Kristanto Budiprabowo (Tatok)
Looking back to the history of the fall of Suharto in the perspective of the history of religion, in my opinion, there are several situations that should be our consideration. First, at that time global political situation directs to the struggle of democratization which combines with the rise of religious criticism and ethno-nationalism. In Indonesia, this situation content with the international negotiation especially in the economical trend. Second, in the regional Asians countries, the economical crisis is the most fatal hit and seems to be the most reasonable thing that fastens social change. In Indonesia, even though government tried using every possibility to save national economical stability, but the political and social instability already uncontrolled. This situation, somehow, show the religious ambiguity. On one side, there were some religious leaders who give religious interpretation to support Suharto’s establishment. On the other side, some religious leader use religious organization as a political movement to criticize him.
Third, in the local context, influence by international and regional situation, the real national situation was exposed. Poverty, inequality between provinces, low income laborer, is some of the social reality that triggers riots in some places. Student’s protest and scholars critics to the government and also political competition among politicians whether civilian or military in background, are the daily news. And because the control from Jakarta weakened, there were also the competition among local elite. In this situation, religion is very easy manipulated as a social solidarity to do violence. The religious violence, for instance in Ambon, is an example that international, regional and local situation have a significant influence. Moreover, in my opinion, in areas which have long history interreligious competition to have political power, religious violence happens more easily.
Minggu, 25 April 2010
Religion and violence in the fall of Suharto and toward democratization;
Tri Harmaji
History of Religions in Indonesia Part II: from c. 1900 to the Present
Religion and violence in the fall of Suharto and toward democratization; Kevin O’Rourke, Reformasi, struggle for power in post-Suharto Indonesia, pg. 87-153 & Mary S. Zurbuchen, Beginning to remember- the past in the Indonesian present, pg. 38-74 & 150-168
In the time, before and after, of Suharto fall most big cities in Indonesia and especially Jakarta were colored by violence. The violence took place in many places and it cost much lives and material loss. But the question here is where religion is in this tragic scene? Did religion involve in this violence? Because the ruined facilities were not just economic or government facilities and building but also some religious facilities such as church buildings, religious involvement is believed to have prevailed in this scene. But from the readings, especially O,Rourke’s analysis about who behind the riot, it is clear that military was the most likely to have masterminding this riot. It is true that some religious figures like Amin Rais, Nucholis Majid and Gusdur were actively participate in the days of Suharto resignation. But it is almost clear also that their role in this scene can not be related to the violence happened in that very tension time. No religious motive was found in that chaotic time of the struggle to step down Suharto from his office. It is likely that the main cause of the people and students’ struggle was economic crisis caused by KKN the Suharto government practiced.
Suharto himself has done his best to defend his power. In his opinion, I perceive, he was a great leader of Indonesia who has brought prosperity to the country. Regardless that in his governance there were many human right abuse, corruption, environment destruction, foreign debt ect. he still thinks that there was much goodness also he has done for the country. It is why when firstly he signaled his willingness to resign in Egypt, he said that it was just because the people have no trust any more to him, then he will ‘make himself close to God’ and become pandito. It is characteristically Javanese religious word. Is really Suharto a religious person? If he is, how about especially mass killing he had done to PKI? In “beginning to remember” a dalang, Ki Trisuti Rachmadi, tells his experience as one victim of Suharto campaign against PKI. From his story I can imagine how suffer they were when they were put in the prison as well as after they were freed. After the fall of Suharto many people begun to bring this issue to the public, and so the badness of Suharto begun more and more apparent. But the question is back again, ‘do this action, killing PKI, contradict to religion?’ for the people now, the answer is clearly ‘Yes!’ but perhaps it was different from religious perspective at that time. Like we know, religious organization also actively played role in the killing, and so it was sure that there was a strong religious justification to the killing at that time.
Another violence interesting to me here is the ninja killing. This tragedy took place in east java shortly after the fall of Suharto, and the victims of this killing were mostly Islamic leaders affiliated to NU. Who are the ninja and who masterminding it? Some people accused Suharto who was taking revenge for his fall. And another opinion, especially from Hasyim, the killing must be performed by the communist who took revenge for what they experienced more that 30 years ago. Both opinions make sense. But on the other side this guess still leave other questions; if the ninja was the communist, why they did not take revenge to Suharto too as the most responsible person to the PKI killing at that time? Or if Suharto was behind this terror, why he just kills Islamic leaders? Is the main actor of his fall was student and perhaps military itself isn’t it?
All of the questions above perhaps can not be answered satisfactorily all the time. And perhaps we do not have to too focus on those questions in understanding the violence around the fall of Suharto. What is universally true is that the small people will always become the victims if two big people are fighting each other. “dua gajah berkelahi, pelanduk mati di tengahnya”.
History of Religions in Indonesia Part II: from c. 1900 to the Present
Religion and violence in the fall of Suharto and toward democratization; Kevin O’Rourke, Reformasi, struggle for power in post-Suharto Indonesia, pg. 87-153 & Mary S. Zurbuchen, Beginning to remember- the past in the Indonesian present, pg. 38-74 & 150-168
In the time, before and after, of Suharto fall most big cities in Indonesia and especially Jakarta were colored by violence. The violence took place in many places and it cost much lives and material loss. But the question here is where religion is in this tragic scene? Did religion involve in this violence? Because the ruined facilities were not just economic or government facilities and building but also some religious facilities such as church buildings, religious involvement is believed to have prevailed in this scene. But from the readings, especially O,Rourke’s analysis about who behind the riot, it is clear that military was the most likely to have masterminding this riot. It is true that some religious figures like Amin Rais, Nucholis Majid and Gusdur were actively participate in the days of Suharto resignation. But it is almost clear also that their role in this scene can not be related to the violence happened in that very tension time. No religious motive was found in that chaotic time of the struggle to step down Suharto from his office. It is likely that the main cause of the people and students’ struggle was economic crisis caused by KKN the Suharto government practiced.
Suharto himself has done his best to defend his power. In his opinion, I perceive, he was a great leader of Indonesia who has brought prosperity to the country. Regardless that in his governance there were many human right abuse, corruption, environment destruction, foreign debt ect. he still thinks that there was much goodness also he has done for the country. It is why when firstly he signaled his willingness to resign in Egypt, he said that it was just because the people have no trust any more to him, then he will ‘make himself close to God’ and become pandito. It is characteristically Javanese religious word. Is really Suharto a religious person? If he is, how about especially mass killing he had done to PKI? In “beginning to remember” a dalang, Ki Trisuti Rachmadi, tells his experience as one victim of Suharto campaign against PKI. From his story I can imagine how suffer they were when they were put in the prison as well as after they were freed. After the fall of Suharto many people begun to bring this issue to the public, and so the badness of Suharto begun more and more apparent. But the question is back again, ‘do this action, killing PKI, contradict to religion?’ for the people now, the answer is clearly ‘Yes!’ but perhaps it was different from religious perspective at that time. Like we know, religious organization also actively played role in the killing, and so it was sure that there was a strong religious justification to the killing at that time.
Another violence interesting to me here is the ninja killing. This tragedy took place in east java shortly after the fall of Suharto, and the victims of this killing were mostly Islamic leaders affiliated to NU. Who are the ninja and who masterminding it? Some people accused Suharto who was taking revenge for his fall. And another opinion, especially from Hasyim, the killing must be performed by the communist who took revenge for what they experienced more that 30 years ago. Both opinions make sense. But on the other side this guess still leave other questions; if the ninja was the communist, why they did not take revenge to Suharto too as the most responsible person to the PKI killing at that time? Or if Suharto was behind this terror, why he just kills Islamic leaders? Is the main actor of his fall was student and perhaps military itself isn’t it?
All of the questions above perhaps can not be answered satisfactorily all the time. And perhaps we do not have to too focus on those questions in understanding the violence around the fall of Suharto. What is universally true is that the small people will always become the victims if two big people are fighting each other. “dua gajah berkelahi, pelanduk mati di tengahnya”.
How is the Historiographies in Indonesia after Soeharto’s Era ? By Nihayatul Wafiroh
The generation who was born from 1960s until 1980s would have the same memories about Indonesian history. For instance, Sukarno joined the banned party, which is a communist party, and we always had assumed that Suharto was the most important person to bring Indonesia in the new era. Our knowledge about Indonesia based on one resource which was the historical book in our school. Geery Van Klinken in his article The Battle for History after Soeharto claimed that the power of Suharto arranged everything about the Indonesian history.
Although Soeharto already fell in 1998, it does not mean that Indonesia would create better historiographies. There are still some problems for example the less controlled by state. Indeed, this situation opens the opportunities for all people to write the history that is based on their own perspectives. In the other hand, the reform era has brought an opportunity for everyone to express their courage to write about the history of Indonesia, so there emerge several groups of historians who have a different focus on the historiographical Indonesia. Klinken groups four historiographical streams into four groups: (1) Orthodox nationalist stream, (2) Societal historiographies at the national level, (3) Regional ethno-nationalisms, (4) Local histories.
For me the most interesting of these four groups is the first group. Disclosure of information and the absence of pressure from the government do not open their eyes about the real history of Indonesia. Indeed, the history of Indosia had been covered by Suharto. They still hold the view of the "forbidden" to have a different view of history, so they raided the history books that in their view not in line with their opinions. If this group still exists, I am sure that the historigraphical Indonesia will not move ahead.
Then, how about the history of religions in Indonesia? I think that during Suharto’s era, the history of religions was only written from one side which was government’s side. So is there any differences before and after Soeharto’s era?
Although Soeharto already fell in 1998, it does not mean that Indonesia would create better historiographies. There are still some problems for example the less controlled by state. Indeed, this situation opens the opportunities for all people to write the history that is based on their own perspectives. In the other hand, the reform era has brought an opportunity for everyone to express their courage to write about the history of Indonesia, so there emerge several groups of historians who have a different focus on the historiographical Indonesia. Klinken groups four historiographical streams into four groups: (1) Orthodox nationalist stream, (2) Societal historiographies at the national level, (3) Regional ethno-nationalisms, (4) Local histories.
For me the most interesting of these four groups is the first group. Disclosure of information and the absence of pressure from the government do not open their eyes about the real history of Indonesia. Indeed, the history of Indosia had been covered by Suharto. They still hold the view of the "forbidden" to have a different view of history, so they raided the history books that in their view not in line with their opinions. If this group still exists, I am sure that the historigraphical Indonesia will not move ahead.
Then, how about the history of religions in Indonesia? I think that during Suharto’s era, the history of religions was only written from one side which was government’s side. So is there any differences before and after Soeharto’s era?
Can the State be mandated seriously?
By Roma Ulinnuha
Readings:
1. Hasan, Noorhaidi, “Reformasi, Religious Diversity, and Islamic Radicalism after Soeharto”, Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities, Vol. 1, 2008, pp. 23–51
URL: http://www.kitlv-journals.nl/index.php/jissh/index.
2. Hüsken, Frans, Violence and Vengeance: Discontent and Conflict in New Order Indonesia; The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 62, No. 3 (Aug., 2003), pp. 1005-1007
It is a very huge challenge for Indonesia, soon after the New Order’s regime stepped down, to face the complex issue on leadership, trust and unity. Leaving behind the authoritarian regime was a fortune, but it also assigned the big question on the pathways of newly Indonesia vision that formulated in Reformasi Era. Noorhaidi Hasan (2008) viewed the quarrel of political strive related to religious segments. Hasan argues that ‘in the context of mounting competition among elites, religion has become tremendously politicised and has served more as a tactical tool used by political contenders in their own interests’ (p. 24). Violence as the impact of political fragility was manifest. Frans Husken (2003) argues that three years after Soeharto’s resignation, Indonesia witnessed refugees and sectarian violence (p.1005). In this uncertainty, the state seemed awkward in responding the vast changing of political discourse. Habibie, according to Hasan, liberalized the regulation on the establishment of political parties and abolished the asas tunggal, thus explicitly allowing Islam to enter the political arena of Indonesia. A dozen political parties that endorsed the shari’a and other conservative positions thus came to the political arena of post-Suharto Indonesia (p.33). This strategy should actually be carefully taken into consideration for the situational moment at the time.
The legacy of the act, I think, is present now. Some radical Islam groups were free after the New Order’s repression to act in a more extensive mode of action. I believe the evil acts of prostitution, gambling, and other horrible acts should be seen carefully in terms of the law consequence. Any religious groups in Indonesia should not be a street justice executor. Indonesia is a religious country, but it does not legalize the acts of religious groups acting as the agent of the state such as military or police. I disagree with the social pathology—such as crime, prostitution and other negative acts, at the same time I also believe that the fair justice should be done. The question is: can the state be fair enough to lead law enforcement? If the state cannot be trusted, I hope the street justice is not just a last choice. Violence in political, social, economic, and religious realm is then the assignment should be responded seriously by the state.
Readings:
1. Hasan, Noorhaidi, “Reformasi, Religious Diversity, and Islamic Radicalism after Soeharto”, Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities, Vol. 1, 2008, pp. 23–51
URL: http://www.kitlv-journals.nl/index.php/jissh/index.
2. Hüsken, Frans, Violence and Vengeance: Discontent and Conflict in New Order Indonesia; The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 62, No. 3 (Aug., 2003), pp. 1005-1007
It is a very huge challenge for Indonesia, soon after the New Order’s regime stepped down, to face the complex issue on leadership, trust and unity. Leaving behind the authoritarian regime was a fortune, but it also assigned the big question on the pathways of newly Indonesia vision that formulated in Reformasi Era. Noorhaidi Hasan (2008) viewed the quarrel of political strive related to religious segments. Hasan argues that ‘in the context of mounting competition among elites, religion has become tremendously politicised and has served more as a tactical tool used by political contenders in their own interests’ (p. 24). Violence as the impact of political fragility was manifest. Frans Husken (2003) argues that three years after Soeharto’s resignation, Indonesia witnessed refugees and sectarian violence (p.1005). In this uncertainty, the state seemed awkward in responding the vast changing of political discourse. Habibie, according to Hasan, liberalized the regulation on the establishment of political parties and abolished the asas tunggal, thus explicitly allowing Islam to enter the political arena of Indonesia. A dozen political parties that endorsed the shari’a and other conservative positions thus came to the political arena of post-Suharto Indonesia (p.33). This strategy should actually be carefully taken into consideration for the situational moment at the time.
The legacy of the act, I think, is present now. Some radical Islam groups were free after the New Order’s repression to act in a more extensive mode of action. I believe the evil acts of prostitution, gambling, and other horrible acts should be seen carefully in terms of the law consequence. Any religious groups in Indonesia should not be a street justice executor. Indonesia is a religious country, but it does not legalize the acts of religious groups acting as the agent of the state such as military or police. I disagree with the social pathology—such as crime, prostitution and other negative acts, at the same time I also believe that the fair justice should be done. The question is: can the state be fair enough to lead law enforcement? If the state cannot be trusted, I hope the street justice is not just a last choice. Violence in political, social, economic, and religious realm is then the assignment should be responded seriously by the state.
So, what is the real Indonesian history?
by Nina Mariani Noor
In talking about history in Indonesia, particularly after the fall of Soeharto, Van Klinken points out some important issues that emerged and got more attention from historians and scholars like G. 30. S PKI events, March 1st . I do agree with him that “official history” made during Soeharto’s reign mostly uncovered the real events that happened in the past in order to promote Soeharto’s power. I, personally, in fact experienced knowing and understanding this “official history” during my school time. Therefore, history about Indonesia that keep in my mind is this kind of history so that I find it difficult sometimes to change my understanding on a fact in the past. And I am sure, that my experiences are similar to other people in Indonesia. for example in the case of communism in 1965-1966, I never taught about the mass killing at that time by my history teacher in my junior and also senior high school. What we know is only about the brutality of PKI rebellion.
In my opinion, some attempts from historians now to reveal the history about Indonesia are really useful and valuable for our next generation. Establishing official history to build a strong nationalism is good. However, we have to avoid blaming or even victimizing some people just to make the history seems good and perfect. Revealing the facts is more important that make them up in order to make it in accordance with what we want.
O’ Rourke explains some backgrounds about some leaders who involved in the reformation process to send Soeharto down from his reign like Megawati, Abdurrahman Wahid and Amin Rais. His way of presenting their short biography and backgrounds provides the readers with clearer background on reformation in Indonesia. Furthermore, it seems that he tries to show the real events in the past to his readers and it seems to be that it is effective in calling readers’ attention.
After all, there is a question in my mind after the development of history writing in Indonesia, What is the real history of Indonesia? Which history that we should believe?
Readings: Gerry Van Klinken, The Battle for History after Suharto, in Mary Zurbuchen ed, Beginning to Remember.
Kevin O’ Rourke, Reformasi the struggle for Power in Post Soeharto Indonesia
In talking about history in Indonesia, particularly after the fall of Soeharto, Van Klinken points out some important issues that emerged and got more attention from historians and scholars like G. 30. S PKI events, March 1st . I do agree with him that “official history” made during Soeharto’s reign mostly uncovered the real events that happened in the past in order to promote Soeharto’s power. I, personally, in fact experienced knowing and understanding this “official history” during my school time. Therefore, history about Indonesia that keep in my mind is this kind of history so that I find it difficult sometimes to change my understanding on a fact in the past. And I am sure, that my experiences are similar to other people in Indonesia. for example in the case of communism in 1965-1966, I never taught about the mass killing at that time by my history teacher in my junior and also senior high school. What we know is only about the brutality of PKI rebellion.
In my opinion, some attempts from historians now to reveal the history about Indonesia are really useful and valuable for our next generation. Establishing official history to build a strong nationalism is good. However, we have to avoid blaming or even victimizing some people just to make the history seems good and perfect. Revealing the facts is more important that make them up in order to make it in accordance with what we want.
O’ Rourke explains some backgrounds about some leaders who involved in the reformation process to send Soeharto down from his reign like Megawati, Abdurrahman Wahid and Amin Rais. His way of presenting their short biography and backgrounds provides the readers with clearer background on reformation in Indonesia. Furthermore, it seems that he tries to show the real events in the past to his readers and it seems to be that it is effective in calling readers’ attention.
After all, there is a question in my mind after the development of history writing in Indonesia, What is the real history of Indonesia? Which history that we should believe?
Readings: Gerry Van Klinken, The Battle for History after Suharto, in Mary Zurbuchen ed, Beginning to Remember.
Kevin O’ Rourke, Reformasi the struggle for Power in Post Soeharto Indonesia
Soeharto's Legacy
LEYAKET ALI MOHAMED OMAR
History of Religion Part 2- Prof Bernard Adeney- Risakotta and Prof Margana
Readings are from : Gerry van Klinken- The Battle for History after Suharto
Like many of his fellow Indonesians, this once-dominant leader has only one name: Suharto. A former Army General came to power in 1965 when political turmoil rocked the rule of former President Sukarno. He became president in 1968, a post he held in an iron grip until the financial crisis of 1998 precipitated widespread unrest and protest, leading to his resigning the presidency in that year.
