Tri Harmaji
History of Religions in Indonesia Part II: from c. 1900 to the Present
Religion, September 11, the “war on terror” and “clash of civilization”: the future of religious diversity in Indonesia; Noorhaidi Hasan, September 11 and Islamic Militancy in Post-New Order Indonesia, Bernard Adeney-Risakotta, The Impact of September 11 on Islam in Southeast Asia.
‘The clash of civilization’, like describes in the reading is a rejected theory to explain ‘the war against terrorism’ campaign led by United Stated of America with the main targets are Islamic country Afghanistan and Iraq following the September 11 attack on the two American symbols of superiority World Trade Centre and Pentagon. This theory is very dangerous to this campaign because the theory will make all ‘really’ Islamic country will not just give any support to the campaign but also will together against the campaign. But this theory, I think, is also not just like children story in bad. It perhaps has strong argumentations and reasons.
If we clean Islam from every modern (western) influence from philosophical idea such as human right declaration, gender equality etc. to material advantage such as technology, perhaps we can clearly see Islam as a really different civilization other than western civilization. To do this job now is perhaps very difficult because western modernity has profoundly penetrated Islamic world to their blood and bone. This penetration has been going on for the first time the two civilizations encountered. So many Muslim students from Islamic countries has gone to study in the western countries, learn it philosophy, ideas and technology, and then bring it back to their home countries to be implemented. What we can see liberal Islam in Indonesia for example is a kind of Islam that has already influenced by western philosophy and ideas. So what is the pure Islam then?
It is right that the Islamic version of radical fundamentalist groups perhaps is not the true and pure Islamic civilization. And perhaps there is no what is called as pure Islamic civilization anymore because Islamic world has together developed with western influences. But what is emerging from the phenomenon of fundamentalist Islam recently, perhaps, is really a sign that what is called as Islamic civilization is really exist. And this civilization is definitely different from western civilization.
If what I guessed above is right, then the theory of clash civilization is so not impossible. The well known crusade event is perhaps the first clash happened between these civilizations. Centuries later this first clash was followed by subsequent victories of the west over Islamic countries in the east by the policy of colonialism. Both clashes are definitely bloody and the second clash was ended in the nineteenth century by then ending of colonialism era. From these two clashes Islamic world had severely injured and many Muslim started to acknowledge the western superiority and went there to study. This last process has responsible for the sunk of Islamic civilization amid the powerful western civilization. Under this policy the idea or consciousness of the great Islamic civilization became more and more weaken among the Islamic communities especially Islamic people in Indonesia.
What is significant about the war against terrorism campaign of America toward Islamic countries is a wake up call for Islamic people to remember what they have lost today: their own civilization. The consciousness of Islamic civilization attacked and destroyed by western civilization then growing rapidly like mushroom in the rainy season. What is the end of this scene will be? In my opinion what is propagated by radical Islam now in Indonesia is definitely this theory, and on the other hand what is promoted by liberal Islam is the counter theory of it. And what we call as the future of religious diversity in Indonesia, in my opinion, will be decided especially by who is the winner of this struggle.
Minggu, 02 Mei 2010
The world goes to war on terror
MUCHA Q ARQUIZA
Another head hangs lowly, tied slowly to die
and the violence cause such silence
who are we mistaken
but, you see, it's not my family
in your head they are fighting...
Another mother's breaking heart has taken over
when the violence cause such silence
who are we mistaken
it’s the same old team since 1916
they are still fighting...’
[‘Zombie’, The Cranberry]
In the 60s,70s and the 80s, America waged terrible wars on terror. At first, it was Vietnam, and then, it was Afghanistan. There, the terrorist was itself, America. In its Afghan war, America harnessed international soldier-recruits to fight its holy war. The mujahideens were to reduce Afghanistan into smithereens to flush out Russian communists. Earlier, the same jihad was also fanned by American CIA in Indonesia that successfully cleansed the country off in less than a year of close to one million suspected member of the PKI and repudiated from society its future generations forever. Little did the Muslims and mujahideen in both countries knew that they were fighting a jihad not for Muslims, not for Allah, but for Uncle Sam.
In 2001, America again invested on a war on terrorism. The terrorists were the heroes it helped prop up and built-up in strength, Osama bin Laden, and Arab and Indonesian extremists. In this war America was again recruiting international allies to ‘be with us’ or else ‘you are against us’. The fight was called a crusade for ‘infinite justice’, later scaled down to ‘enduring freedom’. Little did the loyal allies knew that they were launching a crusade not for themselves, or for their gods or holy saints, but for the future of world religion – the Market – and the future god called Profit.
Ten years later now into the 2010, we have completely become and still are conscripted and embroiled into this war on terror that America has led us all. And each with his own defense to justify America’s and the West’s successes and interests as our own, this American holy war is also the world’s war. As the US, the world is to liberate Muslims from their autocratic regimes, for instance, and to democratize Islam that is not liberal enough; in the name of American ideals of liberty and freedom, the world is supposed to fight this, so it claims, 'oppressive and backward' religion of the 'illiterates' ruled by the 'savage laws of the desert nomads'. The new war doctrine says Muslims and Islam must be liberated to see the shining lights of US and Western democracy and liberal capitalistic lifestyle. The irony of all is that Muslims who have been coerced to be soldiers of this world war have been targeting its own, the women and secular intellectuals, most especially, yet perennially blind to the real instigator or the war-monger.
This war on terror, as America intends, is enduring freedom indeed, pervasively fought globally on a 24-7 basis, and worse than the previous world wars that went before us. For in this war, we fight at airports where we are made to remove our shoes, our belts, our coin purses; leave our toothpaste, shampoo and lotions and unconsumed bottled water; and if we are Muslims, in some airports, we are made to unrobe and untangle our jilbab and unhook our brassieres. The war goes to schools, too. In countries such as mine [Philippines] where Muslims are a minority, poor innocent grade-school kids with Arab sounding names get extra attention by suspicious teachers, and are demanded to narrate their ‘brief’ personal – meaning, religious – life history lest they be related, if distant, to any of the ‘terror-sounding’ names and hooded personalities. Or else, for someone declaring herself Muslim but bearing a ‘Christian-sounding’ name most likely gets into arguments where ‘curious’ [islamophobic?] school-mates are wont to investigate why, ‘but your name is Christian name, why are you a Muslim?’ -- as though being a Muslim is some sort of a disease or dreadful thing that one better stay away from. Overnight, everyone becomes self-conscious about their race and ethnicity, religion, gender and with other markers of identity that define ‘us’ and ‘they’. Suddenly, friends become enemies and fences are erected between neighbors. And when things go a little bit overheated, or overboard with too much politics, they apply the instant 'band-aid', a moral emergency kit called 'interfaith dialogue'.
The new war on terror as designed by the United States of America is a Zombie war, fought in the battlefield of emotions and intellect -- its weapons are anger and hatred stashed in hearts and fired away by fingertips and tongues; its target victims are not bodies but souls. And as the Cranberry sings the wars go on and on: ‘in your head, are their tanks, and their bombs and their guns, in your head…’
Another head hangs lowly, tied slowly to die
and the violence cause such silence
who are we mistaken
but, you see, it's not my family
in your head they are fighting...
Another mother's breaking heart has taken over
when the violence cause such silence
who are we mistaken
it’s the same old team since 1916
they are still fighting...’
[‘Zombie’, The Cranberry]
In the 60s,70s and the 80s, America waged terrible wars on terror. At first, it was Vietnam, and then, it was Afghanistan. There, the terrorist was itself, America. In its Afghan war, America harnessed international soldier-recruits to fight its holy war. The mujahideens were to reduce Afghanistan into smithereens to flush out Russian communists. Earlier, the same jihad was also fanned by American CIA in Indonesia that successfully cleansed the country off in less than a year of close to one million suspected member of the PKI and repudiated from society its future generations forever. Little did the Muslims and mujahideen in both countries knew that they were fighting a jihad not for Muslims, not for Allah, but for Uncle Sam.
In 2001, America again invested on a war on terrorism. The terrorists were the heroes it helped prop up and built-up in strength, Osama bin Laden, and Arab and Indonesian extremists. In this war America was again recruiting international allies to ‘be with us’ or else ‘you are against us’. The fight was called a crusade for ‘infinite justice’, later scaled down to ‘enduring freedom’. Little did the loyal allies knew that they were launching a crusade not for themselves, or for their gods or holy saints, but for the future of world religion – the Market – and the future god called Profit.
Ten years later now into the 2010, we have completely become and still are conscripted and embroiled into this war on terror that America has led us all. And each with his own defense to justify America’s and the West’s successes and interests as our own, this American holy war is also the world’s war. As the US, the world is to liberate Muslims from their autocratic regimes, for instance, and to democratize Islam that is not liberal enough; in the name of American ideals of liberty and freedom, the world is supposed to fight this, so it claims, 'oppressive and backward' religion of the 'illiterates' ruled by the 'savage laws of the desert nomads'. The new war doctrine says Muslims and Islam must be liberated to see the shining lights of US and Western democracy and liberal capitalistic lifestyle. The irony of all is that Muslims who have been coerced to be soldiers of this world war have been targeting its own, the women and secular intellectuals, most especially, yet perennially blind to the real instigator or the war-monger.
This war on terror, as America intends, is enduring freedom indeed, pervasively fought globally on a 24-7 basis, and worse than the previous world wars that went before us. For in this war, we fight at airports where we are made to remove our shoes, our belts, our coin purses; leave our toothpaste, shampoo and lotions and unconsumed bottled water; and if we are Muslims, in some airports, we are made to unrobe and untangle our jilbab and unhook our brassieres. The war goes to schools, too. In countries such as mine [Philippines] where Muslims are a minority, poor innocent grade-school kids with Arab sounding names get extra attention by suspicious teachers, and are demanded to narrate their ‘brief’ personal – meaning, religious – life history lest they be related, if distant, to any of the ‘terror-sounding’ names and hooded personalities. Or else, for someone declaring herself Muslim but bearing a ‘Christian-sounding’ name most likely gets into arguments where ‘curious’ [islamophobic?] school-mates are wont to investigate why, ‘but your name is Christian name, why are you a Muslim?’ -- as though being a Muslim is some sort of a disease or dreadful thing that one better stay away from. Overnight, everyone becomes self-conscious about their race and ethnicity, religion, gender and with other markers of identity that define ‘us’ and ‘they’. Suddenly, friends become enemies and fences are erected between neighbors. And when things go a little bit overheated, or overboard with too much politics, they apply the instant 'band-aid', a moral emergency kit called 'interfaith dialogue'.
The new war on terror as designed by the United States of America is a Zombie war, fought in the battlefield of emotions and intellect -- its weapons are anger and hatred stashed in hearts and fired away by fingertips and tongues; its target victims are not bodies but souls. And as the Cranberry sings the wars go on and on: ‘in your head, are their tanks, and their bombs and their guns, in your head…’
Who are Terrorists? By Nihayatul Wafiroh
Last month I watched the movie “My Name is Khan.” For me, it is a good picture about the impact of September 11 for Muslim people although they did not involve in the terrorism. The first implication from this tragedy is that people attempt to determine the term “terrorism.” Who are terrorists? United States, in my opinion, gives the wrong direction in the identification of terrorists. US direct or indirect shows in their news that terrorists are from Muslim people. Indeed, this generalization gives negative effects for Muslim in all countries. Osama bin Laden who is assumed to be the leader of terrorist is a Muslim, but it does not mean that all Muslim follow his ideas.
I remember my experiences when I used to live in Hawaii. For Indonesian-Muslim men they need at least one and half-hour to deal with immigration staff when they arrived or departed to US. The US immigration always assumes that all Muslim men from Indonesia are suspected to be “dangerous” people, so they need to make sure that they are clean from terrorism. When the first time my husband came to Hawaii, he had to transit one hour in Guam. In Guam, the immigration staff asked him with many question. As a result he missed his flight and had to wait for 10 hours in Guam for another flight. We made a joke for his case, “although your name is without Muhammad, your face is look like al-Qaida.”
In Indonesia case, as a Muslim, I understand that in my country there are many types of Muslim groups : liberal, moderat and radical. Indonesian is a unique country, so all groups can develop together. Before September 11, I seemed that all groups did not have any problem. In fact, the tension among groups did not occur. Bernard Adeney-Risakotta mentions in his article that actually the impact of September 11 started in Indonesia since Bali bombing on October 12, 2002. It means before that terrorism was unknown in Indonesia.
As people in other countries, Indonesian people began to step far away from terrorist people. The problem in Indonesia is that the majority population in Indonesia is Muslim, as a result, they distrusted each other. Because of media, Indonesian people image that terrorists are who wear one-quarter pants, long shirt, a beard and have wives who wear the veil. This image is not far from the image of Osama bin Laden. People very strong held this picture, so when they meet people like this, they prefer to stand far from them. It is unfair for them and also for other Muslim people.
I personally disagree with this perspective. This generalization takes away their right. Indeed, not all people who wear this kind of dress are terrorists. Terrorism, in my view, is people who make other people’s feeling are terrorized, and they cannot live peacefully. With this determination, I think that capitalism is the big terrorism in the world, and the leader of capitalism is United States. So who are the truly terrorists?
I remember my experiences when I used to live in Hawaii. For Indonesian-Muslim men they need at least one and half-hour to deal with immigration staff when they arrived or departed to US. The US immigration always assumes that all Muslim men from Indonesia are suspected to be “dangerous” people, so they need to make sure that they are clean from terrorism. When the first time my husband came to Hawaii, he had to transit one hour in Guam. In Guam, the immigration staff asked him with many question. As a result he missed his flight and had to wait for 10 hours in Guam for another flight. We made a joke for his case, “although your name is without Muhammad, your face is look like al-Qaida.”
In Indonesia case, as a Muslim, I understand that in my country there are many types of Muslim groups : liberal, moderat and radical. Indonesian is a unique country, so all groups can develop together. Before September 11, I seemed that all groups did not have any problem. In fact, the tension among groups did not occur. Bernard Adeney-Risakotta mentions in his article that actually the impact of September 11 started in Indonesia since Bali bombing on October 12, 2002. It means before that terrorism was unknown in Indonesia.
As people in other countries, Indonesian people began to step far away from terrorist people. The problem in Indonesia is that the majority population in Indonesia is Muslim, as a result, they distrusted each other. Because of media, Indonesian people image that terrorists are who wear one-quarter pants, long shirt, a beard and have wives who wear the veil. This image is not far from the image of Osama bin Laden. People very strong held this picture, so when they meet people like this, they prefer to stand far from them. It is unfair for them and also for other Muslim people.
I personally disagree with this perspective. This generalization takes away their right. Indeed, not all people who wear this kind of dress are terrorists. Terrorism, in my view, is people who make other people’s feeling are terrorized, and they cannot live peacefully. With this determination, I think that capitalism is the big terrorism in the world, and the leader of capitalism is United States. So who are the truly terrorists?
Terror and Religious diversity in Indonesia
by Nina Mariani Noor
September 11th 2001 tragedy has called many different responses from the world. While George Bush utilized it to start attacking Afghanistan and calling for war against terrorism, some fundamentalism Muslims see it as “the great conspiracy of Israel and US” to destruct Muslims. These different views show the clash between “the west” and “Muslims” world that has already existed for ages and still exist today.
Turning to terrorism, those two parties also have different definition on terrorism. Bush sees September 11 was committed by terrorists, particularly Muslims terrorists so that he called for global crusade against terrorists, whereas Muslims see Bush’s action in attacking Afghanistanand starting war is kind of terrorism toward Muslims world. So, who is the terrorist depends on who see and define it.
Accordingly, in Indonesia the spirit of “Jihad” grew up among Muslims in response to US’ action. Some fundamentalist Muslims eagerly sent their people to do Jihad in Afghanistan or in other way, they committed “suicide bombing” that they did in Indonesia by targeting Americans and other “white foreigners”. Unfortunately, people who were affected by those bombing actions are not only what so called ‘Americans” but also Indonesian and Muslims. Furthermore, those bombing actions bring about negative sentiment toward Muslims from others and also make the harmony among different religious communities is in critical point.
In my opinion, the actors of September 11 are terrorists, and both Bush and Muslims committing bombing in Indonesia are also terrorists since all of them have made other people suffer and also place world peace in danger. Moreover, it seems to me that those kinds of terrorism tend to continue in the future if we do not attempt to deal with it.
Therefore, in Indonesian context, our duty now is how to maintain the harmony among different religious communities in order to continue our idea in building Indonesian nation state. Doing more dialogue among different religions to be more understanding not only on the surface but in deep conversation, I think will have effective impacts on building a democratic nation state that respect all religions.
Readings: Hasan, Noorhaidi, “September 11 and Islamic Militancy in Post-New Order Indonesia”
Adeney-Risakotta, Bernard, The Impact of September 11 on Islam in Southeast Asia’.
September 11th 2001 tragedy has called many different responses from the world. While George Bush utilized it to start attacking Afghanistan and calling for war against terrorism, some fundamentalism Muslims see it as “the great conspiracy of Israel and US” to destruct Muslims. These different views show the clash between “the west” and “Muslims” world that has already existed for ages and still exist today.
Turning to terrorism, those two parties also have different definition on terrorism. Bush sees September 11 was committed by terrorists, particularly Muslims terrorists so that he called for global crusade against terrorists, whereas Muslims see Bush’s action in attacking Afghanistanand starting war is kind of terrorism toward Muslims world. So, who is the terrorist depends on who see and define it.
Accordingly, in Indonesia the spirit of “Jihad” grew up among Muslims in response to US’ action. Some fundamentalist Muslims eagerly sent their people to do Jihad in Afghanistan or in other way, they committed “suicide bombing” that they did in Indonesia by targeting Americans and other “white foreigners”. Unfortunately, people who were affected by those bombing actions are not only what so called ‘Americans” but also Indonesian and Muslims. Furthermore, those bombing actions bring about negative sentiment toward Muslims from others and also make the harmony among different religious communities is in critical point.
In my opinion, the actors of September 11 are terrorists, and both Bush and Muslims committing bombing in Indonesia are also terrorists since all of them have made other people suffer and also place world peace in danger. Moreover, it seems to me that those kinds of terrorism tend to continue in the future if we do not attempt to deal with it.
Therefore, in Indonesian context, our duty now is how to maintain the harmony among different religious communities in order to continue our idea in building Indonesian nation state. Doing more dialogue among different religions to be more understanding not only on the surface but in deep conversation, I think will have effective impacts on building a democratic nation state that respect all religions.
