Escape from the Shadows of Fundamentalism

by Timotius Wibowo

Leo Suryadinata’s article, “Islam and Suharto's Foreign Policy: Indonesia, the Middle East, and Bosnia” (1995) observes that Indonesia’s Foreign Policy during Suharto era was non-Islamic. Analyzing such phenomenon, Suryadinata gives two reasons. First, Suharto wanted to play a bigger role in international political world through Non Aligned Movement. Second, the major reason for such a policy is actually the military’s fear of Islamic fundamentalism. This analysis, in my opinion, is certainly reasonable. However, I absolutely disagree when Suryadinata then concludes, “As long as Indonesia remains authoritarian in its political system and this group is in power, Indonesia’s foreign policy is likely to remain non-Islamic” (p. 303). This conclusion is doubtful at least on two points of view. First, it suggests that an authoritarian political system (including Suharto and his military supporter) could not use Islamic language to achieve their political goals. Second, it suggests that a non-Islamic foreign policy depends on an authoritarian political system.

Indonesia’s national political situation always changes, as well as the international one. Among many factors that influence world’s political dynamic, Islam (as a political ideology) is the most important ones. This phenomenon is also happen in Indonesia’s history. Suryadinata wrote his article in 1995, when Suharto was getting closer to Islamic political powers. Increasing political power of B. J. Habibie can well illustrate political situation at that time. In 1989, Suharto assigned Habibie in charge for strategic industries. In December 1990, ICMI (Union of Indonesian Intellectual Muslims) was born and Habibie became the Chairman. Such a change in Suharto’s policy should have worried his non-Islamic political alliances. Suharto’s national policy, in which he gave more room to Islamic political powers, had raised a question on his foreign policy: Would Suharto remain to be non-Islamic in his foreign political policy. Suryadinata’s article was likely written to answer this question. In other words, this article is written in the shadow of fear of Indonesia’s Islamic fundamentalists.

The fall of Suharto in May 1998, however, proves that Suryadinata’s conclusion is wrong. Indonesia’s non-Islamic policy (both in national and international politics) depends on neither the authoritarian regime nor the military power. Instead, it depends on the fact that the majority of Indonesia’s Muslims are not fundamentalists. This fact, I suggests, should have escaped us from the shadows of Islamic fundamentalism.