Over a thirty-year period, he ruled the 225-million citizenry, 17,000 island archipelago with a firm hand, and I must say brought stability and development to a nation many had thought ungovernable, at least to my understanding from the past history lessons in the course. In the end, the continuing charges of corruption, human rights abuses and stifling of political dissent began to overshadow his achievements, and he was forced into resignation on 21 May, 1998.
Now, with his passing, Indonesians will have to wrestle with the complex legacy of a leader who left an indelible imprint on the country’s history. Klinken’s account of The battle for History after Suharto was interesting to know, he mentions ‘ When the press exploded some of the key historical myth upon which the national-building project had been built, and parents began to accuse hapless teachers around the country of teachings ‘lies’ (p.236)” As I wonder through the actual facts of the “lies’ or fabrication of history through power of ‘silencing’ the fact on 1st March 1949, 30th September 1965 was all a political agenda that has serve its purpose on those period of unrest. Although it might be a myth, but it does has an impact of pro- nationalist ideology that can help to further establish a better country. Soeharto played an exemplary role of moulding the country man to serve the country as a useful citizen. It serves as an important development to the country stagnant crisis of communism; it also marked a drastic change of direction from Soekarno’s socialistic economic system. The new economic system focused on economic liberalization, open-door policy to foreign capital, development policies emphasizing promotion of food production and industrialization, macroeconomic stabilization suppressing fiscal deficits and inflation, and aid acceptance from IMF, the World Bank, the United States, the Europe and Japan.
However, this is seen as injustice to many, especially with the eliminating of those who opposed Soeharto ideas. They demanded a shift from authoritarianism to democracy, from power concentration to decentralization, from political suppression to liberalization, from social control to liberalization, and demands dissolution of the vested interest structure under the his regime. The liberalization of political institutions has brought about the following evolutionary process: Formerly suppressed forces came to raise making use of the newly acquired freedom; the rise of new forces destabilized politics; learning from the instability, the political players started a search for more balanced political institutions.
History of Religion Part 2- Prof Bernard Adeney- Risakotta and Prof Margana
Readings are from : Gerry van Klinken- The Battle for History after Suharto
Like many of his fellow Indonesians, this once-dominant leader has only one name: Suharto. A former Army General came to power in 1965 when political turmoil rocked the rule of former President Sukarno. He became president in 1968, a post he held in an iron grip until the financial crisis of 1998 precipitated widespread unrest and protest, leading to his resigning the presidency in that year.
Over a thirty-year period, he ruled the 225-million citizenry, 17,000 island archipelago with a firm hand, and I must say brought stability and development to a nation many had thought ungovernable, at least to my understanding from the past history lessons in the course. In the end, the continuing charges of corruption, human rights abuses and stifling of political dissent began to overshadow his achievements, and he was forced into resignation on 21 May, 1998.
Now, with his passing, Indonesians will have to wrestle with the complex legacy of a leader who left an indelible imprint on the country’s history. Klinken’s account of The battle for History after Suharto was interesting to know, he mentions ‘ When the press exploded some of the key historical myth upon which the national-building project had been built, and parents began to accuse hapless teachers around the country of teachings ‘lies’ (p.236)” As I wonder through the actual facts of the “lies’ or fabrication of history through power of ‘silencing’ the fact on 1st March 1949, 30th September 1965 was all a political agenda that has serve its purpose on those period of unrest. Although it might be a myth, but it does has an impact of pro- nationalist ideology that can help to further establish a better country. Soeharto played an exemplary role of moulding the country man to serve the country as a useful citizen. It serves as an important development to the country stagnant crisis of communism; it also marked a drastic change of direction from Soekarno’s socialistic economic system. The new economic system focused on economic liberalization, open-door policy to foreign capital, development policies emphasizing promotion of food production and industrialization, macroeconomic stabilization suppressing fiscal deficits and inflation, and aid acceptance from IMF, the World Bank, the United States, the Europe and Japan.
However, this is seen as injustice to many, especially with the eliminating of those who opposed Soeharto ideas. They demanded a shift from authoritarianism to democracy, from power concentration to decentralization, from political suppression to liberalization, from social control to liberalization, and demands dissolution of the vested interest structure under the his regime. The liberalization of political institutions has brought about the following evolutionary process: Formerly suppressed forces came to raise making use of the newly acquired freedom; the rise of new forces destabilized politics; learning from the instability, the political players started a search for more balanced political institutions.
Indonesia means Multiculturalism!
by Timotius Wibowo
Reading: Bernard Adeney-Risakotta (2009), “Religion, Violence and Diversity: Negotiating the Boundaries of Indonesian Identity” in Religion, Civil Society, and Conflict in Indonesia. Zurich and Berlin: LIT.
Addressing the problem of religion, violence and diversity in Indonesia, Bernard Adeney-Risakotta (2009) suggests a dialectic dialogue between three different ways of liberal human rights, a substantive vision of good society, and multiculturalism. I absolutely agree with Adeney-Risakotta’s suggestion. However, among the three substances, I propose multiculturalism to be the starting point. It means that the other two substances should be developed from multiculturalism point of view. Although this article has enough room to discuss multiculturalism, it does not regard its prominence among the three.
I suggest multiculturalism to be the starting point of any efforts both in building national identity and in solving the problems of religious and social diversity, based on at least three reasons. First, from both geographical and social points of view, Indonesia’s culture comprises thousands cultures. Such a richness of culture unfortunately has been regarded as burden, instead of blessing. That is why our leaders in the past always failed to unify Indonesia’s multicultural people. For centuries, cultural codes have been strong factor in Indonesia’s communities, both in building social relationships and in solving social conflicts.
Second, from historical perspective, multiculturalism is our unfinished task in building the foundation of our nation. Our political leaders, especially Sukarno and Suharto, used Pancasila only as a short cut to solve the problems of diversity. However, in my opinion, Pancasila could not really solve the problems. The first principle of Pancasila, “Ketuhanan Yang Mahaesa,” is never friendly both to Indonesian indigenous beliefs (and cultures) and minority’s religions. Instead of protects them, it is often used as a legal base to oppress them. Cultural peace during the New Order Era was only a deceit, since it was exercised by authoritarian presidency and its military forces.
Third, from global perspective, multiculturalism is the most proper value to establish a strong identity for Indonesian people. Amidst the bipolarization of radical Islam and secular Western (American) forces, Indonesia should build her national identity on her own heritages. The most dangerous threat of those two bipolar powers is not in political or military context, instead in cultural. Neither Western (or American) culture nor the Middle East (or Arabian) culture should colonize Indonesian people. Indonesian people should develop their own culture derived from its multicultural reality. Extinction of a nation starts from its culture.
It is true that it will take a long way to build Indonesia’s identity based on its multicultural reality. Such effort, nevertheless, is worthy. If we succeeded to finish it, we would have a strong cultural foundation for our nation.
Reading: Bernard Adeney-Risakotta (2009), “Religion, Violence and Diversity: Negotiating the Boundaries of Indonesian Identity” in Religion, Civil Society, and Conflict in Indonesia. Zurich and Berlin: LIT.
Addressing the problem of religion, violence and diversity in Indonesia, Bernard Adeney-Risakotta (2009) suggests a dialectic dialogue between three different ways of liberal human rights, a substantive vision of good society, and multiculturalism. I absolutely agree with Adeney-Risakotta’s suggestion. However, among the three substances, I propose multiculturalism to be the starting point. It means that the other two substances should be developed from multiculturalism point of view. Although this article has enough room to discuss multiculturalism, it does not regard its prominence among the three.
I suggest multiculturalism to be the starting point of any efforts both in building national identity and in solving the problems of religious and social diversity, based on at least three reasons. First, from both geographical and social points of view, Indonesia’s culture comprises thousands cultures. Such a richness of culture unfortunately has been regarded as burden, instead of blessing. That is why our leaders in the past always failed to unify Indonesia’s multicultural people. For centuries, cultural codes have been strong factor in Indonesia’s communities, both in building social relationships and in solving social conflicts.
Second, from historical perspective, multiculturalism is our unfinished task in building the foundation of our nation. Our political leaders, especially Sukarno and Suharto, used Pancasila only as a short cut to solve the problems of diversity. However, in my opinion, Pancasila could not really solve the problems. The first principle of Pancasila, “Ketuhanan Yang Mahaesa,” is never friendly both to Indonesian indigenous beliefs (and cultures) and minority’s religions. Instead of protects them, it is often used as a legal base to oppress them. Cultural peace during the New Order Era was only a deceit, since it was exercised by authoritarian presidency and its military forces.
Third, from global perspective, multiculturalism is the most proper value to establish a strong identity for Indonesian people. Amidst the bipolarization of radical Islam and secular Western (American) forces, Indonesia should build her national identity on her own heritages. The most dangerous threat of those two bipolar powers is not in political or military context, instead in cultural. Neither Western (or American) culture nor the Middle East (or Arabian) culture should colonize Indonesian people. Indonesian people should develop their own culture derived from its multicultural reality. Extinction of a nation starts from its culture.
It is true that it will take a long way to build Indonesia’s identity based on its multicultural reality. Such effort, nevertheless, is worthy. If we succeeded to finish it, we would have a strong cultural foundation for our nation.
Religion and Violence in the Fall of Soeharto and Transition to Democracy : 1997-2004
by Joko Wicoyo
I think the book titled Beginning to Remember pictures Indonesia's turbulent decades of cultural repression and renewal amid the rise and fall of Suharto's New Order regime. These cross-disciplinary pieces illuminate Indonesia's current efforts to reexamine and understand its past in order to shape new civic and cultural arrangements.
In 1998, the beginning of reformation era in Indonesia brought a wave of relief and euphoria. The fall of Suharto in 1998 opened a proliferation of studies on different aspects of memory and history. It allows space for people whose voices had been muted opened the floodgates to all manner of commentaries, newspaper accounts, and conference and seminar papers. This atmosphere which is well known called “reformation era” indicates the spirited efforts to remember, interrogate and rewrite the past which Suharto did not dispel persistent corruption, official secrecy and denial, religious and ethnic violence, and security policies leading to tragedy in East Timor, Aceh, and other regions in Indonesia. But the reformation opened up new possibilities for seeing the past by presenting a surge of discourse that challenged officially codified national history in mass media and publishing in public policy debate, in the arts, and in popular mobilization and politics.
This book edited by Mary Zurbuchen consists of 15 articles written by Indonesian and foreign scholars, artists and poets as well as writers presents the descriptions and exploration of some of the expressions, narratives, and interpretations of the past found in Indonesia today. The authors illustrate ways in which the dissolution of the Indonesian state's monopoly on history is now permitting new national, local, and individual accounts and representations of the past to emerge. This book covers fields from performing arts and literature to anthropology, history, and transitional justice.
Beginning with Ki Tristuti Rachmadi’s powerful autobiographical account of his sufferings under the New Order (‘My Life as a Shadow Master Under Suharto’), the volume immediately goes further to Degung Santikarma’s ‘Monument, Document and Mass Grave: The Politics of Representing Violence in Bali’, a gripping narrative that includes a story of an individual whose painful memory of the 1965 killings is suppressed by the protocol of power relations in contemporary Indonesia.
Another chapter is a personal memoir by one of Java's famous shadow-play masters, Tristuti Rachmadi, for years imprisoned under the New Order, and finally this volume comes to a close with an article by historian Anthony Reid commemorates the national struggle at the regional level, while South African lawyer Paul van Zyl compares efforts in transitional justice in Indonesia, East Timor, and South Africa.
For me, this book written by many outstanding experts in arts, politics, history and sociology reminds my memory to what happened since the fall of Suharto when I was in the first year to pursue my master degree in political sciences. What are expressed in this book refresh my mind towards some events which I missed from my perception. All papers presented in this book really enrich my intellectual achieves with a suitable balance between depth, breadth, and unity amidst such an enormous diversity of views and approaches. I‘m sure this book is really interesting to read and without having doubt I propose not only to Indonesian students, but also to any students who are interested in Southeast Asian studies to read this book.
Readings : Zurbuchen, Mary S. (ed). Beginning to Remember.
I think the book titled Beginning to Remember pictures Indonesia's turbulent decades of cultural repression and renewal amid the rise and fall of Suharto's New Order regime. These cross-disciplinary pieces illuminate Indonesia's current efforts to reexamine and understand its past in order to shape new civic and cultural arrangements.
In 1998, the beginning of reformation era in Indonesia brought a wave of relief and euphoria. The fall of Suharto in 1998 opened a proliferation of studies on different aspects of memory and history. It allows space for people whose voices had been muted opened the floodgates to all manner of commentaries, newspaper accounts, and conference and seminar papers. This atmosphere which is well known called “reformation era” indicates the spirited efforts to remember, interrogate and rewrite the past which Suharto did not dispel persistent corruption, official secrecy and denial, religious and ethnic violence, and security policies leading to tragedy in East Timor, Aceh, and other regions in Indonesia. But the reformation opened up new possibilities for seeing the past by presenting a surge of discourse that challenged officially codified national history in mass media and publishing in public policy debate, in the arts, and in popular mobilization and politics.
This book edited by Mary Zurbuchen consists of 15 articles written by Indonesian and foreign scholars, artists and poets as well as writers presents the descriptions and exploration of some of the expressions, narratives, and interpretations of the past found in Indonesia today. The authors illustrate ways in which the dissolution of the Indonesian state's monopoly on history is now permitting new national, local, and individual accounts and representations of the past to emerge. This book covers fields from performing arts and literature to anthropology, history, and transitional justice.
Beginning with Ki Tristuti Rachmadi’s powerful autobiographical account of his sufferings under the New Order (‘My Life as a Shadow Master Under Suharto’), the volume immediately goes further to Degung Santikarma’s ‘Monument, Document and Mass Grave: The Politics of Representing Violence in Bali’, a gripping narrative that includes a story of an individual whose painful memory of the 1965 killings is suppressed by the protocol of power relations in contemporary Indonesia.
Another chapter is a personal memoir by one of Java's famous shadow-play masters, Tristuti Rachmadi, for years imprisoned under the New Order, and finally this volume comes to a close with an article by historian Anthony Reid commemorates the national struggle at the regional level, while South African lawyer Paul van Zyl compares efforts in transitional justice in Indonesia, East Timor, and South Africa.
For me, this book written by many outstanding experts in arts, politics, history and sociology reminds my memory to what happened since the fall of Suharto when I was in the first year to pursue my master degree in political sciences. What are expressed in this book refresh my mind towards some events which I missed from my perception. All papers presented in this book really enrich my intellectual achieves with a suitable balance between depth, breadth, and unity amidst such an enormous diversity of views and approaches. I‘m sure this book is really interesting to read and without having doubt I propose not only to Indonesian students, but also to any students who are interested in Southeast Asian studies to read this book.
Readings : Zurbuchen, Mary S. (ed). Beginning to Remember.
Sabtu, 24 April 2010
Intelligentsia as Mediator - Roy Allan B Tolentino
Kevin O’Rourke’s account of the last days of Soeharto reads much like a novel, with its protagonists and antagonists and other characters caught up in the wave of history. It is a reminder that history is still a story, as well as an invitation to contribute to the narrative, or even supply another narrative. One thing I find fascinating in O’Rourke’s account, however, is the role he assigns to the Indonesian intelligentsia, who are also, more often than not, key figures in Indonesian religious life.
Two figures who played roles in the drama surrounding the fall of Soeharto are Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid. Although O’Rourke’s account tends toward the dramatic, how he treats these two figures has much to tell us about the role of the intelligentsia in Indonesian society. In describing Madjid, O’Rourke says: “The venerable university rector seemed an unlikely figure amid the coarse world of Jakarta politics, but he possessed a unique set of credentials. Nurcholish’s political philosophy had been encapsulated by the famous soundbite: ‘Islam, yes! Islamic parties, no!’ His eminence as an Islamic scholar won him the trust of modernist Muslims, while his reservations about politicising religion allowed him to maintain constructive relationships with Soeharto and nationalist-minded generals.” (O'Rourke 2002:121) While some might argue that Nurcholish’s position displayed more strategy than conviction, his mediation proved crucial to the progression of events. “The most effective source of organised political opposition was emanating from a loose coalition of Islamic groups, while the arbiter of political change was the military. If these two key institutions—organised Islam and the military—could come to terms on a plan, it would represent a major step forward.” (O'Rourke 2002:121)
In the meeting between the Islamic leaders and Suharto, it would be Gus Dur’s moves (or lack of them) that would become important. “The normally loquacious cleric remained silent throughout most of the meeting. One of his few contributions was to register surprise that Nurcholish was trying ‘to hammer’ Soeharto—a comment which most of those present took to mean that Wahid opposed Soeharto’s immediate resignation.” (O'Rourke 2002:128)According to O’Rourke’s account, this was an uncharacteristic move on the part of Gus Dur, and some assessments claim that Gus Dur’s intransigence came from personal ressentiment. “The only explanation for his continued support for Soeharto was that his arch-nemesis, Amien Rais, was leading the anti-Soeharto movement. Even amid this national drama, it appeared to many that Wahid was more concerned with defeating his modernist rivals than with bringing down Soeharto.” (O'Rourke 2002:128)
While I am sure that supporters and critics of both these figures will have something to say about O’Rourke’s depiction of these events, these two vignettes illustrate the position of the intelligentsia as mediators, and this I mean in the broadest sense: the intelligentsia really are positioned in the middle. While it is true that intellectuals can remain rooted in their communities, there is already a certain separation brought about by advanced education; even if one returns to the grassroots, one cannot deny that one’s discourse has changed. Nurcholish and Gus Dur show how this middle position of the intelligentsia can become both a bridge and an obstacle. Being in the middle, an intellectual can become a wedge or a conductor, facilitating change or preventing it. I wonder what sort of intellectuals ICRS students will become.
O'Rourke, Kevin. Reformasi: The Struggle for Power in Post-Soeharto Indonesia. Crows Nest, NSW: Allen and Unwin, 2002.