Readings: Hasan, Noorhaidi, “September 11 and Islamic Militancy in Post-New Order Indonesia”
Adeney-Risakotta, Bernard, The Impact of September 11 on Islam in Southeast Asia’.
Religion, September 11, the “War on Terror” and the “Clash of Civilizayions”: The Future of Religious Diversity in Indonesia
by Joko Wicoyo
I think the appearance of ‘radical’ and/or violent expressions of political Islam in Indonesia after 11 September is not simply understood as a function of the flaws of Indonesia’s post-Soeharto democracy but it can be more fruitfully understood in relation to similar historical and sociological processes intertwined with the ebb and flow of various kinds of Islamic-based movements in many parts of the world over the last half century. Much of this took place in the context of and in relation to the exigencies of the Cold War. Thus, there is an inter-relationship between developments in the international sphere and the nature of social conflict in the domestic which must be scrutinized.
I think it should be kept in mind that the political nature of Indonesian organized Islam, even at the very early stages, could never be separated from a broader international and historical milieu. At its moment of birth it was profoundly affected by the rise of anti colonial movements worldwide in the first decades of the twentieth century. Political Islam was clearly deeply influenced politically by its appearance in the context of growing nationalist and proto-nationalist sentiment in the colonial-era Dutch East Indies, and other parts of the colonized world – one manifestation of which was the Pan Islamic movement. As is well documented, the emergence of political Islam in Indonesia can be traced back at least to the early responses of the class of traders and merchants who perceived their social and economic position to be under threat within the colonial-era Dutch East Indies at the turn of the twentieth century, or thought their social mobility to be severely constrained. It is because of such a historical legacy that social justice ideals, often strongly tinged with a combination of nationalist and anti-capitalist sentiments–in whatever permutation – remain Islamic Militancy and Jihadist Activism
The complexity of the transition process following the fall of Suharto is confirmed by the act that, in tandem with the spread of democratic discourse, a number of militant Islamist groups, including the Front Pembela Islam (FPI) [Front of the Defenders of Islam], the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) [Indonesia’s Party of Liberation], the Laskar Jihad (LJ) [Jihad Paramilitary Force], the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) [Indonesian Holy Warrior Council] and the Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), achieved notoriety by taking to the streets to demand the comprehensive implementation of the shari’a and by raiding cafes, discotheques, casinos, brothels and other reputed dens of iniquity. In response to the bloody communal conflicts in various trouble spots, they stated their determination to fight jihad and mobilized members and other aspirants of mujahidin to venture to the frontlines. The key to the success of the groups’ mobilizing process lay in the existing Islamist networks that had become widespread across the country in tandem with the efflorescence of Islamist ideology.
Framed in general terms, that what happens in Indonesia has very much to do with the global crisis in the Muslim world, the groups proclaimed their determination to offer the shari’a, khilafa system and jihad as the only solution to curb the continuing crises and disasters afflicting Indonesia today. Implicitly and explicitly they questioned the format of the modern nation-state and expressed their profound desire to establish an Islamic state. They asserted that only then would the Indonesian Muslim umma be protected and saved from the attacks of ‘belligerent infidels.’ Action frames developed by the militant Islamist groups could resonate widely in the public sphere of Indonesia, which is friendly to Islam. As a result of the Islamisation process over the past two decades, Islam has increasingly served as a determining variable behind political negotiations and become the most important frame of reference for many Indonesians to reflect upon the socio-political system they imagined capable of bringing about justice and attaining veritable development. According to them, by keeping pace with the growing influence of Islam on politics, Indonesia has witnessed new global forms of religious identity, whose effect is mediated by specific, historically situated, local institutions. The expansion of this so-called ‘global’ Islam appears to be correlated with the accentuation of religious symbols in the public sphere, the increase of personal religiosity as well as the proliferation of Islamic institutions and new life-styles.
In this context, in the wake of September 11, the name of Osama bin Laden came into the political arena of Indonesia. In this socially and politically ‘Islamised’ public sphere, the FPI came to the fore with a basic agenda to raid cafes, discotheques, casinos and brothels. These actions were claimed to be part of their attempts to secure Indonesia from the hegemony of a Zionist–Christian global conspiracy to undermine Islam. HTI appeared to the public to criticize the existing political system and to propose the khilafat system as an alternative to cope with all the problems facing Indonesia today. They claim that the collapse of the khilafat system was the prime cause of the crisis afflicting the Muslim world, which remains under the shadow of the Zionist–Christian hegemony.
The government and pro-democracy groups’ pressure against violent discourse and jihadist activism has gradually forced the militant Islamist groups to leave behind their high profile politics and shift to a strategy of implementing the shari’a from below. These militant groups apparently no longer see any relevance of jihad as a means to realizing the application of the shari’a. Instead, they argue that da’wa (Islamic proselytizing) is more appropriate to endorse the Indonesian Muslims’ awareness of their duty to uphold the supremacy of the shari’a. They also believe that non-violent endeavors would be more suitable to Indonesia’s current situation and crucial to defend Muslim solidarity and long-term struggle for the comprehensive application of the shari’a. In my mind, their campaign to apply the shari’a from above is considered less effective if there are no activists working at the grass-roots level to boost Muslims’ commitment to the application of the shari’a in their everyday lives. As Ba’asyir pointed out, the strategy for implementing the shari’a suitable for current situation in Indonesia is not jihad, but rather informing the Indonesian Muslims about the magnificence of the shari’a. In his eyes, it is the prophetic strategy of da’wa to give hope and threat; the hope of heaven and the threat of hell. Following the prophet, he relates the implementation of the shari’a to the relationship between man’s life in this world and that in the hereafter. Every individual is leader: leader for himself, his family, his village, and above all his country. They are responsible in the hereafter for whatever they have done in this world. Political leaders who do not take any initiatives to create laws that might prevent their people from being put in hell will fall into trouble in the hereafter; they will be responsible for all people’s sins caused by the absence of the shari’a. However, this does not mean that Ba’asyir totally neglected the importance of jihad; he just sees that da’wa is more appropriate for current peaceful Indonesia. For him, da’wa and jihad are twin concepts to establish God’s laws on earth. In his eyes, the West has demonized and criminalized jihad, because they are afraid of Muslim’s return to the past glorious victory of Islam. He argued that if separated from jihad, Islam becomes weak. Islam will gain honorable victory only with jihad. However, he emphasized that jihad should not be understood simply as holy war. It connotes any effort to establish God’s laws, and da’wa in this context is considered the most suitable condition for realizing the spirit of jihad. I think in this case only God knows what is right and what is wrong!
Readings : Noorhaidi Hasan “September 11 and Islamic Militancy in Post-New Order Indonesia” and Bernard Adeney-Risakotta, ”The Impact of September 11 on Islam in Southeast Asia
I think the appearance of ‘radical’ and/or violent expressions of political Islam in Indonesia after 11 September is not simply understood as a function of the flaws of Indonesia’s post-Soeharto democracy but it can be more fruitfully understood in relation to similar historical and sociological processes intertwined with the ebb and flow of various kinds of Islamic-based movements in many parts of the world over the last half century. Much of this took place in the context of and in relation to the exigencies of the Cold War. Thus, there is an inter-relationship between developments in the international sphere and the nature of social conflict in the domestic which must be scrutinized.
I think it should be kept in mind that the political nature of Indonesian organized Islam, even at the very early stages, could never be separated from a broader international and historical milieu. At its moment of birth it was profoundly affected by the rise of anti colonial movements worldwide in the first decades of the twentieth century. Political Islam was clearly deeply influenced politically by its appearance in the context of growing nationalist and proto-nationalist sentiment in the colonial-era Dutch East Indies, and other parts of the colonized world – one manifestation of which was the Pan Islamic movement. As is well documented, the emergence of political Islam in Indonesia can be traced back at least to the early responses of the class of traders and merchants who perceived their social and economic position to be under threat within the colonial-era Dutch East Indies at the turn of the twentieth century, or thought their social mobility to be severely constrained. It is because of such a historical legacy that social justice ideals, often strongly tinged with a combination of nationalist and anti-capitalist sentiments–in whatever permutation – remain Islamic Militancy and Jihadist Activism
The complexity of the transition process following the fall of Suharto is confirmed by the act that, in tandem with the spread of democratic discourse, a number of militant Islamist groups, including the Front Pembela Islam (FPI) [Front of the Defenders of Islam], the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) [Indonesia’s Party of Liberation], the Laskar Jihad (LJ) [Jihad Paramilitary Force], the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) [Indonesian Holy Warrior Council] and the Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), achieved notoriety by taking to the streets to demand the comprehensive implementation of the shari’a and by raiding cafes, discotheques, casinos, brothels and other reputed dens of iniquity. In response to the bloody communal conflicts in various trouble spots, they stated their determination to fight jihad and mobilized members and other aspirants of mujahidin to venture to the frontlines. The key to the success of the groups’ mobilizing process lay in the existing Islamist networks that had become widespread across the country in tandem with the efflorescence of Islamist ideology.
Framed in general terms, that what happens in Indonesia has very much to do with the global crisis in the Muslim world, the groups proclaimed their determination to offer the shari’a, khilafa system and jihad as the only solution to curb the continuing crises and disasters afflicting Indonesia today. Implicitly and explicitly they questioned the format of the modern nation-state and expressed their profound desire to establish an Islamic state. They asserted that only then would the Indonesian Muslim umma be protected and saved from the attacks of ‘belligerent infidels.’ Action frames developed by the militant Islamist groups could resonate widely in the public sphere of Indonesia, which is friendly to Islam. As a result of the Islamisation process over the past two decades, Islam has increasingly served as a determining variable behind political negotiations and become the most important frame of reference for many Indonesians to reflect upon the socio-political system they imagined capable of bringing about justice and attaining veritable development. According to them, by keeping pace with the growing influence of Islam on politics, Indonesia has witnessed new global forms of religious identity, whose effect is mediated by specific, historically situated, local institutions. The expansion of this so-called ‘global’ Islam appears to be correlated with the accentuation of religious symbols in the public sphere, the increase of personal religiosity as well as the proliferation of Islamic institutions and new life-styles.
In this context, in the wake of September 11, the name of Osama bin Laden came into the political arena of Indonesia. In this socially and politically ‘Islamised’ public sphere, the FPI came to the fore with a basic agenda to raid cafes, discotheques, casinos and brothels. These actions were claimed to be part of their attempts to secure Indonesia from the hegemony of a Zionist–Christian global conspiracy to undermine Islam. HTI appeared to the public to criticize the existing political system and to propose the khilafat system as an alternative to cope with all the problems facing Indonesia today. They claim that the collapse of the khilafat system was the prime cause of the crisis afflicting the Muslim world, which remains under the shadow of the Zionist–Christian hegemony.
The government and pro-democracy groups’ pressure against violent discourse and jihadist activism has gradually forced the militant Islamist groups to leave behind their high profile politics and shift to a strategy of implementing the shari’a from below. These militant groups apparently no longer see any relevance of jihad as a means to realizing the application of the shari’a. Instead, they argue that da’wa (Islamic proselytizing) is more appropriate to endorse the Indonesian Muslims’ awareness of their duty to uphold the supremacy of the shari’a. They also believe that non-violent endeavors would be more suitable to Indonesia’s current situation and crucial to defend Muslim solidarity and long-term struggle for the comprehensive application of the shari’a. In my mind, their campaign to apply the shari’a from above is considered less effective if there are no activists working at the grass-roots level to boost Muslims’ commitment to the application of the shari’a in their everyday lives. As Ba’asyir pointed out, the strategy for implementing the shari’a suitable for current situation in Indonesia is not jihad, but rather informing the Indonesian Muslims about the magnificence of the shari’a. In his eyes, it is the prophetic strategy of da’wa to give hope and threat; the hope of heaven and the threat of hell. Following the prophet, he relates the implementation of the shari’a to the relationship between man’s life in this world and that in the hereafter. Every individual is leader: leader for himself, his family, his village, and above all his country. They are responsible in the hereafter for whatever they have done in this world. Political leaders who do not take any initiatives to create laws that might prevent their people from being put in hell will fall into trouble in the hereafter; they will be responsible for all people’s sins caused by the absence of the shari’a. However, this does not mean that Ba’asyir totally neglected the importance of jihad; he just sees that da’wa is more appropriate for current peaceful Indonesia. For him, da’wa and jihad are twin concepts to establish God’s laws on earth. In his eyes, the West has demonized and criminalized jihad, because they are afraid of Muslim’s return to the past glorious victory of Islam. He argued that if separated from jihad, Islam becomes weak. Islam will gain honorable victory only with jihad. However, he emphasized that jihad should not be understood simply as holy war. It connotes any effort to establish God’s laws, and da’wa in this context is considered the most suitable condition for realizing the spirit of jihad. I think in this case only God knows what is right and what is wrong!
Readings : Noorhaidi Hasan “September 11 and Islamic Militancy in Post-New Order Indonesia” and Bernard Adeney-Risakotta, ”The Impact of September 11 on Islam in Southeast Asia
Complexity of Writing History in Post-Suharto Era
by Faqihuddin Abdul Kodir
History is not about facts of the past rather perspectives of present people about those facts for the benefits of establishing their future. Suharto was true in seeing history for building his perspective of the future of Indonesia; one nation, unity in diversity, economic development, national stability, and social prosperity of all citizens. For these reasons, history should be written in a single perspective owned by the government. Sukarno did the same for his own perspective of the future of Indonesia. The leaders of Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) also would likely do the same if they took over the power. This was the critical historical moment of modern Indonesian people having learnt that the truth is one and the source of the truth also one.
At the end of Suharto’s era, after thirty years seizing the power, people had been able to delegitimize the source of “the truth” which was his government. Reformation era following Suharto’s fall from the power in 1999 opened eyes of many people to look at their own sources of the truth. Without any single legitimized source of the truth, each group of Indonesian people spread “their own truth” from “their own source”. Historiography in this period becomes no longer monolithic and nor in single perspective. At least, in the account of Klinken, there have been emerged four historiographical streams in Indonesia: (1) Orthodox nationalist stream, (2) Societal historiographies at the national level, (3) Regional ethno-nationalisms, and (4) Local sources of historiography. These streams provide not only many facts about the same event, but many perspectives, many historical interpretations, and of course many truths.
From these multi-perspectives of writing history, we Indonesian people begin to learn many truths from many sources. At least, we rely not only on government to know and spread our national history. Although each people believe in their own resource, we Indonesian people attempt to negotiate ‘truths’ among us and learn each from other. However, is really the truth many or only one? I think historical fact about certain thing is single and has only one truth, while interpretation of the fact varies, comes from multi-perspectives, and proposes many truths. We will learn more from interpretation rather than from the fact. However the power, anyone owns it, tends to limit the perspectives for its own interests and at the cost of other perspectives owned by people. Unless we control the power, we may back to the era that the source of the truth is only one and will scare us again as we experienced in the era of Suharto. The power here is not necessary the government, but also mass-media and even religion.
Readings:
1. Gerry Van Klinken, “The Battle for History after Suharto”, in Mary Zurbuchen ed., Beginning to Remember. pp. 233-258.
History is not about facts of the past rather perspectives of present people about those facts for the benefits of establishing their future. Suharto was true in seeing history for building his perspective of the future of Indonesia; one nation, unity in diversity, economic development, national stability, and social prosperity of all citizens. For these reasons, history should be written in a single perspective owned by the government. Sukarno did the same for his own perspective of the future of Indonesia. The leaders of Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) also would likely do the same if they took over the power. This was the critical historical moment of modern Indonesian people having learnt that the truth is one and the source of the truth also one.
At the end of Suharto’s era, after thirty years seizing the power, people had been able to delegitimize the source of “the truth” which was his government. Reformation era following Suharto’s fall from the power in 1999 opened eyes of many people to look at their own sources of the truth. Without any single legitimized source of the truth, each group of Indonesian people spread “their own truth” from “their own source”. Historiography in this period becomes no longer monolithic and nor in single perspective. At least, in the account of Klinken, there have been emerged four historiographical streams in Indonesia: (1) Orthodox nationalist stream, (2) Societal historiographies at the national level, (3) Regional ethno-nationalisms, and (4) Local sources of historiography. These streams provide not only many facts about the same event, but many perspectives, many historical interpretations, and of course many truths.
From these multi-perspectives of writing history, we Indonesian people begin to learn many truths from many sources. At least, we rely not only on government to know and spread our national history. Although each people believe in their own resource, we Indonesian people attempt to negotiate ‘truths’ among us and learn each from other. However, is really the truth many or only one? I think historical fact about certain thing is single and has only one truth, while interpretation of the fact varies, comes from multi-perspectives, and proposes many truths. We will learn more from interpretation rather than from the fact. However the power, anyone owns it, tends to limit the perspectives for its own interests and at the cost of other perspectives owned by people. Unless we control the power, we may back to the era that the source of the truth is only one and will scare us again as we experienced in the era of Suharto. The power here is not necessary the government, but also mass-media and even religion.
Readings:
1. Gerry Van Klinken, “The Battle for History after Suharto”, in Mary Zurbuchen ed., Beginning to Remember. pp. 233-258.
Revival of Jihad
LEYAKET ALI MOHAMED OMAR
History of Religion Part 2- Prof Bernard Adeney- Risakotta and Prof Margana
Readings from: K.S Nathan & Mohammad Kamali- Islam In Southeast Asia & Bernard Adeney- Risakotta- The Impact of September 11 on Islam In Southeast Asia
Noorhaidi Hasan account defines the role that the Islamic militancy in the post-new order Indonesia. It is illustrated that basically there is no way these radical Islamic militants are ready for a diplomatic dialogues; it seems that they tends to have an idea of supremacy in their doctrine, it goes like ‘It is either you are with us or you are against us’. As a result of the principle that they grip and hold on tightly, they tend make a total shut off to any other theories or interpretation and hence in order to seek knowledge from another sources is not in their dictionary at all.
The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States constituted the single most important new development in the international security environment around the globe. On the other hand in Indonesia changes are taken place almost immediately after that significant event and Jihad has no longer been anything new to Indonesia political sphere. It has been long awaited since after the New Order.
We know that long before the new order it has always been a subject that kept its leader on guard; its roots in Darul Islam, a radical movement in Indonesia in the 1940s. Example is Jemaah Islamiah which was formally founded on 1 January 1993 by JI leaders, Abu Bakar Bashir and Abdullah Sungkar while hiding in Malaysia from the persecution of the Suharto Government. After the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998, both men returned to Indonesia where JI gained a terrorist edge when one of its founders, the late Abdullah Sungkar established contact with Osama Bin Laden’s- al-Qaeda network.
