Modernization, Secularization, Privatization - Roy Allan B Tolentino

"Islamic leaders favor modernization while fearing secularism and Westernization. They define modernization as structural changes in the economic system through rational action. But modernization must be conducted in a spirit of devotion to God, for the term “modern” has only a temporary connotation. Only God can give lasting meaning to human action. Secularism is considered to be the rejection of God's values in the settlement of man's worldly affairs and the recognition of man's authority and the power of his reason. It is considered to be the cause of decline in morality and the source of disaster which threatens civilization. Modernization based upon secularism results in Westernization, the process found in the Western world which, while bringing material abundance, must result in moral decay." (Samson 1968:1016)

This description, written by Allan Samson in 1968, is interesting in that it reveals the mindset of the Indonesian religious leadership of the time. The way modernization and secularization are nuanced betrays a sense of being pulled in different directions: there is the direction of industrialization and economic growth (understood as modernization); there is also the desire to retain a certain purity of faith by avoiding any contamination by Western ideology (secularization). While this is a rather sharp division, and some might argue that a nation cannot have one without the other, it would be interesting to see how this thinking may have changed over the course of three decades.

The Suharto regime, of course, attempted to depoliticize Islam as much as it could, and favoured a more secular approach to government. This, of course, allowed the New Order to entrench itself for the next decades, and the disputes within the Indonesian intelligentsia served to diffuse their power. As Kenneth George recounts, “prominent modernist intellectuals like Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid argued that an Islamic society did not necessitate an Islamic political party or an Islamic state, a view quite welcome in government circles. Stirred by these intellectuals and consistently faced with the suppression of Muslim political activity, many of the younger and university-educated members of the ummat turned away from formal politics and began to cultivate social, cultural, and religious activities that would put Muslim values at the heart of national civic life, most especially as lived by the urban and middle class.” (George 1998:698) While the government, through its policies, pushed for an apolitical Islam, the Muslim intelligentsia also led a cultural shift to what could be called a privatization of religion. Privatization is not so much secularization, in the sense of being infected by alien ideologies, but the relegation of religion to the sphere of private life. As George notes, “what has taken place during the last fifteen years is a dramatic turn toward everyday piety in the home, on the street, in schools, in businesses, and in government offices. Emblems of pious thought and conduct have become the signs for a modern Indonesian Muslim subject as well as markers of distinction and taste for members of a progressive and rising social class.” (George 1998:698-699)

Of course, the fall of Suharto has changed the rules of the game again. I wonder, however, if in their zeal to counteract secularization, Indonesian Muslims have been less circumspect of the privatization that has occurred in their religious life. Although there are groups which have been pushing for a more political interpretation of Islam, the majority seems to feel that this is an unnecessary step. I wonder if that is religious pluralism or privatization talking.

Samson, Allan A. “Islam in Indonesian Politics”in Asian Survey, Vol. 8, No. 12. (Dec., 1968)
George, Kenneth M. “Designs on Indonesia’s Muslim Communities” in The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 57, No. 3. (Aug., 1998)