Two figures who played roles in the drama surrounding the fall of Soeharto are Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid. Although O’Rourke’s account tends toward the dramatic, how he treats these two figures has much to tell us about the role of the intelligentsia in Indonesian society. In describing Madjid, O’Rourke says: “The venerable university rector seemed an unlikely figure amid the coarse world of Jakarta politics, but he possessed a unique set of credentials. Nurcholish’s political philosophy had been encapsulated by the famous soundbite: ‘Islam, yes! Islamic parties, no!’ His eminence as an Islamic scholar won him the trust of modernist Muslims, while his reservations about politicising religion allowed him to maintain constructive relationships with Soeharto and nationalist-minded generals.” (O'Rourke 2002:121) While some might argue that Nurcholish’s position displayed more strategy than conviction, his mediation proved crucial to the progression of events. “The most effective source of organised political opposition was emanating from a loose coalition of Islamic groups, while the arbiter of political change was the military. If these two key institutions—organised Islam and the military—could come to terms on a plan, it would represent a major step forward.” (O'Rourke 2002:121)
In the meeting between the Islamic leaders and Suharto, it would be Gus Dur’s moves (or lack of them) that would become important. “The normally loquacious cleric remained silent throughout most of the meeting. One of his few contributions was to register surprise that Nurcholish was trying ‘to hammer’ Soeharto—a comment which most of those present took to mean that Wahid opposed Soeharto’s immediate resignation.” (O'Rourke 2002:128)According to O’Rourke’s account, this was an uncharacteristic move on the part of Gus Dur, and some assessments claim that Gus Dur’s intransigence came from personal ressentiment. “The only explanation for his continued support for Soeharto was that his arch-nemesis, Amien Rais, was leading the anti-Soeharto movement. Even amid this national drama, it appeared to many that Wahid was more concerned with defeating his modernist rivals than with bringing down Soeharto.” (O'Rourke 2002:128)
While I am sure that supporters and critics of both these figures will have something to say about O’Rourke’s depiction of these events, these two vignettes illustrate the position of the intelligentsia as mediators, and this I mean in the broadest sense: the intelligentsia really are positioned in the middle. While it is true that intellectuals can remain rooted in their communities, there is already a certain separation brought about by advanced education; even if one returns to the grassroots, one cannot deny that one’s discourse has changed. Nurcholish and Gus Dur show how this middle position of the intelligentsia can become both a bridge and an obstacle. Being in the middle, an intellectual can become a wedge or a conductor, facilitating change or preventing it. I wonder what sort of intellectuals ICRS students will become.
O'Rourke, Kevin. Reformasi: The Struggle for Power in Post-Soeharto Indonesia. Crows Nest, NSW: Allen and Unwin, 2002.
Minggu, 18 April 2010
Respond paper on Religion in the New Order: 1965-1998
The ineffective way to collect political power
Kristanto Budiprabowo (TATOK)
Reading Indonesia history along Suharto era we see that using religion as a strategy to expand political power is ineffective. Probably in the beginning religion is very attractive to collect the mass sentiment in order to make the vision of Indonesia. The idea of nationality, anti-colonialism, and letter anti-communism were seem the main issue in the most campaign of the political party. And it is always be an interesting subject in order to attract the participant in politic right until now. There was two important moments that seems in contrast. First, when Gus Dur and Nahdathul Ulama were withdrawn from the PPP, in my opinion, it was the best strategy to increase his political bargaining with government. In the same moment, in contrast, when Suharto used religion to keep his establishment to be president, it was even decrease his popularity. Second, the cause of the reformation movement was not religious issue but socio-political situation. But, religious leader has an important role whether to make the movement less chaotic or to create new political party based on the religion. Religious organization is always can play its role whatever the form of the position.
The correlation between the government and religion in the New Era makes me aware that in Indonesia politic religion has two sides or perhaps two layers. On one side, religion can collect political sentiment among the society. But, in this layer, religious symbol importantly functions whether to strengthen or to irritate the political power. On the other side, religious organization can be the government alliance in certain political issues and situations. But, in this layer, religious organization political agenda can be easy to see. It makes the popularity of the religious organization in politic decrease.
Kristanto Budiprabowo (TATOK)
Reading Indonesia history along Suharto era we see that using religion as a strategy to expand political power is ineffective. Probably in the beginning religion is very attractive to collect the mass sentiment in order to make the vision of Indonesia. The idea of nationality, anti-colonialism, and letter anti-communism were seem the main issue in the most campaign of the political party. And it is always be an interesting subject in order to attract the participant in politic right until now. There was two important moments that seems in contrast. First, when Gus Dur and Nahdathul Ulama were withdrawn from the PPP, in my opinion, it was the best strategy to increase his political bargaining with government. In the same moment, in contrast, when Suharto used religion to keep his establishment to be president, it was even decrease his popularity. Second, the cause of the reformation movement was not religious issue but socio-political situation. But, religious leader has an important role whether to make the movement less chaotic or to create new political party based on the religion. Religious organization is always can play its role whatever the form of the position.
The correlation between the government and religion in the New Era makes me aware that in Indonesia politic religion has two sides or perhaps two layers. On one side, religion can collect political sentiment among the society. But, in this layer, religious symbol importantly functions whether to strengthen or to irritate the political power. On the other side, religious organization can be the government alliance in certain political issues and situations. But, in this layer, religious organization political agenda can be easy to see. It makes the popularity of the religious organization in politic decrease.
Religion in the new order: 1965-1998;
Tri Harmaji
History of Religions in Indonesia Part II: from c. 1900 to the Present
Religion in the new order: 1965-1998; Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and democratization I Indonesia, Lorraine V. Aragon, Fields of the Lords: animism, Christian minorities, and state development in Indonesia
New order is Indonesian political era that is so particular than other era in term of its fixed concept. If two other eras, the old order and reformation era, are undergone in unexpected situation and almost without fixed concept, the new order era is apparently well planned. It is why in this era the government is effectively using of political, social and economic resources for the state development. The term ‘effectively using’ here mea that the government encourage active participation all resources that is considered could give good contribution to government development programs, but on the contrary the government also discouraged and even coercively marginalized all political resources that was considered as a threat for government development programs. One of the most important political resources that was seriously considered was religion. From the time of old order and even far time before the independence, religion, and especially slam, was great political resources that had proved its strength and effectiveness to lead the people to whatever direction the religion wanted.
The chief priority of new order government was clearly economic growth. And for this goal the government had sacrificed many ideologies that had been competing in the previous era. The government forced all legal organizations to acknowledge the sole government ideology of Pancasila as their basic principle. Any suspected organization was closely controlled. This policy had severely ruined Islamic political parties that strived for Islamic state in Indonesia. Along their history, the new order government considered Islam as apolitically dangerous thread for the nation-state based on Pancasila the government deserved. Some of prominent figures of the already banned Islamic party of Masyumi were strongly forbid to be active in political affair. Most of Islamic people especially from the modernist groups felt the new order had intentionally reduced and even tried to kill Islamic political potency in Indonesia.
If the attitude toward Islam was so negative, it was somewhat different from the attitude toward other minor religions such as Christianity. Like was shown by Aragon in his research on Christian mission in tobaku highlanders in central Sulawesi, the government positively shows Christianity as the agent of modernity that was so useful in developing the ‘backward’ tribes in Indonesian interiors to whom the government itself did not have much resources to bring the modernity, and so helping the government to advance this country. This positive attitude, Aragon argues, is part of, actually, the government strategy to deal with Islamic great potency. By allowing Christian mission worked in the area, the government hoped Islam would not gain more followers that will certainly increase their political power.
From this strategy (reducing the more powerful and increasing the weaker) the government tried to balance the power of any political power so that there was no too dominant political power, especially Islam, which can effectively challenge the new order government authority. This all policy was directed the only goal, that is economic growth that definitely requires political stability. In this idea religion was not the important concern of the new order government, and their existence was seen just as powerful energy that should be rightly controlled and directed to the government purposes.
History of Religions in Indonesia Part II: from c. 1900 to the Present
Religion in the new order: 1965-1998; Robert W. Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and democratization I Indonesia, Lorraine V. Aragon, Fields of the Lords: animism, Christian minorities, and state development in Indonesia
New order is Indonesian political era that is so particular than other era in term of its fixed concept. If two other eras, the old order and reformation era, are undergone in unexpected situation and almost without fixed concept, the new order era is apparently well planned. It is why in this era the government is effectively using of political, social and economic resources for the state development. The term ‘effectively using’ here mea that the government encourage active participation all resources that is considered could give good contribution to government development programs, but on the contrary the government also discouraged and even coercively marginalized all political resources that was considered as a threat for government development programs. One of the most important political resources that was seriously considered was religion. From the time of old order and even far time before the independence, religion, and especially slam, was great political resources that had proved its strength and effectiveness to lead the people to whatever direction the religion wanted.
The chief priority of new order government was clearly economic growth. And for this goal the government had sacrificed many ideologies that had been competing in the previous era. The government forced all legal organizations to acknowledge the sole government ideology of Pancasila as their basic principle. Any suspected organization was closely controlled. This policy had severely ruined Islamic political parties that strived for Islamic state in Indonesia. Along their history, the new order government considered Islam as apolitically dangerous thread for the nation-state based on Pancasila the government deserved. Some of prominent figures of the already banned Islamic party of Masyumi were strongly forbid to be active in political affair. Most of Islamic people especially from the modernist groups felt the new order had intentionally reduced and even tried to kill Islamic political potency in Indonesia.
If the attitude toward Islam was so negative, it was somewhat different from the attitude toward other minor religions such as Christianity. Like was shown by Aragon in his research on Christian mission in tobaku highlanders in central Sulawesi, the government positively shows Christianity as the agent of modernity that was so useful in developing the ‘backward’ tribes in Indonesian interiors to whom the government itself did not have much resources to bring the modernity, and so helping the government to advance this country. This positive attitude, Aragon argues, is part of, actually, the government strategy to deal with Islamic great potency. By allowing Christian mission worked in the area, the government hoped Islam would not gain more followers that will certainly increase their political power.
From this strategy (reducing the more powerful and increasing the weaker) the government tried to balance the power of any political power so that there was no too dominant political power, especially Islam, which can effectively challenge the new order government authority. This all policy was directed the only goal, that is economic growth that definitely requires political stability. In this idea religion was not the important concern of the new order government, and their existence was seen just as powerful energy that should be rightly controlled and directed to the government purposes.
Politicisized Religion
by Nina Mariani Noor
Leo Suryadinata is successful in catching the main point of Soeharto’s political will. I do agree with him that Soeharto’s policies both at home and at international affairs were not based on religion matter, in this case Islam, but on Soeharto’s interests. It seems to me that Soeharto’s policies were intended to maintain his reign and also his popularity in international context. Since he was intended to be the leader of Non Aligned Movement, he tried to avoid policies that related to religious’ matters. I also assume that those foreign policies were also influenced by his supporters in government and army who were more secular.
However, when it came to the interest of getting support from Indonesian people in general election, Soeharto tended to bit change the reason of his foreign policy to religious matter, like in the case of Bosnia and PLO. Furthermore, the trend that happened in Indonesia at that time in which many Muslims, particularly middle class, were more religious also influenced his policy. In my opinion, religion was not a big deal for Soeharto, but he saw it as a tool for maintaining his power.
Abdurrahman points out that the trend in Hajj tours among Muslims, particularly middle class, was influenced by capitalism. I completely agree with his way of comparing Hajj conduct between lowers class and middle class. It opens our eyes about the reality of Hajj ritual. In my opinion, today, Hajj is not merely a ritual as part of rukun Islam, but it has already moved to economical and social status. Muslims go to hajj are not only intending of completing his obligations as Muslims but also fulfilling their desire of getting higher social status in their community. In this way, hajj ritual brings a lot of advantages and profit for private Hajj agencies and also government.
Relating to Hajj ritual organized by government, I see that government through Ministry of Religious Affairs, really takes advantages from that. It seems to me that, Muslims’ enthusiasm of doing Hajj is utilized by government to get a lot of money that sometimes is corrupted or misused by government officers. And I think these all are rooted from Soeharto’s era and unfortunately, are continued by SBY’s government which declare to be a clean government.
Readings : 1. Moeslim Abdurrahman, “Ritual Divided: Hajj Tours in Capitalist Era Indonesia” in Mark Woodward,ed. Toward a New Paradigm
2. Leo Suryadinata, “Islam and Suharto’s Foreign Policy : Indonesia, the Middle East, and Bosnia”, Asian Survey, Vol. 35No. 3, (Mar., 1995), pp.291-303.
Leo Suryadinata is successful in catching the main point of Soeharto’s political will. I do agree with him that Soeharto’s policies both at home and at international affairs were not based on religion matter, in this case Islam, but on Soeharto’s interests. It seems to me that Soeharto’s policies were intended to maintain his reign and also his popularity in international context. Since he was intended to be the leader of Non Aligned Movement, he tried to avoid policies that related to religious’ matters. I also assume that those foreign policies were also influenced by his supporters in government and army who were more secular.
However, when it came to the interest of getting support from Indonesian people in general election, Soeharto tended to bit change the reason of his foreign policy to religious matter, like in the case of Bosnia and PLO. Furthermore, the trend that happened in Indonesia at that time in which many Muslims, particularly middle class, were more religious also influenced his policy. In my opinion, religion was not a big deal for Soeharto, but he saw it as a tool for maintaining his power.
Abdurrahman points out that the trend in Hajj tours among Muslims, particularly middle class, was influenced by capitalism. I completely agree with his way of comparing Hajj conduct between lowers class and middle class. It opens our eyes about the reality of Hajj ritual. In my opinion, today, Hajj is not merely a ritual as part of rukun Islam, but it has already moved to economical and social status. Muslims go to hajj are not only intending of completing his obligations as Muslims but also fulfilling their desire of getting higher social status in their community. In this way, hajj ritual brings a lot of advantages and profit for private Hajj agencies and also government.
Relating to Hajj ritual organized by government, I see that government through Ministry of Religious Affairs, really takes advantages from that. It seems to me that, Muslims’ enthusiasm of doing Hajj is utilized by government to get a lot of money that sometimes is corrupted or misused by government officers. And I think these all are rooted from Soeharto’s era and unfortunately, are continued by SBY’s government which declare to be a clean government.
Readings : 1. Moeslim Abdurrahman, “Ritual Divided: Hajj Tours in Capitalist Era Indonesia” in Mark Woodward,ed. Toward a New Paradigm
2. Leo Suryadinata, “Islam and Suharto’s Foreign Policy : Indonesia, the Middle East, and Bosnia”, Asian Survey, Vol. 35No. 3, (Mar., 1995), pp.291-303.
“What do We Mean by Islam?”; Defining Religion in the History of Suharto’s Era by Faqihuddin Abdul Kodir
I am often disturbed by an inconsistency of academic scholarship in defining Islam in the context of politically matters of Suharto’s era. On the one hand, many scholars have welcomed the development of ‘the inclusive and subtantive Islam’ during Suharto’s regime. On the other hand, they still analyze Islam in this era from perspective of its symbols and its legal formals. They define ‘proper Islam’ in modern era as ‘the inclusive Islam’ of Nurcholis Madjid and Gus Dur, while they still define Indonesia’s Suharto as secular state not an ‘Islamic’ state.
The idea of inclusive Islam, in simple way, is that Islam is not originally a political matter, rather is moral behavior of individuals. In this understanding, Islam preserves justice, equality, and democracy as it core values. It is not important, according to this understanding, to define Islam through its symbols and its legal formals. Moreover, Islamic symbols are not Islamic in the sense that they violet the values of justice and equality. This is the notion of the inclusive Islam which has been developed since 1980’s of Suharto’s era. Although it is “a matter of interpretation” (Hefner, p. 218), the inclusive Islam has been accepted by many Indonesian Muslim scholars and welcomed by Western researchers.
It will be different when we read researches analyzing whether policy of Suharto is Islamic or not. In this field, many will come back to the definition of Islam as a symbolic, institutional, and a matter of legal formal. Discussing political matters of Suharto from the perspective of Islamic symbols contradicts to the acceptance of substantive Islam as a proper Islam in the modern era. If we accept the view point of substantive Islam in Indonesia, we should implement it in the field of academic scholarship in studying political matters of Muslims. Sukarno and Suharto are Muslims. Their political matters should be analyzed from the sense of policy of justice, not from symbolic Islam, when we apply the perspective of Islamic or non-Islamic. The article of Leo Suryadinata is a good example of how Islam defined as mere a symbol and representation when applied to analyze political matters of Suharto.
Readings:
1. Robert Hefner. 2000. Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia. (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
2. Leo Suryadinata. 1995. “Islam and Suharto’s Foreign Policy: Indonesia, the Middle East, and Bosnia”. In: Asian Survey, vol. 35, no. 3 (Mar., 1995), pp. 291-303.
The idea of inclusive Islam, in simple way, is that Islam is not originally a political matter, rather is moral behavior of individuals. In this understanding, Islam preserves justice, equality, and democracy as it core values. It is not important, according to this understanding, to define Islam through its symbols and its legal formals. Moreover, Islamic symbols are not Islamic in the sense that they violet the values of justice and equality. This is the notion of the inclusive Islam which has been developed since 1980’s of Suharto’s era. Although it is “a matter of interpretation” (Hefner, p. 218), the inclusive Islam has been accepted by many Indonesian Muslim scholars and welcomed by Western researchers.
It will be different when we read researches analyzing whether policy of Suharto is Islamic or not. In this field, many will come back to the definition of Islam as a symbolic, institutional, and a matter of legal formal. Discussing political matters of Suharto from the perspective of Islamic symbols contradicts to the acceptance of substantive Islam as a proper Islam in the modern era. If we accept the view point of substantive Islam in Indonesia, we should implement it in the field of academic scholarship in studying political matters of Muslims. Sukarno and Suharto are Muslims. Their political matters should be analyzed from the sense of policy of justice, not from symbolic Islam, when we apply the perspective of Islamic or non-Islamic. The article of Leo Suryadinata is a good example of how Islam defined as mere a symbol and representation when applied to analyze political matters of Suharto.
Readings:
1. Robert Hefner. 2000. Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia. (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
2. Leo Suryadinata. 1995. “Islam and Suharto’s Foreign Policy: Indonesia, the Middle East, and Bosnia”. In: Asian Survey, vol. 35, no. 3 (Mar., 1995), pp. 291-303.
Religion in the New Order : 1965-1998
by Joko Wicoyo
(I)
Fields of the Lord is Aragon’s research which focused on the repercussions of Protestant missions and state development projects among highland ethnic minorities in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia. She examined how the Dutch colonial and subsequent Indonesian regimes sought to use Protestant missionaries and world religion as a tool for social, economic, and national development. Conversely, she explored how members of highland Indonesian ethnic minorities responded to the introduced version of world religion using their interpretations to pursue local political interests and reorient their own place in a wider nation and world.
Religious and ethnic violence between Indonesia's Muslims and Christians escalated dramatically just before and after President Suharto resigned in 1998. In this first major ethnographic study of Christianization in Indonesia, Aragon delineates colonial and postcolonial circumstances contributing to the dynamics of these contemporary conflicts, and she combines a political economy of colonial missionization with a microanalysis of shifting religious ideology and practice. Fields of the Lord challenges much comparative religion scholarship by contending that religions, like contemporary cultural groups, be located in their spheres of interaction rather than as the abstracted cognitive and behavioral systems conceived by many adherents, modernist states, and Western scholars.