Time bomb as I may call it but the fact, it is a time bomb, the only new thing is that they have a new focus violent operations that previously began as the communal conflicts in Maluku and Poso. It shifted its attention to targeting US and Western interests in Indonesia and the wider Southeast Asian region since the start of the US-led war on terror. The question I may want to ask is that, is it true that the reason behind this is the faith? Or it’s the marginalized Muslims that are frustrated due to economical factors? Well, I believed it’s the second one and religion became its tools to work on the ‘enemy’. The revival of Jihad are developed by the certain radical group who are against the West with an understanding that they are responsible for the marginalized as Hasan mentions ‘ Abu Bakar Baasyir, for instance, points out ‘Violence in the framework of Jihad is allowed to resist against belligerent unbelievers attacking Muslims”(p.313)
History of Religion Part 2- Prof Bernard Adeney- Risakotta and Prof Margana
Readings from: K.S Nathan & Mohammad Kamali- Islam In Southeast Asia & Bernard Adeney- Risakotta- The Impact of September 11 on Islam In Southeast Asia
Noorhaidi Hasan account defines the role that the Islamic militancy in the post-new order Indonesia. It is illustrated that basically there is no way these radical Islamic militants are ready for a diplomatic dialogues; it seems that they tends to have an idea of supremacy in their doctrine, it goes like ‘It is either you are with us or you are against us’. As a result of the principle that they grip and hold on tightly, they tend make a total shut off to any other theories or interpretation and hence in order to seek knowledge from another sources is not in their dictionary at all.
The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States constituted the single most important new development in the international security environment around the globe. On the other hand in Indonesia changes are taken place almost immediately after that significant event and Jihad has no longer been anything new to Indonesia political sphere. It has been long awaited since after the New Order.
We know that long before the new order it has always been a subject that kept its leader on guard; its roots in Darul Islam, a radical movement in Indonesia in the 1940s. Example is Jemaah Islamiah which was formally founded on 1 January 1993 by JI leaders, Abu Bakar Bashir and Abdullah Sungkar while hiding in Malaysia from the persecution of the Suharto Government. After the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998, both men returned to Indonesia where JI gained a terrorist edge when one of its founders, the late Abdullah Sungkar established contact with Osama Bin Laden’s- al-Qaeda network.
Time bomb as I may call it but the fact, it is a time bomb, the only new thing is that they have a new focus violent operations that previously began as the communal conflicts in Maluku and Poso. It shifted its attention to targeting US and Western interests in Indonesia and the wider Southeast Asian region since the start of the US-led war on terror. The question I may want to ask is that, is it true that the reason behind this is the faith? Or it’s the marginalized Muslims that are frustrated due to economical factors? Well, I believed it’s the second one and religion became its tools to work on the ‘enemy’. The revival of Jihad are developed by the certain radical group who are against the West with an understanding that they are responsible for the marginalized as Hasan mentions ‘ Abu Bakar Baasyir, for instance, points out ‘Violence in the framework of Jihad is allowed to resist against belligerent unbelievers attacking Muslims”(p.313)
Terror in an Age of Faith - Roy Allan B Tolentino
Much has been made of the necessity to understand Islam in the world after 9/11. Suddenly, the Western world realized that a sizeable chunk of the population subscribed to a world-view that appeared to be totally different from theirs. There was a sudden urgency to learn more about this world-view, and there was a great demand for experts in the field. To be perfectly honest, even my presence as a Catholic scholar in ICRS could be understood along those lines.
While this urgency has died down in the intervening years, this phenomenon has, on the other hand, obscured the fact that Islam is not new; Islam has been part of the world for centuries and will be for the foreseeable future. Thus, when Western-influenced scholars suddenly seize the opportunity to study this “emerging” religion, it seems honestly rather funny. The dialogue between Islam and Western secular culture (whatever that is) has been going on for some time now, despite occasional fits and many awkward pauses. While Islam constantly takes Western secularism to task for its “anti-religious” world-view, religion has never really been erased from world culture.
If we accept, then, that secularism has not stifled the discourse of religion completely, and that we have never really left the “age of faith,” then an important aspect of the dialogue between religion and culture is the dialogue within religions. If Indonesia is any indicator, the sheer plurality of Islam demands that this internal dialogue continues. Just the Indonesian reaction to 9/11 displays the tension within religion: “In Indonesia, home of the world’s largest Islamic population, reactions to 9/11 and subsequent strikes against Afghanistan were perhaps the most polarized in the region... Megawati was torn between, on the one hand, using the opportunity of the US-led anti-terrorist drive to gain international support and approval of Jakarta’s own battle with armed separatists in Aceh and Irian Jaya, and, on the other hand, keeping her distance from the USA in order not to give political ammunition to the moderate and radical Islamic organizations which constitute the most potent opposition to her government.” (Putzel 2003:177)
What has emerged, in my view, is not so much a revival of faith in an age of terror, but a necessity to understand terror in an age of faith. Terrorism is not so much a climate or a characteristic of an age, but a tool used by those who see no possibility of dialogue. To resort to terror, then, is to deny the dialogue that takes place between religions and within religions. Terrorism, while born of ressentiment, implies an ossification of religion, a stasis of faith. It is the task of religion to ensure that the internal and external discourses continue, to make room for difference and to mediate when those differences threaten to divide us. In Indonesia, I am glad to have seen that dialogue in play, although, of course, there is still much to be done. As Seyyed Hossein Nasr says, this dialogue enjoins Muslims “to make use of this intellectual and spiritual heritage to find a modus vivendi with Christianity and Judaism, and to present a version of Islam to the world that can live with the contemporary world without submitting itself to the follies of the world in which we live.” (Nasr 2008:74) The dynamism of faith will outlast the expediency of terror.
Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. “Religion in a Time of Anxiety” in Part of the Problem, Part of the Solution: Religion Today and Tomorrow. Ed. Arvind Sharma. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2008.
Putzel, James. "Political Islam in Southeast Asia and the US-Philippine Alliance" in Global Responses to Terrorism: 9/11, Afghanistan and Beyond. Ed. Mary Buckley and Rick Fawn. London: Routledge, 2003.
While this urgency has died down in the intervening years, this phenomenon has, on the other hand, obscured the fact that Islam is not new; Islam has been part of the world for centuries and will be for the foreseeable future. Thus, when Western-influenced scholars suddenly seize the opportunity to study this “emerging” religion, it seems honestly rather funny. The dialogue between Islam and Western secular culture (whatever that is) has been going on for some time now, despite occasional fits and many awkward pauses. While Islam constantly takes Western secularism to task for its “anti-religious” world-view, religion has never really been erased from world culture.
If we accept, then, that secularism has not stifled the discourse of religion completely, and that we have never really left the “age of faith,” then an important aspect of the dialogue between religion and culture is the dialogue within religions. If Indonesia is any indicator, the sheer plurality of Islam demands that this internal dialogue continues. Just the Indonesian reaction to 9/11 displays the tension within religion: “In Indonesia, home of the world’s largest Islamic population, reactions to 9/11 and subsequent strikes against Afghanistan were perhaps the most polarized in the region... Megawati was torn between, on the one hand, using the opportunity of the US-led anti-terrorist drive to gain international support and approval of Jakarta’s own battle with armed separatists in Aceh and Irian Jaya, and, on the other hand, keeping her distance from the USA in order not to give political ammunition to the moderate and radical Islamic organizations which constitute the most potent opposition to her government.” (Putzel 2003:177)
What has emerged, in my view, is not so much a revival of faith in an age of terror, but a necessity to understand terror in an age of faith. Terrorism is not so much a climate or a characteristic of an age, but a tool used by those who see no possibility of dialogue. To resort to terror, then, is to deny the dialogue that takes place between religions and within religions. Terrorism, while born of ressentiment, implies an ossification of religion, a stasis of faith. It is the task of religion to ensure that the internal and external discourses continue, to make room for difference and to mediate when those differences threaten to divide us. In Indonesia, I am glad to have seen that dialogue in play, although, of course, there is still much to be done. As Seyyed Hossein Nasr says, this dialogue enjoins Muslims “to make use of this intellectual and spiritual heritage to find a modus vivendi with Christianity and Judaism, and to present a version of Islam to the world that can live with the contemporary world without submitting itself to the follies of the world in which we live.” (Nasr 2008:74) The dynamism of faith will outlast the expediency of terror.
Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. “Religion in a Time of Anxiety” in Part of the Problem, Part of the Solution: Religion Today and Tomorrow. Ed. Arvind Sharma. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2008.
Putzel, James. "Political Islam in Southeast Asia and the US-Philippine Alliance" in Global Responses to Terrorism: 9/11, Afghanistan and Beyond. Ed. Mary Buckley and Rick Fawn. London: Routledge, 2003.
Just war and Anti-terrorism Army
Religion, September 11, the “War on Terror” and the “Clash of civilizations”:
The Future of Religious Diversity in Indonesia.
Kristanto Budiprabowo (tatok)
Terrorism can be analyzed in several perspectives. First, in the first time the act of terror happened and take many lost, people see it as a disaster. Moreover, as any disaster, terrorist act creates “epistemological opportunity” in all of human dimension. After the disaster caused by terrorist act, the strongest reflection is about identity, nationality, religiosity, and the correlation among them. In interreligious relationship, this “epistemological opportunity” can be both in the contras direction whether to increase intolerance or to create new understanding. Refer to the September 11 tragedy, the dynamic on the worldwide politics and interreligious relationship post disaster can creates a space for each country and religion to aware it latent. Now is the opportunity for religions to re-identify their existence for the new human relationship in democratic, justice, and full with understanding and respect.
Second, most of us may agree that after the September 11 and the following terrorism attack worldwide, the face of the world socio-politic and the interreligious relationship come to the new era. At the political perspective, the reaction of a country is influenced not only by the dominant discourse among the politician based on the political trend and the prospective alliance, but also by religious leader from various religion and denominations. The big question to this reaction which is sometime ambiguous is about the concept of war. If we see that terrorism is not an act of war, whatever the argumentation behind the act, a country reaction should be also not a strategically military attack as in the wartime. As far as we see terrorism as an act of war and react with the same method, the question about who is the real terrorist will always rise. Is there a “just war” that can practice in fair although it is doing to eliminate the threat of terrorism?
Furthermore, at the economical perspective, terrorism is a sexy issue that always marketable. Even though terrorism attack like September 11 is a tragedy for many people in the world, it is an opportunity for the media, authors, and politicians to invest their asset for future benefit. Terrorism attack is a rude action and be more impolite in the market. In my opinion, beside the question about the socio-political impact in future international relation, it is also an open question in the immediate global market. Who get the biggest benefit from the threat of terrorism?
The Future of Religious Diversity in Indonesia.
Kristanto Budiprabowo (tatok)
Terrorism can be analyzed in several perspectives. First, in the first time the act of terror happened and take many lost, people see it as a disaster. Moreover, as any disaster, terrorist act creates “epistemological opportunity” in all of human dimension. After the disaster caused by terrorist act, the strongest reflection is about identity, nationality, religiosity, and the correlation among them. In interreligious relationship, this “epistemological opportunity” can be both in the contras direction whether to increase intolerance or to create new understanding. Refer to the September 11 tragedy, the dynamic on the worldwide politics and interreligious relationship post disaster can creates a space for each country and religion to aware it latent. Now is the opportunity for religions to re-identify their existence for the new human relationship in democratic, justice, and full with understanding and respect.
Second, most of us may agree that after the September 11 and the following terrorism attack worldwide, the face of the world socio-politic and the interreligious relationship come to the new era. At the political perspective, the reaction of a country is influenced not only by the dominant discourse among the politician based on the political trend and the prospective alliance, but also by religious leader from various religion and denominations. The big question to this reaction which is sometime ambiguous is about the concept of war. If we see that terrorism is not an act of war, whatever the argumentation behind the act, a country reaction should be also not a strategically military attack as in the wartime. As far as we see terrorism as an act of war and react with the same method, the question about who is the real terrorist will always rise. Is there a “just war” that can practice in fair although it is doing to eliminate the threat of terrorism?
Furthermore, at the economical perspective, terrorism is a sexy issue that always marketable. Even though terrorism attack like September 11 is a tragedy for many people in the world, it is an opportunity for the media, authors, and politicians to invest their asset for future benefit. Terrorism attack is a rude action and be more impolite in the market. In my opinion, beside the question about the socio-political impact in future international relation, it is also an open question in the immediate global market. Who get the biggest benefit from the threat of terrorism?
It is not about “Islam of Southeast Asia” rather “the powerless East” and “the powerful West” by Faqiiuddin Abdul Kodir
Bernard elucidates interestingly, although it is a general attempt, the paradigmatic differences between the West and Islam of Southeast Asia in seeing the tragedy of September 11. Western societies, he argues, are established on the paradigm of “social contract” in which values of individual freedom and safety are very central, while Muslims are influenced rather by values of the family in which the dignity and the well being of the ummah become very fundamental. On the one hand Western people are very much motivated by the belief in the free choice of individuals, and Muslims are rather “tied together by blood and fate” (p. 335).
I would like accordingly to go further that the differences above are not only about Muslims in Southeast Asia rather about Southeast Asian people in general and Western people also in general. Precisely the dimension, I think, is broader than only to be true among Muslims in Southeast Asia. It is not only Muslims of the regions for instance who distrust the governments. The notion that nationalism is less important than “religion” or “local religion” among contemporary Muslims is also true, I think, for Christians, and the adherents of other religions. This is due to the failure of the state as the symbol of nationalism to provide the needs of the civilians. The states of the regions are seen by their people to be exploited by the elites only for interests of the powerful elite including the West.
The dimension of September 11, I think, even goes further to distinguish the perspective of those who feel powerless against those who are powerful, people to people or state to state and even among people in the US. I often read the articles of Americans, such as Michael Parenti the outstanding writer on the critics of capitalism of the State, that the tragedy of September 11 was designed deliberately by the US particularly Bush’s administration to maintain capitalism which makes nothing for people of the US. I am not discussing about the perspective of conspiracy in seeing the tragedy of September 11 among Muslims. I just get impressed, even from the perspective of the news and the articles shown in Kompas run by Indonesian Catholic, that the tragedy tells us more about the idea of social justice between the East and the West, or the South and the North, or the powerless and powerful, and the poor and the rich. This distinguishable perspective exists obviously in many countries of the world even in the State.
Readings:
1. Bernard Adeney-Risakotta, “The Impact of September 11 on Islam in Southeast Asia”, in: K.S. Nathan and Mohammad Hashim Kamali (eds.), Islam in Southeast Asia”, (Singapore: ISEAS, 2005), pp. 325-345.
I would like accordingly to go further that the differences above are not only about Muslims in Southeast Asia rather about Southeast Asian people in general and Western people also in general. Precisely the dimension, I think, is broader than only to be true among Muslims in Southeast Asia. It is not only Muslims of the regions for instance who distrust the governments. The notion that nationalism is less important than “religion” or “local religion” among contemporary Muslims is also true, I think, for Christians, and the adherents of other religions. This is due to the failure of the state as the symbol of nationalism to provide the needs of the civilians. The states of the regions are seen by their people to be exploited by the elites only for interests of the powerful elite including the West.
The dimension of September 11, I think, even goes further to distinguish the perspective of those who feel powerless against those who are powerful, people to people or state to state and even among people in the US. I often read the articles of Americans, such as Michael Parenti the outstanding writer on the critics of capitalism of the State, that the tragedy of September 11 was designed deliberately by the US particularly Bush’s administration to maintain capitalism which makes nothing for people of the US. I am not discussing about the perspective of conspiracy in seeing the tragedy of September 11 among Muslims. I just get impressed, even from the perspective of the news and the articles shown in Kompas run by Indonesian Catholic, that the tragedy tells us more about the idea of social justice between the East and the West, or the South and the North, or the powerless and powerful, and the poor and the rich. This distinguishable perspective exists obviously in many countries of the world even in the State.
Readings:
1. Bernard Adeney-Risakotta, “The Impact of September 11 on Islam in Southeast Asia”, in: K.S. Nathan and Mohammad Hashim Kamali (eds.), Islam in Southeast Asia”, (Singapore: ISEAS, 2005), pp. 325-345.
Sabtu, 01 Mei 2010
9/11 Legacy and its Aftermath: Perception and Education
by
Roma Ulinnuha
As noted by Noorhadi Hasan and Bernard Adeney Risakotta, the particular moment of 9/11 has attributed different perception in different times and spaces. While Hasan pointed out ‘the tension between the proponents of radical Islam and Liberal Islam has turned into open clash’ in Indonesia context (p.317), Adeney-Risakotta argued that there was a need to clarify some differences between the perception of Westerners and South-East Asian Muslims’ (p.342).
I firmly argue that Islam and the West as entities are not in single representation. What have been ‘borrowed’ by terrorists and who have been ‘accused’ as them is not an absolute perspective. Muslim perception in South East Asia is diverse but they are, indeed, together in ultimate mindset. The tightly-bounded framework is against injustice, unfairness and oppression.
9/11 uproar is intolerable, but the more miserable things are false prejudices, and mounted hatred among any entities. Political bias, economic greediness, cultural backwardness and social pathology, I believe, are on the corridor of almost every tension. The tension is even worse, when on the traffic of the corridor, those aspects are engineered by any forms of religious icons directly or indirectly.
On the one side, the tragedy will always happen in the present and the future, but the most sound-ways of efforts is rethinking perceptions among Islam and the West. When media is both promising and evading, there is a need to share a little room where every entity is present. A fair contestation then should start.
Among serious issues should address is the portrayal of Islam and the West as seen in media—TV, Movies, and News papers—as one of the vast contributors constructing the mindset of the people. When media is balanced, I believe, it can work prospectively with the line of educational-type of strategy. Therefore one of the ways to enhance a better perception is educating people, particularly on the relation between Islam and the West.
What we can do now, in this regards, is delivering and accelerating opinions, ideas, and works in any religious basis to promote the notion of inclusiveness, tolerance and plurality. Those words have never been cliché, since some history has proven written in horrible notions by the state, organization, institution, including religious entity as the result of different perceptions in different times and spaces. The challenge is waiting before us.
