties), segments or types of societies, who may not be fit enough to survive and ‘negotiate’ and partake of the fruits of multiculturalism and plurality. ###