I think in this book Aragon tries to portray "near-tribal" populations who characterize themselves as "fanatic Christians" and asks the readers to rethink issues of Indonesian nationalism and "modern" development as they converged in President Suharto's late New Order state. Through its careful documentation of colonial missionary tactics, unexpected postcolonial upheavals, and contemporary Christian narratives, Fields of the Lord analyzes the historical and institutional links between state rule and individuals' religious choices. Beyond these contributions, this ethnography includes captivating stories of Salvation Army "angels of the forest" and nationally marginal but locally autonomous dry-rice and coffee farmers. These Salvation Army "soldiers" make Protestantism work on their own ecological, moral, and political turf, maintaining their communities and ongoing religious concerns in the difficult terrain of the Central Sulawesi highlands.
(II)
Using the frameworks of foreign policy analysis and political culture, Leo provides an insightful and analytical explanation of Indonesia's foreign policy under Suharto. It examines the various factors which have contributed to Suharto's foreign policy, the goals of this policy and the means of achieving them. He also discusses Indonesia's relations with Asian countries and beyond, identifying their problems and prospects. From his analysis, it is clear that Indonesia’s policy towards the Middle East has not been based on Islam but on calculations of Indonesian “national interest’ as perceived by Suharto and other members of the military elites. It is also important to note that Indonesia has never tried to become a leader of the Islamic movement, although it has largest Muslim population in the world. Indonesia prefers to become leader of Non-Aligned Movement which is not based on Islam.
Readings : 1. Lorraine V. Aragon, Fields of the Lord: Animism, Christian Minorities, and State Development in Indonesia (Honolulu : University of Hawaii’s Press, 200)
2. Leo Suryadinata, “Islam and Suharto’s Foreign Policy : Indonesia, the Middle East, and Bosnia”, Asian Survey, Vol. 35No. 3, (Mar., 1995), pp.291-303.
(I)
Fields of the Lord is Aragon’s research which focused on the repercussions of Protestant missions and state development projects among highland ethnic minorities in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia. She examined how the Dutch colonial and subsequent Indonesian regimes sought to use Protestant missionaries and world religion as a tool for social, economic, and national development. Conversely, she explored how members of highland Indonesian ethnic minorities responded to the introduced version of world religion using their interpretations to pursue local political interests and reorient their own place in a wider nation and world.
Religious and ethnic violence between Indonesia's Muslims and Christians escalated dramatically just before and after President Suharto resigned in 1998. In this first major ethnographic study of Christianization in Indonesia, Aragon delineates colonial and postcolonial circumstances contributing to the dynamics of these contemporary conflicts, and she combines a political economy of colonial missionization with a microanalysis of shifting religious ideology and practice. Fields of the Lord challenges much comparative religion scholarship by contending that religions, like contemporary cultural groups, be located in their spheres of interaction rather than as the abstracted cognitive and behavioral systems conceived by many adherents, modernist states, and Western scholars.
I think in this book Aragon tries to portray "near-tribal" populations who characterize themselves as "fanatic Christians" and asks the readers to rethink issues of Indonesian nationalism and "modern" development as they converged in President Suharto's late New Order state. Through its careful documentation of colonial missionary tactics, unexpected postcolonial upheavals, and contemporary Christian narratives, Fields of the Lord analyzes the historical and institutional links between state rule and individuals' religious choices. Beyond these contributions, this ethnography includes captivating stories of Salvation Army "angels of the forest" and nationally marginal but locally autonomous dry-rice and coffee farmers. These Salvation Army "soldiers" make Protestantism work on their own ecological, moral, and political turf, maintaining their communities and ongoing religious concerns in the difficult terrain of the Central Sulawesi highlands.
(II)
Using the frameworks of foreign policy analysis and political culture, Leo provides an insightful and analytical explanation of Indonesia's foreign policy under Suharto. It examines the various factors which have contributed to Suharto's foreign policy, the goals of this policy and the means of achieving them. He also discusses Indonesia's relations with Asian countries and beyond, identifying their problems and prospects. From his analysis, it is clear that Indonesia’s policy towards the Middle East has not been based on Islam but on calculations of Indonesian “national interest’ as perceived by Suharto and other members of the military elites. It is also important to note that Indonesia has never tried to become a leader of the Islamic movement, although it has largest Muslim population in the world. Indonesia prefers to become leader of Non-Aligned Movement which is not based on Islam.
Readings : 1. Lorraine V. Aragon, Fields of the Lord: Animism, Christian Minorities, and State Development in Indonesia (Honolulu : University of Hawaii’s Press, 200)
2. Leo Suryadinata, “Islam and Suharto’s Foreign Policy : Indonesia, the Middle East, and Bosnia”, Asian Survey, Vol. 35No. 3, (Mar., 1995), pp.291-303.
Bersih Lingkungan - cleaning up and the new religion of the New Order
MUCHA Q ARQUIZA
19 April 2010
‘Outward appearance’, Henk Schulte Nordholt [1997] commented is derived from and at best merely the visible face of the ‘real thing’. Most academic accounts of social history often downplay the relevance of outward appearance, he observes, emphasizing that thinking is the ‘inner substance’ and “theory does not need to wear fancy shoes”.’ Yet when social history has rendered into complex narratives of contradiction, ambivalence and false-claims where much of the ‘real thing’ is dressed-over and concealed under heavy cosmetics, the only truthful and reliable best narrative could very well be the visible faces of ‘outward appearances’.
If there were monuments or physical landmarks to capture the outward appearance of the New Order, it would have to be at least two: the Monumen Pancasila Sakti in Lubang Buaya and the Taman Mini. Both New Order monuments capture the current ideology, and religion, in both its physical [i.e.literal] appearance and its symbolisms summarized as Bersih Lingkungan, a clean environment and a clean politics, that emphasizes the purificatory ritualized processes and the new dispensation’s obsessive-compulsive tendencies for keamanan [i.e.order&safety], and kebersihan [i.e.clean]. Order and cleanliness is also exponentially projected and idealized as silent, uncritical and depoliticized society. The outward appearance of New Order religion is, for instance, the halus or finesse of a cultured slematan as opposed to the krasek or chaos of the 'wildness' rebutan as suggested in the study of rituals by Pemberton . It is the reverence and commemoration of military exploits who have ‘brought order’ back as opposed to the memorialization of anti-colonial revolution and independence and the Sukarnoist legacy. The Pancasila Sakti monument’s theme and its meaning vividly captures the new religion of New order as KA LEMBIMENTRA AD [Kepala Lembaga Pembinaan Mental dan Tradisi Angkatan Darat] or ‘Chief of the Institute for Spritual edification and Army Tradition’, a military instrument for ideological control that summarizes the new historical perspective in the following description:
"The theme reflects treachery, terror tactics and the PKI revolt against Pancasila and the government. The bas-relief depicts the struggle by the Indonesia people to crush the PKI-Muso insurrection at Madiun. Next, the people opposed the effort of PKI to influence their fight through the NASAKOM idea. This movement led to the revolt and the betrayal of the G30SPKI and concluded with the liquidation of the PKI and the establishment of the government of the New Order…[The monument] is representative of the historical veracity of the fight and the heroic exploits, as well as of historical objectivity." [Monumen Pancasila Sakti 1975:365]
Indeed the New Order has been a massive clean-up drive, the same ideology that would later pervade civic action projects such as the kerja bakti and Green Revolution, that not only aimed to rid Indonesian society of communists but also to wipe out from collective memory of the heroism of Sukarno and the Guided democracy [i.e. as the old order]. Psyhically, New Order was all about sanitation and sterilization of social ideology and religion itself. Hefner [2000] described the political strategy of Soharto regime where “the government adopted a mixed regimen that combined severe controls on political Islam with guarder support for Islamic spirituality…[organizing] religion as a ground for public morality, as shield against Western liberalism and an antidote to communism…the New order not only tolerated depoliticized forms of religion but encouraged their penetration into all corners of society” [Hefner 2000:59] such that ambivalent alliances have to forged and traditional political concepts and organizations have been rendered anew, often, on contradictory terms and meanings.
Soharto’s policies were thoroughly of ‘non-religious’ sort, according to Hefner, shaped only by self-serving interests and political considerations that were ‘[precoccupied] to hold power, stabilize the economy and reap the benefits of development for himself and his family’. It was only in the late 1980s where Soharto found it to the advantage of its political survival to court the conservative segments of Muslims. Yet while intending to maintain a hold on politicization of Islam and cultivating pliant conservatism, instead, the regime “stimulated the growth of prodemocracy Islam”. [ibid. 2000:72] “ [By] way of liberal democrats, then, notions of freedom, universal citizenship, human rights, and enlightenment made their way into Indonesian political thought in association with democratic socialism.”
And to this latter trend, the resurgence of the new intellectuals, that Hefner calls the ‘junior modernists’ as modeled by Nurcholis Madjid, the secular humanists, the socialist democrats and most young breed of activists represented by the Mahasiswa Islam [MI] and the ‘angkatan 66’ [i.e. generation of ’66, very much comparable with our Philippines’ Martial Law babies] brought in fresh breeze that would prelude the era of reformation, whose politics were favorably coincidental with and catalyzed by the massive boom in information technology, media and literacy, and that, altogether, deserve another write-up and a critical response. ###
====
[1] Nordholt, H.S. [1997] Outward appearances dressing state and society in Indonesia.The Netherlands: KITLV Press, intro. Pp.1-38.
[2] Pemberton, J. [1994] On the subject of ‘java’. Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press.
[3] Hefner [2000] “Ambivalent Alliance: Religion and Politics in the New Order” in Civil Islam. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 58-93.
19 April 2010
‘Outward appearance’, Henk Schulte Nordholt [1997] commented is derived from and at best merely the visible face of the ‘real thing’. Most academic accounts of social history often downplay the relevance of outward appearance, he observes, emphasizing that thinking is the ‘inner substance’ and “theory does not need to wear fancy shoes”.’ Yet when social history has rendered into complex narratives of contradiction, ambivalence and false-claims where much of the ‘real thing’ is dressed-over and concealed under heavy cosmetics, the only truthful and reliable best narrative could very well be the visible faces of ‘outward appearances’.
If there were monuments or physical landmarks to capture the outward appearance of the New Order, it would have to be at least two: the Monumen Pancasila Sakti in Lubang Buaya and the Taman Mini. Both New Order monuments capture the current ideology, and religion, in both its physical [i.e.literal] appearance and its symbolisms summarized as Bersih Lingkungan, a clean environment and a clean politics, that emphasizes the purificatory ritualized processes and the new dispensation’s obsessive-compulsive tendencies for keamanan [i.e.order&safety], and kebersihan [i.e.clean]. Order and cleanliness is also exponentially projected and idealized as silent, uncritical and depoliticized society. The outward appearance of New Order religion is, for instance, the halus or finesse of a cultured slematan as opposed to the krasek or chaos of the 'wildness' rebutan as suggested in the study of rituals by Pemberton . It is the reverence and commemoration of military exploits who have ‘brought order’ back as opposed to the memorialization of anti-colonial revolution and independence and the Sukarnoist legacy. The Pancasila Sakti monument’s theme and its meaning vividly captures the new religion of New order as KA LEMBIMENTRA AD [Kepala Lembaga Pembinaan Mental dan Tradisi Angkatan Darat] or ‘Chief of the Institute for Spritual edification and Army Tradition’, a military instrument for ideological control that summarizes the new historical perspective in the following description:
"The theme reflects treachery, terror tactics and the PKI revolt against Pancasila and the government. The bas-relief depicts the struggle by the Indonesia people to crush the PKI-Muso insurrection at Madiun. Next, the people opposed the effort of PKI to influence their fight through the NASAKOM idea. This movement led to the revolt and the betrayal of the G30SPKI and concluded with the liquidation of the PKI and the establishment of the government of the New Order…[The monument] is representative of the historical veracity of the fight and the heroic exploits, as well as of historical objectivity." [Monumen Pancasila Sakti 1975:365]
Indeed the New Order has been a massive clean-up drive, the same ideology that would later pervade civic action projects such as the kerja bakti and Green Revolution, that not only aimed to rid Indonesian society of communists but also to wipe out from collective memory of the heroism of Sukarno and the Guided democracy [i.e. as the old order]. Psyhically, New Order was all about sanitation and sterilization of social ideology and religion itself. Hefner [2000] described the political strategy of Soharto regime where “the government adopted a mixed regimen that combined severe controls on political Islam with guarder support for Islamic spirituality…[organizing] religion as a ground for public morality, as shield against Western liberalism and an antidote to communism…the New order not only tolerated depoliticized forms of religion but encouraged their penetration into all corners of society” [Hefner 2000:59] such that ambivalent alliances have to forged and traditional political concepts and organizations have been rendered anew, often, on contradictory terms and meanings.
Soharto’s policies were thoroughly of ‘non-religious’ sort, according to Hefner, shaped only by self-serving interests and political considerations that were ‘[precoccupied] to hold power, stabilize the economy and reap the benefits of development for himself and his family’. It was only in the late 1980s where Soharto found it to the advantage of its political survival to court the conservative segments of Muslims. Yet while intending to maintain a hold on politicization of Islam and cultivating pliant conservatism, instead, the regime “stimulated the growth of prodemocracy Islam”. [ibid. 2000:72] “ [By] way of liberal democrats, then, notions of freedom, universal citizenship, human rights, and enlightenment made their way into Indonesian political thought in association with democratic socialism.”
And to this latter trend, the resurgence of the new intellectuals, that Hefner calls the ‘junior modernists’ as modeled by Nurcholis Madjid, the secular humanists, the socialist democrats and most young breed of activists represented by the Mahasiswa Islam [MI] and the ‘angkatan 66’ [i.e. generation of ’66, very much comparable with our Philippines’ Martial Law babies] brought in fresh breeze that would prelude the era of reformation, whose politics were favorably coincidental with and catalyzed by the massive boom in information technology, media and literacy, and that, altogether, deserve another write-up and a critical response. ###
====
[1] Nordholt, H.S. [1997] Outward appearances dressing state and society in Indonesia.The Netherlands: KITLV Press, intro. Pp.1-38.
[2] Pemberton, J. [1994] On the subject of ‘java’. Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press.
[3] Hefner [2000] “Ambivalent Alliance: Religion and Politics in the New Order” in Civil Islam. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 58-93.
Escape from the Shadows of Fundamentalism
by Timotius Wibowo
Leo Suryadinata’s article, “Islam and Suharto's Foreign Policy: Indonesia, the Middle East, and Bosnia” (1995) observes that Indonesia’s Foreign Policy during Suharto era was non-Islamic. Analyzing such phenomenon, Suryadinata gives two reasons. First, Suharto wanted to play a bigger role in international political world through Non Aligned Movement. Second, the major reason for such a policy is actually the military’s fear of Islamic fundamentalism. This analysis, in my opinion, is certainly reasonable. However, I absolutely disagree when Suryadinata then concludes, “As long as Indonesia remains authoritarian in its political system and this group is in power, Indonesia’s foreign policy is likely to remain non-Islamic” (p. 303). This conclusion is doubtful at least on two points of view. First, it suggests that an authoritarian political system (including Suharto and his military supporter) could not use Islamic language to achieve their political goals. Second, it suggests that a non-Islamic foreign policy depends on an authoritarian political system.
Indonesia’s national political situation always changes, as well as the international one. Among many factors that influence world’s political dynamic, Islam (as a political ideology) is the most important ones. This phenomenon is also happen in Indonesia’s history. Suryadinata wrote his article in 1995, when Suharto was getting closer to Islamic political powers. Increasing political power of B. J. Habibie can well illustrate political situation at that time. In 1989, Suharto assigned Habibie in charge for strategic industries. In December 1990, ICMI (Union of Indonesian Intellectual Muslims) was born and Habibie became the Chairman. Such a change in Suharto’s policy should have worried his non-Islamic political alliances. Suharto’s national policy, in which he gave more room to Islamic political powers, had raised a question on his foreign policy: Would Suharto remain to be non-Islamic in his foreign political policy. Suryadinata’s article was likely written to answer this question. In other words, this article is written in the shadow of fear of Indonesia’s Islamic fundamentalists.
The fall of Suharto in May 1998, however, proves that Suryadinata’s conclusion is wrong. Indonesia’s non-Islamic policy (both in national and international politics) depends on neither the authoritarian regime nor the military power. Instead, it depends on the fact that the majority of Indonesia’s Muslims are not fundamentalists. This fact, I suggests, should have escaped us from the shadows of Islamic fundamentalism.
Leo Suryadinata’s article, “Islam and Suharto's Foreign Policy: Indonesia, the Middle East, and Bosnia” (1995) observes that Indonesia’s Foreign Policy during Suharto era was non-Islamic. Analyzing such phenomenon, Suryadinata gives two reasons. First, Suharto wanted to play a bigger role in international political world through Non Aligned Movement. Second, the major reason for such a policy is actually the military’s fear of Islamic fundamentalism. This analysis, in my opinion, is certainly reasonable. However, I absolutely disagree when Suryadinata then concludes, “As long as Indonesia remains authoritarian in its political system and this group is in power, Indonesia’s foreign policy is likely to remain non-Islamic” (p. 303). This conclusion is doubtful at least on two points of view. First, it suggests that an authoritarian political system (including Suharto and his military supporter) could not use Islamic language to achieve their political goals. Second, it suggests that a non-Islamic foreign policy depends on an authoritarian political system.
Indonesia’s national political situation always changes, as well as the international one. Among many factors that influence world’s political dynamic, Islam (as a political ideology) is the most important ones. This phenomenon is also happen in Indonesia’s history. Suryadinata wrote his article in 1995, when Suharto was getting closer to Islamic political powers. Increasing political power of B. J. Habibie can well illustrate political situation at that time. In 1989, Suharto assigned Habibie in charge for strategic industries. In December 1990, ICMI (Union of Indonesian Intellectual Muslims) was born and Habibie became the Chairman. Such a change in Suharto’s policy should have worried his non-Islamic political alliances. Suharto’s national policy, in which he gave more room to Islamic political powers, had raised a question on his foreign policy: Would Suharto remain to be non-Islamic in his foreign political policy. Suryadinata’s article was likely written to answer this question. In other words, this article is written in the shadow of fear of Indonesia’s Islamic fundamentalists.
The fall of Suharto in May 1998, however, proves that Suryadinata’s conclusion is wrong. Indonesia’s non-Islamic policy (both in national and international politics) depends on neither the authoritarian regime nor the military power. Instead, it depends on the fact that the majority of Indonesia’s Muslims are not fundamentalists. This fact, I suggests, should have escaped us from the shadows of Islamic fundamentalism.
Religion in the New Order
LEYAKET ALI MOHAMED OMAR
History of Religion Part 2- Prof Bernard Adeney- Risakotta and Prof Margana
Readings are from : Lorraine V. Aragon – Fields of the Lord: Animism, Christian Minorities and State Development in Indonesia and Robert W. Hefner- Civil Islam
Both throughout history and in recent times, religion has shown itself to be as able to unite people and to divide them, to inspire acts of love and acts of hatred. The introduction in Aragon’s work sent chill down my spine as she explores the event that the world saw as a long bloody battles of religion, race and ethnic violence in recent time. In a sense I think in every country there are bound to be conflicts of religion if it is not nurture with tolerance and respect no matter what circumstances that arises to spark it off.