Readings:
Hasan, Noorhaidi, “September 11 and Islamic Militancy in Post-New Order Indonesia”;
Adeney-Risakotta, Bernard, The Impact of September 11 on Islam in Southeast Asia’.
Roma Ulinnuha
As noted by Noorhadi Hasan and Bernard Adeney Risakotta, the particular moment of 9/11 has attributed different perception in different times and spaces. While Hasan pointed out ‘the tension between the proponents of radical Islam and Liberal Islam has turned into open clash’ in Indonesia context (p.317), Adeney-Risakotta argued that there was a need to clarify some differences between the perception of Westerners and South-East Asian Muslims’ (p.342).
I firmly argue that Islam and the West as entities are not in single representation. What have been ‘borrowed’ by terrorists and who have been ‘accused’ as them is not an absolute perspective. Muslim perception in South East Asia is diverse but they are, indeed, together in ultimate mindset. The tightly-bounded framework is against injustice, unfairness and oppression.
9/11 uproar is intolerable, but the more miserable things are false prejudices, and mounted hatred among any entities. Political bias, economic greediness, cultural backwardness and social pathology, I believe, are on the corridor of almost every tension. The tension is even worse, when on the traffic of the corridor, those aspects are engineered by any forms of religious icons directly or indirectly.
On the one side, the tragedy will always happen in the present and the future, but the most sound-ways of efforts is rethinking perceptions among Islam and the West. When media is both promising and evading, there is a need to share a little room where every entity is present. A fair contestation then should start.
Among serious issues should address is the portrayal of Islam and the West as seen in media—TV, Movies, and News papers—as one of the vast contributors constructing the mindset of the people. When media is balanced, I believe, it can work prospectively with the line of educational-type of strategy. Therefore one of the ways to enhance a better perception is educating people, particularly on the relation between Islam and the West.
What we can do now, in this regards, is delivering and accelerating opinions, ideas, and works in any religious basis to promote the notion of inclusiveness, tolerance and plurality. Those words have never been cliché, since some history has proven written in horrible notions by the state, organization, institution, including religious entity as the result of different perceptions in different times and spaces. The challenge is waiting before us.
Readings:
Hasan, Noorhaidi, “September 11 and Islamic Militancy in Post-New Order Indonesia”;
Adeney-Risakotta, Bernard, The Impact of September 11 on Islam in Southeast Asia’.
September 11: It Changed the Color Tone, Not the Picture
By Timotius Wibowo
September 11 attack has been the most popular reference in discussing Islam-Western relation in 21st century. However, is the impact as great as many people supposed to? In a certain case, the answer is yes, but in some cases, no. It is true that the attack has been great impact for American people, both in economics and in politics. It is also true, that economical impact of that happened to America had been widely spread in global level. Even, the global economical crisis that followed has not been yet totally overcome. However, the political impact, especially in Southeast Asia is not so great. It might change the tone of the colors, yet it did not change the picture of Islam-Western political relation. Before and after the attack, the people and political groups would still in their previous positions. The radical Islam groups would still radically oppose the Western. The pro-Western political groups would still oppose the radical Islam groups. Similarly, the moderate groups would still stay in between. Why is it as such? In my opinion, there are at least two reason.
First, the radical Muslim group is not the only influential group in Southeast Asia. It is true that the radical group is usually the most vocal one. However, it does not mean that they were the most influential one. Azyumardi Azra points out, “it is terribly wrong to assume that these radical groups are influential in Southeast Asia” (p.19). Second, in Southeast Asia, especially in Indonesia, Islam is not a monolithic religion, instead multi-facet in many aspects. Even, locality can be a determining factor for what kind of Muslim they would be. As Adeney-Risakotta points out, “Local communities of Muslims are constantly creating new meanings to mediate the conflicting values and demands of their life in the real world” (p.342). In short, multi-facet character of Indonesian and Southeast Asian Islam has save the region from a single and absolute interpretation of September 11, which could easily make the situation worse for both sides. In this sense, there is actually no new interpretation to the event. Every body will interpreted the event as same as what they previously had. Accordingly, there would be minor changes in the political of Muslim people in Southeast Asia.
September 11 attack has been the most popular reference in discussing Islam-Western relation in 21st century. However, is the impact as great as many people supposed to? In a certain case, the answer is yes, but in some cases, no. It is true that the attack has been great impact for American people, both in economics and in politics. It is also true, that economical impact of that happened to America had been widely spread in global level. Even, the global economical crisis that followed has not been yet totally overcome. However, the political impact, especially in Southeast Asia is not so great. It might change the tone of the colors, yet it did not change the picture of Islam-Western political relation. Before and after the attack, the people and political groups would still in their previous positions. The radical Islam groups would still radically oppose the Western. The pro-Western political groups would still oppose the radical Islam groups. Similarly, the moderate groups would still stay in between. Why is it as such? In my opinion, there are at least two reason.
First, the radical Muslim group is not the only influential group in Southeast Asia. It is true that the radical group is usually the most vocal one. However, it does not mean that they were the most influential one. Azyumardi Azra points out, “it is terribly wrong to assume that these radical groups are influential in Southeast Asia” (p.19). Second, in Southeast Asia, especially in Indonesia, Islam is not a monolithic religion, instead multi-facet in many aspects. Even, locality can be a determining factor for what kind of Muslim they would be. As Adeney-Risakotta points out, “Local communities of Muslims are constantly creating new meanings to mediate the conflicting values and demands of their life in the real world” (p.342). In short, multi-facet character of Indonesian and Southeast Asian Islam has save the region from a single and absolute interpretation of September 11, which could easily make the situation worse for both sides. In this sense, there is actually no new interpretation to the event. Every body will interpreted the event as same as what they previously had. Accordingly, there would be minor changes in the political of Muslim people in Southeast Asia.
Minggu, 25 April 2010
Religion and Violence in the Fall of Suharto
Kristanto Budiprabowo (Tatok)
Looking back to the history of the fall of Suharto in the perspective of the history of religion, in my opinion, there are several situations that should be our consideration. First, at that time global political situation directs to the struggle of democratization which combines with the rise of religious criticism and ethno-nationalism. In Indonesia, this situation content with the international negotiation especially in the economical trend. Second, in the regional Asians countries, the economical crisis is the most fatal hit and seems to be the most reasonable thing that fastens social change. In Indonesia, even though government tried using every possibility to save national economical stability, but the political and social instability already uncontrolled. This situation, somehow, show the religious ambiguity. On one side, there were some religious leaders who give religious interpretation to support Suharto’s establishment. On the other side, some religious leader use religious organization as a political movement to criticize him.
Third, in the local context, influence by international and regional situation, the real national situation was exposed. Poverty, inequality between provinces, low income laborer, is some of the social reality that triggers riots in some places. Student’s protest and scholars critics to the government and also political competition among politicians whether civilian or military in background, are the daily news. And because the control from Jakarta weakened, there were also the competition among local elite. In this situation, religion is very easy manipulated as a social solidarity to do violence. The religious violence, for instance in Ambon, is an example that international, regional and local situation have a significant influence. Moreover, in my opinion, in areas which have long history interreligious competition to have political power, religious violence happens more easily.
Looking back to the history of the fall of Suharto in the perspective of the history of religion, in my opinion, there are several situations that should be our consideration. First, at that time global political situation directs to the struggle of democratization which combines with the rise of religious criticism and ethno-nationalism. In Indonesia, this situation content with the international negotiation especially in the economical trend. Second, in the regional Asians countries, the economical crisis is the most fatal hit and seems to be the most reasonable thing that fastens social change. In Indonesia, even though government tried using every possibility to save national economical stability, but the political and social instability already uncontrolled. This situation, somehow, show the religious ambiguity. On one side, there were some religious leaders who give religious interpretation to support Suharto’s establishment. On the other side, some religious leader use religious organization as a political movement to criticize him.
Third, in the local context, influence by international and regional situation, the real national situation was exposed. Poverty, inequality between provinces, low income laborer, is some of the social reality that triggers riots in some places. Student’s protest and scholars critics to the government and also political competition among politicians whether civilian or military in background, are the daily news. And because the control from Jakarta weakened, there were also the competition among local elite. In this situation, religion is very easy manipulated as a social solidarity to do violence. The religious violence, for instance in Ambon, is an example that international, regional and local situation have a significant influence. Moreover, in my opinion, in areas which have long history interreligious competition to have political power, religious violence happens more easily.
Religion and violence in the fall of Suharto and toward democratization;
Tri Harmaji
History of Religions in Indonesia Part II: from c. 1900 to the Present
Religion and violence in the fall of Suharto and toward democratization; Kevin O’Rourke, Reformasi, struggle for power in post-Suharto Indonesia, pg. 87-153 & Mary S. Zurbuchen, Beginning to remember- the past in the Indonesian present, pg. 38-74 & 150-168
In the time, before and after, of Suharto fall most big cities in Indonesia and especially Jakarta were colored by violence. The violence took place in many places and it cost much lives and material loss. But the question here is where religion is in this tragic scene? Did religion involve in this violence? Because the ruined facilities were not just economic or government facilities and building but also some religious facilities such as church buildings, religious involvement is believed to have prevailed in this scene. But from the readings, especially O,Rourke’s analysis about who behind the riot, it is clear that military was the most likely to have masterminding this riot. It is true that some religious figures like Amin Rais, Nucholis Majid and Gusdur were actively participate in the days of Suharto resignation. But it is almost clear also that their role in this scene can not be related to the violence happened in that very tension time. No religious motive was found in that chaotic time of the struggle to step down Suharto from his office. It is likely that the main cause of the people and students’ struggle was economic crisis caused by KKN the Suharto government practiced.
Suharto himself has done his best to defend his power. In his opinion, I perceive, he was a great leader of Indonesia who has brought prosperity to the country. Regardless that in his governance there were many human right abuse, corruption, environment destruction, foreign debt ect. he still thinks that there was much goodness also he has done for the country. It is why when firstly he signaled his willingness to resign in Egypt, he said that it was just because the people have no trust any more to him, then he will ‘make himself close to God’ and become pandito. It is characteristically Javanese religious word. Is really Suharto a religious person? If he is, how about especially mass killing he had done to PKI? In “beginning to remember” a dalang, Ki Trisuti Rachmadi, tells his experience as one victim of Suharto campaign against PKI. From his story I can imagine how suffer they were when they were put in the prison as well as after they were freed. After the fall of Suharto many people begun to bring this issue to the public, and so the badness of Suharto begun more and more apparent. But the question is back again, ‘do this action, killing PKI, contradict to religion?’ for the people now, the answer is clearly ‘Yes!’ but perhaps it was different from religious perspective at that time. Like we know, religious organization also actively played role in the killing, and so it was sure that there was a strong religious justification to the killing at that time.
Another violence interesting to me here is the ninja killing. This tragedy took place in east java shortly after the fall of Suharto, and the victims of this killing were mostly Islamic leaders affiliated to NU. Who are the ninja and who masterminding it? Some people accused Suharto who was taking revenge for his fall. And another opinion, especially from Hasyim, the killing must be performed by the communist who took revenge for what they experienced more that 30 years ago. Both opinions make sense. But on the other side this guess still leave other questions; if the ninja was the communist, why they did not take revenge to Suharto too as the most responsible person to the PKI killing at that time? Or if Suharto was behind this terror, why he just kills Islamic leaders? Is the main actor of his fall was student and perhaps military itself isn’t it?
All of the questions above perhaps can not be answered satisfactorily all the time. And perhaps we do not have to too focus on those questions in understanding the violence around the fall of Suharto. What is universally true is that the small people will always become the victims if two big people are fighting each other. “dua gajah berkelahi, pelanduk mati di tengahnya”.
History of Religions in Indonesia Part II: from c. 1900 to the Present
Religion and violence in the fall of Suharto and toward democratization; Kevin O’Rourke, Reformasi, struggle for power in post-Suharto Indonesia, pg. 87-153 & Mary S. Zurbuchen, Beginning to remember- the past in the Indonesian present, pg. 38-74 & 150-168
In the time, before and after, of Suharto fall most big cities in Indonesia and especially Jakarta were colored by violence. The violence took place in many places and it cost much lives and material loss. But the question here is where religion is in this tragic scene? Did religion involve in this violence? Because the ruined facilities were not just economic or government facilities and building but also some religious facilities such as church buildings, religious involvement is believed to have prevailed in this scene. But from the readings, especially O,Rourke’s analysis about who behind the riot, it is clear that military was the most likely to have masterminding this riot. It is true that some religious figures like Amin Rais, Nucholis Majid and Gusdur were actively participate in the days of Suharto resignation. But it is almost clear also that their role in this scene can not be related to the violence happened in that very tension time. No religious motive was found in that chaotic time of the struggle to step down Suharto from his office. It is likely that the main cause of the people and students’ struggle was economic crisis caused by KKN the Suharto government practiced.
Suharto himself has done his best to defend his power. In his opinion, I perceive, he was a great leader of Indonesia who has brought prosperity to the country. Regardless that in his governance there were many human right abuse, corruption, environment destruction, foreign debt ect. he still thinks that there was much goodness also he has done for the country. It is why when firstly he signaled his willingness to resign in Egypt, he said that it was just because the people have no trust any more to him, then he will ‘make himself close to God’ and become pandito. It is characteristically Javanese religious word. Is really Suharto a religious person? If he is, how about especially mass killing he had done to PKI? In “beginning to remember” a dalang, Ki Trisuti Rachmadi, tells his experience as one victim of Suharto campaign against PKI. From his story I can imagine how suffer they were when they were put in the prison as well as after they were freed. After the fall of Suharto many people begun to bring this issue to the public, and so the badness of Suharto begun more and more apparent. But the question is back again, ‘do this action, killing PKI, contradict to religion?’ for the people now, the answer is clearly ‘Yes!’ but perhaps it was different from religious perspective at that time. Like we know, religious organization also actively played role in the killing, and so it was sure that there was a strong religious justification to the killing at that time.
Another violence interesting to me here is the ninja killing. This tragedy took place in east java shortly after the fall of Suharto, and the victims of this killing were mostly Islamic leaders affiliated to NU. Who are the ninja and who masterminding it? Some people accused Suharto who was taking revenge for his fall. And another opinion, especially from Hasyim, the killing must be performed by the communist who took revenge for what they experienced more that 30 years ago. Both opinions make sense. But on the other side this guess still leave other questions; if the ninja was the communist, why they did not take revenge to Suharto too as the most responsible person to the PKI killing at that time? Or if Suharto was behind this terror, why he just kills Islamic leaders? Is the main actor of his fall was student and perhaps military itself isn’t it?
All of the questions above perhaps can not be answered satisfactorily all the time. And perhaps we do not have to too focus on those questions in understanding the violence around the fall of Suharto. What is universally true is that the small people will always become the victims if two big people are fighting each other. “dua gajah berkelahi, pelanduk mati di tengahnya”.
How is the Historiographies in Indonesia after Soeharto’s Era ? By Nihayatul Wafiroh
The generation who was born from 1960s until 1980s would have the same memories about Indonesian history. For instance, Sukarno joined the banned party, which is a communist party, and we always had assumed that Suharto was the most important person to bring Indonesia in the new era. Our knowledge about Indonesia based on one resource which was the historical book in our school. Geery Van Klinken in his article The Battle for History after Soeharto claimed that the power of Suharto arranged everything about the Indonesian history.
Although Soeharto already fell in 1998, it does not mean that Indonesia would create better historiographies. There are still some problems for example the less controlled by state. Indeed, this situation opens the opportunities for all people to write the history that is based on their own perspectives. In the other hand, the reform era has brought an opportunity for everyone to express their courage to write about the history of Indonesia, so there emerge several groups of historians who have a different focus on the historiographical Indonesia. Klinken groups four historiographical streams into four groups: (1) Orthodox nationalist stream, (2) Societal historiographies at the national level, (3) Regional ethno-nationalisms, (4) Local histories.
For me the most interesting of these four groups is the first group. Disclosure of information and the absence of pressure from the government do not open their eyes about the real history of Indonesia. Indeed, the history of Indosia had been covered by Suharto. They still hold the view of the "forbidden" to have a different view of history, so they raided the history books that in their view not in line with their opinions. If this group still exists, I am sure that the historigraphical Indonesia will not move ahead.
Then, how about the history of religions in Indonesia? I think that during Suharto’s era, the history of religions was only written from one side which was government’s side. So is there any differences before and after Soeharto’s era?
Although Soeharto already fell in 1998, it does not mean that Indonesia would create better historiographies. There are still some problems for example the less controlled by state. Indeed, this situation opens the opportunities for all people to write the history that is based on their own perspectives. In the other hand, the reform era has brought an opportunity for everyone to express their courage to write about the history of Indonesia, so there emerge several groups of historians who have a different focus on the historiographical Indonesia. Klinken groups four historiographical streams into four groups: (1) Orthodox nationalist stream, (2) Societal historiographies at the national level, (3) Regional ethno-nationalisms, (4) Local histories.
For me the most interesting of these four groups is the first group. Disclosure of information and the absence of pressure from the government do not open their eyes about the real history of Indonesia. Indeed, the history of Indosia had been covered by Suharto. They still hold the view of the "forbidden" to have a different view of history, so they raided the history books that in their view not in line with their opinions. If this group still exists, I am sure that the historigraphical Indonesia will not move ahead.
Then, how about the history of religions in Indonesia? I think that during Suharto’s era, the history of religions was only written from one side which was government’s side. So is there any differences before and after Soeharto’s era?
Can the State be mandated seriously?
By Roma Ulinnuha
Readings:
1. Hasan, Noorhaidi, “Reformasi, Religious Diversity, and Islamic Radicalism after Soeharto”, Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities, Vol. 1, 2008, pp. 23–51
URL: http://www.kitlv-journals.nl/index.php/jissh/index.
2. Hüsken, Frans, Violence and Vengeance: Discontent and Conflict in New Order Indonesia; The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 62, No. 3 (Aug., 2003), pp. 1005-1007
It is a very huge challenge for Indonesia, soon after the New Order’s regime stepped down, to face the complex issue on leadership, trust and unity. Leaving behind the authoritarian regime was a fortune, but it also assigned the big question on the pathways of newly Indonesia vision that formulated in Reformasi Era. Noorhaidi Hasan (2008) viewed the quarrel of political strive related to religious segments. Hasan argues that ‘in the context of mounting competition among elites, religion has become tremendously politicised and has served more as a tactical tool used by political contenders in their own interests’ (p. 24). Violence as the impact of political fragility was manifest. Frans Husken (2003) argues that three years after Soeharto’s resignation, Indonesia witnessed refugees and sectarian violence (p.1005). In this uncertainty, the state seemed awkward in responding the vast changing of political discourse. Habibie, according to Hasan, liberalized the regulation on the establishment of political parties and abolished the asas tunggal, thus explicitly allowing Islam to enter the political arena of Indonesia. A dozen political parties that endorsed the shari’a and other conservative positions thus came to the political arena of post-Suharto Indonesia (p.33). This strategy should actually be carefully taken into consideration for the situational moment at the time.
