Intelligentsia as Mediator - Roy Allan B Tolentino

Kevin O’Rourke’s account of the last days of Soeharto reads much like a novel, with its protagonists and antagonists and other characters caught up in the wave of history. It is a reminder that history is still a story, as well as an invitation to contribute to the narrative, or even supply another narrative. One thing I find fascinating in O’Rourke’s account, however, is the role he assigns to the Indonesian intelligentsia, who are also, more often than not, key figures in Indonesian religious life.

Two figures who played roles in the drama surrounding the fall of Soeharto are Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid. Although O’Rourke’s account tends toward the dramatic, how he treats these two figures has much to tell us about the role of the intelligentsia in Indonesian society. In describing Madjid, O’Rourke says: “The venerable university rector seemed an unlikely figure amid the coarse world of Jakarta politics, but he possessed a unique set of credentials. Nurcholish’s political philosophy had been encapsulated by the famous soundbite: ‘Islam, yes! Islamic parties, no!’ His eminence as an Islamic scholar won him the trust of modernist Muslims, while his reservations about politicising religion allowed him to maintain constructive relationships with Soeharto and nationalist-minded generals.” (O'Rourke 2002:121) While some might argue that Nurcholish’s position displayed more strategy than conviction, his mediation proved crucial to the progression of events. “The most effective source of organised political opposition was emanating from a loose coalition of Islamic groups, while the arbiter of political change was the military. If these two key institutions—organised Islam and the military—could come to terms on a plan, it would represent a major step forward.” (O'Rourke 2002:121)

In the meeting between the Islamic leaders and Suharto, it would be Gus Dur’s moves (or lack of them) that would become important. “The normally loquacious cleric remained silent throughout most of the meeting. One of his few contributions was to register surprise that Nurcholish was trying ‘to hammer’ Soeharto—a comment which most of those present took to mean that Wahid opposed Soeharto’s immediate resignation.” (O'Rourke 2002:128)According to O’Rourke’s account, this was an uncharacteristic move on the part of Gus Dur, and some assessments claim that Gus Dur’s intransigence came from personal ressentiment. “The only explanation for his continued support for Soeharto was that his arch-nemesis, Amien Rais, was leading the anti-Soeharto movement. Even amid this national drama, it appeared to many that Wahid was more concerned with defeating his modernist rivals than with bringing down Soeharto.” (O'Rourke 2002:128)

While I am sure that supporters and critics of both these figures will have something to say about O’Rourke’s depiction of these events, these two vignettes illustrate the position of the intelligentsia as mediators, and this I mean in the broadest sense: the intelligentsia really are positioned in the middle. While it is true that intellectuals can remain rooted in their communities, there is already a certain separation brought about by advanced education; even if one returns to the grassroots, one cannot deny that one’s discourse has changed. Nurcholish and Gus Dur show how this middle position of the intelligentsia can become both a bridge and an obstacle. Being in the middle, an intellectual can become a wedge or a conductor, facilitating change or preventing it. I wonder what sort of intellectuals ICRS students will become.

O'Rourke, Kevin. Reformasi: The Struggle for Power in Post-Soeharto Indonesia. Crows Nest, NSW: Allen and Unwin, 2002.