Singapore began its journey to nationhood in 1965 with racial and religious conflict fresh in its historical memory. The cohesion enjoyed today has been attained neither by sheer accident nor by pretending that racial and religious problems do not exist. Instead, it is in facing the problem of cultural tensions squarely that ways to mitigate them have been attained. Forty-five years on, it may be detrimental to pretend that those who desire to divide Singapore’s multi-racial and multi-religious society only exist in history books. On 21st July 1964, around 1pm, over 20,000 Malays and Muslims had gathered at the Padang(a parade field) for a celebration. This celebration was held annually to commemorate the birthday of Prophet Muhammad. 212 Muslim organizations had also gathered to participate in this procession. This processions were normally grand affairs as many on-lookers would regard is as a Muslim’s “Chingay Parade.” Celebrations to mark the birthday of Prophet Mohammad were also held throughout Malaysia. It was a grand occasion in many towns. However, on that day as the procession, it was said that a group of Chinese man disturbed the marching by throwing a bottle at the participants. Shortly after that fights began to break out. Later, when a federal police officer requested for some marchers to stick to a particular route along the Kallang Gas Works, he was attacked. Disorder soon speeded like wildfire as this triggered the beginning of the worst riot in the history of Singapore. The disorder was so great that by the first day of the riots, 4 people were killed and 178 others injured. On 2 August 1964, the island-wide curfew was completely lifted, 11 days after the ordeal. In all, 23 people were dead and 460 injured.
These factors draw a clear line that the mutual respect, tolerance and the understanding of religions practices. Rituals cannot be taken for granted especially when it is misinterpreted. For the people of Tobaku respecting and believing the dead ancestors still play a big role in the society while at the same time they are Christians. In line to this understanding of faith one, again comes back to the original question of what is religion ? Defining the word "religion" is fraught with difficulty. Many attempts have been made. Most seem to focus on too narrowly only a few aspects of religion; they tend to exclude those religions that do not fit well.
It is understood that religion can be interpreted as a theological, philosophical, anthropological, sociological and even psychological. Quoted scholars from the seventeen, sixteenth till the nineteenth centuries, definition by Samuel Johnson, Dictionary of English language (1755), also Zwingli and Calvin(1696) and Clifford Geertz (1960). Most of them vary from each other’s. These are some of the basic definitions that I find its obvious in most, example; some exclude beliefs and practices that many people passionately defend as religious. This excludes such non-theistic religions as Buddhist, which has no such belief. Some definitions equate "religion" with "Christianity," and thus define two out of every three human in the world as non-religious. Some definitions are so broadly written that they include beliefs and areas of study that most people do not regard as religious. Some define "religion" in terms of "the sacred" and/or "the spiritual," and thus result in two definitions. Sometimes, definitions of "religion" contain more than one deficiency’
Generally, for me personally I think the definition given in Wikipedia defines religion as: "... a system of social coherence based on a common group of beliefs or attitudes concerning an object, person, unseen being, or system of thought considered to be supernatural, sacred, divine or highest truth, and the moral codes, practices, values, institutions, traditions, and rituals associated with such belief or system of thought." Which personally I think is comprehensive enough to make a person understand what I understood as religion.
History of Religion Part 2- Prof Bernard Adeney- Risakotta and Prof Margana
Readings are from : Lorraine V. Aragon – Fields of the Lord: Animism, Christian Minorities and State Development in Indonesia and Robert W. Hefner- Civil Islam
Both throughout history and in recent times, religion has shown itself to be as able to unite people and to divide them, to inspire acts of love and acts of hatred. The introduction in Aragon’s work sent chill down my spine as she explores the event that the world saw as a long bloody battles of religion, race and ethnic violence in recent time. In a sense I think in every country there are bound to be conflicts of religion if it is not nurture with tolerance and respect no matter what circumstances that arises to spark it off.
Singapore began its journey to nationhood in 1965 with racial and religious conflict fresh in its historical memory. The cohesion enjoyed today has been attained neither by sheer accident nor by pretending that racial and religious problems do not exist. Instead, it is in facing the problem of cultural tensions squarely that ways to mitigate them have been attained. Forty-five years on, it may be detrimental to pretend that those who desire to divide Singapore’s multi-racial and multi-religious society only exist in history books. On 21st July 1964, around 1pm, over 20,000 Malays and Muslims had gathered at the Padang(a parade field) for a celebration. This celebration was held annually to commemorate the birthday of Prophet Muhammad. 212 Muslim organizations had also gathered to participate in this procession. This processions were normally grand affairs as many on-lookers would regard is as a Muslim’s “Chingay Parade.” Celebrations to mark the birthday of Prophet Mohammad were also held throughout Malaysia. It was a grand occasion in many towns. However, on that day as the procession, it was said that a group of Chinese man disturbed the marching by throwing a bottle at the participants. Shortly after that fights began to break out. Later, when a federal police officer requested for some marchers to stick to a particular route along the Kallang Gas Works, he was attacked. Disorder soon speeded like wildfire as this triggered the beginning of the worst riot in the history of Singapore. The disorder was so great that by the first day of the riots, 4 people were killed and 178 others injured. On 2 August 1964, the island-wide curfew was completely lifted, 11 days after the ordeal. In all, 23 people were dead and 460 injured.
These factors draw a clear line that the mutual respect, tolerance and the understanding of religions practices. Rituals cannot be taken for granted especially when it is misinterpreted. For the people of Tobaku respecting and believing the dead ancestors still play a big role in the society while at the same time they are Christians. In line to this understanding of faith one, again comes back to the original question of what is religion ? Defining the word "religion" is fraught with difficulty. Many attempts have been made. Most seem to focus on too narrowly only a few aspects of religion; they tend to exclude those religions that do not fit well.
It is understood that religion can be interpreted as a theological, philosophical, anthropological, sociological and even psychological. Quoted scholars from the seventeen, sixteenth till the nineteenth centuries, definition by Samuel Johnson, Dictionary of English language (1755), also Zwingli and Calvin(1696) and Clifford Geertz (1960). Most of them vary from each other’s. These are some of the basic definitions that I find its obvious in most, example; some exclude beliefs and practices that many people passionately defend as religious. This excludes such non-theistic religions as Buddhist, which has no such belief. Some definitions equate "religion" with "Christianity," and thus define two out of every three human in the world as non-religious. Some definitions are so broadly written that they include beliefs and areas of study that most people do not regard as religious. Some define "religion" in terms of "the sacred" and/or "the spiritual," and thus result in two definitions. Sometimes, definitions of "religion" contain more than one deficiency’
Generally, for me personally I think the definition given in Wikipedia defines religion as: "... a system of social coherence based on a common group of beliefs or attitudes concerning an object, person, unseen being, or system of thought considered to be supernatural, sacred, divine or highest truth, and the moral codes, practices, values, institutions, traditions, and rituals associated with such belief or system of thought." Which personally I think is comprehensive enough to make a person understand what I understood as religion.
Religion, Communism, Gender by Nihayatul Wafiroh
As Robert Crib (1990) analyzes that the historiography is an essential problem in Indonesia. New order created the Indonesian historiography to maintain or control the power. I can bet that all people in my generation have perspective that PKI and Gerwani are very bad political organizations in Indonesia, so that we have to ban them. New Order already washed our brains with historical books that put communism to be a banned organization.
I still kept this perspective until I studied in undergraduate. My community in UIN Yogyakarta where I studied for my undergraduate introduced me in new perspectives of the communist discourse in Indonesia. I just realized that New Order attempted to use religions to control people. People were guided to have assumptions that communism was the group, which did not believe God. Communism vs religions became the effective strategy for New Order to manage people.
One of great books that really opens my eyes about the position of Gerwani is Sexual Politics in Indonesia by Saskia Wieringa. Gerwani is often connected to PKI. As a result, Gerwani members were jailed. According to Wieringa, actually Gerwani promoted women’s movement in Indonesia. This organization attempted to encourage women to active in public spheres such as in politic. Gerwani also provided education for women. Because of the propaganda of New Order, all Gerwani’s activities could not be continued. New Order wanted to bring women in a private sphere which was to be amothers and wives. In fact, the issues of religion were used to keep women in home.
In my opinion, Indonesian government should give a formal statement about Gerwani. Indeed, even right now the ex Gerwani’s members still receive unjust treatment. Therefore, Indonesian government has to rehabilitate Gerwani. I think that Indonesian people should also have proper understanding of the real history of G30S PKI. It can avoid misunderstanding of PKI and Gerwani.
I still kept this perspective until I studied in undergraduate. My community in UIN Yogyakarta where I studied for my undergraduate introduced me in new perspectives of the communist discourse in Indonesia. I just realized that New Order attempted to use religions to control people. People were guided to have assumptions that communism was the group, which did not believe God. Communism vs religions became the effective strategy for New Order to manage people.
One of great books that really opens my eyes about the position of Gerwani is Sexual Politics in Indonesia by Saskia Wieringa. Gerwani is often connected to PKI. As a result, Gerwani members were jailed. According to Wieringa, actually Gerwani promoted women’s movement in Indonesia. This organization attempted to encourage women to active in public spheres such as in politic. Gerwani also provided education for women. Because of the propaganda of New Order, all Gerwani’s activities could not be continued. New Order wanted to bring women in a private sphere which was to be amothers and wives. In fact, the issues of religion were used to keep women in home.
In my opinion, Indonesian government should give a formal statement about Gerwani. Indeed, even right now the ex Gerwani’s members still receive unjust treatment. Therefore, Indonesian government has to rehabilitate Gerwani. I think that Indonesian people should also have proper understanding of the real history of G30S PKI. It can avoid misunderstanding of PKI and Gerwani.
Limited Space: Religion and Politics in the New Order Era
By Roma Ulinnuha
In the strong patronage of authoritarian power, many people say that Indonesia under the New Order era is seen as both bless and dismay. In the massive developmental jargon, the regime seemed quite reluctant promoting the religious realm in its truest sense. People were carefully alert to the religious discussion since it related to SARA (ethnic groups, religion, race and inter-groups) issue. In the process of the era, government tended to establish the artificial stability which was actually kept the waves of inconvenience among the citizen. The evidence is the end of the regime due to economic and political instability.
Aragon (2000) questioned the model of policy why Indonesian government did not necessarily relate the Christianity and ‘world religion’ to define modernity and national development (p.39). The response is surely easy to say in the common view of the wide Indonesian region, but it does not mean ‘people who do not yet have a religion’ has been taken seriously into consideration during the era. This segment, I think, occurred as the regime wanted to control the stability. One of the ways to carry out is to make religion as a reductive religious teachings and symbol. In political realm, government merged the aspiration of many religious facets into PPP which was not really satisfied the common people. Even a lot of religious moments were colored with the interest of the mono-loyalty to the government issues and policies.
As powerful regime but tended to dictatorship, Leo Suryadinata (1995) argues that Indonesia under Soeharto wanted to play role in the world affair. In approaching the issue of Palestine-Israel, many moments were engineering the Non Alignment Movements. In this case, Suryadinata argued that religion was not a major consideration for Indonesian Foreign Policy (p.295). I do agree with Suryadinata’s notion that religion is not significant factor in directing Indonesia’s policy at the time. The intensive notion I believe is the political interest to play role in international affair despite the fact that the regime was too far violating the national affairs—of freedom of religion, speech and expression.
Readings:
Lorraine V. Aragon, Fields of Lord: Animism, Christian Minorities, and State development in Indonesia (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000);
Leo Suryadinata, Islam and Suharto’s Foreign Policy: Indonesia, Middle East and Bosnia, Asian Survey, March 1995
In the strong patronage of authoritarian power, many people say that Indonesia under the New Order era is seen as both bless and dismay. In the massive developmental jargon, the regime seemed quite reluctant promoting the religious realm in its truest sense. People were carefully alert to the religious discussion since it related to SARA (ethnic groups, religion, race and inter-groups) issue. In the process of the era, government tended to establish the artificial stability which was actually kept the waves of inconvenience among the citizen. The evidence is the end of the regime due to economic and political instability.
Aragon (2000) questioned the model of policy why Indonesian government did not necessarily relate the Christianity and ‘world religion’ to define modernity and national development (p.39). The response is surely easy to say in the common view of the wide Indonesian region, but it does not mean ‘people who do not yet have a religion’ has been taken seriously into consideration during the era. This segment, I think, occurred as the regime wanted to control the stability. One of the ways to carry out is to make religion as a reductive religious teachings and symbol. In political realm, government merged the aspiration of many religious facets into PPP which was not really satisfied the common people. Even a lot of religious moments were colored with the interest of the mono-loyalty to the government issues and policies.
As powerful regime but tended to dictatorship, Leo Suryadinata (1995) argues that Indonesia under Soeharto wanted to play role in the world affair. In approaching the issue of Palestine-Israel, many moments were engineering the Non Alignment Movements. In this case, Suryadinata argued that religion was not a major consideration for Indonesian Foreign Policy (p.295). I do agree with Suryadinata’s notion that religion is not significant factor in directing Indonesia’s policy at the time. The intensive notion I believe is the political interest to play role in international affair despite the fact that the regime was too far violating the national affairs—of freedom of religion, speech and expression.
Readings:
Lorraine V. Aragon, Fields of Lord: Animism, Christian Minorities, and State development in Indonesia (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000);
Leo Suryadinata, Islam and Suharto’s Foreign Policy: Indonesia, Middle East and Bosnia, Asian Survey, March 1995
Religion during New Order by Nihayatul Wafiroh
Robert W. Hefner (2000) addresses the democratization and civil Islam in Indonesia. Indeed, culture, organization and religion influence in the process of democracy. In case of Indonesia, ICMI played an important rule during Suharto regime. Many components attempted to use ICMI as a vehicle to achieve their goals. In another side, the state played ICMI to control the opponents. From Hefner’s explanation, I could figure out that religious organization has bargaining position as civil society agents.
Meredith L. Weiss (2006) asserts that, “While CSAs played a pivotal role in opposing the ancient regime, they have retained little institutionalized clout since then except as monitors and petitioner.” It is understandable, moreover. When the regime wanted to give signs of his power, the religious issues were the perfect fuse. For instance, in the late 1998 and early 1999, there was the chaos in Banyuwangi. Hundreds people who were categorized as sorcerers were killed. Indeed, most of them were the religious teachers. It recalls me in the frightening situation at the time. In fact, it was to reduce the power of Gus Dur. Since the state always forced and controlled the religious organizations, they received sympathies from people.
In addition, it is understood that after the regime fell, the leaders from many religious organizations ran to the political sphere easily. Recently, Islamic boarding schools also take chances of this situation to send their people in the election. The networking, charisma, and popularity of the pesantren’s leaders are the guarantee for the candidates to be elected although they are lack capability in the politic.
Additionally, the position of students in the reformed era was significant. Weiss states that students who represented the social educated group voiced the condition of society. However, Weiss noted that some groups of student who linked to the NGO made the distance with the poor even though the issues of poor were their commodity to attack the state. In my understanding, this critic might be not for students in Islamic state university (IAIN) in Jogjakarta since the majority of the students there came from the farmers. They were already familiar with the condition of poor, so their demonstration against government was pure for the society, and they connected with the poor.
Economy was also the cause of Suharto’s fall. The economical development in Indonesia could be separated with the Chinese immigrants (John T Sidel). Although they are only minority, their power of economy controls other groups even the majority groups. The violence in May 1998 was the accumulation of abhorrence with Chinese.
Edward Aspirall (2005) categorizes four main responses to the mixture of repression and tolerance under New Order regime: Mobilizational opposition, Semiopposition, Alegal, and Social Organizations. Muridan Swijoyo also classified two groups. First is Gerakan Kritik Orde Baru (GKOB), the critical movement against new order. The second one is Gerakan Anti Orde Baru (GAOB), the anti New Order movement. They had different perspectives of New Order, and, as a result, the expression to demonstrate was not same.
Meredith L. Weiss (2006) asserts that, “While CSAs played a pivotal role in opposing the ancient regime, they have retained little institutionalized clout since then except as monitors and petitioner.” It is understandable, moreover. When the regime wanted to give signs of his power, the religious issues were the perfect fuse. For instance, in the late 1998 and early 1999, there was the chaos in Banyuwangi. Hundreds people who were categorized as sorcerers were killed. Indeed, most of them were the religious teachers. It recalls me in the frightening situation at the time. In fact, it was to reduce the power of Gus Dur. Since the state always forced and controlled the religious organizations, they received sympathies from people.
In addition, it is understood that after the regime fell, the leaders from many religious organizations ran to the political sphere easily. Recently, Islamic boarding schools also take chances of this situation to send their people in the election. The networking, charisma, and popularity of the pesantren’s leaders are the guarantee for the candidates to be elected although they are lack capability in the politic.
Additionally, the position of students in the reformed era was significant. Weiss states that students who represented the social educated group voiced the condition of society. However, Weiss noted that some groups of student who linked to the NGO made the distance with the poor even though the issues of poor were their commodity to attack the state. In my understanding, this critic might be not for students in Islamic state university (IAIN) in Jogjakarta since the majority of the students there came from the farmers. They were already familiar with the condition of poor, so their demonstration against government was pure for the society, and they connected with the poor.
Economy was also the cause of Suharto’s fall. The economical development in Indonesia could be separated with the Chinese immigrants (John T Sidel). Although they are only minority, their power of economy controls other groups even the majority groups. The violence in May 1998 was the accumulation of abhorrence with Chinese.
Edward Aspirall (2005) categorizes four main responses to the mixture of repression and tolerance under New Order regime: Mobilizational opposition, Semiopposition, Alegal, and Social Organizations. Muridan Swijoyo also classified two groups. First is Gerakan Kritik Orde Baru (GKOB), the critical movement against new order. The second one is Gerakan Anti Orde Baru (GAOB), the anti New Order movement. They had different perspectives of New Order, and, as a result, the expression to demonstrate was not same.
Sabtu, 17 April 2010
Innocuous Religion - Roy Allan B Tolentino
Religion, despite its necessarily vague definition, has always been a dangerous idea. By providing a vision of reality that almost always competes with more mundane constructions of power and legitimacy, religion can provide a scathing critique of governance. That is, of course, unless the government is able to subvert the power of religion or make religion an accomplice. This is something that we have seen played out time and again; in the New Order period, much effort was expended in making religion innocuous.