The legacy of the act, I think, is present now. Some radical Islam groups were free after the New Order’s repression to act in a more extensive mode of action. I believe the evil acts of prostitution, gambling, and other horrible acts should be seen carefully in terms of the law consequence. Any religious groups in Indonesia should not be a street justice executor. Indonesia is a religious country, but it does not legalize the acts of religious groups acting as the agent of the state such as military or police. I disagree with the social pathology—such as crime, prostitution and other negative acts, at the same time I also believe that the fair justice should be done. The question is: can the state be fair enough to lead law enforcement? If the state cannot be trusted, I hope the street justice is not just a last choice. Violence in political, social, economic, and religious realm is then the assignment should be responded seriously by the state.
Readings:
1. Hasan, Noorhaidi, “Reformasi, Religious Diversity, and Islamic Radicalism after Soeharto”, Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities, Vol. 1, 2008, pp. 23–51
URL: http://www.kitlv-journals.nl/index.php/jissh/index.
2. Hüsken, Frans, Violence and Vengeance: Discontent and Conflict in New Order Indonesia; The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 62, No. 3 (Aug., 2003), pp. 1005-1007
It is a very huge challenge for Indonesia, soon after the New Order’s regime stepped down, to face the complex issue on leadership, trust and unity. Leaving behind the authoritarian regime was a fortune, but it also assigned the big question on the pathways of newly Indonesia vision that formulated in Reformasi Era. Noorhaidi Hasan (2008) viewed the quarrel of political strive related to religious segments. Hasan argues that ‘in the context of mounting competition among elites, religion has become tremendously politicised and has served more as a tactical tool used by political contenders in their own interests’ (p. 24). Violence as the impact of political fragility was manifest. Frans Husken (2003) argues that three years after Soeharto’s resignation, Indonesia witnessed refugees and sectarian violence (p.1005). In this uncertainty, the state seemed awkward in responding the vast changing of political discourse. Habibie, according to Hasan, liberalized the regulation on the establishment of political parties and abolished the asas tunggal, thus explicitly allowing Islam to enter the political arena of Indonesia. A dozen political parties that endorsed the shari’a and other conservative positions thus came to the political arena of post-Suharto Indonesia (p.33). This strategy should actually be carefully taken into consideration for the situational moment at the time.
The legacy of the act, I think, is present now. Some radical Islam groups were free after the New Order’s repression to act in a more extensive mode of action. I believe the evil acts of prostitution, gambling, and other horrible acts should be seen carefully in terms of the law consequence. Any religious groups in Indonesia should not be a street justice executor. Indonesia is a religious country, but it does not legalize the acts of religious groups acting as the agent of the state such as military or police. I disagree with the social pathology—such as crime, prostitution and other negative acts, at the same time I also believe that the fair justice should be done. The question is: can the state be fair enough to lead law enforcement? If the state cannot be trusted, I hope the street justice is not just a last choice. Violence in political, social, economic, and religious realm is then the assignment should be responded seriously by the state.
So, what is the real Indonesian history?
by Nina Mariani Noor
In talking about history in Indonesia, particularly after the fall of Soeharto, Van Klinken points out some important issues that emerged and got more attention from historians and scholars like G. 30. S PKI events, March 1st . I do agree with him that “official history” made during Soeharto’s reign mostly uncovered the real events that happened in the past in order to promote Soeharto’s power. I, personally, in fact experienced knowing and understanding this “official history” during my school time. Therefore, history about Indonesia that keep in my mind is this kind of history so that I find it difficult sometimes to change my understanding on a fact in the past. And I am sure, that my experiences are similar to other people in Indonesia. for example in the case of communism in 1965-1966, I never taught about the mass killing at that time by my history teacher in my junior and also senior high school. What we know is only about the brutality of PKI rebellion.
In my opinion, some attempts from historians now to reveal the history about Indonesia are really useful and valuable for our next generation. Establishing official history to build a strong nationalism is good. However, we have to avoid blaming or even victimizing some people just to make the history seems good and perfect. Revealing the facts is more important that make them up in order to make it in accordance with what we want.
O’ Rourke explains some backgrounds about some leaders who involved in the reformation process to send Soeharto down from his reign like Megawati, Abdurrahman Wahid and Amin Rais. His way of presenting their short biography and backgrounds provides the readers with clearer background on reformation in Indonesia. Furthermore, it seems that he tries to show the real events in the past to his readers and it seems to be that it is effective in calling readers’ attention.
After all, there is a question in my mind after the development of history writing in Indonesia, What is the real history of Indonesia? Which history that we should believe?
Readings: Gerry Van Klinken, The Battle for History after Suharto, in Mary Zurbuchen ed, Beginning to Remember.
Kevin O’ Rourke, Reformasi the struggle for Power in Post Soeharto Indonesia
In talking about history in Indonesia, particularly after the fall of Soeharto, Van Klinken points out some important issues that emerged and got more attention from historians and scholars like G. 30. S PKI events, March 1st . I do agree with him that “official history” made during Soeharto’s reign mostly uncovered the real events that happened in the past in order to promote Soeharto’s power. I, personally, in fact experienced knowing and understanding this “official history” during my school time. Therefore, history about Indonesia that keep in my mind is this kind of history so that I find it difficult sometimes to change my understanding on a fact in the past. And I am sure, that my experiences are similar to other people in Indonesia. for example in the case of communism in 1965-1966, I never taught about the mass killing at that time by my history teacher in my junior and also senior high school. What we know is only about the brutality of PKI rebellion.
In my opinion, some attempts from historians now to reveal the history about Indonesia are really useful and valuable for our next generation. Establishing official history to build a strong nationalism is good. However, we have to avoid blaming or even victimizing some people just to make the history seems good and perfect. Revealing the facts is more important that make them up in order to make it in accordance with what we want.
O’ Rourke explains some backgrounds about some leaders who involved in the reformation process to send Soeharto down from his reign like Megawati, Abdurrahman Wahid and Amin Rais. His way of presenting their short biography and backgrounds provides the readers with clearer background on reformation in Indonesia. Furthermore, it seems that he tries to show the real events in the past to his readers and it seems to be that it is effective in calling readers’ attention.
After all, there is a question in my mind after the development of history writing in Indonesia, What is the real history of Indonesia? Which history that we should believe?
Readings: Gerry Van Klinken, The Battle for History after Suharto, in Mary Zurbuchen ed, Beginning to Remember.
Kevin O’ Rourke, Reformasi the struggle for Power in Post Soeharto Indonesia
Soeharto's Legacy
LEYAKET ALI MOHAMED OMAR
History of Religion Part 2- Prof Bernard Adeney- Risakotta and Prof Margana
Readings are from : Gerry van Klinken- The Battle for History after Suharto
Like many of his fellow Indonesians, this once-dominant leader has only one name: Suharto. A former Army General came to power in 1965 when political turmoil rocked the rule of former President Sukarno. He became president in 1968, a post he held in an iron grip until the financial crisis of 1998 precipitated widespread unrest and protest, leading to his resigning the presidency in that year.
Over a thirty-year period, he ruled the 225-million citizenry, 17,000 island archipelago with a firm hand, and I must say brought stability and development to a nation many had thought ungovernable, at least to my understanding from the past history lessons in the course. In the end, the continuing charges of corruption, human rights abuses and stifling of political dissent began to overshadow his achievements, and he was forced into resignation on 21 May, 1998.
Now, with his passing, Indonesians will have to wrestle with the complex legacy of a leader who left an indelible imprint on the country’s history. Klinken’s account of The battle for History after Suharto was interesting to know, he mentions ‘ When the press exploded some of the key historical myth upon which the national-building project had been built, and parents began to accuse hapless teachers around the country of teachings ‘lies’ (p.236)” As I wonder through the actual facts of the “lies’ or fabrication of history through power of ‘silencing’ the fact on 1st March 1949, 30th September 1965 was all a political agenda that has serve its purpose on those period of unrest. Although it might be a myth, but it does has an impact of pro- nationalist ideology that can help to further establish a better country. Soeharto played an exemplary role of moulding the country man to serve the country as a useful citizen. It serves as an important development to the country stagnant crisis of communism; it also marked a drastic change of direction from Soekarno’s socialistic economic system. The new economic system focused on economic liberalization, open-door policy to foreign capital, development policies emphasizing promotion of food production and industrialization, macroeconomic stabilization suppressing fiscal deficits and inflation, and aid acceptance from IMF, the World Bank, the United States, the Europe and Japan.
However, this is seen as injustice to many, especially with the eliminating of those who opposed Soeharto ideas. They demanded a shift from authoritarianism to democracy, from power concentration to decentralization, from political suppression to liberalization, from social control to liberalization, and demands dissolution of the vested interest structure under the his regime. The liberalization of political institutions has brought about the following evolutionary process: Formerly suppressed forces came to raise making use of the newly acquired freedom; the rise of new forces destabilized politics; learning from the instability, the political players started a search for more balanced political institutions.
History of Religion Part 2- Prof Bernard Adeney- Risakotta and Prof Margana
Readings are from : Gerry van Klinken- The Battle for History after Suharto
Like many of his fellow Indonesians, this once-dominant leader has only one name: Suharto. A former Army General came to power in 1965 when political turmoil rocked the rule of former President Sukarno. He became president in 1968, a post he held in an iron grip until the financial crisis of 1998 precipitated widespread unrest and protest, leading to his resigning the presidency in that year.
Over a thirty-year period, he ruled the 225-million citizenry, 17,000 island archipelago with a firm hand, and I must say brought stability and development to a nation many had thought ungovernable, at least to my understanding from the past history lessons in the course. In the end, the continuing charges of corruption, human rights abuses and stifling of political dissent began to overshadow his achievements, and he was forced into resignation on 21 May, 1998.
Now, with his passing, Indonesians will have to wrestle with the complex legacy of a leader who left an indelible imprint on the country’s history. Klinken’s account of The battle for History after Suharto was interesting to know, he mentions ‘ When the press exploded some of the key historical myth upon which the national-building project had been built, and parents began to accuse hapless teachers around the country of teachings ‘lies’ (p.236)” As I wonder through the actual facts of the “lies’ or fabrication of history through power of ‘silencing’ the fact on 1st March 1949, 30th September 1965 was all a political agenda that has serve its purpose on those period of unrest. Although it might be a myth, but it does has an impact of pro- nationalist ideology that can help to further establish a better country. Soeharto played an exemplary role of moulding the country man to serve the country as a useful citizen. It serves as an important development to the country stagnant crisis of communism; it also marked a drastic change of direction from Soekarno’s socialistic economic system. The new economic system focused on economic liberalization, open-door policy to foreign capital, development policies emphasizing promotion of food production and industrialization, macroeconomic stabilization suppressing fiscal deficits and inflation, and aid acceptance from IMF, the World Bank, the United States, the Europe and Japan.
However, this is seen as injustice to many, especially with the eliminating of those who opposed Soeharto ideas. They demanded a shift from authoritarianism to democracy, from power concentration to decentralization, from political suppression to liberalization, from social control to liberalization, and demands dissolution of the vested interest structure under the his regime. The liberalization of political institutions has brought about the following evolutionary process: Formerly suppressed forces came to raise making use of the newly acquired freedom; the rise of new forces destabilized politics; learning from the instability, the political players started a search for more balanced political institutions.
Indonesia means Multiculturalism!
by Timotius Wibowo
Reading: Bernard Adeney-Risakotta (2009), “Religion, Violence and Diversity: Negotiating the Boundaries of Indonesian Identity” in Religion, Civil Society, and Conflict in Indonesia. Zurich and Berlin: LIT.
Addressing the problem of religion, violence and diversity in Indonesia, Bernard Adeney-Risakotta (2009) suggests a dialectic dialogue between three different ways of liberal human rights, a substantive vision of good society, and multiculturalism. I absolutely agree with Adeney-Risakotta’s suggestion. However, among the three substances, I propose multiculturalism to be the starting point. It means that the other two substances should be developed from multiculturalism point of view. Although this article has enough room to discuss multiculturalism, it does not regard its prominence among the three.
I suggest multiculturalism to be the starting point of any efforts both in building national identity and in solving the problems of religious and social diversity, based on at least three reasons. First, from both geographical and social points of view, Indonesia’s culture comprises thousands cultures. Such a richness of culture unfortunately has been regarded as burden, instead of blessing. That is why our leaders in the past always failed to unify Indonesia’s multicultural people. For centuries, cultural codes have been strong factor in Indonesia’s communities, both in building social relationships and in solving social conflicts.
Second, from historical perspective, multiculturalism is our unfinished task in building the foundation of our nation. Our political leaders, especially Sukarno and Suharto, used Pancasila only as a short cut to solve the problems of diversity. However, in my opinion, Pancasila could not really solve the problems. The first principle of Pancasila, “Ketuhanan Yang Mahaesa,” is never friendly both to Indonesian indigenous beliefs (and cultures) and minority’s religions. Instead of protects them, it is often used as a legal base to oppress them. Cultural peace during the New Order Era was only a deceit, since it was exercised by authoritarian presidency and its military forces.
Third, from global perspective, multiculturalism is the most proper value to establish a strong identity for Indonesian people. Amidst the bipolarization of radical Islam and secular Western (American) forces, Indonesia should build her national identity on her own heritages. The most dangerous threat of those two bipolar powers is not in political or military context, instead in cultural. Neither Western (or American) culture nor the Middle East (or Arabian) culture should colonize Indonesian people. Indonesian people should develop their own culture derived from its multicultural reality. Extinction of a nation starts from its culture.
It is true that it will take a long way to build Indonesia’s identity based on its multicultural reality. Such effort, nevertheless, is worthy. If we succeeded to finish it, we would have a strong cultural foundation for our nation.
Reading: Bernard Adeney-Risakotta (2009), “Religion, Violence and Diversity: Negotiating the Boundaries of Indonesian Identity” in Religion, Civil Society, and Conflict in Indonesia. Zurich and Berlin: LIT.
Addressing the problem of religion, violence and diversity in Indonesia, Bernard Adeney-Risakotta (2009) suggests a dialectic dialogue between three different ways of liberal human rights, a substantive vision of good society, and multiculturalism. I absolutely agree with Adeney-Risakotta’s suggestion. However, among the three substances, I propose multiculturalism to be the starting point. It means that the other two substances should be developed from multiculturalism point of view. Although this article has enough room to discuss multiculturalism, it does not regard its prominence among the three.
I suggest multiculturalism to be the starting point of any efforts both in building national identity and in solving the problems of religious and social diversity, based on at least three reasons. First, from both geographical and social points of view, Indonesia’s culture comprises thousands cultures. Such a richness of culture unfortunately has been regarded as burden, instead of blessing. That is why our leaders in the past always failed to unify Indonesia’s multicultural people. For centuries, cultural codes have been strong factor in Indonesia’s communities, both in building social relationships and in solving social conflicts.
Second, from historical perspective, multiculturalism is our unfinished task in building the foundation of our nation. Our political leaders, especially Sukarno and Suharto, used Pancasila only as a short cut to solve the problems of diversity. However, in my opinion, Pancasila could not really solve the problems. The first principle of Pancasila, “Ketuhanan Yang Mahaesa,” is never friendly both to Indonesian indigenous beliefs (and cultures) and minority’s religions. Instead of protects them, it is often used as a legal base to oppress them. Cultural peace during the New Order Era was only a deceit, since it was exercised by authoritarian presidency and its military forces.
Third, from global perspective, multiculturalism is the most proper value to establish a strong identity for Indonesian people. Amidst the bipolarization of radical Islam and secular Western (American) forces, Indonesia should build her national identity on her own heritages. The most dangerous threat of those two bipolar powers is not in political or military context, instead in cultural. Neither Western (or American) culture nor the Middle East (or Arabian) culture should colonize Indonesian people. Indonesian people should develop their own culture derived from its multicultural reality. Extinction of a nation starts from its culture.
It is true that it will take a long way to build Indonesia’s identity based on its multicultural reality. Such effort, nevertheless, is worthy. If we succeeded to finish it, we would have a strong cultural foundation for our nation.
Religion and Violence in the Fall of Soeharto and Transition to Democracy : 1997-2004
by Joko Wicoyo
I think the book titled Beginning to Remember pictures Indonesia's turbulent decades of cultural repression and renewal amid the rise and fall of Suharto's New Order regime. These cross-disciplinary pieces illuminate Indonesia's current efforts to reexamine and understand its past in order to shape new civic and cultural arrangements.
In 1998, the beginning of reformation era in Indonesia brought a wave of relief and euphoria. The fall of Suharto in 1998 opened a proliferation of studies on different aspects of memory and history. It allows space for people whose voices had been muted opened the floodgates to all manner of commentaries, newspaper accounts, and conference and seminar papers. This atmosphere which is well known called “reformation era” indicates the spirited efforts to remember, interrogate and rewrite the past which Suharto did not dispel persistent corruption, official secrecy and denial, religious and ethnic violence, and security policies leading to tragedy in East Timor, Aceh, and other regions in Indonesia. But the reformation opened up new possibilities for seeing the past by presenting a surge of discourse that challenged officially codified national history in mass media and publishing in public policy debate, in the arts, and in popular mobilization and politics.
This book edited by Mary Zurbuchen consists of 15 articles written by Indonesian and foreign scholars, artists and poets as well as writers presents the descriptions and exploration of some of the expressions, narratives, and interpretations of the past found in Indonesia today. The authors illustrate ways in which the dissolution of the Indonesian state's monopoly on history is now permitting new national, local, and individual accounts and representations of the past to emerge. This book covers fields from performing arts and literature to anthropology, history, and transitional justice.
Beginning with Ki Tristuti Rachmadi’s powerful autobiographical account of his sufferings under the New Order (‘My Life as a Shadow Master Under Suharto’), the volume immediately goes further to Degung Santikarma’s ‘Monument, Document and Mass Grave: The Politics of Representing Violence in Bali’, a gripping narrative that includes a story of an individual whose painful memory of the 1965 killings is suppressed by the protocol of power relations in contemporary Indonesia.
Another chapter is a personal memoir by one of Java's famous shadow-play masters, Tristuti Rachmadi, for years imprisoned under the New Order, and finally this volume comes to a close with an article by historian Anthony Reid commemorates the national struggle at the regional level, while South African lawyer Paul van Zyl compares efforts in transitional justice in Indonesia, East Timor, and South Africa.
For me, this book written by many outstanding experts in arts, politics, history and sociology reminds my memory to what happened since the fall of Suharto when I was in the first year to pursue my master degree in political sciences. What are expressed in this book refresh my mind towards some events which I missed from my perception. All papers presented in this book really enrich my intellectual achieves with a suitable balance between depth, breadth, and unity amidst such an enormous diversity of views and approaches. I‘m sure this book is really interesting to read and without having doubt I propose not only to Indonesian students, but also to any students who are interested in Southeast Asian studies to read this book.
Readings : Zurbuchen, Mary S. (ed). Beginning to Remember.
I think the book titled Beginning to Remember pictures Indonesia's turbulent decades of cultural repression and renewal amid the rise and fall of Suharto's New Order regime. These cross-disciplinary pieces illuminate Indonesia's current efforts to reexamine and understand its past in order to shape new civic and cultural arrangements.
In 1998, the beginning of reformation era in Indonesia brought a wave of relief and euphoria. The fall of Suharto in 1998 opened a proliferation of studies on different aspects of memory and history. It allows space for people whose voices had been muted opened the floodgates to all manner of commentaries, newspaper accounts, and conference and seminar papers. This atmosphere which is well known called “reformation era” indicates the spirited efforts to remember, interrogate and rewrite the past which Suharto did not dispel persistent corruption, official secrecy and denial, religious and ethnic violence, and security policies leading to tragedy in East Timor, Aceh, and other regions in Indonesia. But the reformation opened up new possibilities for seeing the past by presenting a surge of discourse that challenged officially codified national history in mass media and publishing in public policy debate, in the arts, and in popular mobilization and politics.
This book edited by Mary Zurbuchen consists of 15 articles written by Indonesian and foreign scholars, artists and poets as well as writers presents the descriptions and exploration of some of the expressions, narratives, and interpretations of the past found in Indonesia today. The authors illustrate ways in which the dissolution of the Indonesian state's monopoly on history is now permitting new national, local, and individual accounts and representations of the past to emerge. This book covers fields from performing arts and literature to anthropology, history, and transitional justice.
Beginning with Ki Tristuti Rachmadi’s powerful autobiographical account of his sufferings under the New Order (‘My Life as a Shadow Master Under Suharto’), the volume immediately goes further to Degung Santikarma’s ‘Monument, Document and Mass Grave: The Politics of Representing Violence in Bali’, a gripping narrative that includes a story of an individual whose painful memory of the 1965 killings is suppressed by the protocol of power relations in contemporary Indonesia.
Another chapter is a personal memoir by one of Java's famous shadow-play masters, Tristuti Rachmadi, for years imprisoned under the New Order, and finally this volume comes to a close with an article by historian Anthony Reid commemorates the national struggle at the regional level, while South African lawyer Paul van Zyl compares efforts in transitional justice in Indonesia, East Timor, and South Africa.
For me, this book written by many outstanding experts in arts, politics, history and sociology reminds my memory to what happened since the fall of Suharto when I was in the first year to pursue my master degree in political sciences. What are expressed in this book refresh my mind towards some events which I missed from my perception. All papers presented in this book really enrich my intellectual achieves with a suitable balance between depth, breadth, and unity amidst such an enormous diversity of views and approaches. I‘m sure this book is really interesting to read and without having doubt I propose not only to Indonesian students, but also to any students who are interested in Southeast Asian studies to read this book.
Readings : Zurbuchen, Mary S. (ed). Beginning to Remember.
Sabtu, 24 April 2010
Intelligentsia as Mediator - Roy Allan B Tolentino
Kevin O’Rourke’s account of the last days of Soeharto reads much like a novel, with its protagonists and antagonists and other characters caught up in the wave of history. It is a reminder that history is still a story, as well as an invitation to contribute to the narrative, or even supply another narrative. One thing I find fascinating in O’Rourke’s account, however, is the role he assigns to the Indonesian intelligentsia, who are also, more often than not, key figures in Indonesian religious life.
Two figures who played roles in the drama surrounding the fall of Soeharto are Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid. Although O’Rourke’s account tends toward the dramatic, how he treats these two figures has much to tell us about the role of the intelligentsia in Indonesian society. In describing Madjid, O’Rourke says: “The venerable university rector seemed an unlikely figure amid the coarse world of Jakarta politics, but he possessed a unique set of credentials. Nurcholish’s political philosophy had been encapsulated by the famous soundbite: ‘Islam, yes! Islamic parties, no!’ His eminence as an Islamic scholar won him the trust of modernist Muslims, while his reservations about politicising religion allowed him to maintain constructive relationships with Soeharto and nationalist-minded generals.” (O'Rourke 2002:121) While some might argue that Nurcholish’s position displayed more strategy than conviction, his mediation proved crucial to the progression of events. “The most effective source of organised political opposition was emanating from a loose coalition of Islamic groups, while the arbiter of political change was the military. If these two key institutions—organised Islam and the military—could come to terms on a plan, it would represent a major step forward.” (O'Rourke 2002:121)
In the meeting between the Islamic leaders and Suharto, it would be Gus Dur’s moves (or lack of them) that would become important. “The normally loquacious cleric remained silent throughout most of the meeting. One of his few contributions was to register surprise that Nurcholish was trying ‘to hammer’ Soeharto—a comment which most of those present took to mean that Wahid opposed Soeharto’s immediate resignation.” (O'Rourke 2002:128)According to O’Rourke’s account, this was an uncharacteristic move on the part of Gus Dur, and some assessments claim that Gus Dur’s intransigence came from personal ressentiment. “The only explanation for his continued support for Soeharto was that his arch-nemesis, Amien Rais, was leading the anti-Soeharto movement. Even amid this national drama, it appeared to many that Wahid was more concerned with defeating his modernist rivals than with bringing down Soeharto.” (O'Rourke 2002:128)
While I am sure that supporters and critics of both these figures will have something to say about O’Rourke’s depiction of these events, these two vignettes illustrate the position of the intelligentsia as mediators, and this I mean in the broadest sense: the intelligentsia really are positioned in the middle. While it is true that intellectuals can remain rooted in their communities, there is already a certain separation brought about by advanced education; even if one returns to the grassroots, one cannot deny that one’s discourse has changed. Nurcholish and Gus Dur show how this middle position of the intelligentsia can become both a bridge and an obstacle. Being in the middle, an intellectual can become a wedge or a conductor, facilitating change or preventing it. I wonder what sort of intellectuals ICRS students will become.
O'Rourke, Kevin. Reformasi: The Struggle for Power in Post-Soeharto Indonesia. Crows Nest, NSW: Allen and Unwin, 2002.
Two figures who played roles in the drama surrounding the fall of Soeharto are Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid. Although O’Rourke’s account tends toward the dramatic, how he treats these two figures has much to tell us about the role of the intelligentsia in Indonesian society. In describing Madjid, O’Rourke says: “The venerable university rector seemed an unlikely figure amid the coarse world of Jakarta politics, but he possessed a unique set of credentials. Nurcholish’s political philosophy had been encapsulated by the famous soundbite: ‘Islam, yes! Islamic parties, no!’ His eminence as an Islamic scholar won him the trust of modernist Muslims, while his reservations about politicising religion allowed him to maintain constructive relationships with Soeharto and nationalist-minded generals.” (O'Rourke 2002:121) While some might argue that Nurcholish’s position displayed more strategy than conviction, his mediation proved crucial to the progression of events. “The most effective source of organised political opposition was emanating from a loose coalition of Islamic groups, while the arbiter of political change was the military. If these two key institutions—organised Islam and the military—could come to terms on a plan, it would represent a major step forward.” (O'Rourke 2002:121)
In the meeting between the Islamic leaders and Suharto, it would be Gus Dur’s moves (or lack of them) that would become important. “The normally loquacious cleric remained silent throughout most of the meeting. One of his few contributions was to register surprise that Nurcholish was trying ‘to hammer’ Soeharto—a comment which most of those present took to mean that Wahid opposed Soeharto’s immediate resignation.” (O'Rourke 2002:128)According to O’Rourke’s account, this was an uncharacteristic move on the part of Gus Dur, and some assessments claim that Gus Dur’s intransigence came from personal ressentiment. “The only explanation for his continued support for Soeharto was that his arch-nemesis, Amien Rais, was leading the anti-Soeharto movement. Even amid this national drama, it appeared to many that Wahid was more concerned with defeating his modernist rivals than with bringing down Soeharto.” (O'Rourke 2002:128)
While I am sure that supporters and critics of both these figures will have something to say about O’Rourke’s depiction of these events, these two vignettes illustrate the position of the intelligentsia as mediators, and this I mean in the broadest sense: the intelligentsia really are positioned in the middle. While it is true that intellectuals can remain rooted in their communities, there is already a certain separation brought about by advanced education; even if one returns to the grassroots, one cannot deny that one’s discourse has changed. Nurcholish and Gus Dur show how this middle position of the intelligentsia can become both a bridge and an obstacle. Being in the middle, an intellectual can become a wedge or a conductor, facilitating change or preventing it. I wonder what sort of intellectuals ICRS students will become.
O'Rourke, Kevin. Reformasi: The Struggle for Power in Post-Soeharto Indonesia. Crows Nest, NSW: Allen and Unwin, 2002.
Minggu, 18 April 2010
Respond paper on Religion in the New Order: 1965-1998
The ineffective way to collect political power
Kristanto Budiprabowo (TATOK)
Reading Indonesia history along Suharto era we see that using religion as a strategy to expand political power is ineffective. Probably in the beginning religion is very attractive to collect the mass sentiment in order to make the vision of Indonesia. The idea of nationality, anti-colonialism, and letter anti-communism were seem the main issue in the most campaign of the political party. And it is always be an interesting subject in order to attract the participant in politic right until now. There was two important moments that seems in contrast. First, when Gus Dur and Nahdathul Ulama were withdrawn from the PPP, in my opinion, it was the best strategy to increase his political bargaining with government. In the same moment, in contrast, when Suharto used religion to keep his establishment to be president, it was even decrease his popularity. Second, the cause of the reformation movement was not religious issue but socio-political situation. But, religious leader has an important role whether to make the movement less chaotic or to create new political party based on the religion. Religious organization is always can play its role whatever the form of the position.
The correlation between the government and religion in the New Era makes me aware that in Indonesia politic religion has two sides or perhaps two layers. On one side, religion can collect political sentiment among the society. But, in this layer, religious symbol importantly functions whether to strengthen or to irritate the political power. On the other side, religious organization can be the government alliance in certain political issues and situations. But, in this layer, religious organization political agenda can be easy to see. It makes the popularity of the religious organization in politic decrease.
Kristanto Budiprabowo (TATOK)
Reading Indonesia history along Suharto era we see that using religion as a strategy to expand political power is ineffective. Probably in the beginning religion is very attractive to collect the mass sentiment in order to make the vision of Indonesia. The idea of nationality, anti-colonialism, and letter anti-communism were seem the main issue in the most campaign of the political party. And it is always be an interesting subject in order to attract the participant in politic right until now. There was two important moments that seems in contrast. First, when Gus Dur and Nahdathul Ulama were withdrawn from the PPP, in my opinion, it was the best strategy to increase his political bargaining with government. In the same moment, in contrast, when Suharto used religion to keep his establishment to be president, it was even decrease his popularity. Second, the cause of the reformation movement was not religious issue but socio-political situation. But, religious leader has an important role whether to make the movement less chaotic or to create new political party based on the religion. Religious organization is always can play its role whatever the form of the position.
The correlation between the government and religion in the New Era makes me aware that in Indonesia politic religion has two sides or perhaps two layers. On one side, religion can collect political sentiment among the society. But, in this layer, religious symbol importantly functions whether to strengthen or to irritate the political power. On the other side, religious organization can be the government alliance in certain political issues and situations. But, in this layer, religious organization political agenda can be easy to see. It makes the popularity of the religious organization in politic decrease.
Religion in the new order: 1965-1998;
Tri Harmaji
History of Religions in Indonesia Part II: from c. 1900 to the Present
Religion in the new order: 1965-1998; Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and democratization I Indonesia, Lorraine V. Aragon, Fields of the Lords: animism, Christian minorities, and state development in Indonesia
New order is Indonesian political era that is so particular than other era in term of its fixed concept. If two other eras, the old order and reformation era, are undergone in unexpected situation and almost without fixed concept, the new order era is apparently well planned. It is why in this era the government is effectively using of political, social and economic resources for the state development. The term ‘effectively using’ here mea that the government encourage active participation all resources that is considered could give good contribution to government development programs, but on the contrary the government also discouraged and even coercively marginalized all political resources that was considered as a threat for government development programs. One of the most important political resources that was seriously considered was religion. From the time of old order and even far time before the independence, religion, and especially slam, was great political resources that had proved its strength and effectiveness to lead the people to whatever direction the religion wanted.
The chief priority of new order government was clearly economic growth. And for this goal the government had sacrificed many ideologies that had been competing in the previous era. The government forced all legal organizations to acknowledge the sole government ideology of Pancasila as their basic principle. Any suspected organization was closely controlled. This policy had severely ruined Islamic political parties that strived for Islamic state in Indonesia. Along their history, the new order government considered Islam as apolitically dangerous thread for the nation-state based on Pancasila the government deserved. Some of prominent figures of the already banned Islamic party of Masyumi were strongly forbid to be active in political affair. Most of Islamic people especially from the modernist groups felt the new order had intentionally reduced and even tried to kill Islamic political potency in Indonesia.
If the attitude toward Islam was so negative, it was somewhat different from the attitude toward other minor religions such as Christianity. Like was shown by Aragon in his research on Christian mission in tobaku highlanders in central Sulawesi, the government positively shows Christianity as the agent of modernity that was so useful in developing the ‘backward’ tribes in Indonesian interiors to whom the government itself did not have much resources to bring the modernity, and so helping the government to advance this country. This positive attitude, Aragon argues, is part of, actually, the government strategy to deal with Islamic great potency. By allowing Christian mission worked in the area, the government hoped Islam would not gain more followers that will certainly increase their political power.
From this strategy (reducing the more powerful and increasing the weaker) the government tried to balance the power of any political power so that there was no too dominant political power, especially Islam, which can effectively challenge the new order government authority. This all policy was directed the only goal, that is economic growth that definitely requires political stability. In this idea religion was not the important concern of the new order government, and their existence was seen just as powerful energy that should be rightly controlled and directed to the government purposes.
History of Religions in Indonesia Part II: from c. 1900 to the Present
Religion in the new order: 1965-1998; Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and democratization I Indonesia, Lorraine V. Aragon, Fields of the Lords: animism, Christian minorities, and state development in Indonesia
New order is Indonesian political era that is so particular than other era in term of its fixed concept. If two other eras, the old order and reformation era, are undergone in unexpected situation and almost without fixed concept, the new order era is apparently well planned. It is why in this era the government is effectively using of political, social and economic resources for the state development. The term ‘effectively using’ here mea that the government encourage active participation all resources that is considered could give good contribution to government development programs, but on the contrary the government also discouraged and even coercively marginalized all political resources that was considered as a threat for government development programs. One of the most important political resources that was seriously considered was religion. From the time of old order and even far time before the independence, religion, and especially slam, was great political resources that had proved its strength and effectiveness to lead the people to whatever direction the religion wanted.
The chief priority of new order government was clearly economic growth. And for this goal the government had sacrificed many ideologies that had been competing in the previous era. The government forced all legal organizations to acknowledge the sole government ideology of Pancasila as their basic principle. Any suspected organization was closely controlled. This policy had severely ruined Islamic political parties that strived for Islamic state in Indonesia. Along their history, the new order government considered Islam as apolitically dangerous thread for the nation-state based on Pancasila the government deserved. Some of prominent figures of the already banned Islamic party of Masyumi were strongly forbid to be active in political affair. Most of Islamic people especially from the modernist groups felt the new order had intentionally reduced and even tried to kill Islamic political potency in Indonesia.
If the attitude toward Islam was so negative, it was somewhat different from the attitude toward other minor religions such as Christianity. Like was shown by Aragon in his research on Christian mission in tobaku highlanders in central Sulawesi, the government positively shows Christianity as the agent of modernity that was so useful in developing the ‘backward’ tribes in Indonesian interiors to whom the government itself did not have much resources to bring the modernity, and so helping the government to advance this country. This positive attitude, Aragon argues, is part of, actually, the government strategy to deal with Islamic great potency. By allowing Christian mission worked in the area, the government hoped Islam would not gain more followers that will certainly increase their political power.
From this strategy (reducing the more powerful and increasing the weaker) the government tried to balance the power of any political power so that there was no too dominant political power, especially Islam, which can effectively challenge the new order government authority. This all policy was directed the only goal, that is economic growth that definitely requires political stability. In this idea religion was not the important concern of the new order government, and their existence was seen just as powerful energy that should be rightly controlled and directed to the government purposes.
Politicisized Religion
by Nina Mariani Noor
Leo Suryadinata is successful in catching the main point of Soeharto’s political will. I do agree with him that Soeharto’s policies both at home and at international affairs were not based on religion matter, in this case Islam, but on Soeharto’s interests. It seems to me that Soeharto’s policies were intended to maintain his reign and also his popularity in international context. Since he was intended to be the leader of Non Aligned Movement, he tried to avoid policies that related to religious’ matters. I also assume that those foreign policies were also influenced by his supporters in government and army who were more secular.
However, when it came to the interest of getting support from Indonesian people in general election, Soeharto tended to bit change the reason of his foreign policy to religious matter, like in the case of Bosnia and PLO. Furthermore, the trend that happened in Indonesia at that time in which many Muslims, particularly middle class, were more religious also influenced his policy. In my opinion, religion was not a big deal for Soeharto, but he saw it as a tool for maintaining his power.
Abdurrahman points out that the trend in Hajj tours among Muslims, particularly middle class, was influenced by capitalism. I completely agree with his way of comparing Hajj conduct between lowers class and middle class. It opens our eyes about the reality of Hajj ritual. In my opinion, today, Hajj is not merely a ritual as part of rukun Islam, but it has already moved to economical and social status. Muslims go to hajj are not only intending of completing his obligations as Muslims but also fulfilling their desire of getting higher social status in their community. In this way, hajj ritual brings a lot of advantages and profit for private Hajj agencies and also government.