One strategy that was employed was the rewriting of history. With the rise of Suharto, the consolidation of military power provided an opportunity to recast history in favour of the military. As David Bourchier notes:
"The official texts, predictably enough, hail the achievements of Suharto and the New Order and contrast them with the turbulence and strife of the 'Old Order.' What is most striking about their coverage of the period between the declaration of independence and 1965 is the prominence given to the exploits of the military. The central and unmistakable message of both the text and the photographs is that ever since 1945 the military have been the true guardians of the Indonesian State and ideology. They have stood by to provide leadership whenever the State has been threatened by regional revolts, religious fanaticism, communist subversion and the incompetence of self-interested civilian politicians." (Bourchier 1994:52)
Painting a picture of military heroism, the history that was propagated during the New Order subtly eroded the idea of stability and moral ascendancy that religion might have claimed. Official policy depoliticizing Islam effectively relegated religion to a compartment within Suharto’s governance that allowed him to mobilize religion according to his own agenda. Of course, the disorganization of the religious sector only helped to fence them in, as Bahtiar Effendy recounts:
"When the position of political Islam appeared to be worsening, particularly following the New Order's manoeuvre to restructure Indonesia's political format, many of [political Islam's] leaders became increasingly reactionary. In the view of some observers of Indonesian political Islam, this was a sign of the inability of Islamic political thinkers and activists to structure intelligent religious-political responses pertinent to these challenges." (Effendy 2003:67)
Even to the last years of Suharto, many religious leaders were still held on a tight leash: “In December 1992 Interior Minister Rudini lectured members of the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association (ICMI) that any move to turn ICMI into a political party would revive the turmoil of the liberal 1950s.” (Bourchier 1994:59) The religious sector still seems to be recovering from this long-term restriction and disorganization. Am I suggesting, therefore, that religion ought to meddle in affairs of governance? Not necessarily. There is, however, a position that religion must necessarily take in order to become an ethical resource for criticizing governance, and religion cannot assume that position as long as government keeps religion innocuous.
Bourchier, David. "The 1950s in New Order Ideology and Politics" in Democracy in Indonesia: 1950s and 1990s. Ed. David Bourchier and John Legge. Victoria: CSEAS, Monash University, 1994.
Effendy, Bahtiar. Islam and the State in Indonesia. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2003.
One strategy that was employed was the rewriting of history. With the rise of Suharto, the consolidation of military power provided an opportunity to recast history in favour of the military. As David Bourchier notes:
"The official texts, predictably enough, hail the achievements of Suharto and the New Order and contrast them with the turbulence and strife of the 'Old Order.' What is most striking about their coverage of the period between the declaration of independence and 1965 is the prominence given to the exploits of the military. The central and unmistakable message of both the text and the photographs is that ever since 1945 the military have been the true guardians of the Indonesian State and ideology. They have stood by to provide leadership whenever the State has been threatened by regional revolts, religious fanaticism, communist subversion and the incompetence of self-interested civilian politicians." (Bourchier 1994:52)
Painting a picture of military heroism, the history that was propagated during the New Order subtly eroded the idea of stability and moral ascendancy that religion might have claimed. Official policy depoliticizing Islam effectively relegated religion to a compartment within Suharto’s governance that allowed him to mobilize religion according to his own agenda. Of course, the disorganization of the religious sector only helped to fence them in, as Bahtiar Effendy recounts:
"When the position of political Islam appeared to be worsening, particularly following the New Order's manoeuvre to restructure Indonesia's political format, many of [political Islam's] leaders became increasingly reactionary. In the view of some observers of Indonesian political Islam, this was a sign of the inability of Islamic political thinkers and activists to structure intelligent religious-political responses pertinent to these challenges." (Effendy 2003:67)
Even to the last years of Suharto, many religious leaders were still held on a tight leash: “In December 1992 Interior Minister Rudini lectured members of the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association (ICMI) that any move to turn ICMI into a political party would revive the turmoil of the liberal 1950s.” (Bourchier 1994:59) The religious sector still seems to be recovering from this long-term restriction and disorganization. Am I suggesting, therefore, that religion ought to meddle in affairs of governance? Not necessarily. There is, however, a position that religion must necessarily take in order to become an ethical resource for criticizing governance, and religion cannot assume that position as long as government keeps religion innocuous.
Bourchier, David. "The 1950s in New Order Ideology and Politics" in Democracy in Indonesia: 1950s and 1990s. Ed. David Bourchier and John Legge. Victoria: CSEAS, Monash University, 1994.
Effendy, Bahtiar. Islam and the State in Indonesia. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2003.
Minggu, 11 April 2010
Religion, the Fall of Sukarno and the Elimination of Communism in Indonesia: G30S PKI and the mass killings of 1965-1966
Kristanto Budiprabowo (Tatok)
Discussing the history of mass killings in Indonesia especially in Java PKI mass murder, the first thing that come to my mind is my mother expression when she talking about anything correlating with PKI and the fellow organizations. I always remember how she in sorrow told to us, her children, about her old sister who can escape from the mass systematic murder and about her young brother who was an army but imprisoned because his commander suspected has a good correlation with communist people. When I was in the first high school, it was already 18 years after the PKI become a dangerous issue, in our simple house, she keep very carefully some Sukarno’s books beneath a big box to contain rice. When I found it, she express angry and afraid in her whispering message to keep the secret that she has those collections. Even though I was grew up in the more stable political era but beginning in my house, in the village community, in the school, and from the media information communism and PKI describe as “latent danger” that the present will destroy this country.
Since high school I have been suspicious of that over warning of communism. And I always have several big questions that often I couldn’t find the appropriate answer. History is the story of the winner, the heroes, and the power that dominated the complex truth. But for me, whatever the reasons and purposes, whether it has social or political purpose, whether it has cultural or religious reason, mass killing is always the terrible history of the murderer. In the case of PKI mass murder in Indonesia, it is quite clear that when political interpretation to such a group of people get religious legitimacy it will cause powerful social movement. In this situation, there are many possibilities can happen. There are at least two scenarios to interpret the killings. First, it was an organized action of the certain governmental wing that has good negotiation with local social and religious leader and also has a prospectus affair with international political leader. Second, it is the natural social reaction to the PKI action in killing numbers of generals and to some PKI group effort to take offer local control power.
All of the scenarios are look right for me. But my big question is still haunt me, why the social group who most active in that mass killing was a most traditional religious organization? And, why almost all of religious organizations give a green light or event insist to it adherents to joint in the murder? If I notice the stereotyping to the communist people as an anti-religion, I only see that perhaps that murder was mostly happened in religious motive in spite of political motive. Because, this stereotyping is obviously come from religious people.
Discussing the history of mass killings in Indonesia especially in Java PKI mass murder, the first thing that come to my mind is my mother expression when she talking about anything correlating with PKI and the fellow organizations. I always remember how she in sorrow told to us, her children, about her old sister who can escape from the mass systematic murder and about her young brother who was an army but imprisoned because his commander suspected has a good correlation with communist people. When I was in the first high school, it was already 18 years after the PKI become a dangerous issue, in our simple house, she keep very carefully some Sukarno’s books beneath a big box to contain rice. When I found it, she express angry and afraid in her whispering message to keep the secret that she has those collections. Even though I was grew up in the more stable political era but beginning in my house, in the village community, in the school, and from the media information communism and PKI describe as “latent danger” that the present will destroy this country.
Since high school I have been suspicious of that over warning of communism. And I always have several big questions that often I couldn’t find the appropriate answer. History is the story of the winner, the heroes, and the power that dominated the complex truth. But for me, whatever the reasons and purposes, whether it has social or political purpose, whether it has cultural or religious reason, mass killing is always the terrible history of the murderer. In the case of PKI mass murder in Indonesia, it is quite clear that when political interpretation to such a group of people get religious legitimacy it will cause powerful social movement. In this situation, there are many possibilities can happen. There are at least two scenarios to interpret the killings. First, it was an organized action of the certain governmental wing that has good negotiation with local social and religious leader and also has a prospectus affair with international political leader. Second, it is the natural social reaction to the PKI action in killing numbers of generals and to some PKI group effort to take offer local control power.
All of the scenarios are look right for me. But my big question is still haunt me, why the social group who most active in that mass killing was a most traditional religious organization? And, why almost all of religious organizations give a green light or event insist to it adherents to joint in the murder? If I notice the stereotyping to the communist people as an anti-religion, I only see that perhaps that murder was mostly happened in religious motive in spite of political motive. Because, this stereotyping is obviously come from religious people.
Religion, the fall of Sukarno and the elimination of communism in Indonesia: G30S PKI and the mass killings of 1965-66;
Tri Harmaji
History of Religions in Indonesia Part II: from c. 1900 to the Present
Religion, the fall of Sukarno and the elimination of communism in Indonesia: G30S PKI and the mass killings of 1965-66; Robert Cribb, the Indonesian killings of 1965-66, Robert W Hefner, the political economy of mountain java: an interpretative history.
If we have to relate between the mass killings of 1965-66 with religion, then what I can say about it is a religious tragedy. This event took place in many parts of Indonesian region, but java, especially central and east java is the worst place. These two areas are the biggest PKI stronghold, but also the place where Islam (NU) got many followers. Like was analyzed by Cribb there are some political agendas of military behind this inhuman action, that is this action was taken to eliminate their political rival in order/ as well as to strengthen their own power and authority. Although in somewhat different way, in the next new order government, military also took the same political action to silent their Islamic political rival. It is common in military government to use coercion and violence in their political agenda, and so, from the political point of view, in the event of 1965-66 mass killings.
But what more interesting to me now is the participation of some religious organization in this massacre. Like explained widely in the readings, especially youth body of NU, ANSOR, was very active in this event. Why do they actively and even eagerly involve in this killing? What is their motivation, and what is it mean to Indonesian subsequent history? From Hefner explanation about especially Tengger mid and highland killing done by lowland people give somewhat clear pictures about religious role in this killing. And what had happened here was also happened in other parts of Indonesia in very similar characteristic. From these events it is clear that the hostility between these two parties has going on far time before the event itself.
Besides regional problem, in the national scale Islam just realized its failure to build Islamic state in Indonesia after the general election in 1955. Nothing can they do about this result, but their idea about Islamic state was never given up in their mind. In this frame of thinking, one of their most serious enemies was PKI. It is because besides PKI irreligious atheist, they also frankly refused and against Islamic state in their campaigns. I think there is such idea of how to destroy PKI among Muslim leaders at that time, and coincide with it, when PKI coup was failed and military authority gave sanction to destroy PKI, and then their idea got a good opportunity to be implemented. It is why then when some Islamic body like ANSOR involved in this killing they called this action as jihad for the building of Islamic state, to replace the failed of guided democracy of Sukarno.
Islamic state is the most important political agenda of Islamic parties from the first days of Indonesian independence. They had been disappointed in the first stage when the Japanese authority just gave them a few seats in the BPUPKI that was very important step in directing Indonesia to be Islamic state. However, in their limited vote they have finally successful in bringing Islamic color in would be Indonesian constitution in what is called as Jakarta charter after long discussion and debate with nationalist party. But unfortunately, this achievement was also ruined by Christian objection a few hours before the proclamation. At this moment I can imagine how the disappointment they felt. Throwing away this disappointment, they begun to build confidence to win the first general election and take over the governance. They quite sure about this because the fact that more than 90% of Indonesian population was Muslim.
But, like I have mentioned before, Islamic parties failed to get the major vote and consequently failed to implement their Islamic state idea. I think this failure after long hope and struggle had caused some kind of frustration amongst the Islamic parties and people. This frustration then was exploded in the PKI killing of 1965-66, and along with it, the hope of Islamic state came to emerge again. In this event they eagerly helped the military to clear off PKI from the Indonesian land. This action then becomes one of the eleven factors that Avery T. Willis argues as why two millions people convert to Christianity after the tragedy.
The question now is, is the frustration has ended after it erupted in this massacre? The history tells that it is not. The new government, instead of building Islamic state the Islamic parties hope but on the contrary they even oppressed Islamic parties harder. The new order has disappointed them and sent them into more frustration. This frustration has become a negative collective memory along the history of new order era. And in my opinion what had happened in the 1998 riots (“the war” against Christianity in Ambon, Poso and other parts in java) is also another explosion of this accumulated frustration of Islamic people in dealing with the idea of Islamic state in Indonesia. After the communist was eliminated the turn has come for another obstacle that is Christianity.
History of Religions in Indonesia Part II: from c. 1900 to the Present
Religion, the fall of Sukarno and the elimination of communism in Indonesia: G30S PKI and the mass killings of 1965-66; Robert Cribb, the Indonesian killings of 1965-66, Robert W Hefner, the political economy of mountain java: an interpretative history.
If we have to relate between the mass killings of 1965-66 with religion, then what I can say about it is a religious tragedy. This event took place in many parts of Indonesian region, but java, especially central and east java is the worst place. These two areas are the biggest PKI stronghold, but also the place where Islam (NU) got many followers. Like was analyzed by Cribb there are some political agendas of military behind this inhuman action, that is this action was taken to eliminate their political rival in order/ as well as to strengthen their own power and authority. Although in somewhat different way, in the next new order government, military also took the same political action to silent their Islamic political rival. It is common in military government to use coercion and violence in their political agenda, and so, from the political point of view, in the event of 1965-66 mass killings.
But what more interesting to me now is the participation of some religious organization in this massacre. Like explained widely in the readings, especially youth body of NU, ANSOR, was very active in this event. Why do they actively and even eagerly involve in this killing? What is their motivation, and what is it mean to Indonesian subsequent history? From Hefner explanation about especially Tengger mid and highland killing done by lowland people give somewhat clear pictures about religious role in this killing. And what had happened here was also happened in other parts of Indonesia in very similar characteristic. From these events it is clear that the hostility between these two parties has going on far time before the event itself.
Besides regional problem, in the national scale Islam just realized its failure to build Islamic state in Indonesia after the general election in 1955. Nothing can they do about this result, but their idea about Islamic state was never given up in their mind. In this frame of thinking, one of their most serious enemies was PKI. It is because besides PKI irreligious atheist, they also frankly refused and against Islamic state in their campaigns. I think there is such idea of how to destroy PKI among Muslim leaders at that time, and coincide with it, when PKI coup was failed and military authority gave sanction to destroy PKI, and then their idea got a good opportunity to be implemented. It is why then when some Islamic body like ANSOR involved in this killing they called this action as jihad for the building of Islamic state, to replace the failed of guided democracy of Sukarno.
Islamic state is the most important political agenda of Islamic parties from the first days of Indonesian independence. They had been disappointed in the first stage when the Japanese authority just gave them a few seats in the BPUPKI that was very important step in directing Indonesia to be Islamic state. However, in their limited vote they have finally successful in bringing Islamic color in would be Indonesian constitution in what is called as Jakarta charter after long discussion and debate with nationalist party. But unfortunately, this achievement was also ruined by Christian objection a few hours before the proclamation. At this moment I can imagine how the disappointment they felt. Throwing away this disappointment, they begun to build confidence to win the first general election and take over the governance. They quite sure about this because the fact that more than 90% of Indonesian population was Muslim.
But, like I have mentioned before, Islamic parties failed to get the major vote and consequently failed to implement their Islamic state idea. I think this failure after long hope and struggle had caused some kind of frustration amongst the Islamic parties and people. This frustration then was exploded in the PKI killing of 1965-66, and along with it, the hope of Islamic state came to emerge again. In this event they eagerly helped the military to clear off PKI from the Indonesian land. This action then becomes one of the eleven factors that Avery T. Willis argues as why two millions people convert to Christianity after the tragedy.
The question now is, is the frustration has ended after it erupted in this massacre? The history tells that it is not. The new government, instead of building Islamic state the Islamic parties hope but on the contrary they even oppressed Islamic parties harder. The new order has disappointed them and sent them into more frustration. This frustration has become a negative collective memory along the history of new order era. And in my opinion what had happened in the 1998 riots (“the war” against Christianity in Ambon, Poso and other parts in java) is also another explosion of this accumulated frustration of Islamic people in dealing with the idea of Islamic state in Indonesia. After the communist was eliminated the turn has come for another obstacle that is Christianity.
Religious Problems in Finding the Fact of the Killing of 1965-66 by Faqihuddin Abdul Kodir
Beside the technical problems in the historiography of Indonesian massacre in 1965, Robert Cribb accounts also the problems of philosophy from which Indonesian as well as Western historians see the facts and interpret them. For Indonesians, I think, the major factors behind the historiography are the state’s factor and religious factor. For more than thirty years the regime of New Order under Suharto monopolized the historiography of Indonesia for the favor of its own ‘nationalism’. The only interpretation of historical facts and events accepted by the regime is its own. Moreover, in this case the massacre of 1965, the regime easily gained supports from the majority of diverse organizations of Indonesian Muslims, including Nahdlatul Ulama which had been the supporter of communism politically in the era of ‘guided democracy’. The part of religion in the notion “NASAKOM” (Nasionalisme, Agama, dan Komunisme/Nationalism, religion, and communism) was the Nahdlatul Ulama.
However, the military regime of New Order gained political benefits more than religious element from the state’s interpretation of the killings. From the case of PKI of 65, the regime controlled and restricted any political activities in order not to have the same case like the PKI. Not only Islamic parties were restricted, but also women’s activities which assumed to be politics. Any political movement of women was associated with the most dangerous women’s organizations, Gerwani, female wing of PKI the Indonesian Communist Party, in the eye of the regime. The ‘historical myth’ was circulated around the country that members of Gerwani tortured sexual organs of military generals in the story 65’s coup (G 30 S PKI). The message of the story, according to Ayu Ratih, was very clear that “women who are actively in politics will threaten the safety and the integrity of the nation” (Ayu Ratih, 2009: 128). Accordingly women's organizations were subject to heavy restrictions in the New Order regime.
From the shadows of the 65’s coup, the New Order regime dictated its own concept of nationalism and the unity of Indonesia by restricting all kinds of political activities, including what relates to Muslims and women. In the Reformation era of Gus Dur, the state opened political access widely to Muslims, women, and those who joined the PKI. However, many Muslims criticized the state of Gus Dur for his open policy to ex-members of PKI. Religious people in Indonesia, especially Muslims, still step behind any effort to restrict PKI and not to open gate for their political activities. This is the reason, I think, that religion also is the main problems of writing the history of the killings.
Readings:
1. Robert Cribb, “Problems in the Historiography of the Killings in Indonesia”, in Robert CribbHoward ed., The Indonesian Killings of 1965-66, pp. 1-43.
2. Ayu Ratih, I Gusti Agung. (2009). “Perempuan, Sejarah, dan Keindonesiaan”. Jurnal Perempuan. No. 61. Pp. 121-135.
However, the military regime of New Order gained political benefits more than religious element from the state’s interpretation of the killings. From the case of PKI of 65, the regime controlled and restricted any political activities in order not to have the same case like the PKI. Not only Islamic parties were restricted, but also women’s activities which assumed to be politics. Any political movement of women was associated with the most dangerous women’s organizations, Gerwani, female wing of PKI the Indonesian Communist Party, in the eye of the regime. The ‘historical myth’ was circulated around the country that members of Gerwani tortured sexual organs of military generals in the story 65’s coup (G 30 S PKI). The message of the story, according to Ayu Ratih, was very clear that “women who are actively in politics will threaten the safety and the integrity of the nation” (Ayu Ratih, 2009: 128). Accordingly women's organizations were subject to heavy restrictions in the New Order regime.