Relating to Hajj ritual organized by government, I see that government through Ministry of Religious Affairs, really takes advantages from that. It seems to me that, Muslims’ enthusiasm of doing Hajj is utilized by government to get a lot of money that sometimes is corrupted or misused by government officers. And I think these all are rooted from Soeharto’s era and unfortunately, are continued by SBY’s government which declare to be a clean government.
Readings : 1. Moeslim Abdurrahman, “Ritual Divided: Hajj Tours in Capitalist Era Indonesia” in Mark Woodward,ed. Toward a New Paradigm
2. Leo Suryadinata, “Islam and Suharto’s Foreign Policy : Indonesia, the Middle East, and Bosnia”, Asian Survey, Vol. 35No. 3, (Mar., 1995), pp.291-303.
Leo Suryadinata is successful in catching the main point of Soeharto’s political will. I do agree with him that Soeharto’s policies both at home and at international affairs were not based on religion matter, in this case Islam, but on Soeharto’s interests. It seems to me that Soeharto’s policies were intended to maintain his reign and also his popularity in international context. Since he was intended to be the leader of Non Aligned Movement, he tried to avoid policies that related to religious’ matters. I also assume that those foreign policies were also influenced by his supporters in government and army who were more secular.
However, when it came to the interest of getting support from Indonesian people in general election, Soeharto tended to bit change the reason of his foreign policy to religious matter, like in the case of Bosnia and PLO. Furthermore, the trend that happened in Indonesia at that time in which many Muslims, particularly middle class, were more religious also influenced his policy. In my opinion, religion was not a big deal for Soeharto, but he saw it as a tool for maintaining his power.
Abdurrahman points out that the trend in Hajj tours among Muslims, particularly middle class, was influenced by capitalism. I completely agree with his way of comparing Hajj conduct between lowers class and middle class. It opens our eyes about the reality of Hajj ritual. In my opinion, today, Hajj is not merely a ritual as part of rukun Islam, but it has already moved to economical and social status. Muslims go to hajj are not only intending of completing his obligations as Muslims but also fulfilling their desire of getting higher social status in their community. In this way, hajj ritual brings a lot of advantages and profit for private Hajj agencies and also government.
Relating to Hajj ritual organized by government, I see that government through Ministry of Religious Affairs, really takes advantages from that. It seems to me that, Muslims’ enthusiasm of doing Hajj is utilized by government to get a lot of money that sometimes is corrupted or misused by government officers. And I think these all are rooted from Soeharto’s era and unfortunately, are continued by SBY’s government which declare to be a clean government.
Readings : 1. Moeslim Abdurrahman, “Ritual Divided: Hajj Tours in Capitalist Era Indonesia” in Mark Woodward,ed. Toward a New Paradigm
2. Leo Suryadinata, “Islam and Suharto’s Foreign Policy : Indonesia, the Middle East, and Bosnia”, Asian Survey, Vol. 35No. 3, (Mar., 1995), pp.291-303.
“What do We Mean by Islam?”; Defining Religion in the History of Suharto’s Era by Faqihuddin Abdul Kodir
I am often disturbed by an inconsistency of academic scholarship in defining Islam in the context of politically matters of Suharto’s era. On the one hand, many scholars have welcomed the development of ‘the inclusive and subtantive Islam’ during Suharto’s regime. On the other hand, they still analyze Islam in this era from perspective of its symbols and its legal formals. They define ‘proper Islam’ in modern era as ‘the inclusive Islam’ of Nurcholis Madjid and Gus Dur, while they still define Indonesia’s Suharto as secular state not an ‘Islamic’ state.
The idea of inclusive Islam, in simple way, is that Islam is not originally a political matter, rather is moral behavior of individuals. In this understanding, Islam preserves justice, equality, and democracy as it core values. It is not important, according to this understanding, to define Islam through its symbols and its legal formals. Moreover, Islamic symbols are not Islamic in the sense that they violet the values of justice and equality. This is the notion of the inclusive Islam which has been developed since 1980’s of Suharto’s era. Although it is “a matter of interpretation” (Hefner, p. 218), the inclusive Islam has been accepted by many Indonesian Muslim scholars and welcomed by Western researchers.
It will be different when we read researches analyzing whether policy of Suharto is Islamic or not. In this field, many will come back to the definition of Islam as a symbolic, institutional, and a matter of legal formal. Discussing political matters of Suharto from the perspective of Islamic symbols contradicts to the acceptance of substantive Islam as a proper Islam in the modern era. If we accept the view point of substantive Islam in Indonesia, we should implement it in the field of academic scholarship in studying political matters of Muslims. Sukarno and Suharto are Muslims. Their political matters should be analyzed from the sense of policy of justice, not from symbolic Islam, when we apply the perspective of Islamic or non-Islamic. The article of Leo Suryadinata is a good example of how Islam defined as mere a symbol and representation when applied to analyze political matters of Suharto.
Readings:
1. Robert Hefner. 2000. Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia. (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
2. Leo Suryadinata. 1995. “Islam and Suharto’s Foreign Policy: Indonesia, the Middle East, and Bosnia”. In: Asian Survey, vol. 35, no. 3 (Mar., 1995), pp. 291-303.
The idea of inclusive Islam, in simple way, is that Islam is not originally a political matter, rather is moral behavior of individuals. In this understanding, Islam preserves justice, equality, and democracy as it core values. It is not important, according to this understanding, to define Islam through its symbols and its legal formals. Moreover, Islamic symbols are not Islamic in the sense that they violet the values of justice and equality. This is the notion of the inclusive Islam which has been developed since 1980’s of Suharto’s era. Although it is “a matter of interpretation” (Hefner, p. 218), the inclusive Islam has been accepted by many Indonesian Muslim scholars and welcomed by Western researchers.
It will be different when we read researches analyzing whether policy of Suharto is Islamic or not. In this field, many will come back to the definition of Islam as a symbolic, institutional, and a matter of legal formal. Discussing political matters of Suharto from the perspective of Islamic symbols contradicts to the acceptance of substantive Islam as a proper Islam in the modern era. If we accept the view point of substantive Islam in Indonesia, we should implement it in the field of academic scholarship in studying political matters of Muslims. Sukarno and Suharto are Muslims. Their political matters should be analyzed from the sense of policy of justice, not from symbolic Islam, when we apply the perspective of Islamic or non-Islamic. The article of Leo Suryadinata is a good example of how Islam defined as mere a symbol and representation when applied to analyze political matters of Suharto.
Readings:
1. Robert Hefner. 2000. Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia. (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
2. Leo Suryadinata. 1995. “Islam and Suharto’s Foreign Policy: Indonesia, the Middle East, and Bosnia”. In: Asian Survey, vol. 35, no. 3 (Mar., 1995), pp. 291-303.
Religion in the New Order : 1965-1998
by Joko Wicoyo
(I)
Fields of the Lord is Aragon’s research which focused on the repercussions of Protestant missions and state development projects among highland ethnic minorities in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia. She examined how the Dutch colonial and subsequent Indonesian regimes sought to use Protestant missionaries and world religion as a tool for social, economic, and national development. Conversely, she explored how members of highland Indonesian ethnic minorities responded to the introduced version of world religion using their interpretations to pursue local political interests and reorient their own place in a wider nation and world.
Religious and ethnic violence between Indonesia's Muslims and Christians escalated dramatically just before and after President Suharto resigned in 1998. In this first major ethnographic study of Christianization in Indonesia, Aragon delineates colonial and postcolonial circumstances contributing to the dynamics of these contemporary conflicts, and she combines a political economy of colonial missionization with a microanalysis of shifting religious ideology and practice. Fields of the Lord challenges much comparative religion scholarship by contending that religions, like contemporary cultural groups, be located in their spheres of interaction rather than as the abstracted cognitive and behavioral systems conceived by many adherents, modernist states, and Western scholars.
I think in this book Aragon tries to portray "near-tribal" populations who characterize themselves as "fanatic Christians" and asks the readers to rethink issues of Indonesian nationalism and "modern" development as they converged in President Suharto's late New Order state. Through its careful documentation of colonial missionary tactics, unexpected postcolonial upheavals, and contemporary Christian narratives, Fields of the Lord analyzes the historical and institutional links between state rule and individuals' religious choices. Beyond these contributions, this ethnography includes captivating stories of Salvation Army "angels of the forest" and nationally marginal but locally autonomous dry-rice and coffee farmers. These Salvation Army "soldiers" make Protestantism work on their own ecological, moral, and political turf, maintaining their communities and ongoing religious concerns in the difficult terrain of the Central Sulawesi highlands.
(II)
Using the frameworks of foreign policy analysis and political culture, Leo provides an insightful and analytical explanation of Indonesia's foreign policy under Suharto. It examines the various factors which have contributed to Suharto's foreign policy, the goals of this policy and the means of achieving them. He also discusses Indonesia's relations with Asian countries and beyond, identifying their problems and prospects. From his analysis, it is clear that Indonesia’s policy towards the Middle East has not been based on Islam but on calculations of Indonesian “national interest’ as perceived by Suharto and other members of the military elites. It is also important to note that Indonesia has never tried to become a leader of the Islamic movement, although it has largest Muslim population in the world. Indonesia prefers to become leader of Non-Aligned Movement which is not based on Islam.
Readings : 1. Lorraine V. Aragon, Fields of the Lord: Animism, Christian Minorities, and State Development in Indonesia (Honolulu : University of Hawaii’s Press, 200)
2. Leo Suryadinata, “Islam and Suharto’s Foreign Policy : Indonesia, the Middle East, and Bosnia”, Asian Survey, Vol. 35No. 3, (Mar., 1995), pp.291-303.
(I)
Fields of the Lord is Aragon’s research which focused on the repercussions of Protestant missions and state development projects among highland ethnic minorities in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia. She examined how the Dutch colonial and subsequent Indonesian regimes sought to use Protestant missionaries and world religion as a tool for social, economic, and national development. Conversely, she explored how members of highland Indonesian ethnic minorities responded to the introduced version of world religion using their interpretations to pursue local political interests and reorient their own place in a wider nation and world.
Religious and ethnic violence between Indonesia's Muslims and Christians escalated dramatically just before and after President Suharto resigned in 1998. In this first major ethnographic study of Christianization in Indonesia, Aragon delineates colonial and postcolonial circumstances contributing to the dynamics of these contemporary conflicts, and she combines a political economy of colonial missionization with a microanalysis of shifting religious ideology and practice. Fields of the Lord challenges much comparative religion scholarship by contending that religions, like contemporary cultural groups, be located in their spheres of interaction rather than as the abstracted cognitive and behavioral systems conceived by many adherents, modernist states, and Western scholars.
I think in this book Aragon tries to portray "near-tribal" populations who characterize themselves as "fanatic Christians" and asks the readers to rethink issues of Indonesian nationalism and "modern" development as they converged in President Suharto's late New Order state. Through its careful documentation of colonial missionary tactics, unexpected postcolonial upheavals, and contemporary Christian narratives, Fields of the Lord analyzes the historical and institutional links between state rule and individuals' religious choices. Beyond these contributions, this ethnography includes captivating stories of Salvation Army "angels of the forest" and nationally marginal but locally autonomous dry-rice and coffee farmers. These Salvation Army "soldiers" make Protestantism work on their own ecological, moral, and political turf, maintaining their communities and ongoing religious concerns in the difficult terrain of the Central Sulawesi highlands.
(II)
Using the frameworks of foreign policy analysis and political culture, Leo provides an insightful and analytical explanation of Indonesia's foreign policy under Suharto. It examines the various factors which have contributed to Suharto's foreign policy, the goals of this policy and the means of achieving them. He also discusses Indonesia's relations with Asian countries and beyond, identifying their problems and prospects. From his analysis, it is clear that Indonesia’s policy towards the Middle East has not been based on Islam but on calculations of Indonesian “national interest’ as perceived by Suharto and other members of the military elites. It is also important to note that Indonesia has never tried to become a leader of the Islamic movement, although it has largest Muslim population in the world. Indonesia prefers to become leader of Non-Aligned Movement which is not based on Islam.
Readings : 1. Lorraine V. Aragon, Fields of the Lord: Animism, Christian Minorities, and State Development in Indonesia (Honolulu : University of Hawaii’s Press, 200)
2. Leo Suryadinata, “Islam and Suharto’s Foreign Policy : Indonesia, the Middle East, and Bosnia”, Asian Survey, Vol. 35No. 3, (Mar., 1995), pp.291-303.
Bersih Lingkungan - cleaning up and the new religion of the New Order
MUCHA Q ARQUIZA
19 April 2010
‘Outward appearance’, Henk Schulte Nordholt [1997] commented is derived from and at best merely the visible face of the ‘real thing’. Most academic accounts of social history often downplay the relevance of outward appearance, he observes, emphasizing that thinking is the ‘inner substance’ and “theory does not need to wear fancy shoes”.’ Yet when social history has rendered into complex narratives of contradiction, ambivalence and false-claims where much of the ‘real thing’ is dressed-over and concealed under heavy cosmetics, the only truthful and reliable best narrative could very well be the visible faces of ‘outward appearances’.
If there were monuments or physical landmarks to capture the outward appearance of the New Order, it would have to be at least two: the Monumen Pancasila Sakti in Lubang Buaya and the Taman Mini. Both New Order monuments capture the current ideology, and religion, in both its physical [i.e.literal] appearance and its symbolisms summarized as Bersih Lingkungan, a clean environment and a clean politics, that emphasizes the purificatory ritualized processes and the new dispensation’s obsessive-compulsive tendencies for keamanan [i.e.order&safety], and kebersihan [i.e.clean]. Order and cleanliness is also exponentially projected and idealized as silent, uncritical and depoliticized society. The outward appearance of New Order religion is, for instance, the halus or finesse of a cultured slematan as opposed to the krasek or chaos of the 'wildness' rebutan as suggested in the study of rituals by Pemberton . It is the reverence and commemoration of military exploits who have ‘brought order’ back as opposed to the memorialization of anti-colonial revolution and independence and the Sukarnoist legacy. The Pancasila Sakti monument’s theme and its meaning vividly captures the new religion of New order as KA LEMBIMENTRA AD [Kepala Lembaga Pembinaan Mental dan Tradisi Angkatan Darat] or ‘Chief of the Institute for Spritual edification and Army Tradition’, a military instrument for ideological control that summarizes the new historical perspective in the following description:
"The theme reflects treachery, terror tactics and the PKI revolt against Pancasila and the government. The bas-relief depicts the struggle by the Indonesia people to crush the PKI-Muso insurrection at Madiun. Next, the people opposed the effort of PKI to influence their fight through the NASAKOM idea. This movement led to the revolt and the betrayal of the G30SPKI and concluded with the liquidation of the PKI and the establishment of the government of the New Order…[The monument] is representative of the historical veracity of the fight and the heroic exploits, as well as of historical objectivity." [Monumen Pancasila Sakti 1975:365]
Indeed the New Order has been a massive clean-up drive, the same ideology that would later pervade civic action projects such as the kerja bakti and Green Revolution, that not only aimed to rid Indonesian society of communists but also to wipe out from collective memory of the heroism of Sukarno and the Guided democracy [i.e. as the old order]. Psyhically, New Order was all about sanitation and sterilization of social ideology and religion itself. Hefner [2000] described the political strategy of Soharto regime where “the government adopted a mixed regimen that combined severe controls on political Islam with guarder support for Islamic spirituality…[organizing] religion as a ground for public morality, as shield against Western liberalism and an antidote to communism…the New order not only tolerated depoliticized forms of religion but encouraged their penetration into all corners of society” [Hefner 2000:59] such that ambivalent alliances have to forged and traditional political concepts and organizations have been rendered anew, often, on contradictory terms and meanings.
Soharto’s policies were thoroughly of ‘non-religious’ sort, according to Hefner, shaped only by self-serving interests and political considerations that were ‘[precoccupied] to hold power, stabilize the economy and reap the benefits of development for himself and his family’. It was only in the late 1980s where Soharto found it to the advantage of its political survival to court the conservative segments of Muslims. Yet while intending to maintain a hold on politicization of Islam and cultivating pliant conservatism, instead, the regime “stimulated the growth of prodemocracy Islam”. [ibid. 2000:72] “ [By] way of liberal democrats, then, notions of freedom, universal citizenship, human rights, and enlightenment made their way into Indonesian political thought in association with democratic socialism.”
And to this latter trend, the resurgence of the new intellectuals, that Hefner calls the ‘junior modernists’ as modeled by Nurcholis Madjid, the secular humanists, the socialist democrats and most young breed of activists represented by the Mahasiswa Islam [MI] and the ‘angkatan 66’ [i.e. generation of ’66, very much comparable with our Philippines’ Martial Law babies] brought in fresh breeze that would prelude the era of reformation, whose politics were favorably coincidental with and catalyzed by the massive boom in information technology, media and literacy, and that, altogether, deserve another write-up and a critical response. ###
====
[1] Nordholt, H.S. [1997] Outward appearances dressing state and society in Indonesia.The Netherlands: KITLV Press, intro. Pp.1-38.
[2] Pemberton, J. [1994] On the subject of ‘java’. Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press.
[3] Hefner [2000] “Ambivalent Alliance: Religion and Politics in the New Order” in Civil Islam. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 58-93.
19 April 2010
‘Outward appearance’, Henk Schulte Nordholt [1997] commented is derived from and at best merely the visible face of the ‘real thing’. Most academic accounts of social history often downplay the relevance of outward appearance, he observes, emphasizing that thinking is the ‘inner substance’ and “theory does not need to wear fancy shoes”.’ Yet when social history has rendered into complex narratives of contradiction, ambivalence and false-claims where much of the ‘real thing’ is dressed-over and concealed under heavy cosmetics, the only truthful and reliable best narrative could very well be the visible faces of ‘outward appearances’.