From the shadows of the 65’s coup, the New Order regime dictated its own concept of nationalism and the unity of Indonesia by restricting all kinds of political activities, including what relates to Muslims and women. In the Reformation era of Gus Dur, the state opened political access widely to Muslims, women, and those who joined the PKI. However, many Muslims criticized the state of Gus Dur for his open policy to ex-members of PKI. Religious people in Indonesia, especially Muslims, still step behind any effort to restrict PKI and not to open gate for their political activities. This is the reason, I think, that religion also is the main problems of writing the history of the killings.
Readings:
1. Robert Cribb, “Problems in the Historiography of the Killings in Indonesia”, in Robert CribbHoward ed., The Indonesian Killings of 1965-66, pp. 1-43.
2. Ayu Ratih, I Gusti Agung. (2009). “Perempuan, Sejarah, dan Keindonesiaan”. Jurnal Perempuan. No. 61. Pp. 121-135.
Politics: The Hidden Hand of the Story
by Timotius Wibowo
Both Robert Cribb’s and Robert Hefner’s articles on mass killing show how cruel politics can be. When politics came to the stage, it will dominate the innermost part of the people, often in the most subtle way. In Indonesian mass killings, politics had shown its dominance over at least three important aspects of Indonesian people. In those tragedies, politics had been a hidden hand that determined both the opening and the ending of the story.
First, it shows us politics’ dominance over religions. One may say that religion is the best motives of people’s attitude and behavior. However, in fact, religions could easily manipulated by political powers. As well as Pasuruan’s highlanders in Hefner’s research had inaccurate assessment of the situation (p. 215), the people involved in a mass conflict usually never realize the political interests behind it. Political motives are always hidden in religious spirit of war. In my opinion, hidden political agendas could easily penetrate the religious symbols because people’s lack of knowledge on both politics and religions. Such conflicts might be diminished by educating more people on politics, as well as on religions.
Second, the Indonesian mass killings obviously show us the dominance of politics over humanity. In those cases, humanity was sacrificed for political agendas. This fact, in my opinion, is not easy to explain. How could political motives undermine the humanity, which naturally embedded in human beings? Searching an answer for this question, I come to the most ancient motives of human mass conflict: ethnic rivalry. Certainly, I am not so sure with this. In fact, in all of mass killing cases, ethnicity is always intertwined with other motives. In Indonesian mass killing cases, the Chinese ethnic is always the most suffered victims. It will be interesting to discuss this phenomenon.
The last but not least, the narratives of Indonesian mass killings shows us the dominance of politics over “history.” As Cribb observes, the historiography of Indonesian mass killings presents the problems of information, problems of philosophy, and problems of interpretation (p. 2). As explained in the article, these problems raised due to political interests of the ruling regimes. It means that a historiography is never objective, instead polluted with subjective interests of the historiographers. What should we do to diminish such destructive pollutant in our historiography? The stories about Indonesian mass killings proof that this is never an easy task of Indonesian historians.
Both Robert Cribb’s and Robert Hefner’s articles on mass killing show how cruel politics can be. When politics came to the stage, it will dominate the innermost part of the people, often in the most subtle way. In Indonesian mass killings, politics had shown its dominance over at least three important aspects of Indonesian people. In those tragedies, politics had been a hidden hand that determined both the opening and the ending of the story.
First, it shows us politics’ dominance over religions. One may say that religion is the best motives of people’s attitude and behavior. However, in fact, religions could easily manipulated by political powers. As well as Pasuruan’s highlanders in Hefner’s research had inaccurate assessment of the situation (p. 215), the people involved in a mass conflict usually never realize the political interests behind it. Political motives are always hidden in religious spirit of war. In my opinion, hidden political agendas could easily penetrate the religious symbols because people’s lack of knowledge on both politics and religions. Such conflicts might be diminished by educating more people on politics, as well as on religions.
Second, the Indonesian mass killings obviously show us the dominance of politics over humanity. In those cases, humanity was sacrificed for political agendas. This fact, in my opinion, is not easy to explain. How could political motives undermine the humanity, which naturally embedded in human beings? Searching an answer for this question, I come to the most ancient motives of human mass conflict: ethnic rivalry. Certainly, I am not so sure with this. In fact, in all of mass killing cases, ethnicity is always intertwined with other motives. In Indonesian mass killing cases, the Chinese ethnic is always the most suffered victims. It will be interesting to discuss this phenomenon.
The last but not least, the narratives of Indonesian mass killings shows us the dominance of politics over “history.” As Cribb observes, the historiography of Indonesian mass killings presents the problems of information, problems of philosophy, and problems of interpretation (p. 2). As explained in the article, these problems raised due to political interests of the ruling regimes. It means that a historiography is never objective, instead polluted with subjective interests of the historiographers. What should we do to diminish such destructive pollutant in our historiography? The stories about Indonesian mass killings proof that this is never an easy task of Indonesian historians.
Religion and conflicting ideologies
by Nina Mariani Noor
The phenomenon of mass killing of 1965-66 was a tragedy in Indonesian history. However, there is only a little number of books available which revealed what actually happened in that year since the intention of New order era to cover it. For years, young generation were only taught about the brutality of PKI members and the heroism of Indonesian army in eliminating PKI without uncovering the real fact.
These two readings, at least open our eyes about what exactly happened at that time in more balance way and enrich our knowledge on that moment. It seems to me that in G. 30. S PKI event, religion could be a push factor to commit killings. When people think that their religion is being threatened by other ideology, they will spontaneously react to protect their ideology. Unfortunately, the way they react, sometimes neglect the humanity. They often attack the people who having the other ideology or even kill them. In Indonesia, this trend, in my opinion, is still tangible nowadays. It can be seen from some conflicts that happened in the name of religion in the last decade. Sometimes I question, why people who claim to be religious do commit violence in order to protect their beliefs? Do they forget their religious teaching not to abuse other human beings? Why don’t they choose more manner way like doing dialogue with opposite parties? Is doing violence the “hidden” characteristics of Indonesian people?
In response to Cribb’s statement in page 39 about the wave of religious conversion after the events of 1965-66 in which 2.8 million people converted to Christianity and also Hinduism, I partly admit that one of the reason is that Christianity did not deeply involved in the confrontation and killings. However, there is still a question in my mind, can we say that people who converted, thought that they would convert to any official religions but not Islam? Was that a kind of anxious and hatred feeling toward Muslims because of the events of 1965-66?
Readings: Robert Cribb, The Indonesian Killings of 1965-66
Robert W. Hefner, “Politics and Social Identity: The 1965-66 Violence and Aftermath ”
The phenomenon of mass killing of 1965-66 was a tragedy in Indonesian history. However, there is only a little number of books available which revealed what actually happened in that year since the intention of New order era to cover it. For years, young generation were only taught about the brutality of PKI members and the heroism of Indonesian army in eliminating PKI without uncovering the real fact.
These two readings, at least open our eyes about what exactly happened at that time in more balance way and enrich our knowledge on that moment. It seems to me that in G. 30. S PKI event, religion could be a push factor to commit killings. When people think that their religion is being threatened by other ideology, they will spontaneously react to protect their ideology. Unfortunately, the way they react, sometimes neglect the humanity. They often attack the people who having the other ideology or even kill them. In Indonesia, this trend, in my opinion, is still tangible nowadays. It can be seen from some conflicts that happened in the name of religion in the last decade. Sometimes I question, why people who claim to be religious do commit violence in order to protect their beliefs? Do they forget their religious teaching not to abuse other human beings? Why don’t they choose more manner way like doing dialogue with opposite parties? Is doing violence the “hidden” characteristics of Indonesian people?
In response to Cribb’s statement in page 39 about the wave of religious conversion after the events of 1965-66 in which 2.8 million people converted to Christianity and also Hinduism, I partly admit that one of the reason is that Christianity did not deeply involved in the confrontation and killings. However, there is still a question in my mind, can we say that people who converted, thought that they would convert to any official religions but not Islam? Was that a kind of anxious and hatred feeling toward Muslims because of the events of 1965-66?
Readings: Robert Cribb, The Indonesian Killings of 1965-66
Robert W. Hefner, “Politics and Social Identity: The 1965-66 Violence and Aftermath ”
Religion, he Fall of Sukarno and the Elimination of Communism in Indonesia : G30S PKI and the Mass Killings of 1965-66 by Joko Wicoyo
In Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto’s Coup d’Etat in Indonesia, Mr. Roosa has written a very good account of The September 30th Movement and Suharto's Coup d'Etat in Indonesia. The September 30th Movement was filmed and I think it was a very famous film in Indonesia during Suharto’s Era. It was always shown on the eve of 1st October as the commemoration of the winner day of Pancasila as the philosophical and political principal of the Republic of Indonesia.
It tells about the early morning hours of October 1, 1965, a group calling itself the September 30th Movement kidnapped and executed six generals of the Indonesian army, including its highest commander. The group claimed that it was attempting to preempt a coup, but it was quickly defeated as the senior surviving general, Suharto, drove the movement’s partisans out of Jakarta. Riding the crest of mass violence, Suharto blamed the Communist Party of Indonesia for masterminding the movement and used the emergency as a pretext for gradually eroding President Sukarno’s powers and installing himself as a ruler. Imprisoning and killing hundreds of thousands of alleged communists over the next year, Suharto remade the events of October 1, 1965 into the central event of modern Indonesian history and the cornerstone of his thirty-two-year dictatorship.
Up to these days, for most Indonesian people especially scholars, the September 30th Movement has remained shrouded in uncertainty. Who actually masterminded it? What did they hope to achieve? Why did they fail so miserably? And what was the movement’s connection to international Cold War politics? I think, in this book, John Roosa draws on a wealth of new primary source material to suggest a solution to the mystery behind the movement and the enabling myth of Suharto’s repressive regime.
In my mind this book ignores the murders, the genocide, the pogroms, and instead focuses on the plot that was the pretext or excuse for unleashing the genocide. It insinuates that John Foster Dulles and Eisenhower were 'waiting' for the attempted Communist coup and used the killing of a few military officers to unleash the coup and the mass murder. But the U.S had no role in the mass murder that followed. The U.S was fed a lie by Suharto, namely that the Communists were trying to seize power, and thus Suharto was able to carry out his ethnic-cleansing. I think this book is essential reading for students of modern Indonesian history, and for anyone who is interested in political violence, the role of the military in politics, and U.S. foreign policy.
It tells about the early morning hours of October 1, 1965, a group calling itself the September 30th Movement kidnapped and executed six generals of the Indonesian army, including its highest commander. The group claimed that it was attempting to preempt a coup, but it was quickly defeated as the senior surviving general, Suharto, drove the movement’s partisans out of Jakarta. Riding the crest of mass violence, Suharto blamed the Communist Party of Indonesia for masterminding the movement and used the emergency as a pretext for gradually eroding President Sukarno’s powers and installing himself as a ruler. Imprisoning and killing hundreds of thousands of alleged communists over the next year, Suharto remade the events of October 1, 1965 into the central event of modern Indonesian history and the cornerstone of his thirty-two-year dictatorship.
Up to these days, for most Indonesian people especially scholars, the September 30th Movement has remained shrouded in uncertainty. Who actually masterminded it? What did they hope to achieve? Why did they fail so miserably? And what was the movement’s connection to international Cold War politics? I think, in this book, John Roosa draws on a wealth of new primary source material to suggest a solution to the mystery behind the movement and the enabling myth of Suharto’s repressive regime.
In my mind this book ignores the murders, the genocide, the pogroms, and instead focuses on the plot that was the pretext or excuse for unleashing the genocide. It insinuates that John Foster Dulles and Eisenhower were 'waiting' for the attempted Communist coup and used the killing of a few military officers to unleash the coup and the mass murder. But the U.S had no role in the mass murder that followed. The U.S was fed a lie by Suharto, namely that the Communists were trying to seize power, and thus Suharto was able to carry out his ethnic-cleansing. I think this book is essential reading for students of modern Indonesian history, and for anyone who is interested in political violence, the role of the military in politics, and U.S. foreign policy.
Religion and Violence?
LEYAKET ALI MOHAMED OMAR
History of Religion Part 2- Prof Bernard Adeney- Risakotta and Prof Margana
Readings are from : Robert Cribb- The Indonesian Killing of 1965-66 and Robert W. Hefner- Politics and Social Identity
Cribb states that the 1965 killings were carried out using simple implements such as knives, machetes, and guns. There were no gas chambers such as those that were used by the Nazis in the slaughter of the Jews and many other groups. And those who were executed were not taken far before being killed; usually they were killed near their homes. Another feature of the killings is that they were usually carried out at night. The killings of the PKI were not carried out systematically; the pattern varied from one region to another. The ways of disposing the body was also inhuman in such a way that they do not show any sense of mercy.
He also mentions of the numerous ways to count the number of victims, in this line I think these statistics are cold numbers and it only account for a little understanding of the critical so called pain and lost. It does not represent the emotional impacts of being gripped with fear or the disgust at seeing people killed or raped. The widespread psychological and cultural impacts of the killings have never been measured in any systematic way, despite the long-term consequences of 1965 for Indonesian society or for that matter any massacre. This also stimulates further questioning: why didn’t the security forces (if any) try to intervene to prevent such widespread slaughter? One certainly gets the impression that the violence was allowed to happen. After all, this meant eliminating the group that had been involved in power struggles with the military.
It is interesting to see the process of seeking to eradicate PKI members and sympathisers was completed relatively quickly, in just a matter of months. Look at the Nazis as an example of mass killing comparison. It needed many years, and the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia four years, to do the similar work. Comparing both the similar kind of militant several factors contributes to the possibilities for the wiping out of PKI quickly. I think firstly, the conflict between communist and non-communist groups, particularly the kyais, had been evident since early in the decade. Second, the military is suspected of playing a role in motivating the masses to commit violence. Third, the mass media, under the control of the military, deliberately provoked the public’s rage.
The basic assumption of religion being the cause of violence will never prevail no matter what and how the proving statements can be. The fact is; there is no religion that preaches to any cause of unnecessary violence such as the mentioned account. Thus, history has always been a great learning subject to learn the pattern of a society then and now. Working in parallel, its people might want to take great lessons not to repeat its unpleasant history of great civilisation that had gone astray due to violence. Perhaps, through this episode of violence personally I understood that Indonesian, being a multi-cultural and multi-ethnicity society and religions must be familiar and resort to diplomatic discussion and engagement in the road to tolerance and open view of the society, mainly its minority.
History of Religion Part 2- Prof Bernard Adeney- Risakotta and Prof Margana
Readings are from : Robert Cribb- The Indonesian Killing of 1965-66 and Robert W. Hefner- Politics and Social Identity
Cribb states that the 1965 killings were carried out using simple implements such as knives, machetes, and guns. There were no gas chambers such as those that were used by the Nazis in the slaughter of the Jews and many other groups. And those who were executed were not taken far before being killed; usually they were killed near their homes. Another feature of the killings is that they were usually carried out at night. The killings of the PKI were not carried out systematically; the pattern varied from one region to another. The ways of disposing the body was also inhuman in such a way that they do not show any sense of mercy.
He also mentions of the numerous ways to count the number of victims, in this line I think these statistics are cold numbers and it only account for a little understanding of the critical so called pain and lost. It does not represent the emotional impacts of being gripped with fear or the disgust at seeing people killed or raped. The widespread psychological and cultural impacts of the killings have never been measured in any systematic way, despite the long-term consequences of 1965 for Indonesian society or for that matter any massacre. This also stimulates further questioning: why didn’t the security forces (if any) try to intervene to prevent such widespread slaughter? One certainly gets the impression that the violence was allowed to happen. After all, this meant eliminating the group that had been involved in power struggles with the military.
It is interesting to see the process of seeking to eradicate PKI members and sympathisers was completed relatively quickly, in just a matter of months. Look at the Nazis as an example of mass killing comparison. It needed many years, and the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia four years, to do the similar work. Comparing both the similar kind of militant several factors contributes to the possibilities for the wiping out of PKI quickly. I think firstly, the conflict between communist and non-communist groups, particularly the kyais, had been evident since early in the decade. Second, the military is suspected of playing a role in motivating the masses to commit violence. Third, the mass media, under the control of the military, deliberately provoked the public’s rage.
The basic assumption of religion being the cause of violence will never prevail no matter what and how the proving statements can be. The fact is; there is no religion that preaches to any cause of unnecessary violence such as the mentioned account. Thus, history has always been a great learning subject to learn the pattern of a society then and now. Working in parallel, its people might want to take great lessons not to repeat its unpleasant history of great civilisation that had gone astray due to violence. Perhaps, through this episode of violence personally I understood that Indonesian, being a multi-cultural and multi-ethnicity society and religions must be familiar and resort to diplomatic discussion and engagement in the road to tolerance and open view of the society, mainly its minority.
How media - as the fourth estate - purged Indonesia of communists
MUCHA Q ARQUIZA
Direct and detailed accounts of the Indonesian mass killings of 1965-1966 have been little reported not until 1969 when the silence was supposed to have been broken with the three-week long running news of the renewed extensive killing in the Purwodadi area in Central Java which Jakarta broadsheets, HarianKMI, Indonesia Raya and Sinar Harapan variously headlined and featured in stories about abduction, illegal detentions, torture and interrogations and summary execution and exhumation of mass graves of the alleged PKI ‘middle sector’, the religious and intellectuals. What made the stories most grippingly intriguing and exciting were the muddled up versions of its almost Rashomon-like quality of combining rumors, superstition, and employment of modern-fiction techniques of intrigue, scandal, cliff-hangers and inverse or counter-stream surprise endings that kept such questions hanging as ‘did the PKI do it?’, ‘where the police, local authorities and political Parties infiltrated by PKI?’, ‘where the churches and mosques all the while in collusion with PKI?’, etcetera.
Reading and listening to stories that must have gone through various processes of distillation and distortions in its many retelling and rehashing and only after three years have passed, must lend not only incredulity but highly glossed it over with the evanescence of a myth and so much bloated with sensationalized air that one could only attribute to a work of fiction but it nonetheless lessened the sale-ability of the stories to an audience hungry not for truth but for a justification of an inhuman act. Accounts and retold tales of the killings would therefore hardly elicit the desired sympathy and passion for the victims that would have accompanied ethics of care and ethics of justice that the immediacy of a fresh and real documentary news or information would have affected audience and receptors. And media must have known it and used it to its utmost advantage, where in fact by ‘doing its mission’ it was actually circumventing such ethics and instead aiming for other purposes namely legitimizing a state discourse. The journalistic accounts of Indonesian killings and scholarly reports that included supposed academic researches compiled by non-partisam UGM field researchers that Cribb described as assuming a ‘victor’s account’, while generally towing the official line of the New Order, did not actually add anything of value or served the interest of supposed demand for ‘truth’ and pursuit of ‘justice’. If at all, it just reinforced the rumors spread by the officials and military and fortified their justification of the mass slaughter of at least a million of its population to purge society with the most dreadful infection of communism and its evil ideology.
The news paper reports or creative non-ficition accounts, however vigilantly meticulous and thoroughly investigative an effort they might have claimed in the production and reproduction of stories, only succeeded in reinforcing and affirming the already smoothly rolling well-oiled information and education machinery of the post-Sokarno and anti-communist regime that the Indonesian killings was a justified ‘war against terror’. This is what McLuhan in 1970s would later refer to in mass media theory as “the medium is the message”. And wittingly or unwittingly media has been complicit in Soharto’s psychological war and, whether it likes or admits it or not, had its hands bloodied as well.
Reporting stories such as those that impacts on the religious sentiments is indeed hard-hitting the core of human pathos: anger, fear, hatred, although audience were hardly critical and did not fight back or talk back as a matter of reaction to these stories, neither were willing to leave it alone; to the contrary, audience were most likely to be hooked to it.
In a lot of sense, religious sentiment might very well be one of the most sensitive and security-threatening of all human psychic concerns for it touches not only the physical aspect of human core of being but endangers the confidence and stability of the perceived divine order, of pure and sancrosanct heavenly and metaphysical realm- the final rest and highest sanctum of human existence – polluting it with evil and ungodly ideology such as communism would be putting human psychical future in line and rendering at risk of annihilation of our eternal existence, which to many is more important than the physical one. Media and news sensationalism then, when hitting on at this very weakest link in human cognition, have stumbled upon a journalistic mine-field. This is why George Bush’s rhetoric of war against terror when framed within the discourse of religious war or clash of civilization easily catches fire on media and explodes up in the world’s imaginations more than sex and scandals ever did.
In comparison with the Indonesian communist hysteria pepped up by media, I could see a parodic parallelism here of a little journalistic tweaking by glossing-over otherwise mundane activities of cattle-rustling, petty extortion or bullying of Abu Sayaf and catapulting this rather ragtag village bandits into overnight sensation by profiling and projecting it as dreary and monstrous ‘global islamist terrorists’ that seriously rocked the psychic boat and religious serenity of the dominantly catholic Philippines.
To tell news and stories profiling communists and aliran sasat who were beheld as anathema to religion [i.e. especially Islam] then, and to claim that this campaign was with the noble aim of establishing order, effectively perpetuated a myth disguised as a ‘cleaning-up’ or ‘purification’ (a.k.a tata tantrem or ‘everything orderly’) drive at retelling Indonesian religious history, and here, journalism and literature (i.e. as were films such as Arifin C. Noer’s Pengkhianatan G30s/PKI and similar literary and artistic works that popularized the New Order version of the killings and were routinely viewed and read by school children and civil servants for the entire duration of Soeharto administration) effectively serviced and played a complimentary role not too unlike a dwifungsi [i.e. in reverse civilian role of military] to the military and civil authorities in the bio-politics of surveillance and controlling functions of governmentality. Where the military and government authorities had been widely deploying its best efforts to control and manage through physical [i.e. bodily] and geographic marshalling i.e. through the imposition of Martial law and repressive rules such as curfew hours, warrantless arrests and detentions, torture with interrogations and summary execution; the sensationalized coverages by media were successfully complimenting it by effectively marshalling the society’s psychic selves through feeding them with the ‘right’ information and opinion ‘properly’ tempered [i.e. and peppered] to elicit the desired reaction of subservience, submission to and support of authority; and hence suitably preparing the stage for the ushering of the New Order era that was soon followed.
---
Readings:
Robert Cribb. 1990. The Indonesian Killings of 1965-1966. Introduction. Pp.1-44 (Monash Paper on Southeast Asia no.21 Center of Southeast Asian Studies)
Maskun Iskandar and Jopie Lasut in R. Cribb (1990) The Purwodadi Affair: Two Accounts., p.195-226.
Keith Foulcher in Cribb (1990) Making history:recent Indonesian Literature and the events of 1965. pp.101-120
Direct and detailed accounts of the Indonesian mass killings of 1965-1966 have been little reported not until 1969 when the silence was supposed to have been broken with the three-week long running news of the renewed extensive killing in the Purwodadi area in Central Java which Jakarta broadsheets, HarianKMI, Indonesia Raya and Sinar Harapan variously headlined and featured in stories about abduction, illegal detentions, torture and interrogations and summary execution and exhumation of mass graves of the alleged PKI ‘middle sector’, the religious and intellectuals. What made the stories most grippingly intriguing and exciting were the muddled up versions of its almost Rashomon-like quality of combining rumors, superstition, and employment of modern-fiction techniques of intrigue, scandal, cliff-hangers and inverse or counter-stream surprise endings that kept such questions hanging as ‘did the PKI do it?’, ‘where the police, local authorities and political Parties infiltrated by PKI?’, ‘where the churches and mosques all the while in collusion with PKI?’, etcetera.
Reading and listening to stories that must have gone through various processes of distillation and distortions in its many retelling and rehashing and only after three years have passed, must lend not only incredulity but highly glossed it over with the evanescence of a myth and so much bloated with sensationalized air that one could only attribute to a work of fiction but it nonetheless lessened the sale-ability of the stories to an audience hungry not for truth but for a justification of an inhuman act. Accounts and retold tales of the killings would therefore hardly elicit the desired sympathy and passion for the victims that would have accompanied ethics of care and ethics of justice that the immediacy of a fresh and real documentary news or information would have affected audience and receptors. And media must have known it and used it to its utmost advantage, where in fact by ‘doing its mission’ it was actually circumventing such ethics and instead aiming for other purposes namely legitimizing a state discourse. The journalistic accounts of Indonesian killings and scholarly reports that included supposed academic researches compiled by non-partisam UGM field researchers that Cribb described as assuming a ‘victor’s account’, while generally towing the official line of the New Order, did not actually add anything of value or served the interest of supposed demand for ‘truth’ and pursuit of ‘justice’. If at all, it just reinforced the rumors spread by the officials and military and fortified their justification of the mass slaughter of at least a million of its population to purge society with the most dreadful infection of communism and its evil ideology.
The news paper reports or creative non-ficition accounts, however vigilantly meticulous and thoroughly investigative an effort they might have claimed in the production and reproduction of stories, only succeeded in reinforcing and affirming the already smoothly rolling well-oiled information and education machinery of the post-Sokarno and anti-communist regime that the Indonesian killings was a justified ‘war against terror’. This is what McLuhan in 1970s would later refer to in mass media theory as “the medium is the message”. And wittingly or unwittingly media has been complicit in Soharto’s psychological war and, whether it likes or admits it or not, had its hands bloodied as well.
Reporting stories such as those that impacts on the religious sentiments is indeed hard-hitting the core of human pathos: anger, fear, hatred, although audience were hardly critical and did not fight back or talk back as a matter of reaction to these stories, neither were willing to leave it alone; to the contrary, audience were most likely to be hooked to it.
In a lot of sense, religious sentiment might very well be one of the most sensitive and security-threatening of all human psychic concerns for it touches not only the physical aspect of human core of being but endangers the confidence and stability of the perceived divine order, of pure and sancrosanct heavenly and metaphysical realm- the final rest and highest sanctum of human existence – polluting it with evil and ungodly ideology such as communism would be putting human psychical future in line and rendering at risk of annihilation of our eternal existence, which to many is more important than the physical one. Media and news sensationalism then, when hitting on at this very weakest link in human cognition, have stumbled upon a journalistic mine-field. This is why George Bush’s rhetoric of war against terror when framed within the discourse of religious war or clash of civilization easily catches fire on media and explodes up in the world’s imaginations more than sex and scandals ever did.
In comparison with the Indonesian communist hysteria pepped up by media, I could see a parodic parallelism here of a little journalistic tweaking by glossing-over otherwise mundane activities of cattle-rustling, petty extortion or bullying of Abu Sayaf and catapulting this rather ragtag village bandits into overnight sensation by profiling and projecting it as dreary and monstrous ‘global islamist terrorists’ that seriously rocked the psychic boat and religious serenity of the dominantly catholic Philippines.
To tell news and stories profiling communists and aliran sasat who were beheld as anathema to religion [i.e. especially Islam] then, and to claim that this campaign was with the noble aim of establishing order, effectively perpetuated a myth disguised as a ‘cleaning-up’ or ‘purification’ (a.k.a tata tantrem or ‘everything orderly’) drive at retelling Indonesian religious history, and here, journalism and literature (i.e. as were films such as Arifin C. Noer’s Pengkhianatan G30s/PKI and similar literary and artistic works that popularized the New Order version of the killings and were routinely viewed and read by school children and civil servants for the entire duration of Soeharto administration) effectively serviced and played a complimentary role not too unlike a dwifungsi [i.e. in reverse civilian role of military] to the military and civil authorities in the bio-politics of surveillance and controlling functions of governmentality. Where the military and government authorities had been widely deploying its best efforts to control and manage through physical [i.e. bodily] and geographic marshalling i.e. through the imposition of Martial law and repressive rules such as curfew hours, warrantless arrests and detentions, torture with interrogations and summary execution; the sensationalized coverages by media were successfully complimenting it by effectively marshalling the society’s psychic selves through feeding them with the ‘right’ information and opinion ‘properly’ tempered [i.e. and peppered] to elicit the desired reaction of subservience, submission to and support of authority; and hence suitably preparing the stage for the ushering of the New Order era that was soon followed.
---
Readings:
Robert Cribb. 1990. The Indonesian Killings of 1965-1966. Introduction. Pp.1-44 (Monash Paper on Southeast Asia no.21 Center of Southeast Asian Studies)
Maskun Iskandar and Jopie Lasut in R. Cribb (1990) The Purwodadi Affair: Two Accounts., p.195-226.
Keith Foulcher in Cribb (1990) Making history:recent Indonesian Literature and the events of 1965. pp.101-120
The Dullness of the Sixties: Reading Religion, State, and Politics relation in Indonesia
By Roma Ulinnuha
The midst of the sixties in Indonesian situation is one of the significant moments which represented the Indonesian complexities of religion, society and politics. The mass killings, such as depicted by Robert Cribb, were manifest in many areas, while Robert Hefner sees the issues of aliran politics (p.222). As the president of the republic of Indonesia, Soekarno has multifaceted thoughts which denote his strong intellectuals. The formulation of Nationalist, Religion and Communism, I think, is one of his intellectual thought in the course of the newly-born state. With various backgrounds—of Muslims various groups and ideologies, the nationalists groups, and the socialists type of ideology, Indonesia is the colorful facts of diversity, so Soekarno should be in between amongst those complex elements of nation. In the meantime, at the political view, Soekarno almost lost of political support from the public as well as the elite, for the guided democracy he offered.
After the 30 September riots, Soekarno stated that it was the corrupted ideas of the Communist party elite to execute the movement. As the result, the killings of the Communits Party members and the sympathies were the culmination of tension amongst the various groups. The groups were the religious aspects and the apparatus of the state. By all reasons what both parties did—the Communits and the anti-Communists—in the course of political engineering, we should clarify it. I think, it is not appropriate to any entities to deliver differences as a tool to legitimate the violence and oppression. If people in the name of religion, borrowed its notion to eradicate evil with the acts of violence, the notion should be revisited. History can inspire us with how to see religion in relation to the state, and the reality in the complex society.
In the coming Indonesian mindset, it is useful to start thinking on what should be done to develop the multicultural aspects of the people. The interaction of political, economy, and social aspects should view religion in a proportional standpoint. Indonesia is distinctive feature which promotes the divine manifestation in the heart of the every citizen, but at the same time it also serves for the openness of seeing the other paradigm and perspective with the best attitude we have.
Readings:
Robert Cribb, “The Indonesia Killings of 1965-66, (Clayton, Monash University, 1990);
Robert W. Hefner, The political-Economy of Mountain Java”, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990) Religion, the Fall of Sukarno, and the Elimination of Communism in Indonesia.
The midst of the sixties in Indonesian situation is one of the significant moments which represented the Indonesian complexities of religion, society and politics. The mass killings, such as depicted by Robert Cribb, were manifest in many areas, while Robert Hefner sees the issues of aliran politics (p.222). As the president of the republic of Indonesia, Soekarno has multifaceted thoughts which denote his strong intellectuals. The formulation of Nationalist, Religion and Communism, I think, is one of his intellectual thought in the course of the newly-born state. With various backgrounds—of Muslims various groups and ideologies, the nationalists groups, and the socialists type of ideology, Indonesia is the colorful facts of diversity, so Soekarno should be in between amongst those complex elements of nation. In the meantime, at the political view, Soekarno almost lost of political support from the public as well as the elite, for the guided democracy he offered.
After the 30 September riots, Soekarno stated that it was the corrupted ideas of the Communist party elite to execute the movement. As the result, the killings of the Communits Party members and the sympathies were the culmination of tension amongst the various groups. The groups were the religious aspects and the apparatus of the state. By all reasons what both parties did—the Communits and the anti-Communists—in the course of political engineering, we should clarify it. I think, it is not appropriate to any entities to deliver differences as a tool to legitimate the violence and oppression. If people in the name of religion, borrowed its notion to eradicate evil with the acts of violence, the notion should be revisited. History can inspire us with how to see religion in relation to the state, and the reality in the complex society.
In the coming Indonesian mindset, it is useful to start thinking on what should be done to develop the multicultural aspects of the people. The interaction of political, economy, and social aspects should view religion in a proportional standpoint. Indonesia is distinctive feature which promotes the divine manifestation in the heart of the every citizen, but at the same time it also serves for the openness of seeing the other paradigm and perspective with the best attitude we have.
Readings:
Robert Cribb, “The Indonesia Killings of 1965-66, (Clayton, Monash University, 1990);
Robert W. Hefner, The political-Economy of Mountain Java”, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990) Religion, the Fall of Sukarno, and the Elimination of Communism in Indonesia.
Violence as Aporia - Roy Allan B Tolentino
There is something altogether chilling in reading the accounts of the killings of 1965-66. Part of this discomfort comes from the candour with which these scholars admit the shortcomings of theory and critical analysis in understanding why these killings took place. Details such as the sequence of events, unreliable statistics, key figures and dates allow us a few footholds by which to approach this precipice, but eventually, we stand at the edge of the abyss in anxiety and puzzlement. As Robert Cribb puts it: “We look into the hearts of mass murderers and wonder whether we are in fact looking into those of our colleagues, our families, ourselves.” (Cribb 1990:15)
However, it is more discomfiting to realize that, perhaps to this day, some feel that the killings were justified; the extermination of the PKI appears to be an unfortunate but necessary bump in Indonesian history. The New Order government did a lot to distribute complicity in the killings and engender a sense of shame despite the aberrant character of this whole episode. This shame, combined with collective trauma, makes the banality of this episode even more stark. As Cribb notes, the killings were not borne of ideology, but something more base: “Ideological motives were there in the Indonesian case, of course, along with fear, revenge, adventure and so on but for the most part the perceived need to kill arose out of a sense of self-interest and self-defense, and was in no way dictated by a formal ideological world view.” (Cribb 1990:15)
While this is certainly not a formal ideology, it is still a mentality of the type described by Emmanuel Levinas. Diagnosing the human condition, Levinas sees that violence of this sort or of any other is made possible only by demonizing difference and proclaiming the sovereignty of the self. As Levinas says, “violence is to be found in any action in which one acts as if one were alone to act: as if the rest of the universe were there only to receive the action; violence is consequently also any action which we endure without at every point collaborating in it.” (Levinas 1990:6) The pattern of ego-logy on the level of the individual is repeated and exponentially magnified on the level of groups: what is different (in this case, communist) is to be subsumed and made the same, or destroyed and made of no consequence. Inasmuch as violence is an aporia for understanding, in that theorists have failed to explain satisfactorily how one descends into the wanton violence of mass killing, it is also an aporia for the perpetrator. In the words of Pascal: “'This is my place in the sun.' That is how the usurpation of the whole world began.” Indeed, the world is usurped in the demarcation between “us” and “them,” in which “us” is superior, infallible, the arbiter of “justice.” The violence that arises from such a distinction shrinks the world; there is no way out if the whole world revolves only around yourself and what you consider correct. Hannah Arendt’s words might well describe the killings of 1965: “The sad truth is that most evil is done by people who never make up their minds to be good or evil.” Unfortunately, as long as difference is used to justify division and discrimination, the aporia of violence will remain.
Cribb, Robert. “Introduction” in The Indonesian Killings of 1965-1966: Studies from Java and Bali. Ed. Robert Cribb. Victoria: CSEAS, Monash University Press, 1990.
Levinas, Emmanuel. “Ethics and Spirit” in Difficult Freedom: Essays in Judaism. Trans. Sean Hand. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1990.
However, it is more discomfiting to realize that, perhaps to this day, some feel that the killings were justified; the extermination of the PKI appears to be an unfortunate but necessary bump in Indonesian history. The New Order government did a lot to distribute complicity in the killings and engender a sense of shame despite the aberrant character of this whole episode. This shame, combined with collective trauma, makes the banality of this episode even more stark. As Cribb notes, the killings were not borne of ideology, but something more base: “Ideological motives were there in the Indonesian case, of course, along with fear, revenge, adventure and so on but for the most part the perceived need to kill arose out of a sense of self-interest and self-defense, and was in no way dictated by a formal ideological world view.” (Cribb 1990:15)
While this is certainly not a formal ideology, it is still a mentality of the type described by Emmanuel Levinas. Diagnosing the human condition, Levinas sees that violence of this sort or of any other is made possible only by demonizing difference and proclaiming the sovereignty of the self. As Levinas says, “violence is to be found in any action in which one acts as if one were alone to act: as if the rest of the universe were there only to receive the action; violence is consequently also any action which we endure without at every point collaborating in it.” (Levinas 1990:6) The pattern of ego-logy on the level of the individual is repeated and exponentially magnified on the level of groups: what is different (in this case, communist) is to be subsumed and made the same, or destroyed and made of no consequence. Inasmuch as violence is an aporia for understanding, in that theorists have failed to explain satisfactorily how one descends into the wanton violence of mass killing, it is also an aporia for the perpetrator. In the words of Pascal: “'This is my place in the sun.' That is how the usurpation of the whole world began.” Indeed, the world is usurped in the demarcation between “us” and “them,” in which “us” is superior, infallible, the arbiter of “justice.” The violence that arises from such a distinction shrinks the world; there is no way out if the whole world revolves only around yourself and what you consider correct. Hannah Arendt’s words might well describe the killings of 1965: “The sad truth is that most evil is done by people who never make up their minds to be good or evil.” Unfortunately, as long as difference is used to justify division and discrimination, the aporia of violence will remain.
Cribb, Robert. “Introduction” in The Indonesian Killings of 1965-1966: Studies from Java and Bali. Ed. Robert Cribb. Victoria: CSEAS, Monash University Press, 1990.
Levinas, Emmanuel. “Ethics and Spirit” in Difficult Freedom: Essays in Judaism. Trans. Sean Hand. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1990.
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