If there were monuments or physical landmarks to capture the outward appearance of the New Order, it would have to be at least two: the Monumen Pancasila Sakti in Lubang Buaya and the Taman Mini. Both New Order monuments capture the current ideology, and religion, in both its physical [i.e.literal] appearance and its symbolisms summarized as Bersih Lingkungan, a clean environment and a clean politics, that emphasizes the purificatory ritualized processes and the new dispensation’s obsessive-compulsive tendencies for keamanan [i.e.order&safety], and kebersihan [i.e.clean]. Order and cleanliness is also exponentially projected and idealized as silent, uncritical and depoliticized society. The outward appearance of New Order religion is, for instance, the halus or finesse of a cultured slematan as opposed to the krasek or chaos of the 'wildness' rebutan as suggested in the study of rituals by Pemberton . It is the reverence and commemoration of military exploits who have ‘brought order’ back as opposed to the memorialization of anti-colonial revolution and independence and the Sukarnoist legacy. The Pancasila Sakti monument’s theme and its meaning vividly captures the new religion of New order as KA LEMBIMENTRA AD [Kepala Lembaga Pembinaan Mental dan Tradisi Angkatan Darat] or ‘Chief of the Institute for Spritual edification and Army Tradition’, a military instrument for ideological control that summarizes the new historical perspective in the following description:
"The theme reflects treachery, terror tactics and the PKI revolt against Pancasila and the government. The bas-relief depicts the struggle by the Indonesia people to crush the PKI-Muso insurrection at Madiun. Next, the people opposed the effort of PKI to influence their fight through the NASAKOM idea. This movement led to the revolt and the betrayal of the G30SPKI and concluded with the liquidation of the PKI and the establishment of the government of the New Order…[The monument] is representative of the historical veracity of the fight and the heroic exploits, as well as of historical objectivity." [Monumen Pancasila Sakti 1975:365]
Indeed the New Order has been a massive clean-up drive, the same ideology that would later pervade civic action projects such as the kerja bakti and Green Revolution, that not only aimed to rid Indonesian society of communists but also to wipe out from collective memory of the heroism of Sukarno and the Guided democracy [i.e. as the old order]. Psyhically, New Order was all about sanitation and sterilization of social ideology and religion itself. Hefner [2000] described the political strategy of Soharto regime where “the government adopted a mixed regimen that combined severe controls on political Islam with guarder support for Islamic spirituality…[organizing] religion as a ground for public morality, as shield against Western liberalism and an antidote to communism…the New order not only tolerated depoliticized forms of religion but encouraged their penetration into all corners of society” [Hefner 2000:59] such that ambivalent alliances have to forged and traditional political concepts and organizations have been rendered anew, often, on contradictory terms and meanings.
Soharto’s policies were thoroughly of ‘non-religious’ sort, according to Hefner, shaped only by self-serving interests and political considerations that were ‘[precoccupied] to hold power, stabilize the economy and reap the benefits of development for himself and his family’. It was only in the late 1980s where Soharto found it to the advantage of its political survival to court the conservative segments of Muslims. Yet while intending to maintain a hold on politicization of Islam and cultivating pliant conservatism, instead, the regime “stimulated the growth of prodemocracy Islam”. [ibid. 2000:72] “ [By] way of liberal democrats, then, notions of freedom, universal citizenship, human rights, and enlightenment made their way into Indonesian political thought in association with democratic socialism.”
And to this latter trend, the resurgence of the new intellectuals, that Hefner calls the ‘junior modernists’ as modeled by Nurcholis Madjid, the secular humanists, the socialist democrats and most young breed of activists represented by the Mahasiswa Islam [MI] and the ‘angkatan 66’ [i.e. generation of ’66, very much comparable with our Philippines’ Martial Law babies] brought in fresh breeze that would prelude the era of reformation, whose politics were favorably coincidental with and catalyzed by the massive boom in information technology, media and literacy, and that, altogether, deserve another write-up and a critical response. ###
====
[1] Nordholt, H.S. [1997] Outward appearances dressing state and society in Indonesia.The Netherlands: KITLV Press, intro. Pp.1-38.
[2] Pemberton, J. [1994] On the subject of ‘java’. Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press.
[3] Hefner [2000] “Ambivalent Alliance: Religion and Politics in the New Order” in Civil Islam. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 58-93.
Escape from the Shadows of Fundamentalism
by Timotius Wibowo
Leo Suryadinata’s article, “Islam and Suharto's Foreign Policy: Indonesia, the Middle East, and Bosnia” (1995) observes that Indonesia’s Foreign Policy during Suharto era was non-Islamic. Analyzing such phenomenon, Suryadinata gives two reasons. First, Suharto wanted to play a bigger role in international political world through Non Aligned Movement. Second, the major reason for such a policy is actually the military’s fear of Islamic fundamentalism. This analysis, in my opinion, is certainly reasonable. However, I absolutely disagree when Suryadinata then concludes, “As long as Indonesia remains authoritarian in its political system and this group is in power, Indonesia’s foreign policy is likely to remain non-Islamic” (p. 303). This conclusion is doubtful at least on two points of view. First, it suggests that an authoritarian political system (including Suharto and his military supporter) could not use Islamic language to achieve their political goals. Second, it suggests that a non-Islamic foreign policy depends on an authoritarian political system.
Indonesia’s national political situation always changes, as well as the international one. Among many factors that influence world’s political dynamic, Islam (as a political ideology) is the most important ones. This phenomenon is also happen in Indonesia’s history. Suryadinata wrote his article in 1995, when Suharto was getting closer to Islamic political powers. Increasing political power of B. J. Habibie can well illustrate political situation at that time. In 1989, Suharto assigned Habibie in charge for strategic industries. In December 1990, ICMI (Union of Indonesian Intellectual Muslims) was born and Habibie became the Chairman. Such a change in Suharto’s policy should have worried his non-Islamic political alliances. Suharto’s national policy, in which he gave more room to Islamic political powers, had raised a question on his foreign policy: Would Suharto remain to be non-Islamic in his foreign political policy. Suryadinata’s article was likely written to answer this question. In other words, this article is written in the shadow of fear of Indonesia’s Islamic fundamentalists.
The fall of Suharto in May 1998, however, proves that Suryadinata’s conclusion is wrong. Indonesia’s non-Islamic policy (both in national and international politics) depends on neither the authoritarian regime nor the military power. Instead, it depends on the fact that the majority of Indonesia’s Muslims are not fundamentalists. This fact, I suggests, should have escaped us from the shadows of Islamic fundamentalism.
Leo Suryadinata’s article, “Islam and Suharto's Foreign Policy: Indonesia, the Middle East, and Bosnia” (1995) observes that Indonesia’s Foreign Policy during Suharto era was non-Islamic. Analyzing such phenomenon, Suryadinata gives two reasons. First, Suharto wanted to play a bigger role in international political world through Non Aligned Movement. Second, the major reason for such a policy is actually the military’s fear of Islamic fundamentalism. This analysis, in my opinion, is certainly reasonable. However, I absolutely disagree when Suryadinata then concludes, “As long as Indonesia remains authoritarian in its political system and this group is in power, Indonesia’s foreign policy is likely to remain non-Islamic” (p. 303). This conclusion is doubtful at least on two points of view. First, it suggests that an authoritarian political system (including Suharto and his military supporter) could not use Islamic language to achieve their political goals. Second, it suggests that a non-Islamic foreign policy depends on an authoritarian political system.
Indonesia’s national political situation always changes, as well as the international one. Among many factors that influence world’s political dynamic, Islam (as a political ideology) is the most important ones. This phenomenon is also happen in Indonesia’s history. Suryadinata wrote his article in 1995, when Suharto was getting closer to Islamic political powers. Increasing political power of B. J. Habibie can well illustrate political situation at that time. In 1989, Suharto assigned Habibie in charge for strategic industries. In December 1990, ICMI (Union of Indonesian Intellectual Muslims) was born and Habibie became the Chairman. Such a change in Suharto’s policy should have worried his non-Islamic political alliances. Suharto’s national policy, in which he gave more room to Islamic political powers, had raised a question on his foreign policy: Would Suharto remain to be non-Islamic in his foreign political policy. Suryadinata’s article was likely written to answer this question. In other words, this article is written in the shadow of fear of Indonesia’s Islamic fundamentalists.
The fall of Suharto in May 1998, however, proves that Suryadinata’s conclusion is wrong. Indonesia’s non-Islamic policy (both in national and international politics) depends on neither the authoritarian regime nor the military power. Instead, it depends on the fact that the majority of Indonesia’s Muslims are not fundamentalists. This fact, I suggests, should have escaped us from the shadows of Islamic fundamentalism.
Religion in the New Order
LEYAKET ALI MOHAMED OMAR
History of Religion Part 2- Prof Bernard Adeney- Risakotta and Prof Margana
Readings are from : Lorraine V. Aragon – Fields of the Lord: Animism, Christian Minorities and State Development in Indonesia and Robert W. Hefner- Civil Islam
Both throughout history and in recent times, religion has shown itself to be as able to unite people and to divide them, to inspire acts of love and acts of hatred. The introduction in Aragon’s work sent chill down my spine as she explores the event that the world saw as a long bloody battles of religion, race and ethnic violence in recent time. In a sense I think in every country there are bound to be conflicts of religion if it is not nurture with tolerance and respect no matter what circumstances that arises to spark it off.
Singapore began its journey to nationhood in 1965 with racial and religious conflict fresh in its historical memory. The cohesion enjoyed today has been attained neither by sheer accident nor by pretending that racial and religious problems do not exist. Instead, it is in facing the problem of cultural tensions squarely that ways to mitigate them have been attained. Forty-five years on, it may be detrimental to pretend that those who desire to divide Singapore’s multi-racial and multi-religious society only exist in history books. On 21st July 1964, around 1pm, over 20,000 Malays and Muslims had gathered at the Padang(a parade field) for a celebration. This celebration was held annually to commemorate the birthday of Prophet Muhammad. 212 Muslim organizations had also gathered to participate in this procession. This processions were normally grand affairs as many on-lookers would regard is as a Muslim’s “Chingay Parade.” Celebrations to mark the birthday of Prophet Mohammad were also held throughout Malaysia. It was a grand occasion in many towns. However, on that day as the procession, it was said that a group of Chinese man disturbed the marching by throwing a bottle at the participants. Shortly after that fights began to break out. Later, when a federal police officer requested for some marchers to stick to a particular route along the Kallang Gas Works, he was attacked. Disorder soon speeded like wildfire as this triggered the beginning of the worst riot in the history of Singapore. The disorder was so great that by the first day of the riots, 4 people were killed and 178 others injured. On 2 August 1964, the island-wide curfew was completely lifted, 11 days after the ordeal. In all, 23 people were dead and 460 injured.
These factors draw a clear line that the mutual respect, tolerance and the understanding of religions practices. Rituals cannot be taken for granted especially when it is misinterpreted. For the people of Tobaku respecting and believing the dead ancestors still play a big role in the society while at the same time they are Christians. In line to this understanding of faith one, again comes back to the original question of what is religion ? Defining the word "religion" is fraught with difficulty. Many attempts have been made. Most seem to focus on too narrowly only a few aspects of religion; they tend to exclude those religions that do not fit well.
It is understood that religion can be interpreted as a theological, philosophical, anthropological, sociological and even psychological. Quoted scholars from the seventeen, sixteenth till the nineteenth centuries, definition by Samuel Johnson, Dictionary of English language (1755), also Zwingli and Calvin(1696) and Clifford Geertz (1960). Most of them vary from each other’s. These are some of the basic definitions that I find its obvious in most, example; some exclude beliefs and practices that many people passionately defend as religious. This excludes such non-theistic religions as Buddhist, which has no such belief. Some definitions equate "religion" with "Christianity," and thus define two out of every three human in the world as non-religious. Some definitions are so broadly written that they include beliefs and areas of study that most people do not regard as religious. Some define "religion" in terms of "the sacred" and/or "the spiritual," and thus result in two definitions. Sometimes, definitions of "religion" contain more than one deficiency’
Generally, for me personally I think the definition given in Wikipedia defines religion as: "... a system of social coherence based on a common group of beliefs or attitudes concerning an object, person, unseen being, or system of thought considered to be supernatural, sacred, divine or highest truth, and the moral codes, practices, values, institutions, traditions, and rituals associated with such belief or system of thought." Which personally I think is comprehensive enough to make a person understand what I understood as religion.
History of Religion Part 2- Prof Bernard Adeney- Risakotta and Prof Margana
Readings are from : Lorraine V. Aragon – Fields of the Lord: Animism, Christian Minorities and State Development in Indonesia and Robert W. Hefner- Civil Islam
Both throughout history and in recent times, religion has shown itself to be as able to unite people and to divide them, to inspire acts of love and acts of hatred. The introduction in Aragon’s work sent chill down my spine as she explores the event that the world saw as a long bloody battles of religion, race and ethnic violence in recent time. In a sense I think in every country there are bound to be conflicts of religion if it is not nurture with tolerance and respect no matter what circumstances that arises to spark it off.
Singapore began its journey to nationhood in 1965 with racial and religious conflict fresh in its historical memory. The cohesion enjoyed today has been attained neither by sheer accident nor by pretending that racial and religious problems do not exist. Instead, it is in facing the problem of cultural tensions squarely that ways to mitigate them have been attained. Forty-five years on, it may be detrimental to pretend that those who desire to divide Singapore’s multi-racial and multi-religious society only exist in history books. On 21st July 1964, around 1pm, over 20,000 Malays and Muslims had gathered at the Padang(a parade field) for a celebration. This celebration was held annually to commemorate the birthday of Prophet Muhammad. 212 Muslim organizations had also gathered to participate in this procession. This processions were normally grand affairs as many on-lookers would regard is as a Muslim’s “Chingay Parade.” Celebrations to mark the birthday of Prophet Mohammad were also held throughout Malaysia. It was a grand occasion in many towns. However, on that day as the procession, it was said that a group of Chinese man disturbed the marching by throwing a bottle at the participants. Shortly after that fights began to break out. Later, when a federal police officer requested for some marchers to stick to a particular route along the Kallang Gas Works, he was attacked. Disorder soon speeded like wildfire as this triggered the beginning of the worst riot in the history of Singapore. The disorder was so great that by the first day of the riots, 4 people were killed and 178 others injured. On 2 August 1964, the island-wide curfew was completely lifted, 11 days after the ordeal. In all, 23 people were dead and 460 injured.
These factors draw a clear line that the mutual respect, tolerance and the understanding of religions practices. Rituals cannot be taken for granted especially when it is misinterpreted. For the people of Tobaku respecting and believing the dead ancestors still play a big role in the society while at the same time they are Christians. In line to this understanding of faith one, again comes back to the original question of what is religion ? Defining the word "religion" is fraught with difficulty. Many attempts have been made. Most seem to focus on too narrowly only a few aspects of religion; they tend to exclude those religions that do not fit well.
It is understood that religion can be interpreted as a theological, philosophical, anthropological, sociological and even psychological. Quoted scholars from the seventeen, sixteenth till the nineteenth centuries, definition by Samuel Johnson, Dictionary of English language (1755), also Zwingli and Calvin(1696) and Clifford Geertz (1960). Most of them vary from each other’s. These are some of the basic definitions that I find its obvious in most, example; some exclude beliefs and practices that many people passionately defend as religious. This excludes such non-theistic religions as Buddhist, which has no such belief. Some definitions equate "religion" with "Christianity," and thus define two out of every three human in the world as non-religious. Some definitions are so broadly written that they include beliefs and areas of study that most people do not regard as religious. Some define "religion" in terms of "the sacred" and/or "the spiritual," and thus result in two definitions. Sometimes, definitions of "religion" contain more than one deficiency’
Generally, for me personally I think the definition given in Wikipedia defines religion as: "... a system of social coherence based on a common group of beliefs or attitudes concerning an object, person, unseen being, or system of thought considered to be supernatural, sacred, divine or highest truth, and the moral codes, practices, values, institutions, traditions, and rituals associated with such belief or system of thought." Which personally I think is comprehensive enough to make a person understand what I understood as religion.
Religion, Communism, Gender by Nihayatul Wafiroh
As Robert Crib (1990) analyzes that the historiography is an essential problem in Indonesia. New order created the Indonesian historiography to maintain or control the power. I can bet that all people in my generation have perspective that PKI and Gerwani are very bad political organizations in Indonesia, so that we have to ban them. New Order already washed our brains with historical books that put communism to be a banned organization.
I still kept this perspective until I studied in undergraduate. My community in UIN Yogyakarta where I studied for my undergraduate introduced me in new perspectives of the communist discourse in Indonesia. I just realized that New Order attempted to use religions to control people. People were guided to have assumptions that communism was the group, which did not believe God. Communism vs religions became the effective strategy for New Order to manage people.
One of great books that really opens my eyes about the position of Gerwani is Sexual Politics in Indonesia by Saskia Wieringa. Gerwani is often connected to PKI. As a result, Gerwani members were jailed. According to Wieringa, actually Gerwani promoted women’s movement in Indonesia. This organization attempted to encourage women to active in public spheres such as in politic. Gerwani also provided education for women. Because of the propaganda of New Order, all Gerwani’s activities could not be continued. New Order wanted to bring women in a private sphere which was to be amothers and wives. In fact, the issues of religion were used to keep women in home.
In my opinion, Indonesian government should give a formal statement about Gerwani. Indeed, even right now the ex Gerwani’s members still receive unjust treatment. Therefore, Indonesian government has to rehabilitate Gerwani. I think that Indonesian people should also have proper understanding of the real history of G30S PKI. It can avoid misunderstanding of PKI and Gerwani.
I still kept this perspective until I studied in undergraduate. My community in UIN Yogyakarta where I studied for my undergraduate introduced me in new perspectives of the communist discourse in Indonesia. I just realized that New Order attempted to use religions to control people. People were guided to have assumptions that communism was the group, which did not believe God. Communism vs religions became the effective strategy for New Order to manage people.
One of great books that really opens my eyes about the position of Gerwani is Sexual Politics in Indonesia by Saskia Wieringa. Gerwani is often connected to PKI. As a result, Gerwani members were jailed. According to Wieringa, actually Gerwani promoted women’s movement in Indonesia. This organization attempted to encourage women to active in public spheres such as in politic. Gerwani also provided education for women. Because of the propaganda of New Order, all Gerwani’s activities could not be continued. New Order wanted to bring women in a private sphere which was to be amothers and wives. In fact, the issues of religion were used to keep women in home.
In my opinion, Indonesian government should give a formal statement about Gerwani. Indeed, even right now the ex Gerwani’s members still receive unjust treatment. Therefore, Indonesian government has to rehabilitate Gerwani. I think that Indonesian people should also have proper understanding of the real history of G30S PKI. It can avoid misunderstanding of PKI and Gerwani.
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